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ABSTRACT 
 
The development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been associated with its 
growing petroleum industry since late 1930s.  This development has created a 
sudden wealth in the country that shaped its labour market as well as its skill 
formation systems in the years after.  It has also, thanks to the government 
involvement, developed the country’s world class economy and its evolving private 
sector.  However, this involvement has also created a duel labour market in which 
Saudis expect employment in the government while expatriates are continuously 
employed in private organizations.  Employment in the government was always 
available to Saudis regardless of their qualifications which are dominated by 
theoretical literary majors over scientific and technical degrees.  In the early days of 
the country’s development this did not produce major concerns to the government 
nor to Saudis.    However, the country is producing one of the highest growth rates 
in the world with the majority of its citizens are under the age of 19.  Government 
employment is always limited as the majority of employment opportunities are 
available in the country’s private sector.  Since the late 1980s, this has generated 
high rates of unemployment among Saudis as government employment reached its 
peak and as the private sector continues in recruiting millions of cheap expatriates to 
increase its profits and competitiveness.  This is creating an unbalanced labour 
market structure as well as economic, political and social problems. 
 
A number of government initiatives have been introduced to rectify such dilemma.  
One of which is Saudization to replace the country’s 4.7 million of expatriates 
recruited mainly (95%) in the private sector with as many qualified Saudis as 
possible.  However, such efforts has not yet produced fruitful results as the private 
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sector is still recruiting expatriates and as skill formation systems are still producing 
Saudis with incompatible skills, knowledge and attitudes with the private labour 
market needs.  This research assumes that ineffective Saudization in the private 
sector is not the core problem of the employment process in Saudi Arabia.  In fact it 
is the outcome of the government’s heavy and unnecessary involvement and control 
over skill formation systems in the Kingdom especially over the General 
Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training (GOTEVT) which is 
the main skill formation provider for the private labour market  This involvement 
imposes the government’s rigid bureaucracy and limited funding on a very dynamic, 
flexible and self-sufficient economy like the private market in Saudi Arabia that is 
operating in a very competitive and changeable environment. 
 
Investigation of such argument against empirical findings from interviews with a 
number of government, quasigovernment and private sector managers supports such 
conclusion.  It even illustrates that government involvement and bureaucratization is 
hindering the implementation of Saudization strategy itself in private organizations.  
Recommendations are made about changing the role of GOTEVT to create industry-
led training organizations to serve and link the outcomes of this skill formation 
organization to the employment needs of the labour market and to the needs of the 
economy in general.         
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction  
 
The growing petroleum industry in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has developed 
Riyadh, the modern capital of Saudi Arabia, in less than five decades from a village of 
few dusty square miles into an urban centre of hundreds of square miles with a 
modern skyline at its centre and a population of over 4 million. This development also 
included the roads where at a time there were less than 80 miles of paved roads, but 
now there are thousands of miles connecting almost all Saudi cities. The Saudi 
modernization was the reason behind establishing thousands of hospitals, health 
centres, and dispensaries, hundreds of schools in all public education levels including 
a number of government and private universities, where once there were almost no 
medical or educational facilities.  The government laid railroad tracks and 
telecommunication lines and built one of the largest national airlines in the Middle 
East. Apartment buildings and multilevel modern concrete homes replaced the 
thatched roof houses that once were common. Present-day Saudi Arabia bears almost 
no resemblance to what it was even a decade ago; so rapid has been its assent from 
one of the world's most underdeveloped regions to one of the most modernized.   
 
The Modernization’s genesis in Saudi Arabia can be dated back to the discovery of 
the country’s massive oil resources in 1939 (Al-Jasser, 2002).  From that date onward 
the country has invested in developing its huge infrastructure projects as well as the 
development of its human capital through establishing its skill formation systems and 
health services.  Unfortunately, this young country was not prepared with available 
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qualified human resources to establish such massive projects generated from the 
sudden wealth and revenues of increasing oil prices.  Alternatively, in the 1970s, in 
particular, oil prices were so high that they influenced decisions makers in the 
government to import and recruit a large number of expatriates to assist the 
government and its new private sector in building the country’s infrastructure.  At the 
same time, the government was employing its nationals in government jobs with 
reasonable salaries (Al-Humaid, 2005).  More importantly, they are offered 
employment security for life and a promotion system based on employment longevity 
rather than performance.  They are, in addition, provided with flexible housing loans, 
free health care, and free education.   
 
On the other hand, the private sector continued and increased its recruitment of cheap 
expatriates in different industries.  At the same time, it evades recruiting Saudis who 
are viewed by managers of the sector to be costly to recruit, retain and develop.  They 
also consider them to be equipped with mismatched skills, knowledge and attitudes in 
comparison to the demands of the labour market.  They are qualified for only office 
and administrative jobs which represent the minority of the sector’s recruitment 
needs.  As a result, and until this date, foreign workers dominate jobs in the private 
labour market to perform technical and labouring jobs while Saudis are either seeking 
employment in administrative and office government jobs or being unemployed.   
 
The long-lasting employment practices and segregations in the labour market between 
government and private sector employment since the 1970s support Saudis’ 
preference for employment in the government sector.  It also encourages the private 
sector to continue in recruiting cheap expatriates to increase its profits and 
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competitiveness.  However, government employment has reached its peak as it is 
unable to create more employment opportunities to Saudis to cope with the country’s 
high population growth rates.  Therefore, the government is focusing on creating such 
opportunities in the rapidly developing private sector that is recruiting more than 4.7 
million expatriates by replacing expatriates with as many unemployed Saudis as 
possible.      
 
However, a major obstacle remains in the country’s efforts to replace expatriates with 
Saudis who are capable of demonstrating the professionalism or vocationalism of a 
Saudi working class.  The country’s skill formation systems are still ineffectual in 
responding to the private sector’s demands of technical and vocational skills, 
knowledge and attitudes.  In fact and historically speaking, incapability of such 
systems was at the core of the country’s dilemma of excessive expatriates’ 
recruitment which was initiated originally to bridge the country’s vacuum of qualified 
human resources.  However, the difference between now and then is that at that time 
the systems were underdeveloped like all services and facilities in the country.  
Whereas now, they are considered to be financially and managerially established yet 
only contributing by increasing the unemployment of Saudi graduates.  Their strategic 
directions and curriculum development are created and executed with less 
coordination and cooperation with the private sector.  The skill formation systems are 
dominated and influenced by government bureaucracies and practices that are 
hindering their responsiveness to the changing and increasing demands of the private 
labour market for an industry-focused technical and vocational training. 
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At the moment technical and vocational training and education is provided through 
private training institutes and a number of government ones.  However, the major 
technical and vocational training provider is the General Organisation for Technical 
Education and Vocational Training known as GOTEVT. It is a government agency 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Labour.  It provides commercial, agricultural 
and industrial vocational training and education to Saudi students.   
 
1.2 Research Assumptions  
 
The research has two overall assumptions.  First, the government's heavy involvement 
in controlling different aspects of skill formation systems is the core dilemma for their 
ineffective and slow responsiveness to the manpower needs and Saudization in the 
private labour market.  This involvement imposes the government’s rigid bureaucracy 
and limited funding on a very dynamic, flexible and self-sufficient economy like the 
private market in Saudi Arabia that is operating in a very competitive and changeable 
environment.  Second, it appears that GOTEVT is unable to produce graduates with 
the skills required by the private sector and unable to reduce unemployment among 
Saudis.  
    
1.3  Research General Objectives 
 
Although the main focus of this research is GOTEVT as the main government 
provider of the technical and vocational skills for the Saudi private sector, it looks at 
the totality of the country’s skill formation systems.  The former cannot be studied in 
isolation of the impact of the country’s overall umbrella of skill formation systems.  
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The focus in doing so, however, will be on the influence of the government’s 
involvement in such systems.  To accomplish this, the research also examines and 
analyzes Saudization as an important national employment strategy dominating and 
affecting at the same time affected by both government Human Resource 
Development (HRD) efforts as well as private sectors recruitment strategies.  The 
general objectives for this research include, first, exploring the missing link between 
Saudi technical and vocational training programs provided by GOTEVT and 
Saudization in the private sector; second, studying the factors behind some successful 
Saudization scenarios in some private sectors that have focused training 
centres/institutions; and third, investigating the possibilities and impact of changing 
the role of a government training institution i.e. GOTEVT to an industry-led training 
organizations as the prerequisite to the Saudization of the human resources in the 
private sector.    
 
1.4  Research Specific Objectives 
      
Therefore and to fulfil the research’s general objectives, the study is expected to 
answer, in addition to others, the following questions: 
 
• What are the consequences of government involvement in controlling skill 
formation systems and institutions?   
• What are the obstacles in implementing Saudization strategy as seen by 
government agencies (Ministry of Labour, GOTEVT, and the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries)? 
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• What are the obstacles in implementing Saudization strategy as seen by the private 
sector? 
• What are the factors that led to high rates of Saudization in some private sectors 
(Banking, Saudi Telecommunication, etc.)? 
• What are the reactions to changing the role of GOTEVT by both GOTEVT’s top 
management and the private sector? 
 
1.5 Research Layout 
 
This research is presented in eight chapters.  The second chapter provides essential 
profile about Saudi Arabia that enables the reader to comprehend the interrelated 
issues that will be discussed subsequently in the rest of this thesis.  That includes a 
historical, demographical, political and economical overview of the Kingdom.  The 
latter, in particular, includes essential information about the Saudi labour market as it 
will be one of the pillars of this research.  The other pillar for this research is the 
country’s HRD systems which are the focus of chapter three.  This chapter provides 
the reader with an overall profile of such systems’ development, structure, and 
strategic objectives in relation to the needs of the labour market.  The third chapter 
also examines the dilemma encountering linking HRD efforts to employment of 
nationals in Saudi private organizations. 
 
Chapter four examines relevant literature to establish the research’s theoretical 
background which is the backbone of this study.  This chapter starts by briefly 
looking into the distinction between training and education.  This includes looking 
into the Human Capital Theory to explore the linkages between education and training 
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systems and economic performance with an emphasis on the Saudi context.  The 
chapter, finally, examines the relevance of some of the findings of Hendry’s (1991) 
HRD model to the Saudi labour market.  This assists in understanding the factors that 
drive or inhibit private sector firms to invest in training and to encourage them to train 
on a continuing basis. 
 
The fifth chapter introduces the research methodology, data sampling and collection 
technique, and data reporting and analysis procedures.  To achieve this research’s 
objectives, the study implements the qualitative approach.  Its exploratory nature can 
only be fulfilled through an inductive approach focusing on investigating the core 
objectives of this research. 
 
Selected senior operational and HR managers participated in this study from 
government, quasi-government and private sector firms.  The selection criterion of the 
government organizations is based on their immediate involvement with employment, 
Saudization supervision and HRD of Saudis.  On the other hand, a number of large 
quasi-government organizations are also included due to their successful 
implementation of Saudization.  Similarly, different private sector organizations from 
different industries such as banking, retail, automobile, services, leisure and food are 
chosen in accordance to their achievements in linking their training programs with 
their Saudization efforts.  In addition, the selected sample also includes a number of 
managers from private training organizations investing in the HRD industry that are 
well recognized for their training achievements for Saudi human capital development. 
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Answering the core questions of this research are the criterion for choosing the most 
appropriate qualitative approach for this study.  To fulfil this criterion and establish 
the fit between the research questions and the research approach, structured face-to-
face interviews with a set of pre-determined open-ended questions to the selected top 
and HR managers are implemented.  This technique also supports the study’s search 
for in-depth and sensitive information about the realities and rhetorics of training and 
Saudization in the Saudi private sector context.  Moreover, it is essential to prevent 
any possibility of misunderstanding of research questions that are asked as the 
interviewer can either repeat or explain such questions on the spot.  Finally, face-to-
face interview technique in this research allows interviewees to freely criticize 
government bodies such as GOTEVT and the Ministry of Labour which might not be 
achievable using other techniques like focus groups or surveys. 
 
The chapter finally introduces the reporting and analysis techniques that are 
implemented in chapters six and seven of this thesis.  It employs a technique called 
‘the Ad Hoc Meaning Generation’ suggested by Kvale (1996).  This technique 
generates general themes from the conducted interviews which are discussed in 
chapter seven.  Finally, the chapter concludes by describing the experience that the 
researcher encountered during the process of primary data collection.  Such 
experience is essential to highlight the degree of difficulty to conduct similar research 
in Saudi Arabia.  In such a society, people are still reluctant to criticize government 
agencies especially if they are employed in government or quasigovernment 
organizations.  These findings are believed to be important and should be investigated 
in further academic research as it is beyond the scope of the current research.  The 
sixth chapter reports the findings of the face-to-face interviews conducted with 
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selected managers in Saudi Arabia.  It reports the findings that evolve in five general 
themes according to the responses of the interviewees.  These themes are  
 
Theme 1: The challenges confronting the Saudization program in the private sector. 
Theme 2: The factors assisting the Saudization program in some private sector 
organizations.  
Theme 3: The factors influencing training investment decisions in Saudi employees 
in private organizations. 
Theme 4: Evaluation of GOTEVT’s current role and its graduates’ skills level in 
regard to the private sector manpower needs. 
Theme 5: Evaluation of the proposed changes of the role of GOTEVT toward 
industry-led training organizations to fulfil immediate needs of the Saudi 
labour market for employable Saudis. 
   
Under each theme the interviewees’ responses are reported and grouped according to 
their source.  They include interviews with government managers, interviews with 
quasigovernment managers, and interviews with private managers.     
 
Chapter seven of this thesis discusses the findings reported in chapter six.  The 
analysis will be through discussions around direct quotations from interviewees 
(Kvale, 1996).  This discussion will evolve around the central themes mentioned 
earlier excluding the fifth theme that will be discussed in the final chapter.  The 
researcher will establish this discussion from interviewees’ concepts by connecting 
their dialogues about each of the central themes using one or more of the tactics 
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suggested by Kvale’s ‘Ad Hoc Meaning Generation’.  These tactics range from 
descriptive to explanatory and from concrete to more conceptual and abstract. 
 
The final chapter of this thesis, chapter eight, presents the conclusion.  It will also 
provide some practical recommendations for policy makers in the country.  It 
suggests, based on empirical evidence obtained from the labour market, practical 
proposition to improve GOTEVT’s performance and the Saudization in the country.  
This approach enhances the merit of the current research as it is extending beyond 
merely investigating a phenomenon affecting the Saudi private labour market to 
introducing a practical solution.  Such a solution, we believe if introduced, will 
challenge the persistent paradigm of the government dominance over skill formation 
systems in a country like Saudi Arabia that is suffering from increasing 
unemployment for its citizens.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 SAUDI PROFILE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the essential profile on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that will 
enable the reader to understand the context within which the rest of this thesis falls.  
At first, the chapter will start with an overview of the country’s location and a 
snapshot on its history.  Then the reader will be introduced to its political system with 
an overview of its legal system and a look at the country’s population.  Then the 
chapter will look at Saudi economic environment to provide a profile on its main 
economic sectors and the Saudi Development Plans.  From there, the chapter will 
focus on studying the Saudi economy in depth by looking at its economic strategies 
and the important role the private sector plays in this economy.  Lastly, we will 
examine in brief the Saudi labour market, its different labour classifications, the 
employment of women, the level of unemployment and some futuristic figures of 
Saudi labour market in the year 2020.           
 
2.2 Overview of the Country Profile 
2.2.1  Location and History Overview 
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is located at the furthermost part of south-western 
Asia.  It shares its borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait from the north, with the 
Arabian Gulf, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates from the East, with the 
Sultanate of Oman and the Yemen Republic from the South, and with the Red Sea 
from the West.  The Kingdom occupies nearly four-fifths of the Arabian Peninsula 
with a total area of over 2,250,000 square kilometres (Ministry of Planning, 2002). 
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Historically, this Peninsula was the birthplace of Islam, which in the century 
following Prophet Muhammad's death in 632 A.D. spread west to Spain and east to 
India.  Islam as a monotheistic religion has Saudi Arabia as its heartland which has 
the site of the two holy mosques in Makkah and Madinah and the focus of Islamic 
devotion and prayer of all Muslims around the world. Muslims believe in God -Allah- 
and that Muhammad is His Prophet. Today, the worldwide communities of Muslims 
are from many races and cultures and are well over one billion people.  
 
Islam has profoundly affected the history and development of the Arabian Peninsula 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular.   During the seventh and eighth 
centuries, Islam neutralized and unified conflicting loyalties and interests of not only 
Arabs in the peninsula but also Muslims from central Asia to Atlantic Ocean (Al-
Farsy, 1986).  Muslims ruled their vast empire implementing the Holy Qur'an as their 
constitution and the Shari'ah (Islamic law) as their basis of the legal system.  So Islam 
guided not only the lives of the people, but also the policies and functions of their 
government. 
 
The Saudi state, our main focus, began from Ad-Dir’iyah in central Arabian Peninsula 
in about 1744. A local ruler, Muhammad bin Saud, joined forces with an Islamic 
reformer, Muhammad bin Abdal-Wahhab, to create a new political entity. Together 
they conducted an agreement to get “the Arab of the peninsula back to the true faith of 
the Islamic religion” (Al-Farsy, 1986:40).  Over the next 150 years, the fortunes of 
bin Saud family rose and fell several times as Saudi rulers contended with Egypt, the 
Ottoman Empire, and other Arabian tribes for control on the peninsula. The modern 
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Saudi state was founded by the late King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud. In 1902, Abdul Aziz 
recaptured Riyadh, the Al-Saud dynasty's ancestral capital, from the rival Al-Risheed 
family. Continuing his conquests, Abdul Aziz subdued Al-Hasa in the east, the rest of 
Nejd in the heart of Saudi Arabia, and the Hijaz in the south between 1913 and 1926. 
In 1932, these regions were unified as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
 
2.2.2  Political Profile  
 
The central institution of Saudi Arabian Government is the monarchy. The Basic Law 
adopted in 1992 declared that Saudi Arabia is a monarchy ruled by the sons and 
grandsons of King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud and that the Holy Qur'an is the constitution of 
the country, which is governed on the basis of Islamic law (Shari’ah).  Since 1953, the 
Council of Ministers, appointed by and responsible to the king, has the responsibilities 
of formulating and overseeing the implementation of internal, external, financial, 
economic, educational and defence policies, and general affairs of state (Al-Farsy, 
1986). This council consists of a prime minister, the first and second deputy prime 
ministers, 27 ministers (of whom the minister of defence who is also the second 
deputy prime minister), five ministers of state, and a small number of advisers and 
heads of major autonomous organizations. 
 
Continuing the reform process in the Kingdom, in 1992, King Fahd issued a royal 
decree for the establishment of a national Consultative Council, or Majlis Al-Shoura 
with appointed members having advisory powers to review and give advice on issues 
of public interest.  In July 1997, the membership of the Consultative Council was 
expanded from 60 to 90 members, and again in May 2001 from 90 to 120 members. 
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Membership has changed significantly during expansions of the council as many 
members have not been reappointed. The role of the council is gradually expanding as 
it gains experience.  Members of the Council are able to initiate proposal for new 
legislations and review the domestic and foreign policies of the government. Any 
government action not approved by the Council will have to be referred back to the 
King who remains the final arbiter of state affairs. The King also retains the power to 
appoint and dismiss both Ministers and Al-Shoura Council members and has the 
power to dissolve the Council, restructure it, and appoint a new one at any time. 
 
Legislation in the Kingdom which must be compatible with the Shari’ah law, after 
being reviewed by Majlis Al-Shoura, is established by the Council of Ministers and 
ratified by royal decrees. Justice in the country is administered by a system of 
religious courts starting with expeditious courts and moving up the hierarchal system 
to the Shari’ah courts to reach the Commission on Judicial Supervision (Al-Farsy, 
1986).  Judges in this system are appointed by the king on the recommendation of the 
Supreme Judicial Council. The independence of the judiciary is protected by law. The 
king acts as the highest court of appeal and has the power to pardon.  
 
For administrative purposes, the kingdom is divided into the following 13 regions 
governed by a Regional Governor appointed by the King with the rank of Minister 
who is responsible to the Minister of the Interior. These regions are: 
 
• Riyadh  
• Makkah  
• Madinah  
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• Qasim  
• Eastern  
• Asir  
• Tabouk  
• Hail  
• Northern Border  
• Jizan  
• Najran  
• Al-Baha  
• Al-Jouf  
 
2.2.3  Population 
  
According to the 2000 Demographic Survey conducted by the Central Department of 
Statistics, Saudi Arabia has a population of 20,846,884.  Saudi citizens were 
15,588,508 while non-Saudi residents (including their families) were 5,258,079 which 
represented 74.8% and 25.2% respectively.  Of the Saudi national population, 50.04% 
(7,800,051) were male citizens while 49.96% (7,788,754) were female (Ministry of 
Planning, 2002).    These population figures increased according to the 2004 General 
Population Census by the Central Department of Statistics to 22,678,262 (Ministry of 
Planning, 2004).  Saudi citizens represented 72.9% of the total population reaching 
16,527,340 while expatriates increased to 6,150,922 representing 27.1%.  It was 
estimated that more than half (56.4%) of the Saudi population was under the age of 19 
years-old (Figure 2.1) with a rapid population growth of 3.8% (World Bank, 2002).  
Latest figures by The World Fact Book estimated that Saudi population reached 
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28,146,656 by July, 2008.  The population youthfulness of the country accompanied 
by its high rapid growth will influence the Saudi labour forces’ supply and demand 
for jobs as we will discuss in this and in coming chapters.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Saudi population distributed by age group 
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Age Group (years)  Population Age Group (years) Population 
less than 1 417953 45 to 49 590851 
1 to 4 1702582 50 to 54 421581 
5 to 9 2239835 55 to 59 299273 
10 to 14 2237612 60 to 64 260984 
15 to 19 1887689 65 to 69 204458 
20 to 24 1546656 70 to 74 162175 
25 to 29 1426739 75 to 79 87227 
30 to 34 1144278 80 to 84 55433 
35 to 39 990713 85 and more 66430 
40 to 44 784871   
Total Saudi Population  16527340 
 
Source: The 2004 Population and Housing Census.  Ministry of Planning (2004:47). 
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2.3.  The Economic Context  
2.3.1  Introduction  
 
The Saudi economy has witnessed a considerable transformation in economic, social 
and urban aspects of life over the past three decades (1970-2000).  This 
transformation was brought about by extensive government planning and investment 
within the framework of five-year development plans to lay down the social and 
physical infrastructure of the country. This included the construction of massive road 
networks, bridges, dams, airports, seaports and marine terminals, electricity, 
desalination plants and communication systems. Substantial funds were also spent on 
education, health and vocational training programs as well as on projects involving 
the building of schools, colleges, universities, and general and specialized hospitals 
for the civilian and military sectors. In the industrial sector, huge funds were invested 
in establishing industrial estates in major cities, including the two advanced industrial 
cities of Jubail and Yanbu. These were designed to accommodate heavy industries 
such as the basic petrochemical projects, the iron and steel plants and the giant oil 
refineries set-up by the government in partnership with international corporations and 
the Saudi private sector. An extensive pipeline network crossing the Kingdom's 
Eastern, Central and Western regions has been constructed to transfer crude oil and 
gas to the oil refineries and petrochemical plants in Jubail and Yanbu as well as to the 
marine terminals in the two industrial cities for exporting oil and gas products 
overseas. 
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2.3.2  Saudi Main Economic Sectors 
 
According to the Ministry of Planning these sectors are divided and grouped 
depending on their activities as follow: 
 
A. Crude Oil and Natural Gas 
B. Non-Oil Sectors 
a. Producing Sectors 
i. Agriculture (including fishing and forestry) 
ii. Non-Oil Mining and quarrying 
iii. Industry 
1. Oil refining 
2. Petrochemicals  
3. Other Manufacturing 
iv. Electricity, Gas and Water 
v. Construction 
b. Service Sectors 
i. Non-Government Services  
1. Trade (Wholesale and Retail Trade) 
2. Transport , Storage and  Telecommunications 
3. Finance and Real-Estate Services 
a. Real-Estate Services 
b. Banking, Finance and Business Services 
4. Community and Personal Services  
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ii. Government Services (administration, defence and other 
government services) 
 
2.3.3  The Saudi Development Plans  
 
Through five-year Development Plans covering the period from 1970 to 2009, Saudi 
government has sought to allocate its petroleum income to transform its relatively 
undeveloped, oil-based economy into that of a modern industrial and diversified 
economy while maintaining the kingdom's traditional Islamic values and customs. 
The seven development plans represent the government investments in developing the 
infrastructure, human resources, social and health services, along with investments in 
other economic development projects (Ministry of Planning, 2001).  Although 
economic planners have not achieved all their goals, the economy has progressed 
rapidly. Oil wealth has increased the standard of living of most Saudis. However, 
significant population growth has strained the government's ability to finance further 
improvements in the country's standard of living. Heavy dependence on petroleum 
revenue continues, but industry and agriculture now account for a larger share of 
economic activity.  The mismatch between the job skills of Saudi graduates and the 
needs of the private job market at all levels remains the principal obstacle to economic 
diversification and development which will be discussed in greater details in the 
coming chapters of this thesis (Nufaiee, 1993; Ghaban et al, 2002) 
 
Saudi Arabia's first two Development Plans, covering the period from 1970 to 1979, 
emphasized developing the infrastructure. For this purpose the government has 
invested 41.4% and 49.3% respectively of its expenditure (Ministry of Planning, 
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2001).  As indicated in Table (2.1) the focus during the Third Development Plan, 
covering the period from 1980 to 1984 continued to be for establishing the country's 
basic infrastructure.  Simultaneously, expenditure rose markedly on education, health 
and social services and other economic development projects.  The latter in particular 
has received 30.7% of total government expenditure at this plan (Ministry of 
Planning, 2001).  In the Fourth Development Plan from 1985 till 1989, the focus was 
on developing the country's human resources which received 33% of the total 
expenditures.  During this plan period private enterprise were encouraged and foreign 
investment in the form of joint ventures with Saudi public and private companies was 
welcomed.  The private sector became more important, rising to 73.8% of non-oil 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1988.  The objective was for the private sector to 
have 70 to 80% ownership in most joint venture enterprises (Ministry of Planning, 
2001).  
 
The Fifth Development Plan, from 1990 till 1994, emphasized consolidation of the 
country's defences at the same time continued prioritizing HRD by allocating it with 
48% of its expenditure.  The plan also focused on improving the government’s social 
and health services and, most importantly, creating greater private-sector employment 
opportunities for Saudis by reducing the number of non-Saudi workers (Ministry of 
Planning, 2001).  The Sixth Development Plan started from 1995 till 1999.  It focused 
also on lowering the cost of government services and sought expanding educational 
training programs and the Saudization efforts. The Plan called for reducing the 
kingdom's dependence on the petroleum sector by diversifying the country's economy 
through encouraging the involvement of the private sector. It emphasized also 
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practical steps toward privatizing state owned enterprises providing 
telecommunications services (Ministry of Planning, 2000).   
 
The Seventh Development Plan from 2000 to 2004 continued on promoting economic 
diversification.  During this Plan the government aimed at an average GDP growth 
rate of 3.16% each year, with projected growths of 5.04% for the private sector and 
4.01% for the non-oil sector. The government also has set a target of creating 415,200 
new jobs for Saudis (Ministry of Planning, 2000).  Finally, The Eighth Development 
Plan covering the period from 2005 till 2009 assigns top priority to raising the 
citizens' standards of living and eradicating poverty.  It also aims to achieve balanced 
development throughout all regions of the Kingdom and reduce the development gap 
between them.  The Plan's general policies attain to the macro and structural 
imbalances of the labour market in terms of dependence on foreign labour and the 
unemployment among new Saudi graduates.  It will also focus on accelerating the 
growth rates in the private sectors to ensure diversification of the economic base.  
Similarly, the Plan continues tackle the challenges that hamper or slow down the 
process of developing the existing domestic and foreign investment climate.  In this 
respect, The Eighth Plan focuses on key challenges relating to institutional and 
administrative reforms.  It also devotes great attention to the promotion of science and 
technology system as well as the support to scientific research towards promoting a 
knowledge-based economy.  Finally, the Eighth Plan focuses on minimizing the 
adverse impact of social and cultural aspects of globalization as the Kingdom joins 
the WTO (Ministry of Planning, 2005).   
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Table 2.1 
 
Government Expenditures in SR Billion by Development Agencies 
During the Eight Development Plans 
 (1970-2009) 
 
  
  1st plan 2nd Plan 3rd Plan 4th Plan 5th Plan 6th Plan 7th Plan 8th Plan* 
  SR % SR % SR % SR % SR % SR % SR % SR % 
ECONOMIC 
RESOURCES 
Development 
9.5 27.7 97.3 28 192.2 30.7 71.2 20.4 34.1 10 41.6 10 41.7 8.5 71.0 11.5 
Human 
Resources 
Development 
7.0 20.6 51 14.7 115.0 18.4 115.1 33 164.6 48 222.2 53.8 276.9 56.7 347.6 56.6 
Social & 
Health 
Development 
3.5 10.3 27.6 8 61.2 09.8 61.9 17.7 68 20 74.2 18 95.8 19.6 116.5 19.0 
Infrastructure 
Development 14.1 41.4 171.3 49.3 256.8 41.1 100.7 28.9 74.2 22 75 18.2 73.8 15.2 79.5 12.9 
Total 34.1 100 347.2 100 625.2 100 348.9 100 340.9 100 
 
413 
 
100 
 
488.2 
 
100 
 
614.6 
 
100 
 
Source: The Seventh Development Plan, 2000:40 & 158, Ministry Planning. 
* The Eighth Development Plan, 2005:104, Ministry of Planning. 
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2.3.4  Overview of the Saudi Economy 
 
For the last three decades, Saudi Arabia was committed to establish a strong and 
growing economy.  This is vivid in its development efforts to bring about remarkable 
changes in the structure of the Saudi economy.  These changes included increasing the 
non-oil producing sectors’ contribution to GDP; expanding the private sector’s 
activities and participation in building the economy through the privatization 
program; establishing an efficiently functioning financial system; and preparing an 
adequate investment climate to firstly, enable the Saudi economy to integrate with the 
world economy, and to secondly attract foreign investments to the country.  These 
changes stimulated the Saudi economy to achieve 3.2% average annual growth rate of 
the GDP during the period 1970 - 2000.  During the same period, the oil sector 
registered an average annual growth rate of about 3.1%.  Its average share in total 
GDP, however, declined to between 30.3 and 32.9% during the Sixth Development 
Plan against 46.3 and 57.2% in the First Development Plan. This fall signified an 
expansion in non-oil activity and further diversification of the economy.  Non-oil 
GDP recorded a higher average annual growth rate of 5.2%.  Its average share in total 
GDP has gone up from around 41.5% during the First Plan to around 67.6% during 
the Sixth Plan.  Simultaneously, the private sector registered an average annual 
growth rate of about 6%, and its average share in non-oil GDP has risen to about 74% 
while the average share of the government sector was close to 27%.  Therefore, the 
average Saudi per capita income has grown six and a half-fold over this period from 
about SR. 3,750 to about SR 24,150.  The size of the Saudi labour force was estimated 
to have risen from 1.2 million in 1969 to 3.2 million in 1999, increasing by an average 
annual rate of about 3.3%.  The number of expatriate manpower was estimated to 
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have risen from 0.5 million in 1975 to about 4.0 million in 1999, representing about 
55.8% of the total labour force (Ministry of Planning, 2001).   
 
During its development, the Kingdom’s economy growth and steadiness was tested by 
many international incidents.  For example, in the mid-1980s, there was a worldwide 
oil glut resulting from higher oil prices that led to development of more oil fields 
around the world and reduced global consumption.  Saudi oil production, which had 
increased to 9.5 million barrels per day during 1979, dropped to 3.2 million barrels 
per day in 1985 (Ministry of Planning, 2001).  With this heavy drop the government 
revenues dropped as well from SR. 368 billion in 1981 to SR. 104 billion in 1987 (Al-
Jasser, 2002). 
 
In late 1997, Saudi Arabia again faced the challenge of low oil prices. Due to a 
combination of factors--the East Asian economic crises, a warm winter in the West 
caused by El Nino, and an increase in non-OPEC oil production--demand for oil 
production was pulled down from 8.3 million barrels per day in 1992 to 7.56 million 
barrels per day (Ministry of Planning, 2001).  The performance of the Saudi economy 
was also affected by the global economic slowdown especially in industrial countries, 
during 2001, which curtailed demand for oil and, in turn, reduced its prices by 14%. 
The average price of the Arabian Light crude went down from $26.8 a barrel in 2000 
to $23.1 a barrel in 2001 (SAMA, 2003).   
 
Although oil prices and production went down in 2001, the Saudi economy witnessed 
notable positive developments. These included the growth of non-oil private sector, 
more efficient performance of the banking sector in conformity with international 
 25 
standards and continued structural and regulatory reforms and an enhanced 
privatization program.  The Saudi economy continued to make notable progress 
during 2002. The GDP maintained its uptrend recording a growth rate of 2.8% to SR 
698.5 billion in 2002. The non-oil sector GDP grew by 3.1% to SR 436.7 billion, 
constituting 62.5% of GDP. The non-oil private sector GDP went up by 4.0% to SR 
286.1 billion while that of the government sector rose by 1.4% to SR 150.6 billion. 
The oil sector GDP increased by 2.5% in 2002 compared to a decrease of 11.6% in 
2001 (Ministry of Planning, 2002). 
 
The latest SAMA 44th Annual Report indicated that GDP recorded a growth rate of 
7.1% to SR. 1,430.5 billion in 2007. The non-oil sector GDP grew by 4.5% to SR. 
840.4 billion, constituting 45.6% of total GDP. The non-oil private sector GDP went 
up by 8.0% to SR. 403.8 billion and that of the government sector by 4.2% to SR. 
228.9 billion. The oil sector GDP grew by 8.0% to SR. 778.4 billion, constituting 
54.4% of GDP at current prices (SAMA, 2008). 
 
2.3.5  Economic Strategies 
 
Oil prices, as mentioned earlier, are anything but stable, and the average price of a 
barrel of Saudi light crude oil went from $18.80 in 1997 to $12.24 in 1998, only to 
rise to $17.40 in 1999, $26.81 in 2000, $24.70 in 2001 and reached $130 by June, 
2008 (OPEC, 2008).  The broader economic impact of these changes illustrated the 
fact the Saudi per capita income fell from SR 27,423 in 1997 to SR 23,155 in 1998, 
reached SR 29,330 in 2000 (Bourland, 2001) and increased to SR. 74,250 in 2007 
according to the World Fact Book.  
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This dilemma of oil price fluctuation escorted by the country’s rapid population 
growth rates and the economy dependency on government expenditure, and stressed 
the Kingdom’s need for a reform program.  This program which included educational, 
political and economic reforms was to promote the country’s economy and broader 
civic and political participation of Saudi citizens.  According to Bourland (2002), it 
resulted in, for example, privatizing the Saudi Telecommunications Company in 
1998, establishing the Supreme Economic Council (SEC) in 1999 and opening the 
stock market to foreign investment in mutual funds in 1999.  The reform program also 
produced the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Mineral Affairs responsible of oil 
and Gas related policies in 2000.  In the same year, the government passed the 
Foreign Investment Law and created the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA).  It also approved of the Real Estate Law allowing non-Saudis to own real 
estate, except in the two holly cities of Makkah and Madinah.  Also in the year the 
government established the HRD Fund (HRDF) to train Saudis for jobs in the private 
sector.  On November of the same year the government created the Supreme Tourist 
Authority for maximizing growth of tourism industry in Saudi Arabia.  The 
government also in 2001 put guidelines for transparency of economic and fiscal data.  
The government also in the same year reduced tariffs from 12% to 5%.    
 
2.3.6  Private Sector Role in Saudi Economy 
 
Since its early days, the private sector’s role was reinforced and reemphasized by 
Saudi successive five-year Development Plans with the aim of becoming a major 
pillar of Saudi economic activity within the context of a free market.  To accomplish 
this, Saudi Arabia has been strongly pushing ahead with the industry diversification 
policy to prepare for the depletion of petroleum resources and to transform the 
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economic structure which depends on the fluctuating international oil price.  The 
government has been curtailing the oil business share of the nation's GDP by actively 
nurturing the non-oil sector which has increased remarkably since 1970 in both 
numbers and contributions to the GDP (Table 2.2).  Therefore, the private sector grew 
at a real average annual rate of 4.3% during the Seventh Plan period, 2000-2004.  Its 
percentage share of GDP increased from 52.4% in 1999 to 54.6% in 2004 compared 
to the plan target of 55.4%. During the same period, private investment grew at an 
average annual rate of 2.3% compared to the plan target of 8.3% (Ministry of 
Planning, 2005). 
 
Table 2.2 
Main Indicators of the Private Sector’s Role in the Saudi Economy (1970-2004) 
 
Indicators 1970 1999 2004 
Number of Operating Factories 199 3,163 3,652 
Number of Private Sector Companies 923 190,662 194,745 
Contribution in GDP (%) 33.3 52.4 54.6 
Employment in the Private Sector (million) 1.83 6,145 7,076 
Saudi Employment (million) - 1,819 2,512 
Share of Saudi Employment of Total 
Private Sector Employment (%)  29.6 35.5 
Private Sector Employment as (%) of 
Total Employment including the 
Government  
 
- 
 
85.0 
 
85.4 
Source: The 7th Development Plan, 2000:188, and the 8th Development Plan, 2005:131, Ministry 
Planning 
 
Beside improving and diversifying the country’s economy, the government also aims 
at providing ongoing employment and training opportunities at this sector to its 
rapidly growing population which will replace the country’s non-Saudi workers in the 
private sector (Ministry of Planning, 1997 and 2000).  This process is called 
Saudization which will be discussed in further details later in this study.  In brief, 
Saudization which was included in the Development Plans from 1985-1995 and 
ineffectively put into action since then, was enforced by the Council of Ministers’ 
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Resolution No. 50 in 1995.  According to this program private firms employing more 
then 20 workers are required “to reduce their non-Saudi labour force annually by at 
least 5%, and to increase their employment of Saudi workers accordingly; [it has also] 
identified some posts to be filled by Saudi nationals only” (Madhi and Barrientos, 
2003: 75).             
 
Towards these objectives, the government also embraced several measures and 
initiatives to support small-to-medium sized enterprises which represent 80% of the 
registered organizations in Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs, 2001).  Among these measures are: 
  
• Streamline procedures for establishing small and medium scale enterprises to 
eliminate associated routine constraints and enhance technical and 
administrative support for these firms. 
• Study the possibility of establishing a special fund, with government and 
private sector participation, to facilitate access to loans by small and medium 
scale enterprises and develop Islamic financing instruments such as 
Musharaka, Murabah and Mudaraba (see Appendix 1.) to further broaden 
finance opportunities available to these enterprises. 
• Expand the lending activities of the Saudi Credit Bank. 
(Ministry of Planning, 2000:198) 
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2.4  Saudi Labour Market 
 
This country’s profile will not be complete without looking at Saudi labour market a 
major pillar to this study.  At this early stage of the study, we will consider the Saudi 
labour market to encompass all the Saudis, male or female, at 15 years of age and 
older who are jobseekers, either employed or not, who have the abilities, ambitions 
and willingness to work in private or civil government sectors (Ghaban and Others, 
2002; Bourland, 2002).  In their final report, the Institute of Research (2002) identifies 
the following major bodies that interact with the Saudi labour market: 
 
1. Workers who are either employed or jobseekers who possess skills, 
experiences and qualifications. 
2. Enterprises owners with their immediate and futuristic quantity and quality 
demands of workers. 
3. Government sector who is not only a major employer of Saudi manpower, but 
also an influential regulator, investor, economic planner and social insurer. 
          
To supervise such interaction, two government organizations were established i.e. the 
Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Civil Services.  The first ministry, including 
its related employment agencies, are responsible for manpower planning and 
development, labour relations, disputes, visas and the general monitoring of all 
matters relating to employment affairs in the private sector.  Furthermore, and 
according to the Council of Ministers Resolution issued in 23rd of March 2004, the 
Minister of Labour acts as the chairperson of the General Organization for Social 
Insurance, General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training 
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(GOTEVT), and the HRD Fund (Alriyadh, 2004).  The second ministry, on the other 
hand, plans for the civil manpower required in the government sector and ensures that 
the competence of civil servants matches the requirements of the Kingdom as it 
implements its various development programs (Al-Sheikh, 2001). 
 
2.4.1  Size 
 
In its early days the Saudi labour market was affected by Saudi economic changes.  
For example, the high economic growth in Saudi Arabia during the oil boom in the 
1970s and early 1980s resulted in a shortage in the number of workers needed to 
support the growing economy (Looney, 1992).  The swift transformation of the 
economy from an economy based on nomadic trade, fishing and agriculture to an 
economy based on petrochemical, construction and service industries using modern 
technological production processes, created labour vacuum and a need for skilled 
workers not available locally (Shaban et al, 1995).  As a result, Saudi Arabia 
witnessed a major influx of foreign labour.  Farjani (1994) reported that at least 25% 
of the 20 million migrant workers in the world in the 1980s were employed in the 
Gulf States including the Kingdom. 
 
In the last year of the First Development Plan (1974), for instance, the total labour 
population was 1.6 million.  Of which 1,286,000 workers (80.4 per cent) were Saudis 
while 314,000 workers (19.6%) were non-Saudis.  During the same period of the 
Second Development Plan (1979) the total labour population reached 2,471,200 
workers; however, Saudi workers were only 1,411,400 (57%) of this total while non-
Saudis workers were 1,059,800 (43%).  This scenario continued in the last year of the 
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Third Development Plan (1984) which witnessed an increase of the total labour 
population to 5,524,460 workers.  Of which 1,786,000 (34.1%) were Saudi, whereas 
3,458,600 workers were non-Saudis (65.9%).  Similarly, in the last year of the Fourth 
Development Plan (1989) labour population grew to 5,671,800 workers, with Saudis 
representing 1,923,200 workers (33.3%) and non-Saudis representing 3,748,600 
workers (66.7%) (Kallel, 1993).    
 
However, toward the end of the Fifth Development Plan (1995), Saudi labour 
population increased to 39.2% (2,544,800 workers) of the total labour population 
6,489,900 due to government emphasis on the Saudization program to recruit more 
Saudis in the private sector replacing the 3,945,100 non-Saudis (60.8%).  In the Sixth 
Development Plan (1999) Saudization and vocational training grew to be a priority to 
the Kingdom which at this stage was encouraging more private sector participation in 
its economy.  This resulted in increasing Saudi labour to 44.2% (3,172,900) of the 
total labour force (7,176,300 workers) despite the increase of non-Saudi labour to 
4,003,400 (55.8%) (Ministry of Planning, 1995; 1999)   
 
The Seventh Development Plan statistics point to an increase in the total labour force 
from 7.23 million workers in 2000 to about 8.27 million workers in 2003 at an annual 
growth rate of 3.4%.  This resulted in 1.04 million new openings during the same 
period, 56.4% of which were filled by national manpower (Ministry of Planning, 
2005).  
 
The Eighth Development Plan from 2005-09 estimates the increase in the average 
annual growth rate of the Saudi workforce to be 5.13% to meet the objective of the 
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plan to raise the total Saudi nationals participation in the workforce from 36.9% in 
2004 to about 39.2% in 2009. The size of the national workforce at the beginning of 
the Plan is estimated at 3.80 million citizens, of which 14% are women. This number 
is expected to reach 4.89 million citizens at the end the Plan, of which women will 
represent 18.2%.  The plan will therefore focus on increasing women's participation in 
the Saudi workforce from 10.3% at the beginning of the plan to about 14.2% by the 
end of the Plan period. This will fulfil the Plan objective of increasing the women's 
participation in economic activities and reducing the gender gap in terms of 
employment.  The Plan expects the total labour force to increase from 8.28 million 
workers at the beginning of the Plan 2004 to 9.22 million workers by the end of the 
Plan 2009. The national labour force participation ratio will increase from 42.7% to 
51.5% of total workers during the same period (Ministry of Planning, 2005). 
 
2.4.2  Labour Market by Economic Activity 
 
Usually, major economic activities attract the majority of labour.  This in particular is 
an important economic indicator to human resources policy makers and developers to 
understand the dynamics of any labour market (Al-Humaid, 2002).  The Saudi 
government sector, for example, has witnessed a rapid expansion due to the inflow of 
the oil revenues in the 1970s and 1980s.  As a result, it was able to offer well-paid 
employment to Saudis with generous reward packages and good quality of working 
life (Shaban et al, 1995).   It has also led to a situation where wages in the government 
sector continue to exceed private sector’s wages by many times (Al-Iktissad Wal-
Aamal, 1997).  Saudis employed in government jobs earned wages higher than both 
expatriates in the government sector, and Saudis in the private sector (Diwan and 
Girgis, 2002).  Thereby, as Shaban et al. (1995) reported, the government sector 
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became the best option that new entrants to Saudi labour force would consider; a 
government job was and is perceived as a citizen’s right.   
 
However, the fall of oil revenues in the late 1980s and early 1990s forced the 
government to tighten employment in this sector, and increasingly compelled Saudis 
to look to the private sector for jobs (Azzam, 1997).  Additionally, employment in the 
government is bound to reach its limits shortly as Saudis by the end of 1999 occupy 
nearly 88% (591,658 workers) of its total employment (674,554 workers).  This is 
also due to government intention to steadily create new employment posts in this 
sector to 12.8%, if not less, of total employment for the coming years. Instead, the 
majority of new job opportunities will be either created or Saudized in the private 
sector (Ministry of Planning, 2000). 
 
By the end of 1999, as indicated above in (Table 2.2), 85.2% (6,161,200 workers) of 
the total Saudi labour force were employed in the private sector while only 14.8% 
(916,200 workers) are working for the government.  As Table (2.3) illustrates that of 
those working in the private sector by organizations employing 10 workers or more 
the services sectors, particularly personal and community services (which includes 
household maids and private drivers) and government and commercial services, 
contributed about two thirds of the total employment increase during the Sixth 
Development Plan, growing at an average annual rate of 2.3%. On the other hand, 
employment in the producing sectors came second with an annual rate of increase of 
1.5% (Ministry of Planning, 2000).    
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Table 2.3 
Civilian Employment during the Sixth Development Plan 
(Thousand) 
  
Economic Sector 1994 1999 Cumulative change 
Average  annual 
growth rate % 
1. Producing Sectors: 
• Agriculture 
• Manufacturing 
• Other producing sectors  
2107.0 
500.9 
530.9 
1075.2 
2273.3 
557.9 
589.0 
1126.4 
166.3 
57.0 
58.1 
51.2 
1.5 
2.2 
2.1 
0.9 
2. Services Sectors: 
• Private  
• Government  
4289.8 
3429.5 
860.3 
4804.1 
3887.9 
916.2 
514.3 
458.4 
55.9 
2.3 
2.5 
1.3 
Total Non-oil sectors 6396.8 7077.4 680.6 2.0 
3. Crude oil and gas 93.1 98.9 5.8 1.2 
Total  6489.9 7176.3 686.4 2.0 
Of which: 
• Saudi 
• Non-Saudi 
  
2544.8 
3945.1 
  
3172.9 
4003.4 
  
628.1 
58.3 
  
4.5 
0.3 
Source: The 7th Development Plan, Ministry Planning (2000:60). 
 
In the Seventh Development Plan, the employment in the private sector increased by 
328,600 by the end of the plan 2004.  The production sectors had 81,400 new jobs in 
construction, 72,000 in the manufacturing sector and 24,400 in agriculture occupying 
a total of 54% of new created jobs for this plan (Ministry of Planning, 2000). 
 
The Plan also indicated that the private sector services increased and almost 
distributed equally among its various sectors, with the share of the total increase in 
employment amounting to 12.3% for the finance and real estate sector, 11.5% for the 
community and personal services, 10.5% for the trade sector, and about 3.3% for 
transport and communications (Ministry of Planning, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
 35 
2.4.3  Occupational Classification  
 
Classifying labour market by occupation is a very essential indicator for 
understanding the occupational balances of the labour force in terms of the number of 
new entrants into occupational categories and their distribution according to sources 
of demand.  This is also true to understand future labour market requirements of skills 
to be developed and implemented by training programs, a central theme of this 
research.     
 
Saudi Development plans have classified the occupational structure of employment in 
the Saudi labour market according to following general classification for occupations:  
 
• Professional and Technical 
• Management and Administration 
• Clerical 
• Sales Personnel 
• Services Personnel 
• Agricultural and Related 
• Production, Construction and Transportation 
 
According to Table (2.4) which shows the employment structure according to the 
above occupations over the Seventh Development Plan period, it is clear that 
production, construction and transport occupations occupied the majority (31.2%) of 
the labour force employment at the end 2004.  This is despite the slight decrease from 
30.5% these occupations had at the beginning of the plan in 1999.  On the other hand, 
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services personnel occupations come second with 29.3% for the same period; 
followed by professional and technical occupations which absorb 15.5% of the 
employment in the market. Sharing approximately the same level of employment, 
agricultural and related, clerical, and sales occupations occupy (7.7) (7.4) and (7.0%) 
respectively.  Finally, management and administration occupations remain at similar 
employment rates of 1.9% as their base year levels of 1999 (Ministry of Planning, 
2000).   
Table 2.4 
Occupational Structure of Employment in the Seventh Development Plan (2000-2004) 
 
  Employment  
Number (thousand) 
Employment 
Distribution 
% 
  
Change 
Description  1999 
 
2004 
 
1999 
 
2004 
 
Thousand 
 
% 
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate % 
Professional and 
Technical 1122.4 1159.9 15.6 15.5 37.5 11.4 0.7 
Management and 
Administration 133.9 142.9 1.9 1.9 9.0 2.7 1.3 
Clerical 534.4 558.4 7.4 7.4 24.0 7.3 0.9 
Sales Personnel 507.6 528.2 7.1 7.0 20.6 6.3 0.8 
Services Personnel 2138.1 2196.6 29.8 29.3 58.5 17.8 0.5 
Agricultural and 
Related  551.0 575.1 7.7 7.7 24.1 7.3 0.9 
Production, 
Construction and 
Transportation 
2188.9 2343.8 30.5 31.2 154.9 47.1 1.4 
Total 7176.3 7504.9 100.0 100.0 328.6 100.0 0.9 
Source: The 7th Development Plan, The Ministry Planning (2000: 60). 
 
 
2.4.4  Women in the Labour Market 
 
As a commonly agreed upon fact, Saudi females participation in the labor force is 
very low.   According to Diwan and Girgis (2002) their participation barely reaches 
13% for the 25-34 years old group and is below 5% over a women lifetime.  Bourland 
(2002), in his report, puts this percentage of participation to 14.6%.  Al-Humaid 
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(2002), on the other hand, gives a much lower participation rate of 10.7%.  Of this 
participation, 62% are employed in the government sector while 38% are working in 
the private sector.  Their employment in the government is concentrated in the 
education sector which employs 88%, followed by the health sector which absorb 
only 9%, while the remaining 1% works for the social service sector (Al-Sheikh, 
2001).  On the other hand, 35.7% of Saudi women employed in the private sector are 
working in the professional and technical occupations, while 30.4% are employed in 
the clerical occupations, whereas 21.8% are working in the productions (Al-Humaid, 
2002).     
 
Al-Sheikh (2001:124) reports on a number of obstacles and barriers that 
contribute to women low rates of participation in Saudi labour force.  These are:  
 
a) The negative social attitude towards Saudi workingwomen, coupled with some social 
and cultural restrictions, which work to minimise women's opportunity for most jobs.  
b) Poorly trained women being accepted for some jobs offered in the Saudi Labour 
Market. 
c) The social, cultural and Islamic unsuitability of some jobs for Saudi women, such as 
those, which require women to stay overnight.  
d) The lack of technical, administration and business training courses for Saudi women 
make it difficult to compete within the Saudi Labour Force. 
e) The lack of co-ordination and clear vision for the role of women in the future labour 
force. 
f) Women in Saudi Arabia can only be utilised in specific areas of the Saudi labour 
force. 
g) Saudi employment laws require special Saudi women's working environments to be 
created by employers. Furthermore, they are also required to take extra security 
measures for the women's working sites. 
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h) Saudi women cannot expect to work far away from their families     
 
2.4.5  Unemployment  
 
Unemployment rates in Saudi Arabia at the latest report for the Saudi Minister of 
Labour stood at approximately 9.6% (300,000 unemployed) of the total Saudi labour 
force at the working age of 15 years and more (Saudi Press Agency, 2004).  Even 
though, a number of studies show different figures.  Al-Sheikh (2001) and Ghaban et 
al, (2002) for example reported a rate of 27% unemployment due to private sector’s 
evasion to recruit the increasing numbers of Saudi university graduates.  Bourland 
(2002), on the other hand, calculated unemployment of male Saudis around 11.9% 
with 328,286 unemployed Saudis. The inclusion of female Saudis would make this 
average much higher.  According to the same report unemployment among female 
Saudis between 20-24 years old was 33% and 18% for females 25-29 years.  This has 
led Ghaban et al, 2002, to conclude that unemployment reports in Saudi Arabia lack 
accuracy in providing exactly the country’s unemployment rates.  This is mainly, as 
they describe, due to the lack of accurate and up-to-date statistics on demographic 
surveys of the population.        
 
Historically speaking, unemployment in the Saudi labour market was not an issue for 
almost two decades during the period of high economic growth in the 1970s and 
1980s when the government had been “acting as employers of first and last resort” 
(Fasano and Goyal, 2004:3).  Since the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia has suffered a 
downward which directly affected job creation in the government.  For example, in 
1994 the government wage bills accounted for 53% of the government total budget; 
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this number jumped to reach 60% in 1999 (Diwan and Girgis, 2002).  Add to this 
dilemma is the country’s rapid population growth of 3.8% which has put enormous 
pressure on the Saudi economy to create employment at a rapid rate mainly in the 
private sector to cope with the increasing numbers of Saudi graduates every year (Al-
Sheikh, 2001).  In this respect, The Economist (2000) estimated that the Saudi 
economy should be growing by an average of 6% annually instead of its present 3.2% 
to generate enough jobs for young male Saudis entering the labour market.  This 
disparity in economic growth and population growth has pushed the issue of 
unemployment to the forefront as more Saudis are now entering the labour market. 
 
Other studies attribute unemployment to the following core factors some of which 
will be explained in further details in the coming chapters: 
 
• The massive presence of roughly 4 million non-Saudi workers in Saudi labour 
market (55.8%) reduces employment opportunities for Saudis.   
• The reductions in the country’s annual economic growth accompanied with the 
country’s high birth rates.   
• The government sector’s declined role as the major employer to Saudis.  
• The negative cultural inferiority attitude toward certain occupations in the labour 
market.  
• The mismatch between training and education outcome and labour market skills 
demand. 
• The lack of accurate and up-to-date information and statistics on the labour 
market. 
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• The inconsistency of government bodies regulating and supervising the labour 
market. 
• The low wages level paid to Saudis entering the private sector. 
 (Ghaban et al, 2002; Al-Sheikh, 2001; Al Nufaiee, 1993; Ministry of Interior 
1996; and Al Gaith and Al Ma’ashoug, 1997) 
     
2.4.6  Future Labour Force 
 
According to Al-Humaid’s (2002) study which is based on the national Demographic 
Survey of 1992 and the forecasts of the Secretariat General of Manpower Council, 
Saudi Arabia population in the year 2020 will be 33.7 million (50.5% male and 49.5% 
female).  This prediction is based on the permanence of the population annual growth 
on 3.8%.  Of this population, 20.1 million Saudis will be at the employment age yet 
only 6.6 million are employed.  Saudi male labour force population will be 59.6% of 
the total Saudi male population.  On the other hand, female labour force population 
will represent 59.7% of the total Saudi female population.       
 
In contrast, the Seventh Development Plan anticipates that the total population of 
Saudi Arabia will be 29.7 million based on an annual average growth of 3.2% with 
89.2% increase of 2000 total population.  It also predicts that the total population of 
employed Saudis in the year 2020 will be 8.3 million, based on an average annual 
growth of 4.69% (Al-Humaid, 2002).  His study also predicts that Saudization with 
effective training programs for Saudis will reduce the dependency on non-Saudi 
labour force demand by an average of 2.25 % annually until 2020.  The majority of 
employment to new entrants, as he describes, will be in the private sector with further 
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decline of government role in employment as more state-owned enterprises are 
privatized.   
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
This chapter gives the essential information about Saudi Arabia’s history, legal 
system, demographic details, economic environment and labour market background.  
Such information is important to establish the ground to understand the rest of the 
chapters and the arguments to come.   
 
Throughout this chapter, it is clear that the Saudi government is keen to developing 
the country’s economy through its serious efforts in implementing comprehensive 
development strategies through its successive development plans.  The vision of these 
strategies focus on introducing structural changes in the national economy, 
diversifying its base, allowing a larger role for the private sector to undertake 
economic and social activities, and providing support needed to encourage the private 
sector to achieve the development plan’s objectives.   
 
Finally, the chapter covered at the Saudi labour market to understand its structure and 
its different classifications as well as unemployment and women participation.  This 
will assist the current study in examining issues of training and recruiting the 
increasing Saudi manpower.    
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CHAPTER THREE 
SAUDI HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND  
THE LABOUR MARKET   
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter contributes to the in-depth understanding of Saudi Human Resources 
Development structure, system and performance.  It also explores the factors that 
influence its labour market.  On other words, the chapter examines the relationships 
between the country's supply and demand systems.  For this, the chapter explores, 
firstly, the government’s expenditures throughout its Development Plans on Human 
Resource Development.  Then, it looks at the strategic objectives governing Saudi 
HRD activities.  At the same time, it investigates the role of the government's 
dominance and influence over education and skill formation systems.  This is 
followed by a brief look into the Saudi education structure and system.  Afterwards, 
the chapter focuses on each stage in the education system with further discussion 
including the outcomes of the government's dominance and bureaucracy on each of 
stage of skill formation systems.   
 
The chapter then examines the Saudi labour market in relation to the outcomes of the 
country's skill formation systems.  The focus is on the mismatched outcomes of such 
systems in fulfilling the Saudization strategy requirements by providing the demanded 
technical and scientific skills and knowledge to the labour market.  The chapter also 
looks at an important element that is shaping the private labour market i.e. Saudi 
attitudes towards accepting and working in the country's private organizations.  
Finally, the chapter concludes by studying some successful Saudization scenarios in a 
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number of the private organizations to highlight the factors that assisted their efforts 
while many others have failed.               
             
It is worth mentioning that throughout this chapter and due to similar usage of the 
terminologies in the available literature in Saudi Arabia, HRD (HRD) and education 
will be used interchangeably to refer to the same entity.  This is also due to the fact 
that researchers in the country who have engaged in discussing Saudization and 
unemployment issues in conjunction with HRD and education are from various 
academic backgrounds not exclusively HRD or educational specialists.  
 
3.2 Government Expenditure on HRD  
 
The Saudi government has been always placing a very high priority on the 
development of its human resources through its various educational and technical 
programs.  A measure of the government's substantial commitment to this sector is 
seen in its expenditure allocations throughout the successive Development Plans.  For 
example, in the First Development Plan (1970-1974) HRD enjoyed substantial 
attention as its allocations stood at SR. 7 billion or 20.6% of the plan’s total 
expenditures.  This expenditure increased to SR 51 billion representing 14.7% of the 
government’s total expenditures for the Second Development Plan (1975-1979).  
During the Third Development Plan (1980-1984), this percentage increased to reach 
18.4% with more than a two fold increase in comparison with the previous Plan, to 
reach SR 115 billion.  In the Fourth Development Plan (1985-1989), HRD allocations 
remained at higher levels despite the heavy drop in the government revenues in the 
mid-1980s.  The HRD share was SR 115.1 billion representing 33% of the total 
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expenditure for that Plan. In the Fifth Development Plan (1990-1994), allocations rose 
significantly to SR 164.6 billion or 48% of the plan’s total investment expenditure.  
This increasing trend was followed by further support during the Sixth (1995-1999) 
and the Seventh Development Plans (2000-2004) as human resource allocations 
reached 216.6 billion and 276.9 billion, representing 53.5% and 56.7%, respectively, 
of both Plans’ total expenditures (Ministry of Planning, 2003).   
 
As a result and as Table (3.1.) illustrates, the number of students (male and female) 
enrolled in the country’s educational institutions increased from 547,000 students to 
more than 5,104,000 million with an average annual growth ranging between 6.5% to 
7.3% for the period from 1970 to 2002.  Similarly the number of schools for both 
sexes in all educational stages has increased from 3,283 in 1970 to 24,748 in 2002.  
For the same period, the number of teachers in all education levels has increased from 
23,118 to 503,243 (Ministry of Planning, 2001; Ministry of Planning, 2003).   
 
3.3 The Strategic Objectives for Human Resource Development 
 
The core Saudi HRD philosophy places especial emphasis on religion so that Islamic 
values and teachings permeate all aspects of student life.  It also focuses on helping 
them to acquire knowledge, skills and attitudes to meet the religious, economic and 
social needs of the country and to eradicate illiteracy among Saudi adults (Al-Hogail, 
1998; Sinbull et al., 1998). These philosophies are affirmed through the Saudi 
education objectives issued in the Saudi Education Policy Document of 1968 which 
are categorized to include the following: 
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1. Islamic objectives. 
They include strengthening Islamic faith; reinforcing respectfulness of general 
properties of others granted and protected by Islam; acquiring individuals with 
essential concepts, affections and capabilities to carry out the message of Islam; 
and creating a systematic perceiving approach in individuals to appreciate and 
understand the world, human being and knowledge from an Islamic perspective. 
 
2. Knowledge objectives. 
They involve studying the universe and its undisclosed secrets to emphasize 
Gods’ omnipotence and broaden individuals’ knowledge and appreciate their 
environment; providing individuals with career-oriented skills and experiences to 
benefit them and their society; and finally developing their linguistic skills of at 
least one foreign language beside their native language to establish 
communication channels with other cultures and civilizations.  This language is 
English.   
  
3. Skills-acquisition objectives. 
They include developing scientific and research-base thinking and capabilities of 
articulating oneself; enhancing physical skills to provide individuals with healthy 
physiques; and finally, identifying individual differences among students to assist 
talented as well as special needs students. 
       
4. Interest-oriented objectives. 
These objectives assist youth in fulfilling their appropriate majoring and 
occupational interests; correcting their behavior; encouraging constructive 
 46 
hobbies; and ensuring equilibrium among youths’ physical, mental, social, 
psychological and spiritual development needs.  
 
5. Attitudinal and value-related objectives. 
They involve enlightening students about their Islamic civilization 
accomplishments and history; developing their awareness toward understanding 
Saudi society problems, respecting work and supporting social solidarity among 
individuals; and finally, enhancing their sense of altruism of public interest over 
individual’s.     
(Mitwally, 1998) 
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Table 3.1:    Development in Education (Males & Females) 
Number of Students (Thousand) 
 
Year 
 
Pre-
school 
 
Elementary 
Education 
Intermediate 
Education 
Secondary 
Education University 
Training 
Aِbroad 
Teacher 
Training 
Technical 
Education 
Adult 
Literacy 
Other 
/1 
Total 
 
Number of 
teachers 
 
Number of 
schools /2 
 
1970 4 397 61 16 7 2 11 1 43 5 547 23,118 3,283 
1975 14 634 137 42 19 5 15 4 100 14 984 43,777 5,634 
1980 24 862 245 93 48 10 22 7 142 9 1,462 78,309 11,070 
1985 55 1,242 373 158 94 10 17 11 159 30 2,149 137,225 15,079 
1986 68 1,317 388 172 104 8 19 12 160 32 2,280 150,649 15,093 
1986 60 1,460 432 199 113 10 23 14 151 25 2,487 154,414 15,353 
1987 60 1,579 466 218 116 3 23 16 156 20 2,657 171,492 16,295 
1988 67 1,694 494 243 117 3 26 17 146 15 2,822 184,030 16,584 
1989 69 1,762 514 252 122 3 27 18 152 15 2,934 199,487 16,609 
1990 72 1,876 574 291 134 3 28 20 107 30 3,135 208,718 17,038 
1991 72 1,909 613 313 142 3 31 21 114 29 3,247 221,848 18,027 
1992 76 1,980 685 347 152 4 41 25 112 31 3,453 243,002 19,621 
1993 85 2,111 769 384 163 3 63 28 114 38 3,758 270,423 20,799 
1994 84 2,154 815 447 170 3 76 29 116 40 3,934 271,511 21,284 
1995 84 2,204 842 452 185 4 87 29 122 35 4,044 280,595 21,854 
1996 84 2,281 929 534 222 4 84 29 114 44 4,325 300,831 22,153 
1997 87 2,285 960 608 272 4 74 28 110 39 4,467 325,776 22,301 
1998* 91 2,242 982 642 273 5 77 31 107 42 4,492 355,733 22,678 
1999* 94 2,259 1,036 705 363 7 82 37 110 45 4,738 354,357 22,770 
2000* 94 2,285 1,073 756 404 7 86 43 108 48 4,904 356,546 22,435 
2001* 104 2,308 1,083 794 422 - 92 49 106 55 5,013 380,756 - 
2002* 93 2,316 1,132 842 444 7 93 59 118 - 5,104 503,243 24,748 
Note: 1/ Includes special education and specialized training programs organized by different agencies. 
         2/ In the case of higher education, faculties are counted as schools 
Sources: Achievements of the Development Plans 1970-2001: Facts and Figures, Ministry of Planning (2001:297)  
And (*) Statistical Yearbook 2002, Ministry of Planning (2002: 86-118). 
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3.4 Government Dominance and Influence over Education and Skill 
Formation Systems  
 
One major factor that shaped the skill formation systems in the country and affected 
their performances until today is the government dominance and influence.  Since the 
establishment of these systems in the Kingdom, they are supervised, planned for, 
regulated, and controlled entirely by the state.  This is through the Higher Council of 
Education which was established in 1963 to oversee education in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia and determine the educational policies and objectives. This council is 
lead by the King who is Prime Minister with membership of Ministers from 
Education, Higher Education, Interior, Labour and Social Affairs, and Information 
(Sinbull, 1998).  According to Mitwally (1998), Higher Council of Education is 
responsible for:  
 
• Planning the country’s education policies;  
• Approving these policies and their regulations; 
• Approving long, medium and short-term educational development plans in 
accordance with the country’s overall Development Plans; 
• Coordinating between the different educational supervising bodies and the 
different educational stages to ensure the best educational outcome; 
• Approving the policies of adult literacy education; 
• Approving the steps adopted by educational organizations to develop educational 
plans and curricula to accomplish their immediate objectives and the overall 
educational objectives;  
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• Approving admission policies for different education stages recommended by 
different educational institutions; 
• Distributing educational services throughout the different administrative regions 
in the Kingdom; and  
• Approving exam regulations prepared by educational institutions in the country.       
 
The Higher Council of Education policies, plans and regulations are implemented by 
a number of government agencies.  For example, the Ministry of Education is 
responsible for male and female general education up to the pre-university level, in 
addition to adult literacy, special education for disabled students, intermediate 
colleges and teachers’ colleges (Al-Dhuwain et al., 2000).  Although more recently 
the latter’s supervision and administration were reassigned to The Ministry of Higher 
Education in 22nd of June, 2004 (Alriyadh, 2004).  The Ministry of Higher Education 
supervises the country’s eleven universities that have increased from eight in the 9th of 
June, 2004 (Alriyadh, 2004).  Finally, GOTEVT is responsible for technical education 
and vocational training (Sinbull, 1998) under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs. 
 
3.5 Educational Structure and System 
 
As Figure (3.1.) illustrates, the education system, which will be explained in further 
details in the next section, follows the 6-3-3 scheme, involving six years for primary 
education and three years for each of intermediate and secondary education known as 
the general education.  This system, according to Sinbull (1998), is the common and 
most implemented system among many Arab countries like Egypt, Qatar, Yemen, 
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Bahrain, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Mauritania, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.  Special 
Education for students with disabilities follows the same order as general education 
but is conducted in specialized schools.  General education is followed by the higher 
education which consists of post secondary level, university level and postgraduate 
level.  Overlapped with both general and higher educations is technical education and 
vocational training (Sinbull et al., 1998; Al-Hogail, 1998).    
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Education System in Saudi Arabia 
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     and Education System and policy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Al-Hogail, (1998:24) 
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3.6 General Education 
 
As Figure (3.1) shows, general education in the Kingdom consists of optional nursery 
and kindergarten preschool, primary, intermediate and secondary school.  Following 
this scheme, students joining general education have the option to start at the age of 
four spending two years in the nursery and kindergarten preschools or register directly 
for the primary school at the age of six years.  In other words, the former is not a 
prerequisite for the student to proceed to the latter.  On the contrary, graduating from 
a primary school is required to be admitted to the three years intermediate school.  
Similarly, after achieving the intermediate qualification the student joins the 
secondary school for three years (Al-Hogail, 1998).   
 
The nursery and kindergarten stage, to begin with, aims at preparing the children from 
their early years in an Islamic family-like environment to develop their religious 
orientation based on monotheism, Islamic moralities and virtuous social trends.  This 
stage is also designed to introduce children gradually, and via a scientific and 
psychological approach, to primary school by providing them with information in 
accordance with their intellectual development to enhance their creativity.  In 
addition, the nursery and kindergarten stage trains children on physical skills, healthy 
and proper habits, and the utilization of their different senses (Al-Khateeb, 1998).   
 
According to the last figures of the Central Department of Statistics, students, of both 
government and private nurseries and kindergartens, have reached 92,826 in 2002.  
They are studying in 1,075 schools, of which 582 state-owned schools while 493 are 
private investment schools.  The number of teachers in these schools has reached 
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8,131 teachers, of which 7,294 are Saudis while 837 are non-Saudis (Ministry of 
Planning, 2002). 
 
As for the primary stage, it aims at establishing the Islamic creed into the students’ 
soul, simultaneously nurturing their moralities, intellect, linguistic abilities and loyalty 
to the Islamic nation.  It also aims at training the students at performing the prayers 
and endowing them with decencies.  Similarly, this stage is designed to develop the 
students’ basic linguistic, numeric and physical skills; at the same time provide them 
with suitable information in different subjects to enlighten them of their God’s grace.  
This stage also will nurture students’ rhetorical tastes and their creative activities 
whilst at the same time develop their admiration for vocational and manual work.  
Finally, primary stage aims at enhancing students’ awareness, within their ages and 
growth phases, of their responsibilities and their rights toward their country and 
government.  Accordingly this stage curriculum covers subjects like Arabic, art 
education, geography, history, home economics (for girls), mathematics, physical 
education (for boys), Islamic studies and science (Abduljawad, 1998). 
 
At the end of 2002, the number of students in both private and government primary 
schools stood at 2,316,166 pupils registered in 12,815 schools.  Of the latter 12005 
schools were government schools while 810 were private ones.  The total number of 
teachers in these schools has reached 213,511 with 192,469 Saudis and 21,042 non-
Saudis (Ministry of Planning, 2002).  
 
Moving up the Saudi education system, the intermediate stage aims at strengthening 
students’ Islamic belief by establishing Islamic criterion against which they can 
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measure their behaviours.  Furthermore, it will focus on bringing up students 
according to Islamic social life which is dominated by brotherhood, collaboration and 
responsibility, appreciation and assumption.  In addition, this stage will provide 
students with suitable experiences and knowledge of different cultural and scientific 
principles, simultaneously encouraging them to research and explore their 
surroundings utilizing the scientific reasoning approach.  This stage also aims at 
developing and guiding students’ intellectual aptitudes to benefit their skills.  It will 
train students of this stage to be of service to their community and be loyal and 
sincere to their country.  Finally, it will develop in students the habit of utilizing their 
free time constructively and beneficially.  Based on these objectives, this stage 
teaches Arabic, art education, English, geography, history, home economics (for 
girls), mathematics, physical education (for boys), religious studies and science 
(Mitwally, 1998). 
 
The total number of students registered in intermediate stage till the end of 2002 
reached 1,132,115.  They were studying in 6,566 schools; of which 6,012 were 
government owned while 554 were private schools.  The number of teachers for this 
stage totaled 144,220 consisting of 131,709 Saudis and 12,511 non-Saudis (Ministry 
of Planning, 2002).     
 
Similarly, the general objectives for the secondary stage has included most of the 
above three stages’ objectives with more emphasis on caring for youth studying at this 
stage and preparing them for work life.  More specifically, this stage pursues the 
continuing theme of establishing Islamic core values and loyalty to Islam and Saudi 
Arabia's Islamic status.  It aims at developing students’ aptitudes, attitudes, and 
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experiences during their critical adolescent age in accordance with general Islamic 
education as individuals as well as groups.  This stage also will enhance their 
scientific and research skills of conducting a scientific investigation and 
experimentation.  It will prepare students for entering the labour market to supply the 
country’s needs of workers.  Similarly, it aims at preparing those students wishing to 
pursue their higher studies in universities and higher institutions.  More importantly, it 
will provide students with the necessary awareness to form their future families based 
on Islamic principles (Mitwally, 1998).   
 
To accomplish these objectives secondary curriculum includes compulsory subjects 
taught during the first year of this stage consisting of Arabic, biology, chemistry, 
English, geography, history, home economics (for girls), mathematics, physical 
education (for boys) and religious studies.  However, in the final two years, students 
choose to specialize into scientific or literary majors according to their preference and 
consented by their performance in the first secondary year.  At the end of the second 
semester of the last third-year, students take a comprehensive exam, i.e. General 
Secondary Examination, supervised by the Ministry of Education to measure their 
educational achievements which will determine their future.  According to their exam 
results and majors, students will pursue their higher education, vocational education 
or directly join the labour market (Mitwally, 1998).            
  
According to the Ministry of Planning (2003), the total number of students in 2002 
was 842,000 studying in 3,640 schools; the government owned 3,235 of them while 
private sector owned the rest of 405 schools.  The total number of teacher involved in 
 56 
teaching this stage was 93,598, of these 83,444 were Saudis and 10,154 were non-
Saudis. 
 
3.7 Outcomes of Government Dominance and Bureaucracy on General 
Education  
 
According to a study by the Institute of Research of King Fahd University of 
Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM) in 2003, Saudi pre-university level or general 
education is encountering major challenges in fulfilling its objectives.  The challenges 
include, first, the burden of the country’s annual 3.8% rapid population growth.  This 
is fuelled by the fact that more than half of the population, 56.4% to be exact, are 
under the age of 19 years-old which is the age of the general education (World Bank, 
2002).  Second, this pressure escalates by the country’s unbalanced distributions of 
population in different geographical areas.  The government is encountering 
difficulties of providing educational services to all Kingdoms’ rural areas as a result 
of the population movement between Bedouin and less developed areas to towns and 
villages. 
 
According to the same study, this is imposing a great pressure on educational services 
provided by and controlled by the government for this stage of education especially 
with the government dependency on the unpredictable oil revenues.  The result is a 
high cost for the general education reaching 9% of the country’s total GDP. This is 
considered high in comparison with 5% of the Industrial countries and 4% of the 
Developing countries.  Nevertheless, high percentage of general schools in the 
Kingdom occupies leased buildings of houses that are built originally for residency 
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purposes (Ministry of Planning, 2000).  These buildings do not meet basic 
requirements of educational standards and specifications which affect the educational 
environment and disturb learning. Schools of this stage in general suffer shortages of 
laboratories required to fulfill different subjects’ requirements such as physics, 
chemistry, biology and English to mention a few.  As a result, this forces teachers to 
implement a single teaching method i.e. lecturing instead of satisfying the practical 
objectives of these subjects. 
 
Another challenge encountering such systems results from the slowness in developing 
general education curricula by government controlled general education systems.  
Government bureaucracies of supervising and developing bodies complicate and 
delay developing and updating this stage’s curricula and text books to keep pace with 
new scientific and technical advancements.  According to the Seventh Development 
Plan, these curricula need further reviewing efforts to ensure that they conform to 
development needs and ultimately help pupils obtain knowledge through 
comprehension, analysis, and reasoning skills (Ministry of Planning, 2000).  Such 
essential skills are neither taught nor assessed in the Saudi educational systems as 
teachers and pupils are merely utilizing memorization and recalling skills of students 
for the in-class taught knowledge.  This usually reinforces student passiveness 
towards a self-learning approach overlooking the importance of off-class learning 
experiences which are too absent from schools.     
 
To add to this dilemma, teachers of this stage are inefficiently trained.  Their training 
in higher education is excessively unpractical and expected at the same time to teach 
practical curricula.  Such training suffers from the unavailability of up-to-date training 
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technologies and logistics as higher education institutions receive limited government 
budgets from the Ministry of Higher Education.  Such budgets are always influenced 
by the country’s overall revenues mainly from oil.  Finally, these training programs 
are only for teachers in major cities and are voluntary for enrolment.    
     
As a result, the study concludes that Saudi secondary education outcomes are 
inconsistent with labour market demands despite the fact that it is the first gate toward 
joining the labour market and that its graduates represent the majority among other 
educational stages (Table 3.2.).  This gap is due to the rapid development in private 
sector’s needs of skilled and trained workers of new technologies in manufacturing 
and services sectors which is absent from secondary education curricula.  Moreover 
the former requires certain analytical, practical, and innovative skills in addition to a 
satisfactory level of English competency that may not have been achieved at this 
stage.  Moreover, Al-Shammary et al. (2003) and many others confirm that the 
secondary education system limits students’ further scientific and technical education 
through compelling them to major in scientific, literary, or religious studies early in 
secondary education which determines their future majors in higher or postsecondary 
education.      
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Table 3.2:   Graduates of General and Higher Education (Males & Females) 
 General Education Graduates    Higher Education Graduates   
Year Elementary/1 Intermediate Secondary Special 
education TOTAL   
Teachers’ 
Training  
Local 
Universities  Abroad /2  TOTAL 
1970 29,133 12,538 2,806 61 44,538  2,122 808 - 2930 
1975 59,567 21,838 7,246 182 88,833  4,951 1,909 202 7,062 
1980 93,875 40,094 15,568 131 149,668  6,791 4,621 503 11,915 
1985 - 69,803 30,493 90 100,386  5,114 11,145 1,667 17,926 
1986 - 80,753 37,117 118 118,048  4,945 12,501 1,928 19,374 
1986 - 93,631 45,445 118 139,194  6,994 14,095 1,500 22,589 
1987 - 102,297 49,253 130 151,680  7,050 14,074 1,158 22,282 
1988 - 108,678 50,223 145 159,046  8,796 15,013 1,200 25,009 
1989 - 116,719 56,762 135 173,616  8,324 15,389 950 24,663 
1990 - 132,481 63,497 159 196,137  9,162 17,721 760 27,643 
1991 - 138,121 67,301 660 206,082  8,980 17,376 800 27,156 
1992 - 148,380 72,425 694 230,961  9,462 19,798 800 30,060 
1993 - 171,077 86,236 396 257,709  14,780 21,729 800 37,309 
1994 - 178,294 86,643 450 265,387  20,256 21,889 650 42,795 
1995 - 197,759 93,886 1,103 292,748  16,234 24,250 850 41,334 
1996 - 227,189 112,238 1,376 340,803  15,946 30,263 915 47,124 
1997 - 245,316 135,281 1,045 381,642  8,924 31,908 1,100 41,932 
1998 - 255,700 145,008 1,541 372,249  12,700 41,450 1,500 55,650 
1999 - 267,102 164,629 1,079 432,810  14,950 39,903 1,031 55,884 
Note: 1/ Ministry of Education replaced the system with internal examination since 1982.              
          2/ Includes bachelor, higher diploma, master, doctorate and fellowship. 
Sources: Achievements of the Development Plans 1970-2001: Facts and Figures, Ministry of Planning (2001:306) 
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3.8 Higher Education 
 
Entering a new era of rapid development of the country's infrastructure and economy 
in the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia devoted special attention to fostering higher 
education.  This is due to the strong relationship between higher education and the 
development plans of the country (Abduljawad, 1998).  In the same study, 
Abduljawad describes higher education as all education levels following secondary or 
secondary-equivalent education conducted by vocational training centres, higher 
institutions, and university colleges.               
 
Higher education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is conducted by a number of 
educational institutions according to the level of qualification awarded.  For example, 
for the level of bachelor degree and above there are 21 universities1, more than 50 
girls’ colleges of education and 18 male teachers’ colleges which are all administered 
by the Ministry of Higher Education in addition to one technical college supervised 
by GOTEVT.  On the other hand, for the level of postsecondary education, there are a 
number of higher institutions awarding diplomas below the level of bachelor degrees 
including 37 colleges and institutions for the health-related professions supervised by 
the Ministry of Health, 19 intermediate girls’ colleges administered by the Ministry of 
Education, 3 community colleges overseen by the universities, 16 technical colleges 
under GOTEVT, 2 industrial colleges of the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu, 
and the Institute of Public Administration under the Ministry of Civil Services.  There 
are also a number of military and security colleges and institutions awarding military 
bachelor degrees and postsecondary diplomas.  Among these are 3 military colleges 
                                                 
1
 http://www.mohe.gov.sa/Arabic/Universities/Pages/default2.aspx. Sited on 1/12/2008 at 8:00 PM.   
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supervised by the Ministry of Defence, King Khaled Military College of the National 
Guard, and King Fahad Security College administered by the Ministry of Interior 
(Manpower Council, 2003; Ministry of Planning, 2002; Al-Shammary et al. 2003, Al-
Dhuwain et al., 2000).    
 
The Kingdom’s universities include 11 old universities in addition to 14 recently 
established ones.  Some of their available information is included in Table (3.3).  
These universities are Umm Al-Qura University in Makkah, Imam Muhammad bin 
Saud Islamic University in Riyadh, King Saud University also in Riyadh, Islamic 
University of Madinah, King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran, 
King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, and King Faisal University in Dammam and 
Hofuf.  Other recent universities include King Khaled University in Abha, University 
of Ha’il, University of Qasseem, University of Ta’if and University of Taiba.  They 
also include universities that are established between 2004 and 2007 such as Jazan 
University, AlJouf University, Baha University, University of Tabouk, University of 
Najran, Northern Borders University, Girls University in Riyadh, King Saud bin Abdul 
Aziz University for Health Sciences, and King Abdullah University of Science and Technology  
 
To coordinate the work of most of these higher institutions, the government has 
established the Higher Education Council and the University System in 1993.  In 
addition, it works on improving the efficiency of Saudi universities by offering 
programs in new fields, encouraging greater cooperation among Saudi institutes of 
higher learning and increasing involvement of the teaching staff in the operations of 
faculties (Al-Dhuwain et al., 2000).    
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Table 3.3 
Saudi Government Universities 
 
University Name Date of Establishment Number of Students 
Number of 
Students in 
Dates Available 
Reference 
Umm Al-Qura University 1950 950 in 1970 31290 in 2006 http://www.uqu.edu.sa/ and (Ministry of 
Planning, 1970) 
Imam Muhammad Bin 
Saud Islamic University  
1954 2,009 in 1970 27,613 in 2003 (Ministry of Planning, 2005) 
King Saud University 1957 21 when established 61329 in 2008 http://www.ksu.edu.sa/Pages/default.aspx 
Islamic University of 
Madinah 
1961 591 when established 25,849 in 2003 (Ministry of Planning, 2005) 
King Fahd University of 
Petroleum and Minerals 
1963 67 when established 10000 in 2008 www.kfupm.edu.sa 
King Abdul Aziz 
University 
1968 68 male and 30 female 
students when established 
82152 in 2008 www.kau.edu.sa    
King Faisal University 1975 9 in 1979 60000 in 2008 http://www.kfu.edu.sa/About/history-
2.asp 
King Khalid University  Different existing 
colleges merged in 
1998 
11,740 in 1999 9,942 in 2003 (Ministry of Planning, 2005) 
University of Ha’il 1998 NA 16,000 in 2008 http://www.uoh.edu.sa 
University of Qasseem Different existing 
colleges merged in 
2004 
NA 40,000 in 2008 http://www.qu.edu.sa/qsm/init  
University of Ta’if Different existing 
colleges merged in 
2004 
6000 in 1999 NA http://www.tu.edu.sa/taef/init 
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One of the first objectives of higher education in the Kingdom is to strengthen 
students’ faithfulness in Almighty God and provide them with Islamic education to 
develop their sense of responsibility toward the Lord, their country and their work.  It 
is also designed to prepare well educated and qualified citizens to carrying out their 
duties in serving the Kingdom’s development in accordance with Islamic principles.  
In addition, higher education aims at opening the opportunities for talented students 
wishing to pursue their higher and postgraduate studies in different fields of 
knowledge.  Higher education will also fulfill a positive role in research which will 
develop the fields of Literature, Arts, and Sciences as well as new inventions and 
practical solutions to community needs and technical requirements of Saudi Arabia.  
Finally, it aims at enhancing the knowledge and Islamic related publications which 
will present and clarify the Islamic notion at the same time fulfill the Kingdom’s role 
of spreading the message of Islam (Abduljawad, 1998).       
 
As a result, in 2002 there were more than 596,000 students at Saudi universities, 
teachers’ colleges, and technical and vocational postsecondary education, a dramatic 
improvement over the 19,000 students enrolled in 1970 (see Table 3.1).  Of that 
number, the majority of students are registered in the Saudi universities and teachers’ 
colleges as the former stood at 444,000 students and the latter reached 93,000 students 
in 2002.  A total of more than 14,671 teachers are employed at Saudi universities and 
teachers’ colleges (Ministry of Planning, 2002).  As for the number of graduates, 
Table (3.2.) illustrates that in 1999 the number of graduates from universities has 
increased to reach 39,903 which was only 808 in 1970.  For the same period, teachers’ 
training has increased from 2,122 graduates to 14,950 (Ministry of Planning, 2001).       
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To complement their studies in universities in the Kingdom, Saudi students have the 
opportunity to pursue, pre-university, graduate and postgraduate degrees in 
specialized fields abroad. Supported by government scholarships, thousands of Saudi 
students are enrolled in universities outside the Kingdom in some Arab, North 
American, European and Asian countries.  For example, in 2002, there were 1,047 
Saudi students studying in Arab universities, 3,506 in the U.S.A., 581 in Canada, 
1,281 in the United Kingdom, 102 in other European countries, and 228 in Pakistan 
(Ministry of Planning, 2002).   
 
3.9  Initiations of Vocational Education and Training in Saudi Arabia 
 
The discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in 1939 encouraged the settlement of Saudi 
Bedouin societies who were attracted to begin their industrial, commercial, and 
agricultural activities subsidized by the government.  In addition, the government 
itself was in urgent need for trained and vocationally educated manpower that would 
undertake and support the country's economic and social development.   
 
To fulfil this need, industrial vocational education in the course of its development 
started in 1949 under the Directorate of Education by the establishment of the first 
intermediate industrial school in Jeddah admitting 30 elementary graduate students in 
its first year.  This early – perhaps too little - effort was an indication of the beginning 
of vocational education in the Kingdom.  Later in 1963 the Ministry of Education 
increased the number of industrial schools to eight in addition to King Saud Industrial 
Institute and Riyadh College of Industrials.  In 1965, the Ministry replaced 
intermediate industrial schools with secondary industrial institute increasing the entry 
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requirement of this vocational education to the intermediate diploma instead of the 
elementary.  These institutes were equipped with better equipments and new curricula 
to train students on mechanical, electrical, engine, and technological studies.  In 1967, 
the Royal Technical Institute was established in Riyadh on high standards and with a 
total budget of SR 20 million containing a secondary vocational institute, a technical 
industrial institute, a specialized studies department for technical supervisors, and a 
higher teachers’ training institute.  Similarly, in Jeddah another standardized 
Technical Institute was established with a total budget of SR 35 million in 
coordination with the French government.  The number of students registered in 
industrial education has reached 2,727 at the end of the First Development Plan in 
1974 (Al-Khateeb, 1998).     
 
As for commercial vocational education, it started in 1960 with the establishment of 
the first intermediate commercial school to prepare manpower in commerce, financial 
management, accounting and other administrative sciences.  However, in 1967 and 
due to the declining level of graduates’ competencies of intermediate commercial 
schools, the Ministry of Education decided to replace these schools with secondary 
commercial institutes accepting intermediate diploma graduates for three years.  At 
the end of the First Development Plan period in 1974, there were eight institutes 
conducting morning and afternoon classes and enrolling 1,170 students taught by 93 
teachers (Al-Khateeb, 1998).            
 
Agricultural vocational education, on the other hand, started earlier.  In 1955 the 
government established the first agricultural school in Al-Kharj in the Riyadh region 
to prepare agricultural technicians to support the country’s development objectives.  
 66 
This school was initially overseen by the Ministry of Agriculture before being 
transferred in 1959 to the Ministry of Education which became the supervising body 
of vocational education in the country.   Later in 1961, the Ministry established five 
intermediate agricultural schools in five different cities: Hafuf, Majma’a, Buraidah, 
Baljourashi, and Jizan training 844 elementary graduates’ students.  These schools, 
later in 1964, were replaced by secondary agricultural institutes. However, in 1977, 
they were reduced to one standardized agricultural institute in Buraidah city enrolling 
intermediate education graduates for three more years.  This reduction was due to 
shortages of enrollments in this kind of vocational education in the country which 
stopped the initial plans of the First Development Plan to establish three similar 
institutes in the Kingdom for that period (Al-Khateeb, 1998).  
 
Vocational training was first initiated by King Faisal who envisioned the urgency to 
open vocational training centres for both adults aged 18 to 30 and youths aged 13 to 
18.  This vision was translated into reality in 1962 by the establishment of Riyadh 
vocational training centre costing SR 5.3 million followed by the opening of other 
centres in different cities around the country.  These government centres were 
overseen by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.  They were created to fulfil the 
following objectives: 
 
1. Providing and expanding vocational training programs in the light of national 
Development Plans. 
2. Providing professional training to fulfil the increasing demands on skilled and 
semiskilled workers for both government and private sectors. 
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3. Providing on-the-job professional training in private organizations to enhance 
workers technical skills. 
4. Establishing more centres and increasing the existing ones. 
5. Producing a standardized accreditation system to all training levels. 
6. Ensuring that training programs accord capabilities and requirements of 
manpower with the industry needs.  
7. Providing youths with suitable vocational counselling and guidance. 
 
In addition to government vocational training centres of the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs, there was a centre preparing assistant technicians supervised by the 
Ministry of Interior.  Furthermore, there were 12 private evening vocational training 
centres regulated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs teaching typing skills 
and calligraphy (Al-Khateeb, 1998).        
  
3.10  The Establishment of the General Organization for Technical 
Education and Vocational Training (GOTEVT) 
 
After thorough studies of Saudi manpower development needs in conjunction with the 
country’s rapid economic development, the government issued in the 23rd of June 
1980, the royal decree No. M/30 establishing the General Organization for Technical 
Education and Vocational Training (GOTEVT).  According to this decree, training 
and vocational education affairs controlled by different ministries and government 
bodies will be integrate under this government establishment.  GOTEVT, as stated by 
Article 16 of its bylaws, is an autonomous organization controlled from its 
headquarter in Riyadh and enjoys financial and administrative independency under a 
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direct supervision of the Minister of Labour and Social Affairs.  Furthermore, 
GOTEVT’s mission will be to undertake the implementation of vocational and 
technical education programs in various fields of industry, agriculture and commerce 
in addition to various levels of vocational training such as adult vocational training, 
on-the-job training in all fields as well as dropout rehabilitation.  It will also be 
responsible for vocational studies and research aimed at developing the performance 
and productivity of national manpower (Al-Khateeb, 1998; Al-Dhuwain et al., 2000; 
Ministry of Education, 2004; Ghaban et al, 2002). 
 
3.10.1  GOTEVT Overall Strategy and General Objectives 
 
According to its bylaws, GOTEVT is committed to achieve the following strategies 
within the framework policies and plans of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.        
 
1. To prepare and train Saudis to perform vocational and technical works at different 
sectors (industrial, agricultural, commercial and public services) and be qualified 
to work in government or private sectors, in addition to updating in-service 
technicians with the latest scientific and technological knowledge locally and 
abroad. 
2. To help the young and illiterate Saudis who did not get or pursue further academic 
education via training them in morning and evening programs suitable to their age 
and interest. 
3. To prepare technical Saudi cadres such as teachers, instructors and lecturers.  
4. To direct education investments towards developing skills and expansion of 
vocational careers in the Kingdom. 
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5. To create a unified educational system to support technical manpower through 
coordination with other HRD departments and the manpower ministerial 
committee. 
6. To support vocational guidance programs through stimulation of technical and 
vocational awareness. 
7. To conduct researches and studies to solve manpower technical problems in order 
to meet the evolving needs of labour market. 
 (Al-Khateeb, 1998) 
 
To achieve these strategies and establish a framework governing its activities, 
GOTEVT formulated the following general objectives:  
 
1. To train individuals to undertake the required industrial, commercial, agricultural 
and services activities that contribute to the development of the national economy 
whether in government or private sectors.  
2. To provide individuals with Islamic values and general knowledge that contribute 
to building a higher morality level and rational thinking, in addition to the ability 
to adapt to different environments. 
3. To create a scientific base for technical manpower to enable it to interact with the 
rapid developments in technology. 
4. To provide opportunities for individuals wishing to learn a certain vocation or 
pursue their training to the highest educational and vocational degree possible. 
5. To develop the skills of technicians and update their professional information on a 
continuing base. 
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6. To emphasize the value of manual labour and vocational work and their role in the 
prosperity of the society. 
7. To contribute in halting domestic migration of citizens to major cities by 
distributing vocational training centres throughout the Kingdom’s regions.  
8. To emphasize the importance of research and fieldwork studies which deal with 
technical manpower problems in the light of the labour market needs.   
(Al-Khateeb, 1998; Ministry of Education, 2004) 
 
3.10.2 The Structure of GOTEVT's Activities  
 
GOTEVT implements the Kingdom’s strategy of labour force development through a 
system composed basically of three levels: vocational training, technical education 
and higher technical education (Al-Dhuwain et al., 2000; Ministry of Education, 
2004).  In addition and more recently, GOTEVT is involved in different new training 
and development initiatives as part of its efforts to fulfil the increasing skills’ 
demands of the labour market and Saudization of jobs, especially in the private sector 
which will be discussed in the coming chapter.  These initiatives include the National 
System for Joint Training, Military Vocational Training, and on-the Job Training 
(Ministry of Education, 2004).     
 
3.10.3 Vocational Training 
 
The vocational training program includes morning and evening sessions conducted in 
32 GOTEVT vocational training centres around the Kingdom to fulfil the skills 
requirements of the labour market.  This program aims at preparing, training and 
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qualifying Saudis aged between 17 and 45 years who are at the entry level to join the 
labour force; likewise, it transfers unskilled workers who are already employed to 
technicians in their areas of specialties.  This training, in both its morning and evening 
sessions, involves a variety of short-term intensive courses ranging from 6 months for 
the evening sessions and 12 to 18 months for the morning courses (GOTEVT, 2002).  
In general, evening sessions are usually attended by government employees who 
cannot join the morning classes or by individuals who do not meet the admission 
requirements of the morning sessions.  The evening classes do not require specific 
level of education for admission; unlike the morning ones which require a primary or 
intermediate certificate for admission.  However, both sessions provide vocational 
training for Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration, Electrician, Welding, Carpentry, 
Plumbing, Printing, General and Mechanics, Photography, Tailoring and various other 
occupations.  Students enrolled in vocational training receive their training free of 
cost.  On the contrary, they are provided with following incentives: 
 
• Stipend ranging between SR. 600 and 800 after completing half of the course 
and passing the exam. 
• SR. 260 once during their course to cover their training uniform expenses. 
• A reward of SR 1,000 for outstanding achievement. 
• Housing and food services for those coming from outside the city. 
• Medical and social care.   (GOTEVT, 2002) 
 
Over the period from 1982 till 2002 as Table (3.4.) illustrates, the number of trainees 
enrolled in these programs reached 200,988 trainees while the number of graduates 
stood at 122,117 trainees (Al-Khateeb, 1998; Al-Dhuwain et al., 2000; GOTEVT, 
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2002; Ministry of Education, 2004).  In addition in 2002, the number of teachers in 
these programs reached 1,398 while the number of administrators and technical 
supporting staff is 336 (GOTEVT, 2002).  
 
Table 3.4: Development of Vocational Training Trainees and Graduates 
Trainees of Vocational 
Training Programs Graduates Year 
Morning Evening Total Morning Evening Total 
1982 3917 5628 9545 2455 4509 6964 
1983 3751 4866 8617 2808 3948 6756 
1984 3967 4422 8119 2970 3487 6457 
1985 4515 4779 9294 2579 8315 6394 
1986 4991 4950 9941 3012 3979 6991 
1987 5531 2847 8378 3266 2279 5545 
1988 6443 2799 9242 3483 2251 5734 
1989 6601 2923 9534 4718 2371 7089 
1990 6460 2971 9431 4491 2306 6797 
1991 6658 2406 9064 4578 1564 6142 
1992 6115 2727 8842 3942 1969 5911 
1993 6550 2962 9512 4151 2204 6355 
1994 6496 2374 8870 4477 1722 6199 
1995 6571 2270 8841 4333 1727 6060 
1996 7088 1194 8282 4302 949 5251 
1997 5985 1473 7458 4387 1157 5544 
1998 7795 1778 9537 3256 1493 4749 
1999 10122 2265 12387 3866 2128 5994 
2000 9626 1485 11111 4453 1214 5667 
2001 10436 1215 11651 4366 1152 5518 
2002 11673 1659 13332 - - - 
TOTAL 141291 59993 200988 75893 50724 122117 
Sources: 
• Annual Statistical Report for 1422/1423 A.H., GOTEVT (2002: 61, 83, 98).  
• Technical Education and Vocational Training Progress, GOTEVT (1999: 28, 32, 35).    
 
 
3.10.4 Technical Education 
 
Technical education, on the other hand, provides education via its secondary 
industrial, commercial, agricultural and supervisors' institutes.  These institutes 
qualify their students to either join the labour market; or proceed for postsecondary 
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technical education by joining the technical colleges, particularly those graduating 
from secondary industrial and commercial institutes; or alternatively enrol in 
universities for further specialization in their field of study (Al-Dhuwain et al., 2000).  
According to Al-Khateeb (1998), technical education aims at preparing and qualifying 
Saudi human resources to be industrial, commercial, and agricultural technicians and 
professionals through providing them with skills and knowledge related to such areas.     
 
• Secondary Industrial Education 
 
This technical education is conducted in GOTEVT’s ten secondary industrial 
institutes located in Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam, Abha, Ta’if, Hofuf, Madinah, 
Onaizah, and Zulfi cities.  They admit those who have completed intermediate school 
to be trained in a number of specialties like computer, communications, medical 
equipment, electronics, mechanics, electric installations and metal construction.  
Students are required to spend three years before being awarded the Secondary 
Industrial Institute Diploma (GOTEVT, 2002; Al-Dhuwain et. al., 2000).   
 
• Secondary Commercial Education 
 
Secondary commercial education in Saudi Arabia is considered to be, according to 
Al-Dhuwain et al.(2000), one of the significant educational channels in preparing the 
highly demanded national manpower to manage commercial, administrative and 
financial occupations.  For this and to meet the “needs of modern life and the 
development of the labour market, [GOTEVT has] made the necessary changes in 
[this education’s] curricula in order to graduate qualified youths.”  These changes 
which were applied in 1997 include providing first-year students with basic 
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commercial sciences followed in the second year by more specialized courses in 
accounting, book keeping, marketing, public relations, office and material 
management.  Finally, students specialize in one of these areas during their first 
semester of the third year, while spending their second semester in a cooperative 
training in either government or private organization (GOTEVT 2002: 67).   
 
There are 16 secondary commercial institutes in the Kingdom that admit intermediate 
schools graduates. These institutes provide morning and evening sessions awarding 
their graduates the Secondary Commercial Institute Diploma (GOTEVT,  2002).  
 
• Secondary Agricultural Education 
 
It aims at preparing national manpower to work in agricultural sectors to contribute to 
the Kingdom’s agricultural development plans. The four secondary agricultural 
institutes in Buraidah, Wadi Dawassir, Kharj, and Jazan train Saudi intermediate 
school graduates in three main areas i.e. animal and plant production as well as 
agricultural mechanization.  Courses offered include land reform, bee breeding, 
horticulture, irrigation, animal breeding and feeding, poultry, dairy production in 
addition to training courses on operation and maintenance of agricultural machines 
like pumps, reaping machines and greenhouse technology.  Graduates of the 
agricultural institutes are awarded the Secondary Agricultural Institute Diploma 
(GOTEVT, 2002; Al-Dhuwain et. al., 2000). 
 
• Secondary Supervising Education 
 
This technical education started by the establishment of a secondary supervisors 
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institute in 1965 in Riyadh which was followed by four similar institutes in Abha, 
Tabouk, Ta’if and Onaizah cities.   They were established to fulfil the Kingdom needs 
of qualified Saudis in areas like survey, architectural constructions, architectural 
drawing, civil construction works, and health supervision. Students in these institutes 
study for three years after finishing their intermediate education to be awarded the 
Technical Supervisors Secondary Institute Diploma. 
 
Students of technical institutions of industrial, commercial, agricultural and 
supervisors education are provided with the following incentives:  
 
• Monthly stipends ranging between SR. 450 and 675. 
• Work uniform and educational materials and tools. 
• Opportunity for graduates to continue their education in the colleges of 
technology. 
• Housing and food services for those coming from outside the city. 
(GOTEVT, 2002) 
 
Overall, as Table (3.5) illustrates, technical institutions of industrial, commercial, 
agricultural and supervisors education in the Kingdom have had 354,368 students 
enrolled in their different programs for the period from 1981 to 2002.   Of those, 
81,348 students (22.9%) have graduated with their Technical Secondary Institute 
Diploma for the same period.  In 2002, the number of teachers in these institutes is 
2,182 while the number of administrators and technical staff is 784 (GOTEVT, 2002).    
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Table 3.5: Trainees and Graduates Development at 
Secondary Technical Institutes 
Trainees At Secondary Technical 
Institutes Graduates 
Year 
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1981 1819 4468 246 428 6961 321 1074 95 177 1667 
1982 2654 4936 190 485 8265 375 1206 67 176 1824 
1983 3163 5828 148 486 9625 534 1305 47 239 2125 
1984 3698 6479 145 398 10720 739 1520 39 167 2465 
1985 4027 6352 153 333 10865 1112 1647 34 133 2926 
1986 3960 6548 169 346 11023 852 1683 46 112 2693 
1987 4653 7383 266 480 12782 1051 1474 29 120 2674 
1988 5362 7755 422 682 14221 916 1735 42 * 2693 
1989 6243 7980 370 930 15523 1138 1930 64 174 3306 
1990 6815 7198 399 989 15401 1489 1856 133 259 3737 
1991 7375 7025 408 1050 15858 1735 1949 79 302 4065 
1992 7929 7351 506 1131 16917 1960 1797 90 297 4144 
1993 8245 8501 702 1498 18946 1834 1553 133 278 3798 
1994 8672 10335 774 1660 21441 1954 1895 150 336 4335 
1995 8558 10995 737 1738 22028 2069 2425 119 478 5091 
1996 8045 10916 821 1956 21738 2060 2556 205 519 5340 
1997 7816 9554 839 2073 20282 1819 2649 195 487 5150 
1998 7766 8228 670 2178 18842 1635 2862 194 561 5252 
1999 9561 7294 639 2308 19802 1420 1971 203 576 4170 
2000 9470 6906 449 2430 19255 1734 1730 116 646 4226 
2001 11006 7179 321 2693 21199 2301 1775 124 659 4859 
2002 11590 7794 303 2987 22674 2243 1780 74 711 4808 
TOTAL 148427 167005 9677 29259 354368 31291 40372 2278 7407 81348 
* There were no graduates for this year due to changing study period from 2 to 3 years.   
Sources: 
• Annual Statistical Report for 1422/1423 A.H., GOTEVT (2002: 61, 83, 98, 113).  
• Annual Report on the Conditions of Technical Education and Training in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 1422/1423 A.H., Manpower Council (2003: 10, 17, 20, 25, 28). 
• Technical Education and Vocational Training Progress, GOTEVT (1999: 28, 32, 35, 40).    
 
 
3.10.5 Colleges of Technology   
 
There are 20 colleges of technology spread in different regions in the Kingdom 
(GOTEVT, 2003).  They were established based on the needs of developmental 
sectors in the Kingdom to be a basic source for training and qualifying young Saudis 
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in various technical fields to ensure their participation in Saudi development (Ministry 
of Education, 2004).  The first college was established in Riyadh in 23rd of December, 
1983 by the Royal Decree No.  7/H5267.  According to Al-Dhuwain et al., (2000), the 
main objectives for establishing these colleges are: 
 
1. To expand the Saudi manpower base in the different technical fields and provide 
various sectors with qualified national manpower who will undertake the 
country’s development plans. 
2. To open new channels of higher technical education that meet the country’s needs, 
at the same time create more enrolment opportunities for the increasing secondary 
schools and technical institutes’ graduates beside the limited capacity of 
universities. 
3. To expand this sort of higher technical education in the Kingdom’s different 
regions which will eventually develop these regions educationally, socially, and 
economically.  
4. To provide continuing education and training for workers at the technical and 
vocational fields.   
 
Colleges of technology admit the graduates of secondary schools and secondary 
technical institutes who are awarded upon graduation the Technical College Diploma 
qualifications.   These colleges operate on the two-semester system, each semester 
consisting of 15 weeks.  Students study 64 to 75 units including college and 
department mandatory and elective units ideally over four semesters; however, and 
due to failing and repeating some of these units, they usually spend five or even 7-8 
semesters in addition to the mandatory cooperative training semester.  According to 
 78 
the colleges study plans, the units are divided into the following percentages: 20% 
general and humanities studies, 30% basic and specialized sciences, and 50% 
practical training (Al-Dhuwain et. al., 2000).  As for the bachelor’s degree program 
conducted in Riyadh College of Technology, students study 75 units in addition to 12 
units of English language training and graduate having similar privileges granted to 
the graduates of the engineering colleges at the Kingdom’s universities.         
 
In general, according to GOTEVT (2002) colleges of technology conduct the 
following training programs  
 
• Electronic Technology: 
− Industrial Electronics and Control. 
− Communication. 
• Computer Technology: 
− Computer. 
− Software Programming. 
• Electrical Technology: 
− Electrical Machines. 
− Electrical Power. 
• Mechanical Technology: 
− Production. 
− Vehicles.  
− Agriculture Machines. 
− Refrigeration and Air Conditioning. 
− Automatic Control. 
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• Chemical Technology: 
− Chemical Laboratory. 
− Chemical Production. 
• Construction Technology. 
• Management Technology: 
− Accounting. 
− Office Management. 
− Tourism and Hotel Management.  
− Marketing. 
− Bank Management.  
 
Students enrolled in colleges of technology enjoy a number of incentives.  They 
include a monthly stipend of SR 1,000 during their period of study in the college in 
addition to free medical treatments.  They are also provided with all training materials 
and tools (GOTEVT, 2002).    
 
According to GOTEVT (2002), there are 1,987 teachers in the colleges of technology 
in addition to 340 administrative and technical support staff in 2002.  As Table (3.6.) 
shows, the number of students enrolling in the colleges of technology has increased 
from 91 students when establishing the first college to 30,060 students in 2002.  
However, the increase in number of graduates did not follow this increase in 
enrolment reaching only 21,659 students (15.1%).       
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Table 3.6: Students Studying and Graduating from Colleges of Technology 
  
Year Students Graduates 
1984 91 - 
1985 254 62 
1986 241 71 
1987 332 73 
1988 887 100 
1989 1403 447 
1990 2247 479 
1991 3379 590 
1992 4119 1248 
1993 5703 1354 
1994 6648 1706 
1995 7214 1967 
1996 6999 1909 
1997 7629 1916 
1998 8880 1890 
1999 13998 1760 
2000 19635 2242 
2001 23672 3845 
2002 30060 4639* 
TOTAL 143391 
 
21659 
* Not including BSc. graduates from Riyadh College of Technology.     
Sources: 
• Annual Statistical Report for 1422/1423 A.H., GOTEVT (2002: 37).  
• Annual Report on the Conditions of Technical Education and Training in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia 1422/1423 A.H., Manpower Council (2003:07). 
• Technical Education and Vocational Training Progress, GOTEVT (1999: 23). 
 
 
3.11 Private Technical and Vocational Training Institutes 
 
GOTEVT also plays a major role in the private technical and vocational training in 
the Kingdom.  This emerges from its regulatory and supervisory position over private 
technical and vocational training institutes.  According to Manpower Council decision 
No. 5/m16/1404H, GOTEVT has the country’s authority to issue licenses for the 
establishment of private technical institutes and vocational centres.  In addition in the 
26th of August 2000, the decision No. 13326 was issued including the executive rules 
and regulations overseen by GOTEVT controlling private technical institutes and 
vocational centres.  These regulations include licences, authorization, conditions, 
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specifications of buildings, training instructions, and rules of examinations 
(GOTEVT, 2002).    
 
There are 392 private technical institutes and vocational centres in the Kingdom 
offering two levels of training including secondary technical institutes and vocational 
training centres similar to GOTEVT ones.  These institutes and centres conduct one-
month short programs, three-month medium programs, or long two-year diploma 
programs.  These programs cover specializations like computer and communication 
sciences, electronics, automobile mechanics and electronics, safety and security, 
aviation, industrial technical education, commercial technical education, supervisors 
technical education, and other postsecondary programs.  In 2002, the total number of 
students enrolled in these programs reached 31,382 students while the number of 
graduates stood at 15,115 students (Al-Dhuwain et al., 2000; GOTEVT, 2002).                
 
3.12 Outcomes of Government Dominance and Bureaucracy on Higher and 
Vocational and Technical Education 
  
Higher education in the country is not in a better position than the general one.  
According to the same study of the Institute of Research of KFUPM (2003), Saudi 
higher education is coping with a number of obstacles in fulfilling its core objectives.  
It suffers, for example, from shortages in absorbative capacity.  During the Sixth 
Development Plan, the total male and female enrolments in universities and girls’ 
colleges increased from 165,000 students in 1995 to more than 263,000 students in 
1999, at an average annual growth rate of 12.4%. The number of new entrants 
increased from 46,800 male and female students to 78,000 students, and the number 
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of graduates from 22,000 male and female graduates to 41,000 during the same 
period, at an average annual growth rate of 13.6% and 16.8% respectively.  This 
problem escalated even further during the Seventh Development Plan as a huge influx 
of secondary schools students (266,000) graduated by the end of 2004 to face the 
limited absorbative capacity in higher education institutions (Ministry of Planning, 
2000).  
 
The Kingdom’s eleven universities which are designed to absorb 30% of secondary 
school graduates with a total capacity of 218,000 students, are forced to increase their 
intakes beyond their capacity due to the increased demand resulting from high 
population growth and the preference for university education over vocational and 
technical education (Al-Sheikh 2001; World Bank, 2002; Madhi and Barrientos, 
2003.  However, this expansion in university intake was not based on the actual 
market demand for specialisation and, therefore, the trend of expansion in higher 
education has shifted towards social, arts, and literary studies because they are much 
easier to understand and therefore graduate from. This has created a shortage of 
graduates in scientific and technical areas (Ministry of Planning, 1997).  In their study 
Madhi and Barrientos, (2003) state  
 
Available statistics for 1995 show that 80% of all graduates of local universities studied 
in the humanities, including arts, literature, education, sociology, and religious studies. 
The remaining 20% is distributed among all technical and scientific subjects. The 
combined number of graduates in computer science, pharmacy, meteorology, 
environmental studies, geology, and marine sciences, accounted for just 2% of all 
graduates in 1995.     (P: 73) 
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Al-Shammary et al., (2003), on the other hand, indicates minor improvement in their 
statistics of students graduating from universities and girls colleges for three 
consecutive years 1999, 2000, and 2001.  In these statistics the average number of 
graduates from scientific and technical majors represents only 25%; on the other hand, 
the majority or 75% of those graduates are still graduating from literary majors.  In 
their study Al-Shammary found that that higher education and training government 
institutions included a total of 1,000 departments and majors at the university level for 
both genders.  Of those, 422 were scientific departments and majors and 578 were 
humanity and literary ones.  Despite this relative proximity between these two 
numbers, the average number of graduates for the mentioned three years of the former, 
according to the study, was 12,586 students while the latter witnessed an average of 
37,152 students representing 75% of the average number of graduates for that period.  
Similarly, the study found that 525 departments and majors for the postsecondary two 
years diploma level for both genders; 283 of them were scientific departments and 
majors while 242 were humanity and literary ones.  The average number of graduates 
of the former for the three years was 4,650 students while that of the latter was 8,517.  
On the other hand, a different scenario existed in the vocational and technical 
secondary education.  In this level, the study found that 281 departments and majors in 
the Kingdom consisting of 143 scientific and technical departments and majors and 
138 humanity and literary ones.  The average number of graduates of the scientific and 
technical departments and majors reached 14,409 students while humanity and literary 
majors’ graduates were only 5,055 which according to their conclusion is ‘to some 
extent’ consistent with market demands and requires ‘further reinforcement’.  Finally, 
in the pre-secondary vocational and technical levels there were 740 departments and 
majors around the Kingdom.  Of which, the majority, 702, were scientific and 
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technical departments and majors while only 38 were humanity and literary ones 
conducting short courses of English.  However, the average of graduates from the 
former was only 6,576 which, according to their study, was quite low standing at an 
average of only 9 graduates per scientific department.  According to Al-Shammary et 
al. (2003) these figures illustrates an imbalanced outcome of humanity and literary 
study majors over scientific and technical fields in government educational and 
training institutions (Table 3.7). 
 
More alarming, Al-Shammary et al. (2003) argued that Saudi education and training 
outcomes were creating an upside-down pyramid.  The majority of graduates were 
from higher education's universities amounting to 49,738 representing 56% of the 
average total number of graduates 88,954 for the years 2000, 2001, and 2002.  
Whereas average number of graduates from the rest of the three levels of the general 
education altogether amounted to 39,219 which represented only 44%.    
          
Table 3.7. 
Summary table of Al-Shammary et al. (2003) findings of the Average number of 
Graduates according to their majors from the four levels of education in Saudi Arabia 
for the years of 2000, 2001 and 2002 
 
No. of Departments in 
Saudi Arabia Level of 
Education 
H&L* S&T** % of S&T 
Humanity 
& Literary 
Majors 
Graduates 
(H&L) 
Scientific & 
Technical 
Majors 
Graduates 
(S&T) 
 
% of (S&T) 
to (H&L) 
Graduates  
 
 
TO
TA
L 
 
University 578 422 42.2 37152 12586 25.3 49738 
Two-years Post 
Secondary 
Diploma 
242 283 53.9 8517 4650 35.3 13167 
Secondary 
Vocational and 
Technical  
138 143 50.9 5055 14409 74 19464 
Pre-secondary 
Vocational and 
Technical 
38 702 94.8 9 6576 99.8 6585 
TOTAL 996 1550 60.9 50733 38221 42.9 88954 
*Humanity and Literary, ** Scientific and Technical 
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This argument led Al-Shammary et al., and many others to assert the present 
limitations of the capabilities and qualities in these institutions altogether to fulfill 
current market demands of qualified human resources not to mention the future needs.  
They also confirm incompatibilities of these government institutions’ outcomes with 
market demands due to the concentrations on literary studies rather than scientific and 
technical skills, knowledge and attitudes that are mostly demanded in the labour 
market (see also Al-Sultan, 1998; Al-Humaid, 2002; Riyadh Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, 1999; Ghaban et al., 2002; Al-Anssary, 2001; Madhi and Barrientos, 
2003; Hammad, 2006; Madah, 2001; Al Ajaji, 1995; and Al-Shimaimry, and Al-
Dikheelallah, 2000).  
 
Another outcome of such a focus on literary studies rather than scientific and 
technical majors is the excessive utilization of a lecturing method in teaching instead 
of hands-on and learn-by-doing approaches.  Higher education institutions use 
ineffective lecturing teaching method providing merely theories and abstract learning 
experiences to students.  In addition, these institutions, then, evaluate their students’ 
abilities to memorize and recall such experiences with less emphasis on measuring 
what they have acquired.  Therefore, this has shifted the students’ focus from learning 
skills and attitudes essential for their future professions to merely passing their exams. 
 
The other side of the coin of higher education is vocational training that is provided 
by vast commercial training centres and government institutions.  However, technical 
education and vocational training is mainly available through a government agency 
i.e. GOTEVT. It covers commercial, agricultural and industrial and technical training 
and education and it is available only to Saudi students, mainly male ones.  On the 
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other hand, Saudi female students who according to Al-Sheikh (2001) represent more 
than half of the total numbers of students in Saudi Arabia, have limited technical 
education and vocational training opportunities with few exceptions in areas like 
teaching, health care and social work, and clothes design and production (Madhi and 
Barrientos, 2003).  As a result, Saudi females’ employment is strongly concentrated in 
the education sector (educational and administrative jobs) where they constitute 
85.8% of the total number of all employed females. The health and social work 
sectors, followed by public administration make up 6.1% and 4.4% respectively 
(Ministry of Planning, 2005).  According to the same reference, their total 
participation in the labour force represents only 14% of the total labour force in the 
Kingdom.  This participation rate is limited especially when compared with a number 
of Arab and Islamic countries as in Table (3.8.).  
 
Table 3.8: 
Females Participation Rates in Economic Activity 
(15 years and above) (2002) 
Country/Region Participation Rate (%) 
Egypt 35.7 
Lebanon 30.3 
Syria 58.5 
Tunisia 37.5 
Morocco 41.8 
Turkey 50.8 
Pakistan 36.3 
Indonesia 56.0 
Arab Countries 33.0 
Developing Countries 55.8 
Latin American and the Caribbean 42.5 
South Asia 43.7 
Source: The 8th Development Plan, Ministry of Planning (2005:366).  
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However, it should be mentioned here that as of the 13th of April, 2005, GOTEVT 
was assigned to the responsible government body of technical education and 
vocational training activities for Saudi females (GOTEVT, 2006).  According to the 
same report, GOTEVT conduct 23 technical training programs for them covering the 
following areas:  
 
• Computer technologies. 
• Electronic technologies. 
• Administration techniques. 
• Female beautician techniques. 
• Food processing and manufacturing techniques. 
• Jewellery design and manufacturing techniques.    
 
However despite the government’s high expenditure on vocational training, there is a 
general shortage of technical skills to meet the demand in the labour market in 
particular in the private sector (Al-Sheikh, 2001).  Madhi and Barrientos (2003: 72) 
confirm similar conclusion that “education and training systems [in Saudi Arabia] are 
not fully able to supply the economy with the range and quantity of skilled workers it 
requires”.  Similar opinions come from the Saudi labour market by the president of 
Al-Zamil Steel and the Director of H. Al-Zamil Companies who states that his 
organization   
 
[…] have many young Saudi graduates from both the universities and technical colleges 
that are looking for employment.  In most cases, they are not able to find jobs because 
their education and training are not compatible with the demand.    
(Haider, 2003)  
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At the same report, Al-Humaidan, managing director of the Al-Youm Publishing 
Group, agrees that “[Saudi] education policy has to match the market requirements” 
(Haider, 2003)  
 
According to the study by the Institute of Research of KFUPM (2003), GOTEVT 
secondary and higher technical education encounter similar challenges of general and 
higher education in addition to some more.  These challenges include, first, ambiguity 
in admission policies for secondary technical education graduates wishing to proceed 
for postsecondary education in GOTEVT’s technical colleges or public universities.  
Unlike, secondary school graduates from general education, they are expected to join 
the labour market after finishing their diploma and not to go for further education.  
Second, technical education according to the same study encounters the public's 
inferior view of enrolment in secondary or higher technical education as a result of 
insufficient general education curricula to inculcate the importance and respect of 
vocational work.  Third, this education lacks the essential regular revision and 
updating of technical education curricula to support developments of new 
technologies in the labour market.  Therefore, it suffers of weakness of the technical 
education curricula accompanied by costly private vocational training.  Finally, 
technical education and vocational training by GOTEVT have insufficient faculty 
staff that possess technical competencies as well as social and technical guidance 
abilities especially with GOTEVT’s limited financial resources to provide them with 
regular and up-to-date development training in their fields. 
 
In a more general perspective, the findings of Al-Shammary et al. (2003) echo the 
conclusions of a number of other studies and illustrate major problems of government 
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skill formation institutions in conjunction with the Saudi labour market demands (see 
also Al-Sultan, 1998; Al-Humaid, 2002; Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
1999; Ghaban et al., 2002; Al-Anssary, 2001; Madhi and Barrientos, 2003; Hammad, 
2006; Madah, 2001; Al Ajaji, 1995; and Al-Shimaimry, and Al-Dikheelallah, 2000).  
Among such problems is that these skill formation institutions are largely controlled 
and dominated by government resulting in less attractiveness for the private sector 
investment in Human Resource Development.  In fact the government through 
GOTEVT and other government institutions is competing with private sector 
businesses that are willing to risk investing in the HRD fields.  At the same time the 
latter are dominated by GOTEVT’s government bureaucratic supervision and 
regulations that in many cases discourage such investments.  Ironically, the country 
lacks an autonomous government or private academic and vocational assessment and 
recognition body.  It even lacks national vocational qualification standards that could 
direct and determine any HRD initiatives.  More alarmingly, it also lacks unification 
of essential human resources related information due to its dispersal among different 
government organizations such as the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Interior, the 
Ministry of Civil Services, the Council of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and 
the Ministry of Planning just to mention few. Therefore, the country lacks a futuristic 
economic vision that enables long-term skill formation planning for its human 
resources.  This has resulted in, for example, government education and training 
institutions failing to recognize and fulfil small-to-medium size organizations’ 
requirements for Saudi trained human resources despite the fact that they employ 
more than 71% of the workforce.    
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The discussions of the aforementioned studies, confirm that dilemmas dominating 
education and skill formation systems are attributable to the lack of coordination 
between higher education institutions and private and government sectors.  The lack 
of coordination is the direct result of the centralization and control of the country’s 
educational and vocational training systems by various government bodies.  It is 
producing and creating bureaucratic fragmentation resulting in an unsynchronized 
overall vision for the country’s education and economy.  Therefore, the government 
educational and training institutions pay less attention to practical skills mostly 
needed in the labour market when either establishing new or developing old training 
programs.  Due to their rigid government bureaucracies, these institutions experience 
lengthy processes to incorporate and modify their education and training programs to 
meet new market demands and Saudization plans.  As a result, Saudization policies 
are persistently evaded by the private sector due to their limited participation in 
planning and providing Saudis with the education and training compatible to its 
labour market needs.  Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the mismatch and 
unbalanced skill formation programs including GOTEVT's are not adequately 
fulfilling labour market demands for Saudi human resources and this is arguably 
creating the unemployment dilemma among Saudis.  In addition, government systems 
and policies are increasingly becoming obstacles to private organizations rapid 
development as the government is imposing its bureaucratic performance instead of 
assisting this economic sector in a businesslike approach.           
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3.13 The Saudi Labour Market 
 
The most important Saudi labour market dilemma arises as a result of high 
unemployment rates among Saudis while, ironically, employing massive numbers of 
foreign workforce.  This dilemma started to be evident during the county’s high 
economic performance at some stage in the 1970’s and early 1980’s (Madhi and 
Barrientos, 2003).  In the country, as mentioned earlier, there was little need for a 
Saudi working class throughout most of the two decades. In fact, the high oil prices 
were so high that they convinced the government to bring and pay a large number of 
foreign workers recruited mainly in the private sector to help in building the country’s 
infrastructure, while simultaneously employing most Saudis in government jobs (Al-
Humaid, 2005).  It was nation building without getting the citizens' fingernails dirty. 
The government jobs’ salaries were not always enough, but government subsidized 
this with flexible housing loans, free health care, and free education which gave most 
citizens a comfortable middle-class lifestyle.  These government jobs were always 
limited and have finally reached their peak of absorbance for Saudi manpower forcing 
the government to look for more employment in the country’s private sector.  This 
sector was already establishing, during the years of building the country’s 
infrastructure, a labour environment that is exclusively dependant on utilizing cheap 
foreign labour, which in turn created a dual labour market of Saudis employed in 
government jobs and cheap foreign labour in the private sector.     
 
This dilemma of an unbalanced growing foreign labour force is associated with the 
country’s rapid population growth, mentioned earlier, of 3.8% and with more than 
50% of the total population under the age of 19.  This has put enormous pressure on 
 92 
the government to create employment at a rapid rate mainly in the private sector to 
cope with the increasing numbers of Saudi graduating every year from government 
educational and vocational institutions.  According to Al-Sheikh (2001)  
 
At the time when a lot of the private sector organisations in the Kingdom continued to 
evade recruiting Saudi nationals the number of university graduates kept increasing and 
the unemployment rate rising until it reached 27%. This had negative effects on the 
national economy and the security of the Saudi society.    
(P: 123) 
 
The dependency on the foreign labour force in the Saudi private sectors continued 
despite the sharp decline in the government revenues in the 1980’s from 368 billion 
Saudi Riyals in 1981 to 104 billion Saudi Riyals in 1987, and despite the Gulf war in 
the 1990’s (Al-Jasser, 2002).  Figures indicated that there was an increasing trend of 
recruiting foreign labour as the applications for employment visas have been 
increasing annually by 24% between 1990 and 1995.  According to latest figures by 
the Minister of Labour himself, the number of work visas for expatriates issued by his 
Ministry in 2008 reached 1.7 million with an increase of 34% from 1.265 million in 
2007 (Al-Watan, 2008).   
 
According to the 8th Development Plan, the total number of the work force in the 
Kingdom in both government and private sectors grew from 7.23 million in 1999 to 
8.27 million in 2003 at an annual growth rate of 3.4%.  Of the total size of the labour 
force, 3.54 million (42.7%) were Saudis and 4.74 million (57.2%) are expatriates.  
Most of these expatriates (95%) were employed by the private sector and the 
remaining 5% were employed by the government sector. The participation rate of the 
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Saudi work force in the government sector amounted to some 85.2%, while the share 
of Saudi employment in the private sector was only 14.8% in 2004 (Ministry of 
Planning, 2005).  In 2005, figures by the Ministry of Labour’s 2005 Annual Statistical 
Report indicate that Saudis in the private sector reached 623,465 employees 
representing 11.63% of its total employment while foreign workers amounted for 
4,738,823 representing 88.37% (Ministry of Labour, 2005).  The same reference 
illustrates that the majority (85.67%) of the total workforce (Saudis and none) in the 
private sector were recruited in four major industries.  In the construction industry, the 
workforce represented 36.24% of the total employment in the private sector while 
26.34% are in recruited in wholesale and retail trade.  Moreover, 11.67% of the total 
workforce is performing the community and personal services while 11.42% are 
working in the transportation related industries.  The remaining 14.33% of the total 
workforce in the private sector is recruited in the agriculture industries including 
fishing and forestry by 7.09%; and 2.33% are in transportation, storage and 
Telecommunications.  The remaining 4.91% are divided between finance and real-
estate services, electricity, gas and water industries and non-oil mining and quarrying.   
 
The direct result of this low employment of Saudis in the private sector was an 
unemployment rate reaching approximately 9.6% according to the official report by 
the Saudi Minister of Labour (Saudi Press Agency, 2004).  This percentage increased 
to 12% at the end of 2007 (Al-Watan, 2008).  The Kingdom’s unemployment 
according to the findings of the 8th Development Plan is described as ‘structural 
unemployment’ which, according to its field survey, relates to a fundamental 
mismatch between demand and supply of national manpower in terms of quality and 
quantity.  That is to say, unemployment is not merely a result of a lack of vacant jobs 
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due to a downturn in the economy.  The mismatch between supply and demand in the 
labour market and lack of attractiveness to work in the private sector is due partly to 
the relatively low wages and more importantly to a "skills imbalance".  Many Saudis 
looking for jobs do not have the skills sought by the private sector (Ministry of 
Planning, 2005). 
 
Al-Shammary et al. (2003) have examined this mismatch between supply and demand 
in the labour market for three consecutive years of 2000, 2001, and 2002.  They 
conducted comparisons between the number of graduates of government educational 
and training institutions, their major of studies, and the number of foreign workforce 
employed in classified occupations in the labour market.  They find four main 
categories of supply and demand to these occupations according to the time required 
for their full Saudization provided that graduate numbers or their supply remains at its 
average for the three above mentioned years.  The first category includes occupations 
in the Saudi labour market that have a surplus of Saudi graduates over market demand 
especially from literary and teaching study fields.  Second is the category of 
occupations that require 5 to 20 years of Saudi graduates current supply just to fulfil 
the current demands.  These include medical doctors, engineers, technicians in all 
technical areas in addition to computer and electronic specialists just to mention a few 
examples.  Third are occupations that require more than 20 years of current graduates 
supply to fulfill current market demands.  These demands include, for example, 
laboratories and medical supporting technicians, automobile mechanics and 
electricians, veterinary doctors, salespeople, and construction technicians.  Fourth are 
occupations that require only short focus training courses or merely on-the-job training 
to be filled with Saudis due to unavailability of majors in government educational and 
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training institutions covering skills for these occupations.  They include, for example, 
managerial skills for different industrial sectors, aviation specialists, pilots, human 
resource and insurance specialists.  (For complete and detailed specializations see Al-
Shammary et al., 2003: 31-45)    
 
A number of studies by Ghaban et al. (2002), Al-Saiegh (1995), Ministry of Interior 
(1996), Al-Gaith and Al-Ma’ashoug (1997), Al-Sultan (1998), Al-Nowaiser (2001), 
Ba Ishen (2002) and Al-Shammary et al. (2003) have discussed unemployment in 
Saudi Arabia and have reached the following outcomes of this dilemma.  These 
include that: 
 
• Unemployment in Saudi Arabia differs from the rest of the Arab countries as 
Saudi labour market is changeable according to the fluctuation of oil prices which 
are the main economic source of the country. 
• Unemployment rates are high among uneducated as well as educated Saudis 
irrespective of their education fields which are seen to be unfulfilling to labour 
market demands for skills. 
• Unemployment rates are prevailing in the Kingdom’s both cities and villages and 
among both Saudi males and females although the latter rates are much higher 
reaching in Bourland (2002) study to 33% of those between 20-24 years old and 
18% for females 25-29 years. 
• Unemployment rates are higher among university graduates literary majors in 
comparison to those graduating from scientific majors.  Despite this more are still 
graduating from the former.  For example, according to Al-Shammary et al. 
(2003) for the years 2000, 2001 and 2002 the average number of university 
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students graduating of the former fields of study amounts for 37,152 while 
scientific graduates is only 12,586 for the same period. 
• Foreign labour force is rigorously and continuously competing with Saudi labour 
force on available employment in the labour market to the extent it is exceeding 
its demands in some occupations. 
• 60% of the foreign labour force is unskilled workers who are the major source of 
unemployment to their Saudis counterparts. 
• Unemployment stems mainly from private sector organizations’ dependence and 
preference to recruit foreign labour force instead of nationals for a number of 
reasons as will be explained subsequently.   
• Business ownership concealment and exploitation of the sponsorship system are 
increasing unemployment rates.  The Sixth Development Plan period has 
witnessed the growing phenomenon of concealing the true ownership of 
businesses, to conceal the identity of foreigners through illegal practices to enable 
them undertake some commercial activities and limit Saudi nationals employment 
opportunities in the private sector (Ministry of Planning, 2000). 
• Unemployment in the country is a direct consequence of the mismatch of 
education outcomes and labour market demands in both secondary and university 
levels. 
• There are substantial differences among government and private jobs descriptions 
with less incorporation to most recent changes to these jobs in labour market.  
• Doors for foreign unskilled and semiskilled labour recruitment are still wide open 
in the Kingdom as a cheaper and more profitable venue for the private sector 
instead of recruiting Saudis who might require short focused or on-the-job 
training. 
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• Lack of job security, long working hours, few vacations, unclear promotion 
systems, no formal retirement plan (especially for small enterprises employing 10 
or less employees), and non-existence of minimum wage system create important 
unbalanced employment differences among government and private recruitment 
affecting Saudis’ attractiveness for employment in the latter. 
• Non-existence of any government social security system in the country to support 
and ensure minimum life requirements for Saudis who suffer unemployment 
despite their ability and willingness for employment.  
 
This unemployment as illustrated by Al-Sheikh (2001) is associated with a number of 
negative economic, social and security outcomes that are the consequences, as seen by 
the study, of the presence of foreign work force in the Kingdom, which also have 
effects on the labour market. These include the following: 
 
1. A lot of the foreign workers are working in jobs different from the one specified in their 
work permit, 
2. There are transfers of sponsorships for some of the groups not needed in the labour market. 
Such processes enable foreign workers to stay legally in the Kingdom to search for 
alternative jobs, 
3. Family reunion arrangements, which place a lot of burden on services such as education 
and health, 
4. 8% annual rate increase in remits by the foreign workers to their home countries from $3.63 
billion in 1980 to $15.24 billion in 1994.  In another study of Abdel-Rahman (2003), this 
percentage has exceeded this, reaching 10.37% during the period of 1975-2001 achieving 
$18 billion which constituted 11.79% of the country’s GDP over the last decade 1990-1999.   
5. The foreign labour force represents a high proportion of the Saudi population (46%).    
       (P: 109)  
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On the other hand, Al-Sheikh (2001) echoes the findings of a number of writers (Al-
Ewain, 1999; Al-Nimir, 1993; Yamany, 1997) on the main reasons for private sector 
employers in preferring the recruitment of non-Saudis over Saudis.  Employers, first, 
believe that available Saudi qualifications do not fulfil private sector skill 
requirements that search for qualified and highly trained labour at low costs.  Second, 
employers argue that Saudi higher education is not in a position to provide graduates 
with the specialisation needed by the private sector. They believe that graduates of 
arts, humanities and other theoretical disciplines exceed graduates from scientific and 
technical disciplines.  This argument in particular is widely supported in the Saudi 
literature.  In addition, employers believe that the financial boom of the early 
seventies has contributed in establishing a culture of recklessness and dependence 
among Saudi youth.  This culture accompanied with absence of work discipline 
education has led to the Saudi employees’ lack of respect to employment regulations 
of the private sector with its challenging working conditions.  Moreover, employers 
according to Al-Sheikh's study believe that Saudi job seekers lack the experience and 
aspiration for the high productivity working environment essential to this sector.  The 
majority of them are believed to lack communicative skills especially in English 
which is seen as essential requirement by employers despite the argument that some 
of these jobs are of the contrary (Ghaban et al., 2002).  Employers also claim that 
Saudi nationals search for employment in managerial and administrative positions and 
are not flexible or willing for job relocation from one city to another.  Finally, 
employers are facing the dilemma which is a result of unbalanced labour regulations 
in the Kingdom.  On one hand, Saudis are difficult to dismiss; while on the other, they 
are not stable in their private sector jobs due to competitors head hunting (Al Ajaji, 
1995; Tejarat Al-Riyadh, 2001; Alzalabani, 2003). 
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According to these reasons, it is clear that the highest priority is given to 
incompatibility of training and education outcomes of Saudi nationals with market 
skills demand, which is, arguably, the causes for the rest of the other reasons and 
agrees with the widely accepted perspective of evading Saudi employment in the 
private sector.  
 
3.14 Saudi Attitudes toward Labour and Vocational Jobs in the Private Sector   
 
The dilemma of unemployment among Saudis discussed to this point has another 
contributor factor stemming from the Saudi culture itself and accumulating the 
complexity of the dilemma under consideration.  That is the negative view generally 
held among Saudis to labour and manual jobs available in the labour market (Mellahi, 
2000; Wiseman and Alromi, 2003; Alromi, 2001; Madhi and Barrientos, 2003; 
Hammad, 2005).  This negative view evolved as a result of socio-economic changes 
the country has witnessed since the growth of oil revenues in the 1970’s.  This 
negative perception if continues in the Saudi culture will, beyond doubt, affect 
negatively the status and attractiveness to vocational education and training of young 
citizens in the country for generations to come. 
   
As a number of studies (Mellahi, 2000; Wiseman and Alromi, 2003; Alromi, 2001; 
Madhi and Barrientos, 2003; Hammad, 2005) note, these manual jobs are usually 
associated with expatriate workers employed in the private sector for blue-collar 
careers with low social status in comparison to the government administrative or 
managerial jobs most preferable by Saudis.  This is despite the Islamic principle 
which extensively believed on among Saudis that prohibits distinguishing among 
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people based on their social status.  These blue-collar jobs were filled by expatriates 
at times when the country was in a rapid need for cheap skilled and semi-skilled 
labour forces unavailable locally to establish its infrastructure when oil prices were at 
their peak in late 1970’s and early 1980’s.  This need for a prompt establishment of 
the country’s infrastructure has, however, lead to the establishment of a negative 
cultural attitude toward private sector manual jobs that offer less salaries, less 
vacations, longer working hours, less job security, and less social status.  
Simultaneously, this negative cultural attitude was promoted by the government role 
of being the major employer for Saudis in white-collar jobs with higher salaries, 
longer vacations, less working hours, more employment security, and more 
importantly higher social status.   Ironically, in spite of what one would think, Alromi 
(2001) states that for most Saudis “low income in a white-collar job would be 
preferable to high income in a labouring job” (p: 54).  This is despite the fact that 
manual jobs were culturally accepted and performed by Saudis in generations prior to 
oil discovery (Al-Faqi and Shamsaldeen, 1995; Hammad, 2005). Concurrent with the 
same findings, Madhi and Barrientos (2003) echo a field study by Al-Obaid and 
Ateiah who found that 80% of Saudis refused manual work, 74% preferred high status 
occupations, 64% selected jobs with good social reputation over those with higher 
wages, and about the same percentage favoured working for the government.  
Interestingly, the former British ambassador draws upon his experience in the country 
and describes this cultural view by stating that  
 
In the Kingdom, there is a disdain for any work which is not noble.  Most people shy 
away from work they consider ignoble; Englishmen, for example, are reluctant to be 
waiters or dustmen.  But the Saudi classification of jobs is extraordinarily strict.  Not only 
they reject all manual and menial work; they are also reluctant to undertake anything 
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which is tedious or humdrum.  Plumbing is manual and road sweeping is menial; for 
these tasks they employ foreigners.      
       (Alromi, 2001: 54-55) 
 
Looking at the Saudi culture as a “traditional culture” Alromi (2001), one would find 
that Saudi parents, according to Wiseman and Alromi, assume and perform the 
guidance and support responsibilities for their children since they enter school till 
beyond their employment because unlike the independence view held by Western 
societies, “the patriarchal family hierarchy is a lifelong and life permeating 
relationship in most Islamic Arab nations [including Saudi Arabia]” (2003:10).  The 
Saudi family, who usually maintains greater control and influence on their children’s 
education and career choices, prefers university education and government 
employment over vocational and technical education and private sector employment 
to ensure higher social status for not only their children but the family as a whole 
(Wiseman and Alromi, 2003; Al-Faqi and Shamsaldeen, 1995).  This is in part due to 
the same negative view of manual and menial jobs in addition to the unpredictability 
of employment opportunities before the graduates of vocational and technical 
education in the country (Hammad, 2005) due to incompatibility between skill 
demand and education and training system.  These reasons affect negatively not only 
the attractiveness toward this type of education but also the continuation of students 
already involved in vocational and technical education.  For example, in the same 
study 52.5% of secondary school students surveyed showed that they are unaware of 
different vocational and technical programs available in GOTEVT training colleges 
and institutions due to their eagerness and focus to enter university education instead.  
Aldaoud (2000) has also found that only 62.6% (513) graduated from GOTEVT 
 102 
secondary vocational institutions for the year 1991/92 while 37.4% (306) dropped out 
for the same above reasons.        
   
Supporting the notion of incompatibility between skill demand and education and 
training system, Alromi (2001) argues that the Saudi general secondary school 
educational system as seen by both its students and employers does not adequately 
provide its graduates with personal, social, and capacity skills mostly needed in the 
labour market.  The study concludes that the system’s curriculum and skills provided 
do not “appear to have any influence on student’s inclination to look for a job after 
graduating from high school” (2001: 127) leading the family and the student to pursue 
higher education for further self-investment with the expectation of acquiring 
employable skills for employment preferably in the government.   
  
3.15 Government Efforts and Remedies  
 
To rectify the situation, the Saudi government enforced the Saudization policy in 
1990’s, which was included in the development plans since 1985 with limited 
effectiveness since then (Alzalabani, 2003).  Saudization, in its short-term objective, 
aims at solving the dilemma of high unemployment rates among Saudis.  While its 
long-term strategy aims at replacing the country’s 4.74 million foreign workers 
recruited mainly (95%) in the private sector with as many qualified Saudis as 
possible.  These foreign workers are doing everything from managing large 
companies, staffing hospitals with doctors and nurses, and providing every kind of 
professional service, to labouring in the oil fields, cooking in restaurants, changing 
hotel beds, and sweeping the country's immaculate streets.  The Saudization policy 
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was published under the Council of Ministers Decree No. 50 on the 27th of 
September 1994 requiring private firms employing more then 20 workers “to reduce 
their non-Saudi labour force annually by at least 5%, and to increase their 
employment of Saudi workers accordingly; [it has also] identified some posts to be 
filled by Saudi nationals only” (Madhi and Barrientos, 2003: 75).  To ensure a proper 
and effective compliance with Saudization policy the government established a range 
of incentives and penalties to encourage its implementation by employers.  Non-
complying firms can be subject to: 
• a freeze on applications to import new foreign workers; 
• a freeze on applications to renew residence cards for existing workers; 
• exclusion from government tenders and financial support; and 
• exclusion from access to government subsidies and facilities. 
      (Madhi and Barrientos, 2003: 75) 
 
Moreover, according to Alzalabani (2003), the government has restricted government 
loans, contracts and benefits to achieving Saudization rates requirements.  It has also 
introduced yearly prizes to organizations showing high percentages of Saudization.  It 
also encouraged the annual conduct of a Career Day through which the private sector 
display their vacancies and promote their potential career development plans to Saudi 
candidates.  The government also has established 54 private recruitment offices to 
perform as employment agencies between employer and job seekers.  It is also 
arranging through its 37 Labour Offices in different cities for summer recruitment of 
students in local companies to equip them with skills and work attitudes.  Finally, the 
government is increasing administrative expenses of recruiting expatriates from 
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SR351 to SR1, 600 which all goes to the budget of the Human Resource Development 
Fund (HRDF). 
 
HRDF was established in Riyadh under Council of Ministers Decree No. R/18 dated 
5/8/2000.  According to this Decree, the Fund will be financially and administratively 
independent government organization “to realize the intended objectives set by the 
Saudi leadership to qualify young Saudis for employment in the private sector” 
(HRDF, 2004: 18).  The Board of its Directors is chaired by the Minister of Interior 
with three representative businessmen from the private sector in addition to a number 
of government representatives (Tejarat Al-Riyadh, 2001).  In order to achieve its 
general objective, the Fund provides 75% of training costs and 50% of the salary of 
new employee in the private sector for a maximum of two years (Alzalabani, 2003).  
The Fund also, according to its annual report, subsidizes field programs and projects 
to study Saudi employment in the private sector.  It also supports private 
organizations involved in developing and employing Saudi human resources.  Finally, 
the Fund conducts research as well as annual symposiums to serve its main objective 
of Saudizing HR in the private sector.    
 
Since its establishment and up to 2004, HRDF has financed 43,774 employment 
opportunities through its different programs--employment-oriented training program, 
the direct employment program, and joint-training programs (HRDF, 2004).  In 2006, 
the fund has financed 51,059 employment opportunities in the private sector (HRDF, 
2006).  Although HRDF is producing increasing results and positive improvement, 
both figures do not match the increasing ratio of unemployed Saudis that have been 
registered and that are increasing every graduation year.  In its ‘Saudi Employment 
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Campaign’ run by the Ministry of Labour and GOTEVT around the Kingdom, 
155,000 unemployed Saudis were registered till the end of 2005 (Al-Watan, 2005).  
 
So it is safe to conclude that until this date and despite increasing and persistent 
efforts by the government to Saudize the private sector -- the major potential 
recruiting market -- most indicators show the preference of this sector for recruiting 
foreigners the evading the recruitment of Saudi nationals (Al-Sheikh 2001) with some 
few exceptions of organizations achieving high percentages of Saudization.   
 
3.16 Factors of Successful Saudization  
 
The ineffectual Saudization in the private sector we have been discussing so far has 
some successful scenarios in a number of quasi-government as well as private 
organizations.  These successful Saudization examples, although generally overlooked 
by Saudi HR literature, should be explored to understand the reasons for satisfactory 
training and employment efforts behind their Saudization.  These organizations are 
very active in providing their existing employees with an in-house and on the job 
training as well as reorientation training programs for their newly hired employees.  
Organizations such as the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) and 
Saudi Electric Company (SEC) are two examples of quasi-government organizations 
that operate their own training centers.  The Saudi government owns 70% and 72% of 
their shares consecutively while the rest are owned by the private Saudi citizens and 
other Gulf nationals (Ministry of Planning, 2003; Almineef, 1994, Al-Salamah and 
Wilson 2001).   In Addition, there are a number of private organizations, especially 
banks and Saudi Telecommunication Company (STC) and a number of smaller 
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private  organizations that have made remarkable strides in their Saudization drive 
with some of them achieving more than 70% target (Bahthelah, 2005; Al-Jasser, 
2002; Economy World, 2004, SABIC, 2004).  These smaller organizations have been 
awarded the Minister of Interior Award for achieving high Saudization figures (see 
Alyaum, 2003) 
 
After reviewing the limited available literature on these organizations’ experiences 
with Saudization, it appears their achievements of relatively high Saudization are the 
result of three main factors.  First there is a mutual belief and recognition among top 
management of these organizations that Saudization is an achievable national strategic 
long-term goal of investment in Saudi human capital.  This belief, although 
encountering poor qualification of Saudi graduates of government educational and 
training institutions is, nevertheless, achieved through redeveloping those graduates 
on the businesses’ actual skills needs.  Second, to put it differently, they have 
integrated policies to redevelop newly employed human resources and continuously 
develop existing ones through in-house and on-the-job training or customized 
programs through coordination with local or international training bodies.  The third 
factor is illustrated through their incorporation and implementation of human resource 
management initiatives that attract and retain Saudi manpower such as the 
implementation of a gradual Saudization plan, attracting and assessing potential 
employees, linking employee progression plan to his/her career training plan, relating 
salary and promotion system to employee performance,  providing employees with 
clear retirement plans just to mention a few (Alyaum, 2003; Alriyadh, 2003, 
Bahthelah, 2005; SAMA, 2005; Al-Ghaith, 1996; SABIC, 2004; Economy World, 
2003)  
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As an example of an industry achieving high percentages of Saudization and 
implementing the above three factors, the attention will be drawn to the banking 
industry which has exceeded 79% Saudization of its HR (SAMA, 2005).  Their 
experience as a sector of achieving such high figures of Saudization represents, 
arguably, the effectiveness and achievability of the Saudization program.  It was 
clearly a government policy driven by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
the main supervisory and regulatory government body controlling the banking and 
financial sector (Al-Ghaith, 1996).  SAMA’s implementation of such a policy was 
under a balanced process of maintaining the strength and soundness of the sector 
while gradually replacing its foreign HR by qualified Saudis.  This Saudization was 
balanced not to overlook the local banks needs for international expertise to assure 
their global competition (Al-Ghaith, 1996; Al-Jasser, 2002).   
 
To accomplish Saudization, according to Al-Ghaith (1996), SAMA has established a 
Saudization unit to supervise and study the banking sector progress on 
 
• Gradually replacing its foreign staff by Saudis following the government 
annual quota of 5%. 
• Saudizing their top management and leading positions. 
• Establishing and implementing training and development programs to 
redevelop Saudi staff to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness.   
• Reporting their Saudization progress to the unit in SAMA to assist them in 
their Saudization efforts.    
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It could be argued that SAMA’s regulatory and close supervisory role to Saudize HR 
in local banks has put the spin on the wheel of Saudization of the banking industry.  
The gradual and constant process of Saudization has created the culture and belief in 
the banks’ top management to Saudize and invest in developing its HR.  This was 
supported and accompanied by rapid growth of the banking industry which is an 
essential factor of their ability to invest in their HR development and retention.   
 
Saudi banks were not absent from the economy booming in Saudi Arabia since the 
discovery of oil.  For example, the 1970’s “was a period of rapid growth for the 
banking system; banks’ assets grew from 3 billion Saudi Riyals to 93 billion Saudi 
Riyals, and deposits from 2 billion Saudi Riyals to 68 billion Saudi Riyals” (Al-
Jasser, 2002: 7).  Three decades later, Saudi banks are still maintaining their growth 
momentum and profitability despite the consequences of the tumbling oil prices in the 
1980’s and after the Gulf crisis in the 1990’s, and the difficult international conditions 
including 1994 Mexican crisis, the 1997 South East Asian crisis and recent crises in 
Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and Turkey.  These crises as Al-Jasser explains produced 
“heavy withdrawal of deposits for precautionary cash holding and transfer of funds 
abroad [which] created a severe liquidity problem for [Saudi] banks” (2002: 8).  
Internally, on the other hand, the Saudi banking sector is confronting competitive 
trends among each other and with foreign investors coming to the country after the 
new Foreign Investment Law 2000.  This competition includes consolidation through 
mergers and acquisitions, diversification of asset composition, offering conventional 
and Islamic investment products to a diversified investor base and emphasizing 
shareholder value as opposed to growth in balance sheet (Al-Sayari, 2003).  
Moreover, Saudi banks have to face the Saudi rapidly annual growing population of 
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3.8 percent with their increasing consumer awareness and sophistication of not only 
the banking services provided but also the quality in providing such services (World 
Bank, 2002).  
               
Despite all the above conditions and competitions, Saudi banks continued their rapid 
growth in their assets by about 113%, deposits by 104%, and capital and reserves by 
169% during the period of 1990 to June 2002.  They have also exceeded 18.7% on 
their average risk-weighted capital to asset ratio, “which is considerably higher than 
the minimum of 8% recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)” (Al-Jasser, 2002: 9)  
 
Furthermore, Saudi banks have invested heavily in new technologies in order to cope 
with the instantly and secrecy demands of their customers.  They introduced a number 
of sophisticated payment and settlement systems.  
 
[These systems] include Automated Cheque Clearing Houses; Saudi Payments Network 
(SPAN) which supports ATM’s and Point of Sale Terminals and Tadawul the Electronic 
Share Trading System, with T+O settlement features. These state-of-the-art systems have 
been linked together with the Saudi Arabian Riyal Inter-bank System (SARIE), an 
electronic fund transfer system with Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) features. The 
payment systems not only meet but also exceed BIS standards. 
(Al-Sayari, 2003: 2) 
Very importantly and despite this advancement in technology, Saudi banks’ rapid 
growth throughout its history was accompanied with similar growth in its human 
resources management practices.  Al-Sheikh (2001) found “basic elements of the 
HRM models are quite visible in […] the banking sector”, which are according to his 
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study, “relatively advanced” due to banks “competition awareness.”  Results of such 
practices are clear in their recruitment and development programs that contribute to 
the increase of their employees from 11,000 employees in 1980’s to 25,000 
employees in the first half of 2002.  In his report, Al-Jasser (2002: 9) states that   
 
Saudi banks have invested heavily in the training of Saudis by instituting their own 
training programmes and also by benefiting from the Institute of Banking in Riyadh run 
by SAMA. As a result, the Saudi banking system is now 72% Saudized.   
 
Riyad Bank , for example, has even based its training and management development 
‘philosophy’ on that “employees are the most valuable resources in the Bank and they 
shall be treated as such” for the same bank “ the ratio of training budget of the Saudi 
staff payroll is equal to 18.5% which exceed that of most major local and international 
company.” (Ashshowwaf 1995:2) 
            
According to Al-Ghaith (1996), Saudi banks have implemented a number of 
procedures to accelerate their Saudization programs.  These include attracting young 
Saudis holding either Banking Studies diplomas from the Institute of Public 
Administration or Bachelors from local universities regardless of their majors.  The 
banks then develop training programs and progression plans according to their future 
job description.  The training and reorientation programs usually are executed through 
in-house training centers in the banks or through training contracts with local or 
international training centers to provide customized training that entails on-the-job 
training modules (Al-Ghaith, 1996).  For example, during the researcher interview 
with Mr. Al-Najran the General Manager of HR Group at the Arab National Bank 
(ANB) in 2004, he argued that the bank has a  
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Training Centre staffed with ANB trainers who provide our employees with ANB-
specific training as well as some general banking training. For areas not covered by the 
Training Centre, we are pleased to have and always explore the resources of the Institute 
of Banking. ANB staff attends many type of general management and banking programs 
delivered by the Institute of Banking. In addition, at times we contract with the Institute 
of Banking to provide a tailored program for ANB.  
  
It is important to mention that the Saudi banks experience of Saudization is a 
promising example like a number of other successful examples in the Saudi labour 
market that should not be overlooked just because the majority of Saudi HR literature 
focuses on the contrary.  Quite the opposite, lessons should be learnt from those few 
examples of successful Saudization in the market.  This is despite the considerable 
argument in the literature suggesting that quasi-government, banks and other few 
mentioned above organizations are financially and resourcefully capable of 
implementing and sacrificing time, money and efforts to saudize their HR.  
Supporting such an argument is the availability and illegibility of hiring cheap foreign 
labour which beyond doubt increase organizations’ profitability yet exploit the whole 
Saudi nations’ economy.     
 
To Sum up, this final section of this chapter examined the situation in the Saudi 
labour market as discussed in the literature.  The focus was on the different factors 
affecting supply and demand and leading to unemployment of Saudis in the private 
labour market.  The section also included another important factor contributing to 
unemployment among nationals that is Saudis' attitudes of rejecting employment in 
the private sector and preferring employment in the government.  The section 
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analyzed government strategies for reducing unemployment in the labour market i.e. 
Saudization in addition to different government initiatives to increase employment of 
Saudis in private organizations simultaneously decrease expatriates employment.  
Finally, the section examined some successful cases of private organizations 
achieving high rates of Saudization to understand the contributing reasons for their 
success which many others could not achieve yet.     
 
Moreover, this final section will assist our discussion and analysis of the findings of 
this research collected from Saudi government, quasigovernment and private 
organizations.  The findings will provide current and from the field information 
regarding the situation of the labour market on some of the above discussed matters.  
That discussion will include the Saudization strategy and the dominance of expatriates 
in the labour market.  It will examine different obstacles encountering the 
implementation of such strategy in the private labour market.  Furthermore, the 
discussion will examine the factors that are leading to some private organizations to 
accomplish Saudization as viewed by Saudi government, quasigovernment and 
private organizations. 
 
3.17 Conclusion  
 
This chapter sheds light upon HRD and education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.  It 
looks on the Saudi educational structure and system.  It also examines each 
educational stage’s objectives, development, and achievements as well as the 
challenges facing such stages.  From these challenges, it is clear that despite the 
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government’s ample expenditure and extensive planning for HRD and education there 
are still major problems encountering Saudis development in all levels.         
 
This chapter aims to broaden the reader’s understanding to the upcoming chapters that 
will analyze and discuss in further details GOTEVT vocational and training programs 
in conjunction with private sectors demands for qualified Saudi manpower as well as 
the proposed privatization of such essential HRD organization. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TRAINING, EDUCATION AND HRD 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
4.1  Introduction: 
 
This chapter starts with a brief yet essential terminological distinction between 
training and education.  This is followed by examining the essential assumptions and 
implications of the human capital theory in Saudi Arabia.  Then a brief look at two 
examples for skill formation developments in Germany and Malaysia.  The chapter 
then focuses on Hendry’s framework that studies the interaction of factors that drive 
or hinder firms’ support for training and encourages them to practice it on a 
continuing basis.  The examination and discussion of Hendry’s model supports this 
research in studying such factors in the Saudi private organizations.  It might also lead 
to the modification of this model to identify the forces driving, stabilizing, and/or 
inhibiting HRD in the context of Saudization in the Saudi organizations.    
 
4.2  Training and Education 
 
Prior to reviewing the literature in this chapter, it is essential to establish a common 
understanding of the related concepts of training and education.  This will produce a 
concrete foundation for the issues that will be discussed in this study since it will be 
looking at the development of workforce skills and Saudization in Saudi Arabia.  
Such development will, inevitably, include overlapping issues related to both training 
and/or education.  Apparently, both terminologies are employed interchangeably in 
substantial literature in Saudi Arabia to indicate skill development provided by 
different educational bodies in Saudi Arabia for the labour market.  Therefore, 
although, the main focus throughout this study will be on GOTEVT, the Saudi 
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education role cannot be excluded from such discussion as it is, too, an essential 
source of the development of workforce skills.  In fact GOTEVT’s outcomes of skills 
are dependant on the level and quality of the other educational entities especially from 
the basic education stages --primary, intermediate and secondary.  However, this 
section will not be involved in the conceptual distinction among these concepts since 
it is thoroughly discussed in the literature and it is beyond the scope of this research.  
An excellent overview of this distinction can be found in the work of Buckley and 
Caple (1990).  
            
In reviewing the literature on training and education, training according to Nadler and 
Wiggs (1986) is an activity that focuses on “learning the skills, knowledge, and 
attitudes required to initially perform a job or task or improve upon the performance 
of current job or task” (p.4).  Similarly, Buckley and Caple (1990) define training as 
“a planned and systematic effort to modify or develop knowledge/skills/attitude 
through learning experience, to achieve effective performance in an activity or range 
of activities” (p.13).  To Al-Khayyat and Elgamal (1997) training is a “planned 
learning system aimed at attitude and/or behavioural change by equipping individuals 
with desired knowledge and skills in order to maximize his/her potential performance 
and, therefore, increase organization productivity” (p. 89).  Armstrong (2001) adopts 
similar definition for training with an emphasis on changing behaviors through 
“learning [that] occurs as a result of education, instruction, development and planned 
experience” (p. 36). 
 
Education, on the other hand, is a “long-term oriented undertaking, which focuses on 
learning new skills, knowledge and attitudes that will equip an individual to assume a 
 116 
new job or to do a different task at some predetermined future time” (Al-Khayyat and 
Elgamal, 1997: 89).  Buckley and Caple (1990) in their definition of education 
assume an organic process and general effect.  They define education as a “process 
and a series of activities which aim at enabling an individual to assimilate and develop 
knowledge, skills, values and understanding that are not simply related to a narrow 
field of activity but allowed a broad range of problems to be defined, analyzed and 
solved” (1990: 14).   
 
Therefore, it is clear that the concepts are the means that aim at an end of establishing 
a change in the person’s knowledge, skills and attitude to maximize his/her potential 
performance and, therefore, increase organizational productivity (Buckley and Caple, 
1990; Al-Khayyat and Elgamal, 1997; Harrison, 1990; Armstrong, 2001).  Similarly, 
the integration of the two concepts through vocational education and training achieves 
similar development to the individual’s knowledge, skills and attitude in relation to 
his/her job requirements.  In other words, vocational education and training are 
defined as “the process and activities for acquiring the range of knowledge and skills 
that are related to current or future work requirements by formal, structured, or guided 
means” (Hendry et. al., 1991: 57).  
 
4.3  Human Capital Theory 
 
This part of the chapter examines Human Capital Theory in relation to the Saudi 
context.  It looks at its implications and utilizations by both Saudi students and Saudi 
government planning for investing in developing its citizens.  The discussion 
examines studies that look into Saudis perspectives for investing in personal 
development to obtain better employment and therefore better income.  It also 
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examines government investment in developing its human capital as a venue for 
increasing their employability and productivity in the workplace.  
  
Human Capital Theory origins can be traced back to the work of economists such as 
Adam Smith, Gary Becker and Theodore Schultz, just to mention few, on 
establishing techniques and theoretical framework to study the importance of 
education in promoting economic development (Ashton and Green, 1996; Thompson 
and Gray, 1995).  The analysis of training and development as investments in human 
capital was pioneered in the late 1950s and early 1960s through works of leading 
economics scholars (Solow, 1956; Schultz, 1961; Denison, 1962; Mincer, 1962; 
Becker, 1993).  In the United States after World War II, Human Capital Theory was 
associating knowledge levels of American workers primarily with their levels of 
formal schooling.  Associating educational levels with productivity and economic 
growth, led to the inference that more schooling would lead to increased productivity.  
According to Livingstone  
 
Throughout the post-1945 expansionary era, the simultaneous increase of school 
participation rates and earned incomes in advanced industrial market economies [which] 
lent apparent support to both the individual and aggregate dimensions of this perspective 
and encouraged the popular view that more schooling would inevitably lead to greater 
economic success.  
(1997: 9)   
In the 1950s, the main factors of production consisted of the four traditional factors 
namely: physical capital, labour, land and management.  In the early 1960s, economic 
growth accounting studies, explained the growth of the United States of America’s 
economy in terms of the four traditional factors of production (Denison, 1962).  
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However, the income growth accounting equations never balanced due to a gap 
existed which was referred to later as the residual factor (Shultz, 1961).  It was the 
Nobel price winner, Theodore Shultz who identified this residual factor as human 
capital. This was the origin of this important term ‘capital’ that has now become very 
important in the 21st century.  Consequently, instead of confining the term capital to 
physical meaning, it has now acquired additional meanings such as: intellectual 
capital, human capital, structural capital, relational capital, consumer capital, social 
capital, financial capital, organizational capital, innovation capital, and process capital 
(Edvinsson and Malone, 1997).  The fundamental principle that underpins human 
capital theory, our primary focus here, is the belief that peoples' learning capacities 
are comparable to other resources involved in the production of goods and services 
and when the resource is effectively utilized, the results are profitable both for the 
individual and the society at large (Shultz, 1961).  Becker (1993) while explaining the 
unique nature of human capital noted: 
 
I am going to talk about a different kind of capital.  Schooling, a computer training 
course, expenditures on medical care, lectures on the virtues of punctuality and honesty 
are capital too, in the sense that they improve health, raise earnings, or add to a person’s 
appreciation of literature over much of his or her lifetime. Consequently, it is fully in 
keeping with the capital concept as traditionally defined to say that expenditures on 
education, training, medical care etc., are investments in capital. 
       (P. 15-16) 
Much has been written about the benefits of investing in human capital as a 
precondition to a country’s development. Countries not endowed with natural 
resources such as Korea and Japan argue that the main resource is the people hence 
the need to invest in them.  Their strategy of investing in their human resources is 
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consistent with views of economists such as Romer (1990, 1994) who regards human 
capital in terms of the contribution of ideas as the primary source of economic growth 
and development of any society.  Similarly, Aliaga (2001) asserts that the theory of 
human capital is one theory that “better explains the gains of education and training” 
(p: 442) as a form of investment in human resources.  The theory also, according to 
the same study, considers as its main proposition that “human capital [including skills 
and knowledge] is a form of capital [which] is in substantial part a product of 
investment” (2001: 443).  In other words, education and training are processes of 
human capital formation of people resulting from deliberate investments.   
 
Another consequence or outcome of this investment in human capital is the 
improvement in the person’s income due to his/her gain of new skills and knowledge.  
Becker (1993:17) asserts that, “high school and college education in the United States 
greatly raise a person’s income”, and that “many workers increase their productivity 
by learning new skills and perfecting old ones while on the job” (p: 31).  Education 
and schooling are seen as activities that prepare the labour force and account for the 
“otherwise unexplained rise in earnings” (Aliaga, 2001:443; Shultz, 1961). Therefore, 
human capital theory is an economic theory that addresses the macroeconomics of 
production and economic development.  Zidan (2001: 437) observed that “human 
capital theory views human capabilities – their knowledge, skills, health and efforts – 
as integral parts of the capital of a country, along with financial and natural 
resources.”  This is concurrent with Hogendorn (1996) who explains that the premise 
of the Human Capital Theory is that investments made in educating the workforce and 
developing their skills among other services such as providing them with nourishment 
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and maintaining their health would pay economic dividends for a country or 
organization. 
 
A Number of scholars including Becker (1993), Shultz (1961), Mincer (1962), and 
Dennison (1962) present their theories to explain the impact of education and training 
on an individual’s performance, lifetime wages, and earnings. Education and training 
are the most tangible concepts in the Human Capital Theory which have direct 
linkage with HRD (Aliaga, 2001). In the same study, Aliaga attempts to explain the 
relationship between Human Capital Theory, HRD, and performance as illustrated in 
Figure 4.1.  Human Capital Theory has its foundation in the economic theory of the 
firm which “explains the use of inputs to produce output” (2001: 443).  A firm as an 
economic unit employs several resources, including human resources or human 
capital with the main objective of profit maximization.  Thus, through HRD, human 
resources are developed and employed by the firm in order to achieve its objectives.  
The theory of human capital states that education and training equips workers with 
competent skills, knowledge and attitude that make them more productive.  It equips 
people with durable traits and makes them good performers in organizations, 
communities and in society at large.  Therefore, the only way to improve individual 
performance is to increase their productivity through education and training.  Human 
Resource Development, beyond its effect on individuals and organizations, also 
carries with it the potential for economic benefits (Zidan, 2001). 
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Figure 4.1: Economic Theory as a Foundation of HRD Discipline 
 
Source: Aliaga, O. (2001) Human Capital, HRD and the Knowledge Organization. In O. A. 
Aliaga (eds.): Academy of HRD 2001 Conference Proceedings (pp: 441-448), Baton 
Rouge, LA., Academy of Human Resource Development. 
 
 
A Similar belief of investing in human resources as human capital has been adopted 
by both individual Saudis and their families as well as the Saudi government 
throughout its successive development plans.  For example according to Wiseman and 
Alromi (2003: 11) “human capital rationale predominate school to work transition 
investment and implementation decisions among Saudi students and families”.  On 
the other hand, the state has also established most of its HRD strategies on investing 
in Saudis as its human capital.  According to the 7th Development Plan for example  
 
International experience in the field of socio-economic development clearly demonstrates 
that the ultimate source of a nation's wealth increasingly lies in its human resources and 
the productive skills of its labour force, or in its “human capital”. Recognizing this trend 
from the onset of development planning, the Kingdom's successive plans have given 
greater attention to human resources development through continuous support of primary, 
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intermediate, secondary and higher education, as well as of technical education, 
vocational training, and pre-service and in-service training. 
      (Ministry of Planning, 2000: 44)  
 
This investment in fact was translated into considerable quantitative development of 
both graduates and schools of all education and training levels starting from general 
education --primary, intermediate and secondary-- and universities to technical 
education and vocational training colleges and centres (Ministry of Planning, 2000).  
However, despite all these developments an essential question of quality of these 
developments and their outcomes remains unclear or unaccounted for which might 
challenge some of the principles of Human Capital Theory when applied in a country 
like the Kingdom (Alromi, 2001) and add to the criticism of such a theory already 
existing in the literature.     
 
In Alromi’s (2001) study, the attempt was to examine the conditions and abilities, as 
seen by students and potential employers, of the general secondary school system and 
curriculum to provide its students with personal, social and capacity employable 
skills.  The study concluded that “spending time in a general high school system such 
as Saudi Arabia’s without acquiring multiple skills --personal, social and capacity-- 
does not ensure employment for general high school graduates” (2001: 129).  This 
finding, as argued by Alromi, ‘challenges’ one of the propositions of Human Capital 
Theory which proposes that acquiring more knowledge and basic vocational skills by 
spending more time in schooling would assist graduates in their future employment in  
(Becker, 1993).  Accordingly, Alromi asserts that Human Capital Theory overlooks 
the diversification of skills provided to students instead of just focusing on knowledge 
and skills as an approach toward better productivity especially in the case studied in 
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the Saudi context.  Alromi’s argument advocates a better understanding of labour 
market needs for skills and knowledge to be incorporated into the school system and 
curriculum for best return on human capital investment.  However, it is essential to 
mention that the Human Capital Theory advocates its propositions in societies that 
dose not use excessive foreign labour in their labour markets.  In other words, Alromi 
arguments, although still valid, it should not overlook the unique variables of the 
Saudi offer and demands systems that were not accounted for in the Human Capital 
Theory.         
 
Livingstone (1997), on the other hand, argues that blaming learning systems for 
shortages in Human Capital Theory is just an approach applied by human capital 
advocates to overcome its failure in accounting for the ‘education-jobs gap’ in the 
Canadian system.  His critique of the theory argues that “investments in education and 
training programs […] are unlikely to close the education-jobs gap in light of the 
surplus of human capital already widely available” (1997:12).  This surplus, 
according to Livingstone, has created underemployment resulting in people’s years of 
investment through the formal and further education which has produced “the 
credential gap” and “the performance gap”.  Both gaps represent a discrepancy in 
employment between what people are qualified and knowledgeable of, and the 
entrants’ and performance requirements for the jobs.  Livingstone asserts that 
economic reforms are the key to these gaps between what education produces of skills 
and knowledge and what the labour market demands.  Ashton and Green, (1996) 
consider similar view in that economists perceive, through Human Capital Theory, 
that education systems as a “black box” to produce skills regardless of what goes on 
inside “as if it were a form of physical capital” (p:18).  This ‘black box’ will be the 
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one to receive the blame if the employment market suffers high rates of 
unemployment.                     
 
In conclusion, to be fair, although the argument of quality in the Saudi education and 
training system would stand resulting in a skills gap, the employment market, 
especially in the private sector, is not entirely innocent.  In fact the private sector is 
seeking cheap foreign labour to maximize its revenues, and practice more 
employment control on recruitment, promotion, salaries, relocation, and dismissal.  
On the one hand, this dilemma has been supported by the government ‘open door 
policy to foreign workers’ implemented to this date accumulating the challenge of 
growing unemployment rates in the Kingdom.  While on the other hand, it has been 
encouraged by the Saudi cultural avoidance and reluctance to gain employment in the 
manual and menial vocational jobs in the private sector.  It has been also stimulated 
by mismatched workforce development programs that are not yet developed 
according to industry needs to support the country’s efforts to Saudize the private 
labour market.  In other words, even if the Saudi individual wishes to invest in 
developing him/herself to be employable, the current skill formation systems do not 
support such ambition.  Graduates of such systems lack the specialization skills, 
knowledge and attitudes that can increase their employment opportunities as well as 
their longevity in the more challenging and performance demanding environments of 
the private sector.     
 
4.5 Overview of the International Process of Skill Formation 
 
Two examples on the process of skill formation in Germany and Malaysia are 
examined briefly.  Although there are many other alternatives, the selection of these 
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two particular countries was based on their industrialization and skill formation 
developments which have impacted on the Saudi’s skill formation development.  
Their skill formation processes frequently influence the Saudi ones during 
government strategic planning and policy development.  In addition, these two 
countries have major consultative cooperation projects with the Saudi’s systems that, 
beyond doubt, affect the latter with the accumulative experiences from these 
countries.   
Germany, after the war time and the end of the Nazi era, was divided into 16 regional 
states (Landers) (Al-Dhuwain et al., 2000).  This supported the country’s new 
approach of pluralism and replace Hitler years of totalitarian principles (Ashton and 
Green, 1996).  Regional policies concerning skill formation became the responsibility 
of the regional states leaving the central government with limited role of setting broad 
legal boundaries and a regulatory framework as well as supervising vocational 
training and certification (Shackleton et al., 1995; Gibbons-Wood and Lange, 2000).  
This process according to Al-Dhuwain et al. (2000) guarantees more flexibility to the 
regional states to pursue educational and skill formation policies that fulfill their 
regional market needs.    
 
On the other hand, Germany’s central government role has achieved a high degree of 
success in resolving conflict between capital and labour.  This structure has the 
strength of regulation and enforcement by the state with coordination with 
professional unions or ‘Guilds’ and the German Commercial and Industrial Chambers 
(Al-Dhuwain et al., 2000).  Therefore, it produced the country’s apprenticeship 
qualifications systems in addition to a financial system encouraging long-term 
investment in developing the country’s human resources.  It also established a market 
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strategy of high-value-added production systems interdependent on technology 
leadership and a highly skilled work-force (Ashton and Green, 1996).    However, this 
heavily structured system which is characterized by its high levels of skill formation, 
according to Buectmann et al. (1994) and Ashton and Green (1996), is inflexible and 
limits workers’ movement between occupations or even progression to higher skills 
professions. 
 
Unlike Germany, the Malaysian central government is the main controller on skill 
formation systems.  The creation of a Malaysian skill formation system has been a 
gradual process following the economic developments in the country.  According to 
Tzannatos and Johnes “the primary goal of educational policy [in Malaysia] has been 
to foster national unity.” (1997: 436).  The government has made significant efforts to 
increase investment in education and training and linking them to research and 
development (Obaid, 2004).  But only where such efforts were well coordinated and 
linked among government, private actors and academia have they been successful 
(Al-Mutawa, 2005).   
 
The bureaucracy responsible for skill formation in Malaysia was highly fragmented.  
The country’s skill formation system was divided between different Ministries, 
quasigovernment agencies, research institutes, corporations and the Economic 
Planning Unit in the Prime Minister’s office (Malaysian Ministry of Finance, 2002).  
There was very little coordination within the bureaucracy or among these entities (Tan 
and Gill, 2000).  The patterns of bureaucratic fragmentation at the line ministry level 
were increasingly put together with an increasing amount of bureaucratic decision-
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making centralization in the office of the Prime Minister (Research Institute for Asia 
and Pacific, 2001).   According to the same study, bureaucratic fragmentation 
prioritized investment into the public rather than private sector.  Therefore, instead of 
creating firm-focused training institutes, the government chose to expand the public 
system of education and training.   
 
To overcome such obstacles, Malaysia attempted to create linkages of consultative 
mechanisms with the private actors to extract information regarding their HRD needs 
and the venues of meeting such needs (Tan and Gill, 2000).  But these mechanisms, 
according to Ritchie, (2001b) and Ritchie, (2001a) assume that once government has 
acquired the necessary information, it can respond to these needs of the private sector 
on its own.  While this was perhaps true when private actors needed roads and 
telephone lines, it is decreasingly true when the needed goods are skills, knowledge, 
innovation, and so forth.  Especially that the government training efforts focused on 
pre-employment training rather than in-service training (Tan and Gill, 2000).  
According to their study, they found that graduates of the skill formation system were 
“tested for competencies in basic skills, not in the intermediate or advanced skills that 
are needed after entering employment” (2000: 234) which may not reflect the 
country’s transition toward their Vision 2020. 
 
4.6 Private Sector Organizations and the Development of Workforce Skills 
 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, the inclusion of Hendry’s model in this study 
assists our understanding and analysis of the factors that affect investing in training 
Saudis on the level of the organization.  The examination of Hendry’s work in this 
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chapter establishes the theoretical background for the examination of the findings in 
the Analysis Chapter later.  In this respect, it assists examining the current factors that 
drive, stabilize and/or hinder Saudi private organizations to invest in training to 
accomplish Saudization or for retaining qualified employees after achieving high rates 
of Saudization.  The latter, we believe, is more crucial from an HRD perspective than 
the former as it ensures long-term investment in developing Saudi employees that is 
not merely conditioned to Saudization requirements.  Accordingly, this approach is an 
investment approach that views Saudi employees as a real human capital asset for 
private organizations’ which is a belief and an approach that government policy 
makers and skill formation systems should not overlook.         
 
Hendry (1991) employed in his study a model originally developed from a research 
with Pettigrew and others in 1989 to assist in understanding the factors that interact 
with each other to either drive or stop firms to train and to encourage them to train on 
a continuing basis.  The study of the Centre for Corporate Strategy and Change at 
Warwick University was used to understand the HRD practices in small-to-medium 
enterprises.  Over a period of years, the two studies examined over 40 detailed case 
studies of organizations employing between 25 and 500 employees, covering a range 
of sectors and regions to study the relationship between corporate strategy and 
training-as one means towards securing skill supply- and how the latter “has been 
driven by strategic responses to heightened competition” (Hendry, 1991:79).  This 
relationship, as Hendry concludes, is “not simple and direct” and involves “a wide 
variety of human resource practices” to meet its long-term needs of skill supply.  
More importantly, it is affected by a variety of ‘driving’, ‘stabilizing’, and/or 
‘inhibiting’ factors (1991:79).         
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According to Hendry (1991), the training driving and stabilizing or ‘positive’ factors 
which are shown in Figure (4.2) include business strategy, competitive pressure, the 
external labour market, the internal labour market, internal actors and systems, and 
external support for training.  On the contrary, there are a number of ‘specific 
circumstances’ that inhibit or have a ‘negative’ impact on training in organizations 
such as the simple products or tasks, lack of qualifications culture, clerical and 
technical bias of training with low status trainers, and lack of influence of 
management training.  The study argues that for training activities to produce an 
‘effective change’, organizations must ‘mobilize’ a large number of the positive 
factors and ‘neutralize’ the negative ones.  In addition and for the same purpose, 
training activities must be incorporated with the broader HRD and HRM process since 
they will be affecting organizations’ recruitment, grading, pay, and appraisal. 
 
Hendry (1991) argued that individual organizations decide their training in response 
to competitive pressure which, in his conclusion, will not serve the country’s or 
individual’s interests.   This pressure might be the result of technical change, product 
market development or even management change, just to mention a few examples, 
which all in all trigger an urgent business strategy to fulfill the performance gap 
created by such changes.  On a broader level, the pressure might even extend to 
include changes resulting from internationalization or globalization of markets 
exposing national industries to be “…vulnerable to the superior products, costs, or 
quality of goods produced elsewhere” (Robert et. al., 1993: 10).  Paradoxically, 
Hendry et al., (1991) found that growth in organizations, also, impacts training needs 
and practices.  While it tends to increase training needs, if only through the 
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recruitment of new staff, growth tends to put pressure on the necessary managerial 
and financial resources.  This training decision usually is associated with the 
importance of spending versus not spending on training and, therefore, investing on 
high performance instead of high spending on training.  The latter in particular, 
according Hendry, “has often seemed to stem from a failure of imagination, planning, 
and of systematic thinking” (1991:85). 
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The other factor affecting training decision in organizations, according to the same 
study, is the consideration of the external labour market to determine the availability 
of skills readily to be recruited as a cheaper alternative to conducting training.  The 
external labour market for firms, as indicated by Hendry et al (1991) “may well 
…have local, national, and sectoral components” (p: 37).  The study has found that 
firms look at the economics of this decision “by taking into account non-monetary 
factors” such as the impact of the decision “on the motivation and retention of 
existing employees” (Hendry, 1991:85).  It has also found that, as a broad framework, 
firms normally adopt short term adaptive responses to their manpower and skills 
supply strategies which resemble their way of developing their business strategies of 
solving specific problems step by step.  Interestingly, the study observed that mature 
sectors such as retail and banking were able to “anticipate changing skills 
requirements quite adequately from watching competitors, by cooperation and 
communication at inter-firm level and by adopting generally held assumptions about 
how that industry would evolve” (1991:86).  However, in the case of new sector and 
smaller firms, predictions for the future skill needs depended on watching the ‘lead’ 
firms via participating in trade fairs and exhibitions which also assist them in 
identifying technological opportunities.   
 
Decisions driving training in organizations are also influenced by a number of internal 
labour market factors interacting with the external ones.  First, organizations tend to 
decide to train or retrain existing employees as a result of its reduction of the number 
of staff to improve productivity, cut their employment costs, and/or drive down 
responsibilities to lower level by for example restructuring production operatives, 
redundancy and/or stripping out middle management.  These operative decisions lead 
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to an expansion in tasks and skill demands of individuals requiring ‘composite skills’ 
and a ‘multi-’ and ‘cross-skilling’ retraining.  Organizations’ objectives of skill 
development are seen “to be curtailed by loyalty to the existing workforce, minimize 
industrial relations frictions following redundancies, and by the desire to keep 
retraining costs to a minimum” (Hendry, 1991:87).  Second, as a result of firms’ 
expansion and moving upmarket which causes, as described by Hendry (1991:87), 
“high levels of attrition”, firms tend to employ a ‘positive approach’ to training 
through recruiting and retaining its high quality staff in order to cut the alternative of 
head hunting process resulting in pay competition.  Third, training people with higher 
levels of skills working under the traditions of high quality recruitment, retention and 
promotion is a practical option in an organization planning for or experiencing a 
change.  This option, as the above study reveals, is critical in influencing those higher 
levels of skills to direct the change as planned and not to resist its long-term impact on 
recruitment, training, and industrial relations.  
 
Looking at the other side of the coin, internal labour market driving factors for 
training may encounter a number of negative or detractive elements from training 
toward recruitment.  First, firms tend to fall back to a recruitment option instead of 
long training periods, to overcome an introduction of a heavy investment in its 
production which requires non-existing high skills from its current staff.  Second, 
organizations tend to consider the option of temporary recruitment, such as contract 
employees, extracting themselves from the immediate training onus of the surplus 
pool of people and focusing on providing training to their small permanent group 
(Hendry, 1991).   
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At this stage of our discussion, it is important to quote Hendry’s conclusion that  
 
These observations about external and internal labour markets need qualifying in 
relations to firms’ size, their respective abilities to resource recruitment versus training 
solutions and, indeed, by lack of clarity about skill requirements.     
(1991:89) 
 
Moving from the ‘driving’ forces to train in organizations, the discussion next focuses 
on the ‘stabilizing’, ‘enabling’, or ‘nice to have’ factors.  They are concerned with 
internal actors, systems, philosophy, and organization that are grouped according to 
Hendry (1991) as the ‘internal actors and systems’.  These factors include, first, top 
management commitment and company values toward supporting training.  This was 
confirmed in Hendry’s study which found “the belief of the chief executive in the 
value of training was a prime mover in constant effort devoted to it [and that] top 
management endorsement and support was a major asset” (1991: 98).  This support is 
demonstrated through considering long-term training versus the short-term one, the 
influence of financial values in controlling attitudes to training, and the willingness to 
invest in training despite the pressure for short-term profit criteria imposing concerns 
with short-run performance of the company.  Although in the case of the latter, 
evidence from Hendry’s study of organizations ranging from 25 to 500 employees, 
suggests that “production problems underlie much of the training effort and that 
concern with short-run performance drives this effort” (Hendry et al, 1991: 90).  So, 
in this case, companies concern with production efficiency became a driving force to 
training. 
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The second stabilizing training factor is the company’s training infrastructure 
including planning.  According to Hendry (1991), an effective training philosophy 
requires structures and mechanisms to “carry it down and see it shared [which] in turn 
create upward pressure for training” (p: 91).  The absence of such structures and 
mechanisms creates a planning gap between organizations’ practices and their good 
intentions.  This can be overcome by creating mechanisms for top-down planning for 
skill development involving training departments at an earlier stage of the larger 
strategic planning for the organization to specify training plans instead of late 
involvement as problems arise (Hendry, 1991; Nadler and Wiggs, 1986).  This top-
down planning can encounter bottom-up demands for an on-going training based on 
individual, departmental and process needs which might endanger the stability of 
training process since they are not set in any general framework or strategy for 
training.  This as concluded by Hendry is what “makes training vulnerable to cuts” 
(1991:92). 
 
The Third factor assisting in stabilizing skill development in organizations is their 
ability to overcome budgetary and time constraints of training.  This can impose a 
problem especially for the limited number of staff in small-to-medium organizations 
to release some of their employees for training which will also have a cost factor 
associated to it.  This cost amounts to 75% of the true training costs; according to 
Hendry (1991), this is due to firms’ effort “to reduce headcount, continuing pressure 
to reduce costs and raise productivity, and little surplus resources to cover for 
absences and overtime” (p: 94).  The cost and absenteeism constraints can be bridged 
with a number of training methodologies such as distance learning, video 
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conferencing, computer-based training, and on-the-job training through training 
managers to be trainers in their sites (Hendry, 1991).          
 
The fourth factor to stabilize training is through more engagement of line managers in 
budgeting responsibilities for the development of their staff.  Those managers are the 
key ‘gatekeepers’, according to Hendry (1991) who are the most knowledgeable 
persons in their organizations of their employees’ training needs and who are held 
accountable of improving productivity and profit through improving their employees’ 
performance.  Similar arguments opened the door to decentralization concepts and 
practices in the 1980s to devolve more responsibilities of productivity, management, 
and profit down the organization structure.  In the light of these themes, organizations 
decentralize a number of their central operational activities in order to achieve an 
effective and efficient performance and to be closer to their customers.  Among such 
activities are training and personnel functions which serve Hendry’s argument of the 
essentiality of line managers’ involvement in the different aspects of employees’ 
development. 
 
Trade union membership is the final stabilizing factor of training in this set of 
‘internal actors and systems’.  Trade union representation in organizations is supposed 
to act as a ‘watchdog’ pressurizing and controlling organizations’ training.  This, 
according to Hendry (1991), was not the case in companies they have studied.  They 
have found that the trade union role has been “limited to health and safety matters and 
to performance by shop stewards of their representative functions” (1991:95).  
However in his conclusion, Hendry indicates that trade union membership makes a 
positive impact through agreements or high level representation to ensure companies’ 
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commitment to training, in addition to their cooperation with companies’ who have 
undergone changes which have created skill gaps leading these companies to train.                   
 
Lastly are the external support factors for training which stimulate organizations to 
train.  These factors include health and safety legislations, customer requirements for 
quality, external training provision, training grants, and shaming comparisons 
(Hendry, 1991). 
 
First, health and safety legislations have been, according to Hendry, influencing 
training activity positively.  It has survived the period of recession in the UK to 
become second in importance to ‘sharpen up competitiveness’ in some companies 
investigated in his study as a result of the public policies implementation (Hendry, 
1991). 
 
The customer requirement for quality is the second important factor stimulating 
training.  As we all know and as illustrated by Hendry’s study that quality is a corner 
stone in the competitiveness process which creates “measurable criteria that training 
can fix” (1991:97).  Examples of such criteria in UK business are BS5750 and 
AQAP-1 (see Hendry, 1991:96).  These quality standards expose training efforts of 
companies adopting such measures to external auditing bodies to gain accreditation to 
their product or service.  
 
The third external factor is the availability and suitability of external training 
provisions which are affected, in the UK, by the effectiveness of the mechanisms 
adopted by Training Agency-grants and the public training infrastructure.  Hendry in 
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his study suggests that these infrastructures are ‘enabling factors’ for most companies 
who are looking for modifiable training programs to fulfill their specific requirements.  
He discriminates in this instance between small to medium firms and larger firms 
which have the resources for formal off-the-job training.  In general, he includes the 
report of Deloitte/IFF which shows that “only one fifth of employers’ training is 
carried out by external providers, public and private” (1991:97).  Indeed, the Johnson 
and Gubbins study confirms this in their findings.  They have found that training in 
small to medium enterprises is firm-specific through merely showing recruits ‘how 
things are done here’.  For these enterprises formal, structured courses are the 
exceptions rather than the rule.  In fact, informal on-the-job methods are superior to 
more formal training due to lack of resource to develop their own formal programs.  
In addition they consider that external providers are too costly and often too general in 
nature (1993).                                          
 
The fourth factor is the external sources to finance training costs through training 
grants.  Again deciding to train in accordance to available grants awarding process 
appears to be influenced by firms’ size.  In smaller firms, as illustrated by Hendry 
(1991), a training decision is preceded by a consideration of grant availability, while 
in larger ones such decisions to train are taken first followed by a search of ways of 
defraying the cost if available.  For the latter, according to the same study, business 
changes are more important in driving training regardless of the availability of grants 
which “do not induce them to train” (1991: 98).  
 
The final external support factor to training is the firms’ considerations of 
embarrassing comparisons.  Instances of such comparisons can be found in reports of 
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training performances known to training professionals and line managers 
internationally and locally which are according to Hendry (1991) occasionally 
expressing concerns unfavorable to UK own firms’ performance.  Another venue of 
such information comes from mergers between companies highlighting training 
performance deficiencies of new partners.  This information as Hendry believes, 
despite the absence of supporting evidence of such a conclusion, that “information 
about training by firms in the same sector could be effective … [even though it is] 
commercially sensitive” (1991: 99).      
 
Finally, Hendry’s model, although adapted and implemented on Western 
industrialized countries, can determine the broad framework of driving, stabilizing, 
and/or inhibiting training factors influencing training activities in Saudi organizations.  
The factors discussed earlier, are implemented in Western contexts with an underlying 
philosophy of adopting and implementing the investment habits of continuous training 
in private organizations.  If adopted by Saudi private sector organizations, this 
philosophy of continuous development or ‘Human Resource Development’ would 
assist Saudi private firms in establishing long-term skill formation and development 
objectives.  It would also provide a “conscious strategy, rather than being a responsive 
to external forces” such as Saudization which if satisfied at some stage of 
organizational development, could impact on training to fade out (Hendry, 1991: 
101).   
 
It could be argued that Hendry’s work, in general, is of relevance to the Saudi context.   
This relevance is expected to affect our understanding of the driving, stabilizing 
and/or hindering factors determining private organizations’ decisions to invest in 
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training Saudis.  In other words, it will serve the immediate purpose of this research 
by diagnosing the existing factors that affect viewing training as a long-term and 
continuous investment in Saudi human resources by Saudi private sector 
organizations.  However, to achieve the ultimate benefit of such relevance the model 
requires essential adaptation to business practices and approaches of the Saudi private 
labour market.  The eventual outcome of such modification to the model is expected 
to generate new driving, stabilizing and/or hindering factors that could be 
incorporated in Hendry’s framework to fit the Saudi context.   
 
4.7 Hendry’s Model and the Saudi Context  
 
Hendry’s model although adapted and implemented on Western industrialized 
countries, it can determine the broad framework of driving, stabilizing, and/or 
inhibiting training factors influencing training activities in Saudi organizations.  The 
factors discussed earlier, are implemented in Western contexts with underlying 
philosophy of adopting and implementing the investment habits of continues training 
in private organizations.  If adopted by Saudi private organizations, this philosophy of 
continuous development or HRD would assist Saudi private firms in establishing 
long-term skill formation and development objectives.  It would also provide a 
“conscious strategy, rather than being a responsive to external forces” such as 
Saudization which if satisfied at some stage of organizational development, could 
impact training to fade out (Hendry, 1991: 101).   
 
Deriving from theoretical terms which will be verified against empirical findings of 
this research in the analysis chapter, it can be argued Hendry’s work, in general, is of 
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relevance to the Saudi context.  This relevance is expected to affect our understanding 
of the driving, stabilizing and/or hindering factors determining private organizations’ 
decisions to invest in training Saudis.  On other words, it will serve the immediate 
purpose of this research by diagnosing the existing factors that affect viewing training 
as a long-term and continues investment in Saudi human resources by Saudi private 
organizations.  However, to achieve the ultimate benefit of such relevance the model 
requires essential adaptation to business practices and approaches of the Saudi private 
labour market.  The eventual outcome of such modification to the model is expected 
to generate new driving, stabilizing and/or hindering factors that are incorporated in 
Hendry’s frame work to fit the Saudi context.   
 
It is expected that the driving and stabilizing factors would include Saudization 
policies and requirements as a major external driving and stabilizing factor.  This 
policy is encouraging organizations to invest in training and employing Saudis on an 
annual basis to avoid government penalties and receive its incentives.  The factors 
would also include private organizations’ interests in utilizing available government 
funds from the government Human Resource Development Fund.  These funds, as 
will be discussed later in this chapter, are designed to assist private organizations to 
train their potential Saudi employees for employment.  This is mainly on-the-job 
training.  It is anticipated that Saudi private organizations initiate their decisions to 
invest in training their employees to bridge their skill gap to improve their 
competitive advantages in their markets.  Such competition, as evident in Saudi 
market, is not merely on physical products but on human capital as private 
organizations are headhunted for their competent employees.  Therefore, they invest 
in training such employees to ensure their stability and retention.  However, this 
 143 
driving factor in some organizations is merely a top management belief in developing 
Saudis as a part of their public commitment toward their Saudi fellow citizens.  The 
skill gaps, on the other hand, evolve as a result of unfocused skill formation provided 
by government controlled skill formation agencies including GOTEVT.  The gaps 
also increase due to the introduction of new products and technologies as well as new 
employment regulations and requirements in the labour market by the Ministry of 
Labour.             
 
The modified model of Hendry will emphasize, additionally, the hindering factors of 
this investment approach of training that are discouraging private organizations of 
such investment.  In this regard, the model will also highlight, as government training 
is expected to lead to Saudization, that such expectation is imprecise as it is 
encountered by skill formation systems that are producing unfocused and non-
industry related skills, knowledge and attitudes.  Accordingly, investment initiatives 
in training Saudis are geared toward retraining the systems’ graduates to fit private 
organizations’ needs instead of investing in providing them with advanced industry 
related skills, knowledge and attitudes.  Such investment is developing into costly 
efforts which can be a hindering factor for the long-term and continuous HRD 
philosophies.  Another hindering factor is the fact that these systems have not yet 
created recognized Saudi training vocational qualification standards.  They, if 
available, can assist both skill formation systems in determining their training 
programs as well as employment market in measuring skills and knowledge of 
persons, Saudi or non, against job requirements in private organizations.  This is 
fueled by the evident Saudi labour market dilemma i.e. private sector long-lasting 
dependency on the cheap and easy to retain expatriates dominating the market and 
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creating high rates of unemployment among nationals.  The dilemma is intensified by 
Saudis’ attitudes for rejecting employment in the private labour and performance 
demanding jobs.  These attitudes resulted in Saudis becoming instable and unreliable 
for employment in the private sector as they are preferring employment in the 
government sector like the old days of the Saudi labour market.      
 
4.8 Conclusion  
 
This chapter establishes the conceptual framework for the study.  It examines the 
essential literature on training, education and HRD including Hendry’s model.  These 
three elements represent the theoretical backbone for this study as they support its 
examination of the Saudi skill formation systems.  The analysis of these theoretical 
areas and Hendry, in particular, will assist our understanding of the driving and 
inhibiting factors to view training as a HRD approach for long-term investment in 
Saudi employees by private organizations.  It will also assist the analysis in chapter 
seven as it will highlight the consequence of the availability of cheap and well trained 
expatriates on adopting such a model.  This is in addition to other influential factors 
that are unique to the Saudi context such as the government influence, organizations’ 
size and systems, and unavailability of industry-led training programs.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will explain and identify the research methodology employed to achieve 
its overall objectives including definitions and descriptions of the methodology, 
research sampling, as well as procedures of data collection and analysis.    
 
As mentioned earlier, this research focuses on three central objectives.  First, it 
investigates the missing link between employment in the private sector and skill 
formation systems with the emphasis on the vocational training provided by 
GOTEVT.  Second, it explores successful Saudization practices in a number of 
private industries to highlight the factors that led to their high rates of employing 
Saudis.  Finally, it evaluates practical suggestion of the possibilities and impact of 
transforming the role of a government training institution i.e. GOTEVT to industry-
led training organizations as the prerequisite to the Saudization in the private sector.  
Saudization means replacing the country’s 4.7 million foreign workers recruited 
mainly (95%) in the private sector with as many qualified Saudis as possible.  Young 
Saudi graduates are increasingly unable to find employment despite the existence of 
4.7 million jobs.  This is creating an unbalanced labour market structure as well as 
economic, political and social problems.  This research assumes that ineffective 
Saudization in the private sector is not the core problem of the employment process in 
Saudi Arabia.  In fact, it is the outcome of the government’s heavy and unnecessary 
involvement and control of vocational and training system in the Kingdom.  This 
involvement imposes the government’s rigid bureaucracy and limited funding on a 
 146 
very dynamic, flexible and self-sufficient economy like the private market in Saudi 
Arabia that is operating in a very competitive and changeable environment.    
 
5.2 Methodology Definition and Description 
 
To achieve the above objectives, this study implements a qualitative approach.  Its 
exploratory nature can only be fulfilled through an inductive approach of an in-depth 
investigation of the present Saudi skill formation systems and Saudization in the 
private sector.  This approach assists the research attempts for profoundly 
investigating the possibilities, requirements, and impact of changing the present role 
of GOTEVT to an industry led training organization as explained by a selected 
sample of experts in Saudi Arabia.  In addition, this qualitative approach allows the 
employment of Hendry’s framework to understand the forces driving, stabilizing, 
and/or inhibiting HRD in the private sector.  However, the location of the research in 
Saudi Arabia with the process of Saudization adds another level of complexity.  
Hence, the utilization of Hendry’s model will not be of “theory-testing” strategy in 
this research, rather it will be to assist our understanding of the interacting factors that 
drive or stop Saudi private sector organizations viewing HRD as a continuous 
investment in Saudi manpower even after their achievement of high rates of 
Saudization.     
 
Quantitative research, in general, allows the researcher to familiarize him/herself with 
the problem or concept to be studied, and perhaps generate hypotheses to be tested.  
In this paradigm: (1) the emphasis is on facts and causes of behaviour (Bogdan and 
Biklen, 1998), (2) the information is in the form of numbers that can be quantified and 
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summarized, (3) the mathematical process is the norm for analysing the numeric data 
and (4) the final result is expressed in statistical terminologies (Charles, 1995).   
 
Generally, quantitative research “[…] supported by the positivist or scientific 
paradigm, leads us to regard the world as made up of observable, measurable facts” 
(Glesne and Peshkin, 1992: 6) though their assumption that “social facts have an 
objective reality” and “variables can…be identified and relationships measured” (p: 7) 
which can be problematic.  The notion of ‘measuring’ means to understand 
educational issues by performing an operation called ‘measurement’ on the physical 
world by the observer (Crocker and Algina, 1986).  Therefore, one may perceive 
measurement as necessarily objective, quantitative and statistically relevant.  Simply 
put, measurement can be about numbers, objective hard data which does not fulfil our 
primary purpose of the research in hand.  Our attempt through this research is not to 
fragment and delimit phenomena into measurable or common categories that can be 
applied to all of the subjects or wider and similar situations (Winter, 2000).  Nor is the 
attempt to involve the "use of standardised measures so that the varying perspectives 
and experiences of people can be fitted into a limited number of predetermined 
response categories to which numbers are assigned" (Patton, 2002: 14). 
 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, uses a naturalistic approach that seeks to 
understand phenomena in context-specific settings, such as "real world setting 
[where] the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest" 
(Patton, 2002: 39).  Broadly defined, qualitative research means "any kind of research 
that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means 
of quantification" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 17) and instead, the kind of research that 
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produces findings arrived from real-world settings where the "phenomenon of interest 
unfold naturally" (Patton, 2002: 39).  Campbell (1997: 122), argues that qualitative 
research “assumes that reality is socially constructed and that variables are complex, 
interwoven, and difficult to measure [and that] researcher seeks the insider’s point of 
view and is personally involved in the process”.  Generally, these types of studies end 
with hypotheses (assertions, themes, or patterns) or grounded theory.  Unlike 
quantitative researchers who seek causal determination, prediction, and generalization 
of findings, qualitative researchers seek, instead, illumination, understanding, and 
extrapolation to similar situations (Hoepfl, 1997). 
 
Qualitative analysis results in a different type of knowledge than does quantitative 
inquiry because one party argues from the underlying philosophical nature of each 
paradigm, enjoying detailed interviewing and the other focuses on the apparent 
compatibility of the research methods, “enjoying the rewards of both numbers and 
words” (Glesne and  Peshkin, 1992: 8).  This means such methods like interviews and 
observations are dominant in the naturalist (interpretive) paradigm and supplementary 
in the positive paradigm, where the use of survey is paramount.  Although it has been 
claimed (Winter, 2000) that quantitative researchers attempt to disassociate 
themselves as much as possible from the research process, qualitative researchers 
have come to embrace their involvement and role within the research.  Patton (2002) 
supports the notion of researcher's involvement and immersion into the research by 
proposing that the real world is subject to change and therefore, a qualitative 
researcher should be present during the changes to record an event after and before 
the change occurs.  However, both qualitative and quantitative researchers need to test 
and demonstrate that their studies are credible.  While the credibility in quantitative 
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research depends on instrument construction, in qualitative research, “the researcher is 
the instrument" (Patton, 2002: 14).  Thus, it seems when quantitative researchers 
speak of research validity and reliability, they are usually referring to a research that 
is credible while the credibility of a qualitative research depends on the ability and 
effort of the researcher (Merriam, 1998; Cohen et al., 2000).  Although reliability and 
validity are treated separately in quantitative studies, these terms are not viewed 
separately in qualitative research.  Instead, terminology that encompasses both, such 
as credibility, transferability, and trustworthiness is used. 
 
5.3 Qualitative versus Quantitative Research on This Topic: advantages, 
disadvantages and practical issues  
 
Both research methods have their own individual strengths and weaknesses.  These 
need to be recognised so that the most suitable method can be applied to this research 
project.   
 
Qualitative research usually achieves a greater level of depth and detail than 
quantitative techniques due to its inductive, investigatory and exploratory nature. It is 
preferred when researching sensitive subjects.  Rather than being constrained by pre-
set answers, qualitative methods allow sensitive subjects to be approached in a open 
way by allowing the researcher to employ personal skills to help lessen the difficulties 
of the subject matter.  These methods create openness between all parties and can help 
generate new theories or new problem solving techniques.  Participating subjects can 
discuss issues that are important to them, rather than responding to closed 
questionnaires’ questions that dominate qualitative approaches.  Subjects can also 
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clarify ambiguities or confusion over concepts.  Additionally, observation can take 
place allowing attitudes to be revealed, and observed.  “It certainly seems reasonable 
to suggest that one may have a better understanding of a community members 
situation by reading a descriptive passage than just looking at demographic statistics”, 
(Kruger, 2003:18).  .  
 
However this openness and greater interaction with the researcher can in some cases 
be counter-productive.  Some subjects can feel uncomfortable in the presence of an 
interviewer and give answers under duress; additionally influences like gender and 
ethnicity of the researcher can impact on some of the answers given by the 
participating subject.  Moreover, qualitative results are more difficult to aggregate and 
therefore make systematic comparisons.  It can also be difficult to replicate research 
due to the lack of structured design or standardised procedures (Cohen et al., 2000).  
 
In contrast, the use of standardised methods in quantitative research allows for greater 
objectivity and accuracy of results.  Generally, quantitative methods are designed to 
provide summaries of data that support generalisations about the phenomenon under 
study.  In order to accomplish this, quantitative research usually involves few 
variables and many cases, and employs prescribed procedures to ensure validity and 
reliability.  Using standards means that the research can be replicated, and then 
analysed and compared with similar studies.  Kruger (2003: 19) confirms that 
“quantitative methods allow us to summarize vast sources of information and 
facilitate comparisons across categories and over time”.  However the research is 
often carried out in an unnatural, artificial environment so that a level of control can 
be applied to the exercise.  This level of control might not normally be in place in the 
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real world yielding laboratory results as opposed to real world results (Cohen et al., 
2000).  In addition preset answers will not necessarily reflect how people really feel 
about a subject and in some cases might just be the closest match (Merriam, 1998). 
 
The development of standard questions by researchers can lead to 'structural' bias and 
false representation, where the data actually reflects the view of them instead of the 
participating subject.  However, personal bias can be avoided by researchers keeping 
a 'distance' from participating subjects and employing subjects unknown to them 
(Cohen et al., 2000).  
 
Quantitative methods allow for a broader study, involving a greater number of 
subjects, and enhancing the generalisation of the results.  Unfortunately, in 
comparison to qualitative methods, quantitative methods collect a much narrower and 
sometimes superficial dataset.  Results are limited as they provide numerical 
descriptions rather than detailed narrative and generally provide less elaborate 
accounts of human perception.  Additionally, these statistics can be humanely 
insignificant, therefore yielding insignificant results (Cohen et al., 2000).     
 
Quantitative methods are ideally suited for finding out who, what, when, and where 
(Day, 1998).  However they are inappropriate for the collection of behavioural and 
humanitarian aspects of data (Cohen et al., 2000).  Questions of quantitative methods 
have to be direct and easily quantified, and made available to a large sample of 
participants to permit reliable statistical analysis.  These questions can be “quite 
complex and require considerable investment for proper understanding and use” 
(Kruger, 2003: 19).   
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To conclude, in this section advantages and disadvantages of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods have been described and explained. Qualitative 
research is an unconstrained method of phenomena study.  Although data collection 
standards exist (Bogdan and Biklen, 1992), qualitative research is highly reliant upon 
the researcher carrying out the study.  The researcher has total control over the type of 
data collected and the methods used for analysis. Contrastingly, the benefits of 
quantitative research lie in the researcher’s ability to summarise results in statistically 
meaningful ways, allowing findings to be generalised to other populations. 
 
Employing the above advantages and disadvantages of both methods as the criteria for 
selecting the appropriate method, the researcher chooses not to implement a 
quantitative approach in this study due to the in-depth, realistic and exploratory nature 
of this study.  In addition intimate information will be gathered from a sample of 
several sectors of the economy in Saudi Arabia requiring interactions that can only be 
achieved through a qualitative approach.  Moreover, the research deals with sensitive 
issues and information on Saudization that are only publicized to authorized 
government representatives through official government correspondence.  This 
information can only be obtained through face-to-face interviews with a number of 
executives and training managers to establish an environment to overcome the 
sensitivity of issues discussed.  In other words, this research is not concerned with a 
large quantity of participating subjects; instead it is looking for quality and 
insightfulness of a few experts and managers from both the government and private 
sectors who are encountering and dealing with training and Saudization issues in the 
country.  Finally, this research will be trying to answer why and how questions rather 
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than who, what, when, and where ones which also support selecting a qualitative 
method for this research.              
 
5.4 Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research 
  
The discussion of quality in qualitative research was initiated from concerns about 
validity and reliability in the quantitative tradition which “involved substituting new 
term for words such as validity and reliability to reflect interpretivist [qualitative] 
conceptions” (Seale, 1999: 465).  
 
Validity and reliability for Patton (2002) are two factors which any qualitative 
researcher should be concerned about while designing a study, analyzing results and 
judging the quality of the study.  This corresponds to the question that “how can an 
inquirer persuade his or her audiences that the research findings of an inquiry are 
worth paying attention to” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985:290).  To answer, Healy and 
Perry (2000) assert that the quality of a study in each paradigm should be judged by 
its own paradigm’s terms.  For example, while the terms Reliability and Validity are 
essential criterion for quality in quantitative and qualitative paradigms, the terms 
Credibility, Neutrality or Confirmability, Consistency or Dependability and 
Applicability or Transferability are to be the essential criteria for quality (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985).   To be more specific with the term of reliability in qualitative research, 
Lincoln and Guba (1985: 300) use “dependability”, in qualitative research which 
closely corresponds to the notion of “reliability” in quantitative research.  They 
further emphasize “inquiry audit” (p: 317) as one measure which might enhance the 
dependability of qualitative research.  This can be used to examine both the process 
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and the product of the research for consistency (Hoepfl, 1997).  In the same vein, 
Clont (1992) and Seale (1999) endorse the concept of dependability with the concept 
of consistency or reliability in qualitative research. The consistency of data will be 
achieved when the steps of the research are verified through examination of such 
items as raw data, data reduction products, and process notes (Campbell, 1997).  
 
To ensure reliability and validity in qualitative research, the examination of 
trustworthiness is crucial.  Seale (1999), while establishing good quality studies 
through reliability and validity in qualitative research, states that the “trustworthiness 
of a research report lies at the heart of issues conventionally discussed as validity and 
reliability” (p: 266).  This was also supported by Lincoln and Guba (1985) who 
indicated that the idea of discovering truth through measures of reliability and validity 
is replaced by the idea of trustworthiness, which is “defensible” (Johnson 1997, p: 
282) and establishing confidence in the findings.  When judging qualitative work, 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest that the “usual canons of ‘good science’…require 
redefinition in order to fit the realities of qualitative research” (p: 250).   Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) argued that sustaining the trustworthiness of a research report depends 
on the issues, quantitatively, discussed as validity and reliability.   
 
5.5 Reliability and Validity in This Research 
 
The above brief debates of validity and reliability demonstrates the divergence among 
scholars of developing a consensus as to the appropriate quality criteria for qualitative 
research based on validity and reliability measures.  However, it is essential for this 
research like any other research to establish to its audience in the field the 
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trustworthiness of its research results in order to enrich the empirical literature and 
make a difference in people’s lives.  To establish such trustworthiness, this research 
will be seeking understanding of the constructed realities as interpreted by selected 
managers from Saudi private, quasigovernment and government organizations who 
are dealing with Saudization and training issues on a daily basis.  Their inputs and 
interpretations evolving from the field regarding these two issues which are the core 
of this study are essential to provide trustworthy, valid and practical results from the 
Saudi environment.  This dependency on human subjects’ interpretations 
demonstrates the fact that validity of qualitative research depends on reality that is 
based on multiple sets of mental constructions of the human beings (Merriam, 1998).  
This is, according to the same study, “because human beings are the primary 
instruments of data collection and analysis in qualitative research, [and that their] 
interpretations of reality are accessed directly through their […] interviews” (1998: 
203).   
 
The other side of the coin of trustworthiness in qualitative research increases from its 
reliability which is concerned traditionally with consistency and replicability of 
research findings in order to minimize errors and biases.  Reliability is considered 
problematic especially when dealing with social sciences due to the dynamic nature of 
human behaviours (Merriam, 1998; Cohen et al., 2000).  However, it is not the 
intension of this research to isolate the laws of human behaviours in order to achieve 
the reliability; yet it is to explore to understand realities and experiences of Saudi 
managers of linking training of Saudis to Saudization.  On the other hand, the 
researcher considers that when dealing with issues studied in this research concerning 
Saudization and the HRD of Saudis, minimizing errors and biases can be achieved to 
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a degree to ensure this research reliability via corroborating documents and other 
evidences from Saudi organizations included in the sample.    
              
Moreover, this research will implement the ‘Triangulation’ strategy advocated by a 
number of scholars such as Merriam (1998), Patton (2001), Mathison (1988), Johnson 
(1997) and many others to ensure its reliability, validity and trustworthiness.  In any 
qualitative research, the aim is to “engage in research that probes for deeper 
understanding rather than examining surface features” (Johnson, 1993, p. 4) and 
constructivism incorporates such an aim.  The constructivist notion, that reality is 
changing whether the observer wishes it or not (Hipps, 1993), is an indication of 
multiple or possibly diverse constructions of reality.  Constructivism values multiple 
realities that people have in their minds.  Therefore, to acquire valid and reliable 
multiple and diverse realities, multiple methods of searching or gathering data are 
required.  If this calls for the use of triangulation in the constructivism paradigm, then 
the use of investigators, method and data triangulations to record the construction of 
reality is appropriate (Johnson, 1997). 
 
Triangulation is defined as “a validity procedure where researchers search for 
convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or 
categories in a study” (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p: 126).  It includes incorporating 
“multiple methods to confirm the emerging findings” (Merriam, 1998, p: 204).  
Triangulation is typically a strategy (test) for improving the validity and reliability of 
the research or evaluation of findings which “strengthens a study by combining 
methods” (Patton, 2001, p: 247).  Mathison (1988) elaborates on this by stating that:  
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Triangulation has raised an important methodological issue in naturalistic and qualitative 
approaches to evaluation [in order to] control bias and establishing valid propositions 
because traditional scientific techniques are incompatible with this alternate 
epistemology.        (P: 13) 
 
Accordingly, multiple methods, such as, interviews, tape recordings, as well as the 
collection of Saudization documentation from the field will be utilized in this research 
to ensure the achievement of more valid, reliable and diverse construction of realities.  
The focus will be on successful Saudization experiences as they are linked to industry 
led training efforts in Saudi Arabia by quasigovernment and some private sector 
organizations.  In addition, and to improve the analysis and understanding of the 
construction of realities of the selected sample, another step will be taken by the 
researcher to involve a  peer researcher’s examiner to comment on the data collected, 
the interview questions and findings of the research as they emerge.  According to 
Johnson (1997, p: 284) a qualitative researcher can “use investigator triangulation and 
consider the ideas and explanations generated by additional researchers studying the 
research participants” (Johnson, 1997, p. 284).  This peer examiner will be a 
knowledgeable Saudization-field specialist researcher who has wide range 
experiences of vocational and training issues in Saudi Arabia.      
 
5.6 The Research Sample 
 
Selected sampling was incorporated in this study from government, quasigovernment 
and private sector.  Since this study investigated a strategic aim of changing the role 
of GOTEVT to an industry led training organization in addition to examining a 
national strategic objective, i.e. Saudization, the sampling pool consisted of top 
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management in the selected sectors.  The selection criterion of the government 
organizations in this study was based on their immediate involvement with 
employment, Saudization supervision and HRD of Saudis.  On the other hand, a 
number of large quasigovernment organizations were also included due to their 
successful implementation of Saudization among their human capital.  Similarly, 
different private sector organizations from different industries such as banking, retail, 
automobile, services, leisure and food were chosen in accordance with their 
achievements in linking their training programs to their Saudization efforts.  In 
addition, the selected sample included also a number of managers from private 
training organizations investing in the HRD industry that had been well recognized 
for their training achievements of Saudi human capital.  Finally, two managers of 
recruitment companies were also included to incorporate their perspectives on training 
and Saudization in the private sector.             
   
5.6.1 Government Organizations 
 
Government organizations under consideration in the study included the Ministry of 
Labour, GOTEVT and the HRDF. The Ministry is the supervisory and regulatory 
government body directly responsible for Saudization while GOTEVT is the HRD 
organization responsible for providing vocational training and technical education for 
Saudis wishing to be employed in the private sector.  HRDF, on the other hand, plays 
an important role as the government body chaired by the Minister of Labour 
responsible for recruiting, funding training and encouraging the Saudi nationals to 
take up private sector jobs.   
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The research sample will include the following representatives from the above 
mentioned government organizations: 
 
The Deputy Minister for Planning and Development from the Ministry of Labour who 
is also the Acting Manager of the HRD Fund to identify obstacles they are 
encountering in executing the Saudization strategy and their view of the research 
proposed changes to GOTEVT as a solution in linking training to recruitment in the 
private sector. 
 
GOTEVT top managers to investigate their perspectives and reactions to the research 
proposal of changing GOTEVT to an industry led training organization as the 
prerequisite for Saudization in Saudi Arabia.      
 
5.6.2 Quasigovernment Organizations 
 
The sample also included a number of human resources or training managers in 
quasigovernment organizations conducting focused and leading to employment 
training programs of Saudis.  The reason for this selection was to verify their training 
prerequisites, philosophy, and strategies that assist them in linking their training to 
recruitment and achievement of high rates of Saudization in their industries.  This was 
aimed to assist our understanding of the factors and conditions to achieve the 
connection between training and employment in order to achieve high rates of 
Saudization.   These quasigovernment organizations consist of the following: 
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• Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC). 
 
According to its annual report of 2004, SABIC was created in 1976 by the Saudi 
government to be the Middle East’s largest non-oil company to use natural gas 
associated with the production of crude oil for petrochemical productions.  It has 
achieved a record production volume in 2004 ranking SABIC as one of the world’s 
largest exporters of granular urea; second largest producer of ethylene glycol, 
methanol and MTBE; third largest producer of polyethylene; sixth largest producer of 
polypropylene; and overall the fourth largest producer of polymers. 
 
SABIC is headquartered in Riyadh and has two large industrial sites in Saudi Arabia 
(Al-Jubail on the Arabian Gulf coast and Yanbu on the Red Sea coast) with 19 
manufacturing affiliates.  SABIC also has interests in three regional ventures based in 
Bahrain.  In addition, SABIC Euro-Petrochemicals has two petrochemical production 
sites, in Geleen (Netherlands) and Gelsenkirchen (Germany), for the production, 
marketing and sale of polypropylene, polyethylene and hydrocarbons (SABIC, 2004; 
Economy World, 2003). 
 
According to the same report, SABIC has a strong commitment to investing in its 
human resources through its training programs and other human resource practices 
with a broad array of market-competitive benefits, salaries and other financial and 
non-financial incentives that are geared toward creating an attractive and “learning 
organization” corporate culture.  As a result, 82% of SABIC’s workforce in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are Saudi nationals. Moreover, Saudization has exceeded 
93% especially in technical fields in some of the companies affiliated with SABIC 
(Economy World, 2003). 
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• Saudi Electricity Company. 
 
The Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) was established by Royal Decree mandating 
the restructuring of the electricity sector and started its operations in 5 April 2000.  
The SEC was formed through the merger between the ten electricity companies 
working in the kingdom, which were the major suppliers of electricity power and 
geographically covered the kingdom (SABB, 2003).  
 
The Saudi government owns 74.15% of the SEC’s share capital, while the 
government-owned oil company of Aramco owns 6.89% and the private sector owns 
18.96%.  As of end of July 2003, the company accounted for 13% of the Saudi stock 
market capitalization - ranking the 3rd largest publicly listed Saudi corporation by 
market value (SABB, 2003). 
 
In 2002, the Company divided its activities according to specialization instead of the 
previous geographic division. The new SEC divisions are generation, transmission, 
and distribution to subscribers. Under the new division system, four geographic works 
departments were formed, which include the Central, Eastern, Western and Southern 
works areas. In addition, separate departments were formed to include the following 
activities: finance and accounting, general services, human resources and 
shareholders’ affairs, planning and programs, and legal and internal audit affairs 
(SABB, 2003). 
 
According to SEC Annual Report (2004), the company has achieved 80.9% 
Saudization among its 29.047 employees.  This high rate of Saudization according to 
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the Report is due to focused and continuous HRD programs implemented in the 
company’s training centres. 
 
• Saudi Telecommunication Company. 
 
Saudi Telecommunications Co. (STC), the largest telecom operator in the Middle 
Eastern region, started as Saudi Arabia’s sole telecommunications operator in 1998, 
when it was established as a Joint Stock Company by the Saudi Government.  It was 
operating under the umbrella of the Ministry of Post, Telephone and Telegraph, to 
achieve the government’s objectives of telecommunication services and was not 
intended to make a profit.  This establishment was financed entirely by Government 
capital and it had a separate budget.  Operating through four subsidiaries, the 
company provides a wide range of telecommunications services including fixed line, 
mobile, data and internet.   
 
In 2005, the Saudi Government decided to partially privatize STC, selling 30% of the 
equity to Saudi nationals while controlling 61% of the company shares. The rest 10% 
are also owned to two government funds of the General Organization for Social 
Insurance and the Public Pension Fund each owning 5% of the company2. 
 
According to its Annual Report of (2005), since its inception, STC has witnessed a 
rapid subscriber growth catering to 600,000 customers by the end of its very first year 
of existence; at the end of 2005, it boasted a subscriber base of over 15 million.  As of 
now, STC is primarily a domestic operator servicing only the Saudi Arabian market. 
It covers 95% of the country’s geographic landscape with a penetration rate of 
                                                 
2
 Cited from the STC internet website (http://www.stc.com.sa) on 10th of August, 2006 at 5:00 P.M.   
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57.14% (as of the end of 2005). The company enjoys a monopoly in the fixed line, 
data and internet segments and is the leading provider of mobile services. At the end 
of 2005, STC controlled over 80% of Saudi’s mobile telecommunications market. 
 
Currently, STC is employing 20.804 employees of which 88% are Saudis (STC, 
2005).  The company is providing its human capital with focused training programs 
and systemized evaluation procedures linking performance to pay and promotion 
which exceeds market standards to retain its high performing employees (STC, 2004).        
 
5.6.3 Private Organizations 
 
Twenty general, human resources or training managers from a number of private 
organizations were selected to participate in this study.  In addition, the sample 
included two managers from the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry who 
were responsible for training and recruitment affaires.  These two managers in 
particular were selected for their important roles of providing focused and industry led 
training programs for Saudis either employed or wishing to be employed in the 
private sector.  The rest of the private organizations are selected to represent a wide 
variety of industrial activities including banking, manufacturing, retail, construction, 
leisure and travel, farming and food industries.  The selection is also based on their 
continuous cooperation and utilization of training and recruitment contracts with the 
government HRDF.  These organizations are medium-to-large organizations that 
provide their own focused training programs for their existing as well as newly hired 
employees in their training centres.  Studying their focused and leading to 
employment training programs will assist our understanding of the training 
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prerequisites, philosophy, and processes of linking training to recruitment and, 
therefore, achieving high rates of Saudization.  The sample also includes two 
managers from private training industry to identify obstacles of investments 
encountering such industry in Saudi Arabia.  This will allow an in-depth 
understanding of Saudi private training environment that will impact the proposed 
changes to GOTEVT to be an industry led training organization.  The selection of 
these organizations is based on their outstanding HRD programs recognized by both 
labour market and by GOTEVT as the supervising body on private training 
institutions in Saudi Arabia.  Finally, the sample includes two managers of private 
recruitment agencies who are dealing on a daily basis with Saudization related 
matters.  These organizations are: 
 
1. The National Commercial Bank. 
2. Riyad Bank. 
3. Arab National Bank. 
4. The Savola Group. 
5. M. Al Hokair and Sons Group  
6. Zamil Industrial Investment Company  
7. Almarai Company  
8. The National Agricultural Development Company 
9. Al-Safi-Danone Company 
10. Saudi Research & Marketing Group 
11. Alshaya International Trading Co. 
12. Advanced Electronics Company 
13. Mobily Telecommunication Company 
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14. Saudi Real Estate Company 
15. Federal Express Corporation  
16. Riyadh Chamber of Commerce & Industry  
17. Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute 
18. Al Yamamah College  
19. InterSearch Saudi Arabia 
20. Tawteen Training and Recruitment Company 
 
5.7 Data Collection Technique 
 
Answering the core question of this research will be the criterion to choose the most 
appropriate qualitative approach for this study.  To fulfil this criterion and establish 
the fit between the research question and the research approach, structured face-to-
face interviews with a set of pre-determined questions to a selected sample in the 
natural setting in Saudi Arabia were carried out implemented.  This technique 
provides “uniform information, which assures the comparability of data … [at the 
same time], will require fewer interviewing skills than does unstructured 
interviewing” (Kumar, 1999:109).      
 
The interviewing technique is employed in this research because it serves the 
exploratory nature of the study.  It seeks in-depth information about skill formation 
outcomes and Saudization in the Saudi labour market.  The latter issue and the 
information to be obtained are very sensitive to interviewees in this study.  Therefore, 
interviewing is the most appropriate approach.  This can be achieved through a small 
sample of representatives from selected sectors rather than focusing on a large scale 
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population.  Interviewing will, also, enable the “interviewer to supplement 
information obtained from responses with those gained from observation of non-
verbal reactions” (Kumar, 1999:115).  Moreover, this qualitative research falls within 
the context of discovering possible barriers and challenges encountering Saudization 
and HRD in Saudi Arabia.  Therefore, it is essential to prevent any possibility of 
misunderstanding of research questions that will be asked as the interviewer can either 
repeat or explain such questions in the spot which can only be accomplished through 
face-to-face interviewing.   
 
However, as a flexible approach to this research, it is important to mention that as a 
result of using the interview technique and the information gathered from the 
interviews, new assumptions may evolve according to the findings which may open 
other doors for further investigations.  It may also involve complete redirection, or 
modification of, or additions to, existing ideas suggested by the research. 
 
In this regard, it must be, also, noted that interviewing technique is “time-consuming 
and expensive [to conduct]” (Kumar, 1999:115), especially when it involves the 
travelling of the researcher and the valuable time-off of those selected sample to 
participate in the interviews.  Another disadvantage of this technique comes from the 
fact that “quality of data [obtained] depends upon the quality of the interaction 
between interviewer and interviewers [and the skills of the interviewer in conducting 
face-to-face interview]”.  More dangerously, the interviewing technique is vulnerable 
to the researcher’s “bias in forming questions and the interpretation of responses” 
(1999:115).          
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For this research, interviews were conducted to collect data, as the interview allowed 
the researcher to obtain and analyze large amounts of contextual and important data, 
even though the data are subject to misunderstandings, which might lead to 
misinterpretations. These misunderstandings are due to the cultural background and 
uniqueness of Saudi culture; yet the researcher being a member of this culture and of 
Saudi HRD environment will reduce the risk of such misconceptions.  The 
interpretive analysis that was used in this research provides explanations and helps to 
create some generalizations of the actual missing linkages, if they exist, between HRD 
in Saudi Arabia and the promising strategic objective of Saudization.   
 
In fact, this research did not utilize any other data gathering techniques like focus 
groups or surveys due to the confidentiality of information provided by the 
interviewees and to explore in-depth and descriptive data.   
 
5.8 Overview of Data Collection Stage  
 
The trip for data collection to Saudi Arabia started on late December 2006 and 
continued until late April, 2007.  Twenty-Nine interviews were conducted exceeding 
the Twenty-three initial target number of interviews expected before this trip.  
Interviews were conducted with a number of General Managers, Human Resource 
Managers, and/or HRD Managers of some private and quasi-government 
organizations.  In addition, interviews with government top management officials 
were carried out including one with the Deputy Minister of Labour for Planning and 
Development who is also the Acting General Manager of the HRD Fund.  The 
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Governor and his Deputy of GOTEVT were essential parts of this interviewing 
process as they represent the immediate focus of this research.   
 
The selection of the Human Resource and other top managers in this interviewing 
process represented and achieved the diversity intended for this research.  In other 
words, the sample interviewed included different Saudi economic activities to ensure 
diversity in human resource practices and perspectives to deepen the understanding of 
the collected data for this research.  The interviewed managers represented different 
industries such as manufacturing, services, telecommunication, journalism and 
distribution, banking, training, education and recruitment industries, retail, leisure and 
food.    
 
The majority of the interviews (27) were face-to-face taped interviews while only two 
interviewees preferred answering and submitting their interviews on paper and on 
their own time.  One of which was from a quasi-government organization while the 
other was from a private one.  The conducted interviews required on average between 
45 minutes to an hour of taped open-ended questions which were then transcribed 
verbatim to paper format.  Ten of the interviews were in Arabic which were then 
translated into English by a recognized translation services agency.  The interviews 
took place in three different cities in the Kingdom i.e. Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam. 
 
The researcher/interviewer has encountered some challenges and constraints in the 
process of data collection for this research as well as some opportunities.  Among 
these challenges are the unexpected hesitations of a number of interviewees to provide 
views and/or critiques of GOTEVT.  Such hesitations came from government and 
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quasi-government organizations which, prior to conducting the field study, were 
expected to occur from private sector organizations.  The latter were noticeably open 
and transparent in providing such information and perspectives.  Some participants 
from government and quasi-government organizations questioned the qualitative 
research methodology implemented and the interviewing techniques used as they are 
used to deal with questionnaires implemented by quantitative methodology studies.  
This in particular is viewed by the researcher as an opportunity rather than a 
constraint to educate the participants of the qualitative methodology as a parallel 
research approach.  Another byproduct of this data collection trip was the 
establishment of the researcher’s networking with human resource professionals in 
Saudi Arabia for future research projects and practical insightfulness.             
 
The interviewees participated in this study are listed in the following (5.1) table. 
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Name of Interviewee Position Organization Sector 
Ministry of Labor 
1. Dr. Abdulwahed Al-Humaid 
Deputy Minister for Planning & 
Development and Acting Manager of 
Human Resources Development Fund Human Resources Development 
Fund 
Government 
2. Dr. Naser Al-Ghafees Governor 
3. Dr. Hamad Alogla Vice Governor for Education & Training GOTEVT Government 
4. Jamman AlWagdani General Manager The Institute of Banking Government 
5. Dr. Hamad Al-Shagawi Manager of Training Department Saudi Electricity Company-Central Region Branch 
Quasi-
Government 
6. Saleh Al-Zamel Vice President of Human Resources and Training 
Saudi Telecommunication 
Company 
Quasi-
Government 
7. Mohammad Al-Bat'hi Vice President of Human Resources Saudi Basic Industries Corporation Quasi-Government 
8. Bleihid Albleihid Human Resources Director Saudi Research & Marketing Group Private  
9. Haitham Al Shaya General Manager 
10. Hisham Al-Khaldi Human Resources Services Manager in Saudi Arabia 
Alshaya International Trading Co. Private 
11. Khalid Al-Khwaiter Chief Financial Officer 
Abdullah AlSaad Training Operation Supervisor 
 
Advanced Electronics Company 
 
Private 
12. Dr. Fahad AlZahrani Vice President of Human Resources Mobily Telecommunication Company Private 
13. Hamoud Al-Malki Training & Recruitment Manager The National Agricultural Development Company Private 
14. Dr. Abdulrahman Al Turaigi General Manager of Human Resources Almarai Company Private 
Table 5.1: Lists of interviewees Participants 
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15. Khalid Al Thumairi Director of Human Resources Al-Safi-Danone Company Private 
16. Abdullah AlSai Human Resources Department Manager M. Al Hokair & Sons Group Private 
17. Abdul Mohsin Al-Ghamdi Director of Corporate Administration & Human Resources 
Zamil Industrial Investment 
Company Private 
18. Dr. Sameer Hussain Director of Human Resources The Savola Group Private 
19. Dr. Muafig Al-Rwaily Human Resources Development  Manager Riyad Bank Private 
20. Khalid Al-Koblan Assistant General Manager Personnel Manager Arab National Bank Private 
21. Saud Sabban Assistant General Manager and Head of Human Resources The National Commercial Bank Private 
22. Salim Al-Asmari Director Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute Private 
23. Sultan Al Ammash Managing Director InterSearch Saudi Arabia Private 
24. Abdullah Al-Zehairi General Manager Tawteen Training and Recruitment Company Private 
25. Khaled Al-Qahtani Head of Recruitment Center 
26. Mohammad AlSwailim Head of Human Resources Development Centre 
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry Private 
27. Eng. Ali Al-Zaid 
Chairman of Human Resources Committee 
and Chairman of Saudi Real Estate 
Company 
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry 
Saudi Real Estate Company 
Private 
28. Dr. Abdullatif Ghaith Managing Director Federal Express Corporation Private 
29. Dr. Ahmed Al-Eisa College President Al-Yamamah College Private 
  
 172 
The three sets of open-ended question forms (see Appendix 2.) exploring similar data 
were used in the interviews representing different private sector and government 
organizations.  In addition at the end of each interview, a proposed change to role of 
the General Organization for Technical Education and Vocational Training 
(GOTEVT) is introduced to stimulate further discussion and insight from each 
interviewee (see Appendix 2.).     
 
5.9 Data Reporting Technique 
 
The researcher employed ‘the Ad Hoc Meaning Generation’ technique suggested by 
Kvale (1990).  Such a technique advocates the implementation of individual and/or a 
combination of different reporting and analysis tactics.  These tactics range from 
descriptive to explanatory and from concrete to more conceptual and abstract.  They 
are  
 
(1) Noting patterns or themes, (2) seeing plausibility, (3) clustering of “what goes with 
what”, (4) making metaphors to achieve more integration among diverse pieces of data, 
(5) counting the number of agreements or disagreements, (6) making 
contrasts/comparisons to sharpen the understanding of interviewees’ responds, (7) 
partitioning variables to differentiate between responses, (8) subsuming particulars under 
the general to seeing responses and their relationships more abstractly, (9) factoring to 
establish an analogue to a familiar quantitative technique, (10) noting relations between 
variables, (11) finding intervening variables, (12) building logical chain of evidence to 
systematically assemble a coherent understandable data, and (13) making 
conceptual/theoretical coherence. 
(1990: 204)        
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The selection of Kvale’s model for this study was due the freedom it provided in 
selecting from its alternative tactics that allowed establishing coherent relationships 
between the huge qualitative data obtained in this research.  These tactics, for 
example, allowed the researcher to establish common themes from direct quotations 
that involved similar and intervening responses from participants which this research 
is aiming for.  They also allowed counting the number of agreements and/or 
disagreements of participants within each theme to indicate different variables that 
could be discussed in a clearer manner in the coming analysis chapter. 
 
Reporting the data using Kvale’s model included re-reading the interview transcripts 
several times to become familiar with the data, and then attempting to identify the key 
concepts and the relations between them.  The next stage involved cataloguing 
occurrences of these concepts in the data, noting the sources, how often they occur, 
and what level of confidence they provide.   
 
The findings of this research which will be reported in the next chapter were 
developed from direct quotations of the interviewees who were categorized according 
to the sector they work for i.e. government, quasigovernment and private sector.  
According to Kvale’s tactics this reporting evolved around a number of themes that 
were generated from connecting the dialogues of the interviewees’ direct quotations 
on human resource issues including Saudization.  In doing so, the researcher 
examined the responses looking for similar concepts, words and/even expressions that 
could fit together to generate a general theme.  For example, the researcher looked for 
phrases such as ‘problems encountering Saudization’, ‘lack of Saudization’, 
‘ineffective Saudization’ and so forth to fit within a theme that would be discussing 
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the obstacles encountering Saudization in the private sector.  Within this theme, the 
researcher also counted the agreement and disagreement among the responses on the 
major insightfulness and perspectives provided.        
 
This data reporting included the last name of each interviewee when quoting their 
views as it appeared in the above table.  Their quotations were minimally intervened 
with by the researcher unless proven necessary for grammatical purposes to convey 
the correct views expressed by interviewees.  
 
5.10 Data Analysis Technique 
  
The interviews were analysed using a technique called ‘the Ad Hoc Meaning 
Generation’ suggested by also Kvale (1996).  This technique uses “a free interplay of 
different approaches and techniques for meaning generation during the analysis” (p: 
203).  For instance it allows the researcher to  
 
Read the interviews and get an overall impression, then go back to specific passages, 
perhaps make some quantifications like counting statements indicating different attitudes 
to a phenomenon, make deeper interpretations of specific statements, cast parts of the 
interview into a narrative, work out metaphors to capture the material, attempt a 
visualization of the findings in flow diagrams, and so on 
          (1996: 204) 
 
This analysis technique gave the possibility for the researcher to look at the data on a 
more abstract level and from different point of views, since it is giving the possibility 
to look into the interview material as a whole. There is a more free interplay of 
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different techniques during process of analysis. When analyzing the themes, the 
researcher could use counting and in others comparisons between variables. This 
meaning generation technique gives a good possibility to find out the real and deeper 
meaning of the data since no structure is harming the freedom of analysis. (Kvale, 
1996) 
 
The analysis of the current findings, once grouped into themes, was interpretively 
analyzed with connection to the issues discussed in chapter three and four.  The 
emphasis at this stage was on evaluating the empirical data with established literature 
to fulfill the research objectives and to extract the real meaning from the interviews.  
The analysis attempted further and deeper interpretation for the findings to explore 
and understand the discussed issues related to Saudization and skill formation as 
viewed and practiced by the different managers from the field.  It also included 
linking dialogues from different participants’ views to generate new meanings, 
modify existing ones and/or develop new conceptual framework.                  
 
5.11 Conclusion  
 
To sum up, this chapter reviewed the qualitative research strategy chosen which will 
enable the researcher to fulfil the core objectives of this research.  It also described the 
research sample and the criteria of selecting participants for this study and the 
intended data gathering technique.  It also provided a descriptive insight for the 
experience of data gathering in Saudi Arabia to benefit future academic efforts to 
overcome some of the obstacles experienced in this research.  The chapter also 
presented the data reporting technique that will be implemented in the following 
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chapter.  Finally, it gave an introduction to the technique to be used in the analysis 
chapter of this thesis to analyse the findings of the interviews conducted in Saudi 
Arabia.            
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter reports the research findings collected through the interviews in Saudi 
Arabia.  These findings are grouped into the following five major themes to illustrate 
the insights of the different interviewees.  As anticipated, the evolving themes from 
the interviews are echoing the questions that stimulated them in the first place.   
 
Theme 1: The challenges encountering the Saudization program in the private sector. 
Theme 2: The factors assisting the Saudization program in some private sector 
organizations.  
Theme 3: The factors influencing training investment decisions in Saudi employees 
in private organizations. 
Theme 4: Evaluation of GOTEVT’s current role and its graduates’ skills level in 
regard to the private sector manpower needs. 
Theme 5: Evaluation of the proposed changes of the role of GOTEVT toward 
industry-led training organizations to fulfil immediate needs of the Saudi 
labour market for employable Saudis. 
 
6.2 Theme 1: The challenges encountering the Saudization program in the 
private sector. 
 
This theme mainly focuses on exploring the challenges encountered by the 
Saudization program in different private and quasigovernment organizations that were 
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included in this study.  It also investigates government perspectives on such 
challenges as they are the regulators, the supervisory and human resource providers 
for such a strategy.  The theme itself evolved as a direct result of answering the first 
and second question from the interview questions (see APPENDIX 2).  The number 
of respondents varied as a few mangers did not answer the questions directly.  
However, the majority of interviewees responded and gave supporting empirical 
examples.  Three major challenges evolved that are low salaries provided by the 
private sector organizations, government’s influence and role in addition to Saudis’ 
attitudes to work in the private sector.              
 
• Low Salaries  
 
The four government interviewees asserted that the major challenge encountering 
Saudization stems from low salaries provided by small-to-medium size private 
organizations.  These organizations as AlWagdani from the Institute of Banking 
explained “have the potential to recruit a huge number of Saudis […yet are] 
depending greatly in their strategies on reducing expenses” to maximize their profit.  
Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour for example stated that  
 
 The imbalance in [the labour market] occupational structure leads to decrease in salaries 
as our standards of salaries are set by cheap foreign labour forces from Bangladesh and 
Sir Lanka.  […] low salaries don’t attract Saudis to exert efforts and specialize in such 
occupations.  Saudi workers will not continue performing these jobs as they will work for 
one week or two and then leave because salaries usually don’t exceed the SR 1,500 level.  
This level will be too low to meet Saudi living expense standards for even the necessities.           
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This low salaries dilemma for Al-Ghafees from GOTEVT is the result of foreign 
labour controlling and managing “all small size organizations [in the country].  
Foreign labour forces amount for 94% in small size organizations”.  They evade 
recruiting Saudis as they usually recruit their fellow citizens.  Al-Ghafees generally 
believes that “private sector is always searching for profits through reducing salaries 
and searching for cheap foreign labour forces”.  Alogla also from GOTEVT indicated 
that Saudization is affected by “organizational structure” or organizational maturity 
which provides Saudis with better employment security than small-to-medium sized 
private organizations.   
 
As for the private sector interviewees, they generally perceived the obstacles 
encountering Saudization in their sector differently than the government interviewees.  
The majority of private sector interviewees (20 managers) asserted that skill 
formation systems including GOTEVT are not linking their programs and outcomes 
toward the labour market needs and Saudization requirements.  They did not view low 
salaries as the major obstacle for Saudization implementation.  They considered the 
level of salaries to be reasonable especially with the non-industry-led qualifications 
provided by skill formation systems in the Kingdom.  Albleihid, for example, from 
Saudi Research and Marketing Group argued that the country has serious shortages of 
skilled Saudis who can take over expatriates’ positions in different industrial fields.  
Albleihid stated that “for some industries we don’t have the qualified skills within the 
local market”.  One of which is the media industry which his companies specialize in.  
He explains that  
 
The country does not have enough qualified people in the media specialization such as 
journalism, in illustration, in design, in all of that; so we have to take the long run to 
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make our own talents [as a company].  [King Saud University] teaches public relations 
only and marketing but not journalism.  They also provide Bachelor degree in fine art but 
those graduates are not developed in a way [to be] able to design for lay-out and 
illustration of magazines and so forth.    
 
He believed that skill formation systems do not provide the “minimum required 
training” that industries of the private sector can build on through their on-job-training 
afterward.  For example, Al-Khaldi from Alshaya International Trading Corporation 
argued that “English and work ethics are very important and are both absent in Saudi 
employees”.  Both English and work ethics were indicated by the majority of 
respondents (16 private managers) to be unavailable in Saudis who are seeking 
employment in the private sector.  On the other hand, the government interviewee, Al-
Ghafees from GOTEVT argued the contrary.  He claimed that the private 
organizations are seeking any tactics to evade employing Saudis including requesting 
English communication skills even though the majority of their jobs do not require 
English.  He affirmed that  
 
Employers in the private sector insist in using English as a mean for teaching in 
GOTEVT and blame our graduates just for the sake of blaming that they are not qualified 
because of their English communication skills.  At the same time, you find that the 
foreign labour force does not speak Arabic or English and they are attractive for 
employment in the private sector.  
 
In addition, Al-Malki from NADC stated that “the most prevailing feature in the 
Saudi labour market is its scarcity of qualified human resources”.  This necessitates 
organizations in the private sector recruiting the well qualified and easy to retain 
foreign labour instead of Saudis.  These industries cannot depend on the slow and 
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bureaucratic responsiveness of the government skill formation systems to fulfill their 
needs of skills in their very dynamic and competitive market.  For example Al Turaigi 
from Almarai Company asserted that  
 
Saudi universities are producing 70% social oriented graduates.  The need for the private 
sectors does not exceed 5 to 6% [of such outcome] but the need is for medicine, 
engineering, IT, food related majors, science, math, finance, marketing and business 
majors; [yet] only 15% of the output is geared towards that.     
 
AlSwailim from Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry also confirmed that  
 
Graduates of certain majors exceed market demands such as social and religious studies 
that represent 42.2% of universities’ graduates; while graduates of engineering, medical 
sciences and agricultural sciences represent only 8.8%, 13% and 2.9% respectively.  At 
the same time, our studies of the labour market show that GOTEVT’s technical high 
school graduates entering the labour market represent only 13% while 81.8% are coming 
from general high schools.    
 
Al-Zehairi from Tawteen Training and Recruitment and Al Ammash from InterSearch 
two recruitment companies both confirmed that low quality and non-industry focused 
skill formation programs are the main obstacles for Saudization.  Al-Zehairi stated 
that “the first challenge that faces Saudization is the poor and weak training system 
that is not capable of qualifying youth to available jobs in the labour market”.  Al 
Ammash also asserted that “universities’ students do not have the mechanism through 
their current curriculum whereby they can improve and really have the smooth 
transition from higher education to the labour market”.  More alarming, Al-Zehairi 
confirmed that 
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Saudis know that their skills are not up to the working standards in the private sector, so 
they look for employment in the government knowing that they will not be dismissed 
whether they perform or not.  They look for employment for life until they retire 
regardless of the amount of salary they will be receiving.       
 
Al-Zehairi asserted that private sector organizations are offering introductory salaries 
higher than the ones offered by the government starting over “SR. 2,800 for graduates 
of elementary, intermediate and high school.  The salaries of these jobs will be raised 
to SR. 3,500 and 4,000 within one year of recruitment”.  Gaith from Federal Express 
Corporation (FedEx) confirms that  
 
The pay scale for higher middle management and higher management in Saudi 
companies for qualified Saudis is actually sky rocketing.  Now a human resource 
manager with limited experience would bring about SR. 40,000 total pay and that is 
considered in the middle of the pay range.          
 
In other words, “what is absent are the Saudi people with skills to be employed as 
there are no [shortages] of jobs [in the labour market]” as Gaith explained.  Al-Koblan 
from the Arab National Bank (ANB) supported Gaith’s views and stated that  
 
ANB sometimes pay 70% increase to a Saudi who decides to leave us if the bank feels 
that he is worth it. […] We will even triple his pay to keep him as the labour market is 
suffering from shortages of skilled workers [especially] as new businesses are eager to 
attract well trained human resources.  I can challenge anyone saying that pay is the source 
of the problem of Saudization.         
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• Government’s Influence and Role  
 
Three government managers, Al-Ghafees from GOTEVT, AlWagdani from the 
Institute of Banking in addition to Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour believed 
that Saudis are not attracted to employment in private organizations due to lack of job 
security and unavailability of clear career development plans.  On the other hand, job 
security has been always available in government jobs through their employment for 
life for Saudis since the discovery of the country’s oil.  AlWagdani for example 
emphasized that 
  
Saudi youth still fear the risk of moving from one organization to another due to long 
lasting recruitment culture founded by government recruitment in our society and by the 
quasigovernment organizations such as SABIC and others.   
 
Al-Humaid also stated that  
 
Among [the obstacles that hinder Saudization] are the low salaries, long working hours, 
working on Thursdays and evenings whereas government jobs provide great stability.  I 
believe that some Saudis are spoiled to the extent that they don’t want to work anyway.  
They have cars and servants at their homes and they are not accustomed to work and 
follow work values.        
 
In contrast, Al-Ghafees believed that the government institutions are achieving their 
objectives and fulfilling their duties in assisting Saudization efforts.  He asserted that  
 
The training process in the Kingdom is not the problem of Saudization.  The real problem 
doesn’t lie in training or GOTEVT, but in the private sector which doesn’t want to 
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achieve Saudization and puts the blame on GOTEVT. […] The private sector is always 
searching for profits through reducing salaries and searching for cheap labour forces.         
 
In addition, the quasigovernment interviewee, Al-Zamel from STC illustrated the 
problem of overlooking the graduates’ quality in order to achieve the quantitative 
requirements of Saudization which contradicts with organizations’ competitiveness.  
He argued that the country is in a serious problem and whilst it is important to achieve 
Saudization it is even more important that there is the right selection of workforce.  
He explained that  
 
I [as a private organization] cannot just seek any Saudi who might not fit in my 
organization just to fill positions and show that my organization is accomplishing 
Saudization percentages.  I cannot survive the competition.   
 
Private sector interviewees in general (18 private managers) affirmed that government 
interventions overlook and sometimes hinder their efforts to achieve Saudization.  As 
discussed earlier they believed that the government skill formation systems were not 
responding nor fulfilling the needs of qualified and industry-led human resources.  
Moreover, according to Gaith from FedEx, the government through its economy 
booming years developed in the minds of Saudis the view that providing employment 
is “a right and privilege but not only as a payment for results an employee delivers”.  
Private sector interviewees confirmed that the government is not “synchronizing” nor 
unifying its economic vision with strategic planning for human resources especially 
regarding Saudization and skill formation.  For example, Al Zaid from Saudi Real 
Estate Company stated that  
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The major challenge [for Saudization] is that there is no unified and clear vision towards 
the economy and without having such vision one cannot plan for human resources.  There 
is no coordination between various human resource bodies in the country such as private 
sector, education, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Commerce.         
 
Gaith from FedEx also supported such a view and commented that “the educational 
system and the needs of the economy are not being synchronized”.  More alarming, 5 
managers of this sector confirmed that the government through the Ministry of Labour 
was “not listening” nor “consulting with” the private sector regarding government 
regulations for Saudization.  In fact, the government was “forcing” the strategy on the 
sector according to the majority of interviewees (17 private managers).  Albleihid for 
example explained that  
 
The Ministry [of Labour] needs to listen to us as the private sector who is the subject for 
their pre-existing regulations for the last 30 years.  The labour office of the Ministry is 
deciding on its own government bureaucracies that are unable to address the 
[Saudization] issue properly.  What they are doing now is forcing Saudization.  The 
private sector is forced to take the quality [of graduates] that is not up to their standards 
and pay more money.  This will result in hindering our competitive advantage because of 
the cost and inefficiency that we will have.                  
 
Al-Eisa from Al-Yamamah College also confirmed that  
 
The real defect lies in the regulations and policies for Saudization because some of them 
are issued according to reactions or may be issued from bodies and entities that are not 
related directly to Saudization.  For example, these regulations force Saudization on 
certain private sectors and industries [like the Gold retail market and Taxis market].  I am 
against Saudization forced on a complete sector.   
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On the other hand, the Ministry of Labour restricted and tightened companies’ 
abilities to dismiss any Saudi if unable to produce or fit into private organizations.  
Such an attempt was establishing a practice and a culture of avoiding Saudis by 
private employers who fear employing already unqualified Saudis and being unable to 
dismiss them if do not achieve profitability.  Gaith for example from FedEx 
confirmed that such regulations although an attempt by the government to protect 
these employees from arbitrary dismissal, cause other problems. He explained that   
 
The government is protecting them so much that it is affecting their ability to perform. 
[…] This was an extension to the employment culture the government has created in the 
minds of Saudis whom if cannot be utilized, they can be put aside and just rely on the 
people that can be relied on [the expatriates].        
 
Al-Asmari from the Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute supported the view 
that the government is not providing the labour market with quality Saudis for 
Saudization to be achieved.  He stated that   
 
The government should prepare Saudi workers with the knowledge, skills, attitudes and 
work ethics to be ready to work and compete in the private sector.  The government 
cannot just say to the private sector take those young Saudis because they are 
unemployed then train, prepare and recruit them as this will be a heavy load on the 
private sector.   
 
• Saudis’ Attitudes to Work in the Private Sector    
 
Three government interviewees, Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour and Alogla 
from GOTEVT in addition to AlWagdani from the Institute of Banking, suggested 
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that Saudis are still looking for employment in the government or large organizations.  
Saudis are not accepting nor realizing the fact that those employers are unable to 
create job opportunities like small-to-medium private organizations.  These 
organizations like other private businesses require high performance and provide low 
introductory salaries.  AlWagdani emphasized that “the real employing organizations 
at the moment are the small-to-medium ones that compete to reduce their employees’ 
wages who are usually foreign workers”.    
  
Developing this issue, Al-Humaid also confirmed that  
 
Saudi youth prefer government jobs for they have good salaries in comparison to the 
effort an employee may exert.  Saudis should accept the low salaries at the beginning of 
their careers as they will get better as they progress in the private labour market. 
 
Similarly Alogla also supported such an argument by illustrating that “[the Saudi] 
society has developed a culture of seeking employment in the government or large 
organizations not in the private sector.             
 
Two quasigovernment interviewees, Al-Zamel from STC and Al-Bat’hi from SABIC, 
agreed with Alogla that the challenges encountering Saudization are the result of 
Saudis not being prepared for employment in the competitive work environment of 
the private organizations.  Therefore, Saudis prefer employment in the government in 
office and non-technical jobs.  Al-Bat’hi stated that  
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In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia there were some ideas prevalent in society, which did 
not value the technical work and work in private sector.  Therefore, the demand for such 
works was below the expected level.  
 
Five private sector managers commented on the Saudis’ attitudes towards working in 
the private sector.  Similar to Al-Bat’hi’s views, Al-Zehairi from Tawteen Training 
and Recruitment stated  
 
Saudi society does not respect Saudis who are employed in lower jobs that represent the 
majority of all available jobs in the private sector such as sales, cashiers and customer 
service jobs.  This view stems from the person employed in the private sector viewing 
himself with less self-respect then other Saudis in the government sector  
  
Al Turaigi from Almarai confirmed that as well 
 
The majority of Saudis especially in the entry level including the dropouts of high 
schools have problems with work attitudes, discipline, coming to work on time, 
respecting their colleagues and their employers as well as respecting and honoring their 
employment contracts.  When we ask them to join us on a two years contract and demand 
that they give us one month notice before leaving; the majority of them leave without 
seeing them.         
 
Al-Khaldi from Alshaya International Trading Corporation also indicated another 
attitudinal obstacle for Saudization of the service oriented careers.  He explained that  
 
Saudis from the central and northern regions in the Kingdom do not accept working as 
sales advisors for fashion or to serve coffee to customers in our Star Bucks as Saudis 
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come from tribal backgrounds and are not used to service oriented careers.  The 
perception of these jobs was a low status.      
 
This for Al Ammash from InterSearch is the direct result of the country’s sudden 
wealth from the discovery of oil.  He stated that  
 
The country has passed to another state where it experienced immense growth in its 
wealth which has caused people to really come from a very tough environment to a very 
spoiled one that has created the problem to new generation.  Young people do not have 
the common sense to realize the importance of work and of being successful. 
 
Such argument is supported by AlZahrani from Mobily Telecommunication 
Company who asserted that young Saudis lack the initiative and eagerness to invest in 
their development with employable skills.  AlZahrani explained that  
 
Most of the students do not realize the importance of investing in developing themselves 
[…] which is a big problem for the Saudi people.  [A Saudi] has to invest extra effort in 
developing himself with basic skills in computer, English and also in knowing how to 
present and market himself to other people.      
 
6.3 Theme 2: The factors assisting the Saudization program in some private 
sector organizations.  
 
This theme focuses on exploring the factors that led to the successful implementation 
of Saudization in some private organizations.  This theme assists the research to 
examine those successful scenarios to support the research’s findings and 
recommendations.  The theme evolved from answers of interviewees on questions 
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number 3 and 4 from Question Form#1 in addition to question 3 from Question 
Form#2 (see APPENDIX 2).  The number of respondents varied as few mangers did 
not respond to the questions directly.  However, the majority of interviewees 
responded and gave supporting empirical examples.  The main factor for the majority 
of managers was top management belief in Saudization especially in large private and 
quasigovernment organizations.     
 
• Top Management Belief in Saudization in Large Organizations 
 
The government managers, Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour, Al-Ghafees and 
Alogla from GOTEVT in addition to AlWagdani from the Institute of Banking, 
agreed that the key successful factors that led some private organizations to high 
percentages in Saudization are high salaries and clear and attractive career 
development path.  Both factors as indicated by all the government managers are 
associated with large private or quasigovernment organizations in which top 
management view Saudization as a strategic organizational objective.  Al-Humaid 
confirmed such an argument by stating that  
 
We notice that high salary jobs are more attractive to Saudis.  There are certain graduates 
who are better qualified than others.  For example, graduates of King Fahad University 
for Petroleum and Minerals, Al-Jubail and Yanbu colleges of SABIC are greatly wanted 
in the market and businessmen are competing to attract them.  Some companies have 
flexible working hours, no evenings or Thursdays which all attract Saudis.            
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Al-Ghafees also added that successful Saudization is evident in organizations that 
provide “their employees [with] clear professional and career development [plans] 
including on-the-job training”.  For Alogla the key factor for such success was that  
 
SABIC and other large organizations such as banks, Telecommunications and Energy 
companies [have] well defined organizational structure and apply successful 
organizational practices.  They have clearer career paths than even the government’s 
ones.  They are able to implement [Saudization] regulations and rules at the same time act 
as major players in the economy and development.          
 
AlWagdani, from a training institute that serves the banking sector, indicated that 
Saudization success in the banking sector “ranges between 80 to 90%”.  This is due to 
a number of factors that are evident in the sector.  These included according to 
AlWagdani 
 
1. There is a government supervising body namely the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA) that considers Saudization a very important national program since 
the 1980s.  It put standards and established execution that necessitated and monitored 
achieving the sector’s high ratios of Saudizations. 
2. SAMA also established the Institute of Banking (IOB) and linked its activities to the 
sector to be responsive and flexible to its customers’ needs of industry focused 
Human Resource Development.   
3. This sector has the financial and organizational abilities to attract Saudi employees, 
invest in their development as well as retain them with attractive incentives and 
competitive pay and compensation schemes. 
 
Similar to the views of AlWagdani and Alogla, Quasigovernment interviewees, Al-
Shagawi from the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC), Al-Zamel from the Saudi 
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Telecommunication Company (STC) and Al-Bat’hi from SABIC all agreed on the 
essentiality of top management beliefs in Saudization and the availability of 
organizational support systems.  Al-Shagawi for example argued that their successes 
in Saudization required their  
 
Leaders’ belief as well as focused and compatible HRD programs.  Our training focuses 
on what the company needs of skills and competencies.  [SEC] also provided its 
employees with a number of [human resource management] elements to ensure 
occupational satisfaction [such as] the right work environment, a career development 
system, a promotion system as well as incentive and rewards systems that are linked to 
performance.  [Therefore] Saudization in SEC is reaching 88% among 27,000 to 29,000 
employees.             
           
The experience of the Saudi Telecommunication Company, as explained by Al-
Zamel, was different than other private and quasigovernment organizations in the 
labour market.  The company did not encounter a scarcity of qualified Saudi 
employees when it joined the private sector market after its partial privatization from 
state ownership.  Their success in Saudization (90% Saudization out of 20,000 
employees), as reported by Al-Zamel, required  
 
The right selection from its already recruited Saudi manpower through the assessment 
center, a lot of training and repositioning as well as providing attractive early retirement 
program to reorganize and relocate the company’s Saudi manpower.      
 
SABIC, on the other hand, achieved 87% Saudization “during a relatively short 
period of time” as Al-Bat’hi indicated.  He explained that  
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[SABIC’s top management] made the utilization of the nation’s human resources its first 
strategic objective to achieve its other strategic objective which is the development of the 
country’s natural hydrocarbon and mineral resources.   
 
Therefore, SABIC invested in establishing two industrial colleges in Jubail and Yanbu 
to provide industry-led training programs.  In addition, Al-Bat’hi confirmed that  
 
[SABIC worked on] attracting nationals by offering Saudi technicians future career 
opportunities.  It [also] succeeded in preparing national trained and qualified 
competencies […] through a series of training, rehabilitation and development courses of 
action.     
 
The above argument by government and quasigovernment managers was supported 
by the majority of private sector managers (16 managers).  They confirmed that top 
management belief in Saudization and the availability of advanced and attractive 
human resource practices were the major contributors for the successful 
implementation of Saudization.  For example, Al Shaya from Alshaya International 
Trading Corporation suggested that  
 
Top management in Alshaya is supporting all departments on achieving high Saudization 
percentages.  Alshaya have very good training facilities to change Saudi employees’ 
long-lasting culture to accept service jobs in our stores.  [We provide] career 
development and high salaries.  For example, Hisham Al-Khaldi started with us as a 
receptionist and he is now the Human Resource Manager after less than 8 years.      
 
In the same way, Al-Ghamdi from Zamil Industrial Investment Company supported 
such an argument by indicating that his company “started by believing in Saudization 
 194 
because if we do not believe in it we cannot achieve it”.  Similarly, Al-Thumairi from 
Al-Safi-Danone confirmed that Saudization is an objective that his company “believes 
in”.  He agreed with Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour that King Fahad 
University for Petroleum and Minerals in particular is assisting their Saudization as it 
provides them with graduates that are “literate in English and great in computers.  
Likewise, Al-Khwaiter from Advanced Electronics Company (AEC) confirmed that 
top management in their company was the instigator for their 73 to 80% Saudization.  
Al-Khwaiter stated that “it was a belief at AEC from the top management as we were 
ahead of the national initiatives for Saudization”.  This belief directed other 
organizational practices in AEC.  For example, as confirmed by AL-Khwaiter,  
 
One of our objectives is to have more Saudization in our technical production.  As a 
result we have 80% Saudization in these jobs.  We train Saudis and then give them the 
trust by immediately working on meeting their KPIs (Key Performance Indicators).  We 
create a good working environment by giving them the right and fair compensation, the 
trust and the motivation.  We also have a pipe line of new comers that we train [to cover 
the attrition rates].          
 
From Al-Yamamah College, Al-Eisa also believed that Saudization success was 
linked to companies’ abilities to create an attractive occupational environment.  He 
asserted that “for example in the banking sector, one can find great incentives to 
qualified youth and a great competition to attract outstanding persons”. Al Zaid from 
Saudi Real Estate Company supported other private, quasigovernment and 
government managers’ views that Saudization success required “a solid work 
environment, clear future and good pay”.  Such elements for Al Zaid were evident, for 
example, in the banking sector  
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Due to their financial success and their [organizational] capabilities, they are able to 
spend as much as possible on training and the working environment.  [They have] joint 
ventures with international banks who imported their business cultures and environment 
that created employment attractiveness to Saudis.  This successful scenario also happened 
in SABIC with joint ventures.          
 
Al Ammash from InterSearch and Al-Zehairi from Tawteen Training and Recruitment 
both agreed that companies that invested in developing their internal human resource 
practices were more successful in achieving Saudization.  For Al Ammash this could 
be accomplished through  
 
Putting a benefit package whether monetary or non to attract the most qualified Saudis.  
Once attracted the hardest job is to retain them.  [This is through] long-term training and 
career growth opportunities.  Once the company has done all this, Saudis will come to 
them.      
 
In addition, Al-Zehairi also commented on some of the successful Saudization 
implementation experiences he encountered when providing employment services in 
the labour market.  He gave evidence from Lazordi Gold Manufacturing Company, 
which according to him “is one of the successful companies in applying Saudization”.  
He explained that  
 
They provided and executed well planned orientation programs which focus on their 
salaries and their potential increase according to planned performance and evaluation.  
They provided them with career path development at the time of employment.  They also 
receive training either in-house or outside the Kingdom.  They receive bonuses at the end 
of each year linked to the profit of their plant.     
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The three managers interviewed from the banking sector, Al-Rwaily from Riyad 
Bank, Al-Koblan from Arab National Bank and Sabban from the National 
Commercial Bank supported the importance of top management belief and the 
essentiality of attractive human resource practices.  Al-Rwaily, for example, 
confirmed that his bank achieved 92% Saudization.  He explained that    
 
Riyad Bank’s Board Directors and top management took the lead and responsibility to 
implement and monitor Saudization plans throughout the Bank.  The Bank developed an 
intensive training program for the selected Saudi universities’ graduates.  It revised its 
salary structure to be competitive with 75% of the market’s salary benchmark.  It also 
adopted detailed exit plan for non-Saudi staff in which only the CEO has the authority to 
change any pre-set dates.            
 
Arab National Bank, on the other hand, achieved 90% Saudization as confirmed by 
Al-Koblan.  The Bank was directed by “the belief and support of the Board of 
Directors to increase Saudization in different ANB Divisions”.   
 
Like all other banks in the sector, ANB provides good salaries, more compensation and 
benefits such as housing allowances, housing schemes, and share options for the bank’s 
top fliers.  [ANB] invests big money on training and developing the human resources.  
The Institute of Banking of SAMA develops tailor made courses that serves the bank’s 
needs of skills and qualifications.  All Banks [in general] have more a mature 
organizational atmosphere in their businesses compared to other sectors in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Finally, Sabban from the National Commercial Bank asserted that the Bank achieved 
87% Saudization through their careful selection and recruitment and training of 
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Saudis.  He explained that their criteria for selection were “based on English, 
computer skills and creative thinking”.  The Bank then invested profoundly in 
developing Saudis to fit the employment demands of the Bank’s divisions and 
departments.   
 
We select people, we put them through a training program of 6 months, and once the 
training is finished our divisions or departments could see the value of replacing non-
Saudis with Saudis who have English language and computer skills [as well as] 6-8 
months of training.      
            
6.4 Theme 3: The factors influencing training investment decisions in Saudi 
employees in private organizations. 
 
This theme explores the factors that influence the Saudi private organizations’ 
decisions to invest in training Saudis as a long-term development approach.  The 
views of interviewed managers assist the examination of Hendry’s framework in an 
international context like Saudi Arabia.  It assists understanding the forces that drive, 
stabilize and/or inhibit HRD in the Saudi private organizations.  The theme evolved 
from the answers of interviewees on questions number 6 and 7 from Question 
Form#1, questions 4 and 5 from Question Form#2, in addition to questions 3 and 4 
from Question Form#3 (see APPENDIX 2).  The majority of interviewees responded 
and gave supporting empirical examples on this theme.  Some of their response 
overlapped with other responses from the previous theme as both themes in reality 
focused on achieving factors of successful Saudization.  The factors that influenced 
investing in training and development for the majority of managers included 
Saudization and government grants for training and recruitment, in addition to 
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organization size.  They also included the availability of the expatriate work force and 
Saudis’ high employment turnover, in addition to the unavailability of industry-led 
skill formation systems to graduate what the labour market is requiring.      
 
• Saudization and Government Grants for Training and Recruitment  
 
Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour argued that availability of government grants 
for training from the HRD Fund (HRDF) was an essential factor that was driving and 
stabilizing the investments by private organizations in national manpower.  He also 
indicted that Saudization was an important influential factor in driving such 
investments.  Al-Humaid, for example, explained that  
 
The HRD Fund grants Saudi youth financial support and force them to join a recognized 
private training institutions such as Al-Romaizan Institute for Gold.  This profession must 
be Saudized completely as the Ministry of Labour is forcing 100% Saudization on this 
industry.      
 
A quasigovernment manger, Al-Bat’hi from SABIC, confirmed that their 
development investment in their Saudi human resources was driven by Saudization.  
He stated that    
 
SABIC managed to attract a large number of young Saudis who underwent a series of 
training and intensive developmental programs, inside and outside the Kingdom.  With 
this investment, SABIC has accomplished its organized Saudization process.     
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On the other hand, a number of private sector managers (15 interviewees) agreed that 
their organizations have considered investing in training as a long-term development 
approach due to Saudization regulations and to use available grants from HRDF.  
They argued that the government’s push for Saudization and its rigorous follow-ups 
and supervision on achieving the annual quota of Saudization on different industrial 
sectors is driving and stabilizing their Saudization implementation.  They also 
believed that the government’s HRDF supported the development and recruitment of 
Saudis in the private sector.  For example, Al-Thumairi from Al-Safi-Danone 
commented that  
 
The government is doing a good job by putting Saudization as a strategic objective for 
the whole industry and by asking for a set of quotas that decrease every year.  It obliged 
companies to Saudize [at the same time] Saudis feel helped by the government.   
 
AlZahrani from Mobily Telecommunication Company illustrated that his company, 
an international investor in the country, had an agreement with the government to 
Saudize its manpower.  He asserted that “we have to realize that Saudization was an 
element that we cannot ignore and have to commit ourselves to because we signed 
this with the government”.      
 
In the same context, both Al-Rwaily from the Riyad Bank and Al-Koblan from the 
Arab National Bank supported the view that Saudization regulations are playing a 
major role in their training as a long-term investment in the Saudi human resources.  
Al-Rwaily, for instance, confirmed that “their investment in HRD is [to meet] the 
always changing business requirements including [Saudization] job regulations and 
requirements.”  Al-Koblan also reinforced such a view by stating that “ANB trains for 
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new products […] or for [employment] regulations required by the regulator SAMA.”  
These regulations for Al Ammash from InterSearch were composed by the 
government “so that companies have to really comply with if they are to survive and 
sustain growth”.       
 
Similarly, Al-Asmari from the Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute supported 
other interviewees’ view on this argument.  He explained that  
 
Satisfying the Saudization percentages requirements needed by the government in an 
annual basis is the major driver for private sector companies to invest in training.  At the 
same time, they want to have qualified Saudis who have high commitment and good 
work ethics.    
 
In the same way, Al-Qahtani from Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
confirmed that  
 
The pressure and effective follow-up by the Ministry of Labour is increasing Saudization 
in the [private] organizations.  The government has also supported the private sector in its 
efforts to attract Saudis through HRDF as it subsidizes training cost and salaries of newly 
recruited Saudis for two years until they gain experience and the trust of the private 
sector.     
 
AlSwailim also from Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry asserted that “the 
government’s financial and administrative support through HRDF has encouraged 
many private organizations to invest in developing and recruiting Saudi employees.” 
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In fact AlSai from M. Al Hokair and Sons Group and Hussain from Savola Group 
both supported Al-Qahtani’s and AlSwailim’s views that their Saudization processes 
were encouraged by the HRDF.  AlSai confirmed that  
 
[Our organization] depends greatly (90%) on the support from HRDF in their recruitment 
and training of Saudis.  HRDF supports training that is leading to recruitment by paying 
half of the salary of our newly recruited Saudis for the first two years until they fit our 
business.                
 
Similarly Hussain stated that “Savola had the experience with HRDF and we are 
among the first companies to have great cooperation with the Fund as we invested 
more for the Saudization program.”   
 
This is true for Al-Zehairi from Tawteen Training and Recruitment who believed that  
 
90% of the [family businesses] do not invest in training their human resources and have 
only started training because the HRDF has presented financial support to these 
organizations.    
 
• Organization Size 
 
Interviewees from government, quasigovernment and the private sector agreed that 
investment in a long-term HRD and therefore successful Saudization implementation 
were associated with organization size.  Al-Ghafees from GOTEVT stated that  
 
Large organizations in the private sector such as Al-Zamil, Al-Salam for Plans and 
Advanced Electronics Company have no problem investing in training and developing 
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their human resources.  Small-to-medium sized organizations, on the other hand, depend 
on a foreign labour force and they do not consider training as their main priority.        
 
Linked to his previous perspective earlier in Theme 1 in this chapter, Al-Ghafees also 
added an alarming argument that the majority of small-to-medium sized organizations 
are  
 
Taken over illegally by foreign labour forces who pay salaries of SR. 5,000 to the Saudi 
owners for their businesses.  These organizations operate and obtain work licenses under 
the Saudi owners’ names yet are controlled and managed by expatriates who evade 
recruiting Saudis [and do not invest in their training].           
 
However, for the lawful small-to-medium organizations that are run by Saudis, 
AlWagdani from the Institute of Banking believed that they lack the management and 
leadership abilities to view training from a long-term investment perspectives.  He 
argued that  
 
Those who are managing such organizations are still developing as they do not yet have 
the time to manage their operations in a market oriented approach or manage the training 
and development process. […]  The persons responsible for training decisions may not 
know the return on investment or how to measure it which negatively affects such 
decisions and investments.         
 
The three managers interviewed from the large quasigovernment organizations agreed 
on the importance of organizations size and developed internal management systems 
for training to be viewed and practiced as a long-term investment in Saudis’ 
development.  For example Al-Shagawi from SEC indicated that  
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The Saudi Electricity Company does not view this investment as an excessive cost.  
Training, as we view it, should be spent generously and according to planned strategies 
based on the determined needs of various departments by their managers.  We develop 
the occupational loyalty to the company through our continuous development and 
training courses for Saudis and through attractive working environment.              
 
Al-Zamel from STC, similarly, confirmed that training prior to their privatization 
from the government ownership was viewed as a “requirement for promotion”.  He 
believed that such a philosophy changed as their company entered the private sector 
and as “people are promoted when they are competent not because they got training”.  
He added that  
 
Our decisions for investing in training stem from the fact that we believe in training our 
people as we cannot really move further in our business without it.  It is not the cost or 
the percentage of retention that drives our decisions.  If training is justifiable and the 
return on investment is clear, we go ahead with the training and development.          
 
Al-Zamel’s argument supported Alogla’s perspectives from GOTEVT who stated that 
“when [STC] joined the labour market with its offer and demand processes, its 
standards changed completely which affected the whole [telecommunication] sector.” 
 
For SABIC’s interviewee, Al-Bat’hi the driving force behind their investment in 
training and developing Saudis emerged from  
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The belief that the real investment is to invest in the national human resources, which was 
the key element in the success of SABIC.  [Therefore,] SABIC pursued the approach of 
intensive utilization of capital, energy and economy as much as possible in manpower.   
 
A number of private managers (8 interviewees) supported the above argument of 
government and quasigovernment managers.  They too linked the organization’s size, 
its internal management systems and top management beliefs-discussed earlier-with 
viewing and investing in Saudis as a long-term development approach.  Two of them, 
Al-Ghamdi from Zamil Industrial Investment Company and AlSai from M Al Hokair 
and Sons Group, went even further by stating that they invest in training to fulfill their 
organizations’ “social responsibilities” towards their fellow Saudi citizens.  Therefore, 
Al-Ghamdi asserted that the Zamil Company, as a large organization with top 
management believing in Saudization, established  
 
A training center which will be open and contributing to other industries to support 
quality Saudization of machine operators, welders, air-conditioning technicians, 
maintenance specialists and mechanics.    
 
Al-Rwaily from Riyad Bank and Al-Koblan from Arab National Bank both agreed 
that “the cost of training is not an issue” when investing in the long-term development 
of Saudis.  For Riyad Bank, Al-Rwaily confirmed that 
 
We usually have a very well developed training plan for a whole year based on individual 
training requirements.  The managers decide the training for their employees including 
where to go and what type of courses they are looking for.    
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For Al-Sabban from the National Commercial Bank, the largest commercial bank in 
the country, “quality of training comes first.  We are ready to pay; banks and financial 
institutions have the capacity to develop people and profoundly invest in their 
training. The question is what are we paying for?” 
 
On the other hand, Al Asmari from the Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute 
supported the government managers, Al-Ghafees and AlWagdani, in that small-to-
medium sized organizations in the private sector are not investing in the long-term 
development for Saudis.  He stated that  
 
Small-to-medium sized organizations depend on on-the-job training which is not 
guaranteed to be successful because the people who are providing the training for Saudis 
are non-Saudi workers.  They know that these Saudis will be replacing them which create 
problems.  Any small mistake [by a Saudi] is magnified so they do not get hired.                 
     
More alarmingly, Al Zaid from Saudi Real Estate Company argued that small-to-
medium sized organizations  
 
Lack the long-term planning by their owners causing the majority of them to become 
short sighted and opportunists.  They want to jump on any opportunity to make the 
maximum possible financial return.     
 
Agreeing with earlier argument by Al-Ghafees from GOTEVT, Al-Eisa believed that  
 
Some small-to-medium sized organizations do not consider training as their responsibility 
and they consider it to be a loss not an investment. Therefore, 90% of the foreign labour 
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force is recruited in these organizations and, to the present time, the government is unable 
to help them even through its HRDF in planning to recruit and develop Saudis.  
 
• Availability of Expatriate Work Force and Saudis’ High Employment 
Turnover 
 
Al-Ghafees from GOTEVT argued that the availability of cheap expatriates in the 
private labour market is a major inhibitor for any Saudization efforts including 
investing in developing and recruiting Saudis.  He blamed the private sector by 
asserting that “the private sector is always searching for profits through reducing 
salaries and searching for cheap foreign labour force.”  However, such availability 
and demands for expatriates in the Saudi labour market emerged to be inevitable 
“fact” for Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour.  He stated that  
 
If we employ all qualified Saudis in certain vocations, this will never balance the 
shortages of manpower we have in these vocations.  In the Kingdom at the moment we 
have 470,000 unemployed Saudi.  If we employ all of them, foreign labour forces will 
still be needed and will not be stopped as we have 6,400,000 job opportunities held by 
expatriates.          
 
These expatriates are more retainable than Saudis who are as confirmed by a number 
of private managers (11), hard to retain as they move between private organizations in 
the labour market looking for a slight increase in pay.  This was supported by Al-
Malki from NADC who confirmed that investing in recruiting, retraining and 
developing fresh graduate Saudis is becoming a risky approach for private businesses.  
He explained that  
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There are no clear laws and regulations by the labour office of the Ministry of Labour to 
maintain company’s rights and guarantee [Saudi employees] continuity in our company.  
[On the other hand] the foreign workers’ passports and resident licenses are in the hands 
of the company and they cannot leave us.     
 
One government interviewee, AlWagdani from the Institute of Banking, supported 
Al-Malki’s views and acknowledged that  
 
There should be guarantees and assurances for employees’ stability in his or her 
organization in order for management to invest in their development.  These assurances 
are totally missing from the Saudi labour market.    
 
Al-Ghamdi from Zamil Industrial Investment Company also emphasized that “high 
turnover of Saudis is becoming a major challenge for Saudization”.  Al Thumairi from 
Al-Safi-Danone Company supported Al-Ghamdi’s view and stated that investing in 
Saudis through “Saudization is very difficult especially with the very high turnover in 
certain jobs.  These are basically field and labour demanding jobs.  Saudis eventually 
leave us for SR. 500 or SR. 1,000 difference somewhere else”.  AlSai from M. Al 
Hokair and Sons Group also confirmed that  
 
Their group suffers a lot from Saudi employees’ turnover.  It is becoming a problem for 
all Personnel and Recruitment Managers.  It is an important factor that is influencing 
their decisions to invest in training Saudi employees.    
 
Al Turaigi also corroborated other private interviewees’ views and affirmed that  
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Almarai’s employee turnover in 2006 was 25% for Saudis, which means that if I 
employed 100 during 2006, 25 of them have already left me within 2006.  This is costing 
us from 150-200% direct and indirect actual cost without their annual salaries.      
 
Two managers from the banking sector, Al-Rwaily from Riyad Bank and Al-Koblan 
from the Arab National Bank (ANB), commented that high turnover is a major 
obstacle for the Saudi banks to invest in Saudi long-term development.  Al-Rwaily for 
example argued that  
 
High employee turnover is usually in the entry level and is a problem for the whole 
industry.  Usually we have to take a little bit of time [3 months] to see if the person is 
going to continue with us or will be seeking an employment opportunity in other places.  
We provide training despite these concerns.  After training, we make recommendations if 
he/she is okay for the jobs according to his/her commitment, discipline, communication 
skills, and customer services skills 
 
For Al-Koblan, “ANB invests by budgeting for the career development programs to 
retain top players and high potential Saudi employees in the bank […] as their bank 
get headhunted” for their qualified people.   
 
In the same way, Al-Zehairi from Tawteen Training and Recruitment supported other 
private managers on the perception that Saudis are unstable in their employment 
which prevents private companies from investing in their development.  He explained 
that  
 
The most important factor that hinders private organizations from investing in training 
Saudis is the lack of awareness of the newly recruited of the importance of continuity and 
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stability in their jobs.  There is no refunding system that guarantees the return of training 
expenses to companies if a Saudi terminates his/her employment contract.   
 
• Unavailability of Industry-Led Skill Formation Systems 
 
A number of private sector managers including Al Ammash from InterSearch, Al-
Zehairi from Tawteen Training and Recruitment, Gaith from FedEx and Al-Asmari 
from the Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute all agreed that the unavailability 
of industry-led skill formation systems was a hindering factor for investing in 
developing Saudis.  Al Ammash for example explained that  
 
A young Saudi does not really understand the value of work or how to work not because 
he is bad but because the society is not giving him all the chances to learn.  Even though 
it is an extra cost, it is the private sector’s job to bridge that gap to take the person from 
the current stage to the desired one.  Yes sometimes it is not the job of the private sector 
to do so as it is the role of the higher education and the society, but if they are not 
performing it well then it is the private sector’s job.        
 
For Al-Zehairi, such a gap especially in the private family businesses which represent 
“75% of the private sector companies” was not bridged through  
 
Providing their new employees with formal training to establish the basic knowledge 
needed for the job, instead they only provide on-the-job training.  On-the-job training is 
considered the most beneficial approach in training but only if combined with the formal 
one which is absent from most of these companies.      
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These organizations even required its employees, according to Al-Asmari, to “have 
afternoon courses in computer and English skills as they are mostly depending on on-
the-job training.”   
 
Gaith also believed that investing in Saudi's development was always conditioned to 
their “readiness to do the job they are assigned for.  If we find a Saudi who is 
qualified and fit and have eagerness to stay with us we have no problem investing in 
him.”    
 
6.5 Theme 4: Evaluation of GOTEVT’s current role and its graduates’ skills 
level in regard to the private sector manpower needs. 
 
This theme examines the current role of GOTEVT and the level of skills, knowledge 
and attitude of its graduates as seen by different managers from government, 
quasigovernment and the private sector. Interviewees commented on GOTEVT as the 
main government provider of HRD programs for the private sector.  The responses of 
interviewees which generated this theme evolved from answering the question 
numbers 8, 9 and 10 from Question Form#1, questions 6, 7 and 10 from Question 
Form#2, in addition to questions 7, 8 and 12 from Question Form#3 (see APPENDIX 
2).  The majority of interviewees responded to these questions and provided 
supporting empirical examples.  Some of the responses focused on evaluating 
GOTEVT’s operational and strategic role while others provided critical empirical data 
on the level and employability of GOTEVT’s graduates.  
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• GOTEVT’s Operational and Strategic Role 
 
Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour believed that  
 
GOTEVT is doing a great job and graduating thousands of Saudis.  In the last years, 
GOTEVT has changed its curriculum according to a new philosophy which will take 
more time to be apparent.     
 
For Alogla from GOTEVT this change in the curriculum supported GOTEVT’s  
 
Quality [focus which] now begins to evolve greatly.  GOTEVT have a great role in 
developing human resources through satisfying all market needs.  [GOTEVT’s] annual 
reports and statistics [show] extraordinary jumps in graduates’ numbers in the recent 
times.    
 
On the other hand, the government manager, AlWagdani from the Institute of 
Banking, criticized its performance and role by stating that  
 
Different private industrial sectors suffer from GOTEVT’s generalization and mass 
training in meeting specific needs of individual economic sectors.  There are no 
flexibilities in their training programs.  It has become the government body that 
determines training standards for the [private] training sector and supervises its activities 
in addition to conducting training and evaluating its own    
 
Only one quasigovernment manager, Al-Zamel from the Saudi Telecommunication 
Company, admired GOTEVT’s role and management approaches.  He agreed with 
Al-Humaid that   
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GOTEVT has changed during the last 5 years.  It is really improving and moving into the 
right direction.  Its management is asking the private sector to be involved in committees 
to develop their programs.  They are very successful in linking with the private 
businesses.    
 
The other quasigovernment manager from the Saudi Electricity Company, Al-
Shagawi actually criticized GOTEVT by stating that  
 
[GOTEVT is conducting] theoretical [training] which is incompatible with the applied 
nature of our company.  Technical colleges’ curricula and teaching methods differ from 
our applied and practical approach of our business. 
   
A number of private managers (16) commented on GOTEVT’s operational 
approaches and strategic role in serving the private labour market with Saudi 
manpower.  Only one private manager, Al Khwaiter from Advanced Electronics 
Company supported some of the above views of Al-Humaid and Al-Zamel.  He 
explained that  
 
GOTEVT were trying to re-write their materials through talking to everybody in the 
private sector as some of our colleagues [in the company] got invited.  So we can actually 
see improvements in [GOTEVT] in the recent years.  [However] personally, I do not 
expect GOTEVT to go at the same speed as the private sector especially with the 
government bureaucracy.                  
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Other private managers like Hussain from Savola Group and AlZahrani from Mobily 
Telecommunication Company both confirmed a contrary argument to the views of Al-
Humaid and Al-Zamel.  Hussain, for example, explained    
 
I participated in some committees for GOTEVT’s technical college here in Jeddah to 
develop their curriculum.  Honestly, it did not last.  [On the other hand], SABIC’s two 
industrial colleges have a big department called Curriculum Development whose aim is 
to meet the demands of the private sector.  They visited us many times to investigate and 
realize our training and development needs to include them in their curriculum.      
 
Moreover, AlZahrani also confirmed that “the curricula designed [in GOTEVT] do 
not take the market consideration into account”.  Al-Thumairi from Al-Safi-Danone 
also added that he never had “any serious relationship with GOTEVT” despite being 
in his HR position for more than 10 years.  He explained that  
 
I should be the prime customer of an organization like GOTEVT.  It is sad to say that as 
we have relationships and work with much smaller government entities than GOTEVT 
but not with GOTEVT.      
 
Similarly, Al-Qahtani and AlSwailim from Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry suggested that private sector managers are complaining of GOTEVT’s 
curriculum overlooking the training needs of their industries for Saudi manpower.  
Al-Qahtani explained that  
 
GOTEVT is not fully coordinating with the private sector organizations to determine 
their present and future skills’ demands.  The leaders of private organizations are not 
given the opportunities to participate and be included in GOTEVT’s training and 
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education process.  GOTEVT is not concentrating on providing the required attitudes and 
dedication to performance and work disciplines of the private work environment.  It is 
still following the lecturing techniques in transferring knowledge to their students.     
 
In fact, GOTEVT is not even encouraging participation of professionals and 
practitioners from different industries to present in their programs.  Al-Koblan from 
the Arab National Bank stated that 
 
GOTEVT do not welcome people from the Industry to participate in providing 
knowledge and experiences from the field.  I have never been asked nor my colleagues in 
the banking sector to go and talk about the banking sector to GOTEVT’s students.    
 
For Gaith from FedEx and Al-Eisa from Al-Yamamah GOTEVT’s curricula are not 
preparing its graduates with intellectual abilities to broaden their perspectives.  Gaith 
argued that  
 
GOTEVT is not taking care of the other facets of thinking development such as reading, 
writing, social science, critique and a bit of literature.  What they are creating is a person 
who cannot take other directions and grow to higher positions.  He is not a person who 
has learnt to think and see the broader perspective.       
 
Al-Eisa also explained that  
 
GOTEVT is not preparing its graduates with intellectual and mental thinking as well as 
behavioral training.  Ignoring these areas led to the decrease in scientific subject in their 
programs which provide their students with the skills and abilities to analyze and learn 
continuously.    
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In fact, Gaith, Al-Eisa and Al Ammash and a number other private sector managers 
(7) criticized skill formation systems in general including GOTEVT for providing 
Saudi students with excessive “memorization” and the “receiving of information” 
while overlooking essential experimental and practical learning.  Such systems for 
AlZahrani from Mobily are “knowledge providers” which focus on theoretical 
learning.        
 
Furthermore, Al-Turaigi from Almarai, Al-Malki from NADC, Al-Thumairi from Al-
Safi-Danone and all confirmed that GOTEVT is not considering the dairy production 
needs of their industries of trained and specialized Saudis.  For example, Al-Turaigi 
confirmed that GOTEVT “do not have any major covering the core of our business 
that is dairy production”.  Al-Malki also argued that   
 
During the seven years I have been working in the private sector, no one from GOTEVT 
asked us about our human resources needs.  They are not realizing our real needs of dairy 
specializations forcing us to recruit foreign labour forces […] There is no Saudi graduate 
who is specialized in this field despite the existence of many dairy production companies 
in the country.      
 
In the same way, Al Shaya from Alshaya International Trading Corporation asserted 
that  
 
There is no one in the market that has a retail academy or a training program to prepare 
Saudis to work in a retail business.  They graduate in any major and come to us for 
retraining.    
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This overlooking of different market demands for qualified and specialized Saudis in 
different industrial sectors was associated in GOTEVT with “extremely poor trainers” 
as confirmed by Al-Ghamdi from Zamil Industrial Investment Company, Al-Asmari 
from the Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute and Al-Zehairi from Tawteen 
Training and Recruitment Company.  Al-Ghamdi asserted that  
 
Their trainers are hopeless and do not have drive and incentive factor [to perform and 
develop themselves].  [They are] protected by the government employment system.  
Government salaries are not attractive to have good professional trainers.  [So GOTEVT] 
have to have the full authority to dismiss and recruit as well as having a different pay 
scale [that is] linked to trainers’ performance.        
 
Al-Asmari supported this argument by stating that  
 
The problem is their trainers.  GOTEVT do not have the flexibility to recruit trainers 
from different nationalities.  Their trainers are Saudis who do not have the skills yet they 
are training their trainees to graduate and work in a very skill demanding environment 
like the private sector.      
 
In fact, even Alogla from GOTEVT substantiated such a view by stating   
 
[Our trainers] come to GOTEVT from other education systems in the Kingdom and it is 
not an easy process to involve them in the training industry.  For example, industrial 
countries utilize their skillful workers who have practical experiences in the industry.  As 
for GOTEVT, its role as a training provider is interfered with by different government 
bodies and we became the victim of Saudization.    
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On the strategic level, for some of the interviewees (8), GOTEVT as a government 
organization is expanding with less effectiveness in developing industry-led skills, 
knowledge and attitudes.  Alogla from GOTEVT acknowledged that GOTEVT is 
getting larger as it is “dealing with the vast area of the Kingdom with its growing 
demography.”  Al Ammash from InterSearch recruitment organization believed that  
 
GOTEVT was brought on to help drop-outs in finding good jobs.  [Now] it is a huge 
organization in which its management always trying to fix the problems within the 
organization structure.  They are wasting money on how to manage their institutes not on 
helping Saudis to get jobs by preparing them to the labour market.  It is also trying to 
plan for others [private training industry].       
 
Similarly, Gaith from FedEx and Al-Eisa from Al-Yamamah College both argued that 
GOTEVT is increasing its dominance and control over other industries to become the 
government body for any vocational training initiative in the country.  Gaith for 
example explained that  
 
GOTEVT seem to have a direction of expanding its control rather than actually 
concentrating on developing standards for the technical and vocational training by 
bringing industry consultants groups to be accreditors for other training organizations and 
institutes.       
 
Al-Eisa also argued that  
 
GOTEVT’s main problem lies in the lack of clarity in its mission and its overall 
objectives as they do not know what they want.  GOTEVT is providing the joint training 
program, female and military training, in addition to establishing and running technical 
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institutes.  People in GOTEVT are just trying to look for a mission to redefine 
themselves.     
 
In fact, they are even competing unfairly with the private training industry as 
illustrated by Al-Zehairi from Tawteen.   
 
They are the one licensing my training business as they are the supervising body on 
private training industry.  At the same time, they are competing unfairly with my center 
by providing free training to the public.  They will win such competition due to the strong 
support they receive from the government.     
 
Furthermore, Gaith criticized GOTEVT for intervening into the micro management of 
such industry.  He stated that  
 
With their [GOTEVT] recent regulations, they are not only deciding what the curriculum 
should be, they are actually interfering with the day to day management of the private 
training industry.  They say to them you do not hire unless we interview your future staff.  
They say a diploma has to be two years. They are putting rigid rules that will actually 
jeopardize initiative for the whole industry of private training.         
 
Al Zaid from the Saudi Real Estate Company emphasized that  
 
Vocational training, if not linked directly to the industry on very tight bounds, would not 
achieve its basic objectives.  It is becoming evident that it is very difficult for GOTEVT 
to train people and put them in the market.   
 
Two private managers Al Zaid and AlSwailim from Riyadh Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry criticized GOTEVT and other skill formation systems of not considering 
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or attaining to the future vision of the Saudi economy.  For example, Al Zaid stated 
that  
 
Our government leaders have decided that the Kingdom will be world major player in 
three main competitive advantage sectors i.e. energy, transportation and information 
communication technology.  We have not built yet the entire human resource 
infrastructure to develop and run these sectors.  In these sectors, we have to deepen the 
knowledge to create the knowledge work base instead of training on low skills.   
   
• Evaluation of GOTEVT’s Graduates 
 
Al-Ghafees from GOTEVT affirmed that their graduates are attractive for 
employment in different organizations in the labour market as they provided them 
with quality and specialized vocational and technical training.  He explained that  
 
Aramco, Saudi Electricity Company, Water and Sanitation Agency in addition to the 
General Organization for Water Desalination signed training agreements with GOTEVT 
to obtain our graduates.  These agreements are evidences that our graduates are needed 
and attractive to the labour market.         
 
He also argued that those graduates are needed despite their development in GOTEVT 
in Arabic.  He added that  
 
If Aramco is convinced of the level of GOTEVT’s graduates, this is a clear indication 
that there is no problem in our training programs and qualifications despite our usage of 
Arabic in training.  These big organizations are saying give us your graduates with their 
technical skills and we will train them in English for our own needs.   
 220 
 
On the other hand, AlWagdani from the Institute of Banking contradicted Al-
Ghafees’s views and stated that “GOTEVT’s graduates do not meet the needs of the 
labour market.” 
 
Two of the quasigovernment managers, Al-Shagawi from the Saudi Electricity 
Company (SEC) and Al-Bat’hi from SABIC both agreed with some of Al-Ghafees’s 
views.  Al-Shagawi, for example, asserted that “the outcomes of GOTEVT are good” 
yet they require “more emphasis on the practical side of their technical training”.  His 
company for example recruits them after implementing “rigorous screening and 
selection techniques to ensure that we only recruit the best”.  He added that SEC then 
“retrains them according to the nature of our work that is completely different from 
their study in GOTEVT’s Colleges.”           
 
Similarly, Al-Bat’hi recognized that  
 
GOTEVT has been instrumental in the side of SABIC and has aided in the 
implementation of a series of training programs which yielded good numbers of 
graduates who represent important groups in the operation and maintenance of SABIC’s 
industrial complexes which apply the latest world-class cutting-edge technologies.   
 
At the same time, he also believed that  
 
The challenges facing the outcomes of GOTEVT are concentrated in meeting the 
demands of the labour market of the private sector.  In this area, SABIC has established 
advanced [training] centers within all plants to avoid the shortage of required capacities 
and skills.     
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Private sector managers, on the other hand, unanimously (23) agreed that GOTEVT’s 
graduates are not fulfilling their employment demands of specialized skill, knowledge 
and attitudes for different industries.  The same managers also believed that these 
graduates lack interpersonal communication skills especially in English in addition to 
basic computer skills and work ethics.  Al Shaya from Alshaya International Trading 
Corporation asserted that “a fresh graduate from GOTEVT’s technical college needs 
retraining for one year.  They do not have English [skills] as our business deals with 
international brands and market.”  Al-Khwaiter and Al Saad from the Advanced 
Electronics Company also confirmed that a technical college graduate who has 
studied for three has “less knowledge depth in his area”.   Al-Malki from NADC also 
asserted that  
 
The outcomes of the technical colleges do not meet the required skills and attitudes level 
in the private sector.  GOTEVT’s graduates [also] have problems communicating in 
English which has become the basic media for communication in the work field.    
 
Al Thumairi from Al-Safi-Danone supported other private managers’ arguments and 
stated that  
 
GOTEVT graduates’ quality is not up to our multinational organization’s standards.  
They do not have the English proficiency, and lack logical thinking and critical reasoning 
skill, so their chances of being promoted on their jobs are slimmer than other graduates 
from the Institute of Public Administration for example.    
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Similarly, Al Zaid from Saudi Real Estate Company, Al-Qahtani and AlSwailim from 
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry all agreed that GOTEVT’s outcome is 
not matching the skills and attitudes demanded by the private sector.  Al-Qahtani 
emphasized that “GOTEVT graduates lack English language and computer skills that 
are essential for the majority of private sector organizations and the new era in Saudi 
Arabia.” 
 
Albleihid from the Saudi Research and Marketing Group also argued that  
 
[GOTEVT’s graduates] lack English which is very important in our business and I think 
in all businesses across the country.  We are now part of the World Trade Organization 
and we cannot only speak Arabic as we need to sell our products [internationally].                   
 
He added that  
 
If I hired qualified graduates for our needs from GOTEVT who only require two months 
orientation on-the-job, I would not invest in creating this institute (Prince Ahmad Applied 
Media Institute).  I would use the money of this investment to develop my business and 
create more jobs and Saudize better.  
 
Al-Ghamdi also described graduates from GOTEVT’s technical colleges as “big 
disaster and big failure”.  He added that  
 
We are big recipients of technical colleges’ graduates.  We have to redo [or retrain them].  
They do not have the general skills such as English, computer and communication 
[skills].  It is not in the curriculum of GOTEVT.  Their specialty skills are very bad.  
GOTEVT wastes government budget money.       
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Hussain from the Savola Group indicated that  
 
GOTEVT’s graduates are totally out of line.  They need a lot of off and on-the-job 
training compared to graduates from SABIC’s Yanbu and Jubail Industrial Colleges who 
are far away better.  They are business driven and oriented.        
 
Two of the managers from the banking sector agreed with other private managers that 
GOTEVT’s outcome do not match their employment requirements.  Al-Rwaily from 
Riyad Bank asserted that  
 
GOTEVT’s graduates do not pass the profiling [stages] to be admitted to the interviews.  
Other graduates from the Institute of Public Administration, Community Colleges and 
universities pass as they have high grade in profiling.  [GOTEVT’s graduates] have 
minimal knowledge, skills and attitudes toward wok.  Their writing and reading are 
miserable.       
 
On the other hand, Al-Koblan from the Arab National Bank (ANB) although at the 
start acknowledged that GOTEVT’s graduates are “excellent caliber”, he confirmed 
that  
 
ANB Invest in retraining them off and on-the-job.  GOTEVT train their students with old 
books from the 50s and 60s.  Their manuals and training materials are outdated and all in 
Arabic.  GOTEVT’s graduates have a major weakness in English.  
 
Sabban from the National Commercial Bank stated that “I do not have any experience 
with GOTEVT so I cannot comment on them.” 
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Both managers from the two recruitment companies interviewed, Al Ammash from 
InterSearch and Al-Zehairi from Tawteen are hesitant to recommend the recruitment 
of GOTEVT’s graduates to their clients in the private sector.  Al-Zehairi, for example, 
explained that 
 
Until recently, my recruitment company has not recruited any GOTEVT’s applicant in 
the private sector because I believe that their levels are not suitable for my clients.  
GOTEVT’s graduates have a poor qualification with which they cannot compete with the 
Institute of Public Administration graduates or with graduates who studied for 6 or 7 
months in [the training centers of] the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.      
 
In fact, Gaith from FedEx, AlZahrani from Mobily Telecommunication Company, 
and Al-Eisa from Al-Yamamah College all agreed that graduates of GOTEVT are 
only seeking diplomas in any major just to get jobs which in most cases are not in 
their majors.  Gaith for example explained that  
 
What GOTEVT offer their students is not up to the expectations of the students 
[themselves].  So many of their graduates are just there to take a degree but when they 
leave they find that it is not really something that everybody is running after.        
 
Therefore, according to Al-Eisa, many of these “graduates can work as administrative 
employees but cannot perform what they have been specialized in as electricians or 
mechanics [for example]”.  In this respect, AlZahrani disagreed with some of the 
earlier views of Alogla from GOTEVT.  Even though he agreed with him that 
GOTEVT is “graduating so many people every year”, he argued that  
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The point here is not how many people GOTEVT is pushing to the labour market, but 
how many of those are succeeding in getting decent jobs related to their majors which 
they spent studying for three years.   Most of those graduates are not looking for work to 
practice their majors, but to compete on jobs mostly in the military or the government.  
[Therefore], GOTEVT’s students come to class with no motivation.          
 
Similarly, Al Turaigi confirmed that  
 
GOTEVT’s graduates lack motivation and clarity of occupational vision.  A graduate has 
a degree from GOTEVT in a major but he never thought about having a job.       
 
Finally, three managers Al-Zehairi from Tawteen, Al-Rwaily from Riyad Bank in 
addition to a quasigovernment manager Al-Zamel from the Saudi Telecommunication 
Company all argued that GOTEVT’s inadequate final product is linked to its 
admission of low grade students graduating from general high schools.  Al-Zehairi 
supported this argument by stating that  
 
GOTEVT, throughout its history, was never the first choice of youth.  High school 
graduates go to GOTEVT because it is their last chance after all other distinguished 
graduates are admitted somewhere else.  Thus, technical colleges have a bad reputation in 
the labour market and their graduates are not desired by the private sector.      
 
Similarly, Al-Rwaily stated that 
 
GOTEVT admit low grade high school graduates.  Usually other high school graduates 
with good or average grades go to top colleges while the rest go to GOTEVT.  I think 
GOTEVT have also a stigma associated with their practical training.       
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6.6 Theme 5: Evaluation of the proposed changes of the role of GOTEVT 
toward industry-led training organizations to fulfil the immediate needs 
of the Saudi labour market for employable Saudis. 
 
This theme mainly focuses on evaluating the possibilities and requirements of 
changing GOTEVT to industry-led training organizations that are affiliated to 
different economic sectors as explained in APPENDIX 2.  The aim for GOTEVT is 
to remain a government body that is only regulating, supervising and financing these 
training organizations without its involvement in the actual implantation of the 
training itself.  It is, accordingly, the responsibility of these different economic sectors 
to plan to develop and conduct their own training that is serving each sector’s needs 
of skills, knowledge and attitudes.  The theme itself evolved as a direct result of 
answering the questions after the introduction of the study’s proposed changes to 
GOTEVT.  These questions were 1, 2 and 3 from both Question Form#1 and #3, in 
addition to questions 1, 2, 3 and 4 from Question Form#2 (see APPENDIX 2).  A few 
mangers did not answer the questions directly.  However, the majority of interviewees 
responded and gave supporting empirical examples.  The managers' perspectives were 
either fully supporting the proposal or supporting its essence yet are sceptical of its 
practicality and acceptance by the government or even the private sector itself 
especially by small-to-medium sized private organizations.   
 
For the government interviewee, Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour, changing 
GOTEVT was recommended by a prior study.  In fact, Al-Humaid argued that  
 
The idea of privatizing GOTEVT is not a new one.  King Fahad University for Petroleum 
and Minerals conducted a study and prepared a proposal for the former Manpower 
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Council that suggested dividing economic sectors into clusters each one is responsible for 
its own training in coordination with the government.  Now GOTEVT’s strategy includes 
more details that consider participation of different sectors in GOTEVT’s work.           
 
He also added that “privatization of training in the Kingdom is theoretical and may 
not be successful.  If the private sector took over with its training institutes, would 
your proposal guarantee having better outcomes than GOTEVT’s?” 
 
Al-Ghafees and Alogla from GOTEVT, similarly, were not opposed to transferring 
the training conduction role of GOTEVT to the private sector itself.  Alogla argued 
that “if the private sector has the desire to get involved in training [as the study 
proposes], we are the first supporters of such a desire.  But the problem is who will 
adopt this?  This is an expensive and difficult process.”  In fact, both managers 
claimed that their new strategy and practices were to establish strategic partnerships 
with a number of private organizations to conduct their own specialized training for 
their industry.  Al-Ghafees confirmed that 
  
GOTEVT have no problem accepting the privatization.  However, the important question 
is that how many companies would be able to accept this?  They only represent 20% of 
the Saudi private market while 80% are not eager to provide training to their human 
resources.       
 
Al-Ghafees also provided some examples of their new partnership strategies with 
some private organizations. 
 
The strategic partnerships with the Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute (SJAHI), 
the intended establishment of the Institute for Plastic with Sharq Company, a Vocational 
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Institute for Cars with Al-Jafali and Al-Eisa, and a partnership with the Ministry of 
Petroleum to establish a joint institute for petroleum services.     
 
On the government level, Al-Ghafees and Alogla both agreed that in order for such a 
new direction to be implemented it “requires flexibility in the government systems to 
operate these institutes and colleges by allowing international cooperation programs 
with some participating countries under the supervision of GOTEVT.” 
 
AlWagdani from the Institute of Banking also supported the proposed changes to the 
current role of GOTEVT to be an industry-led training organization as “mass training 
does not serve the market”.  Furthermore, he suggested that 
 
Training should be the responsibility of the market and the people who work in each 
industrial sector as they will conduct training programs when and how they need them.  
GOTEVT, [at the same time], can conduct training for individual professions that are not 
included in any cluster of industries in the private sector.  It can establish standards and 
examinations for different professions.     
 
Quasigovernment managers, on the other hand, were less enthusiastic or supportive to 
changing the role of GOTEVT.  Al-Bat’hi from SABIC and Al-Shagawi from the 
Saudi Electricity Company both focused on the importance of participation and 
coordination between GOTEVT and the private sector.  Al-Bat’hi for example argued 
that  
 
The focus is on the outputs of GOTEVT to meet private sector needs.  The challenges 
require cooperation between GOTEVT and the economic sectors.  The focus is also on 
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the English language as the language of business and technology.  The focus is on work 
behaviors and the technical skills required by businesses.        
 
Al-Shagawi also explained that  
 
GOTEVT meets the needs of the labour market and wants to develop its outcomes.   It 
lacks developing English skills in its graduates.  It needs periodical examination to its 
curricula and accepting ideas from others in the labour market.  Participation between 
GOTEVT and all private organizations benefiting from their products is the only means 
for their development and success.       
         
Similarly, Al-Zamel from the Saudi Telecommunication Company was uncertain of 
the effectiveness and practicality of giving the private sector the training and 
development role of GOTEVT.  He argued that  
 
Training cannot be left to private industry itself as it will not work.  Different 
organizations including GOTEVT might have certain agendas that cannot be completely 
transferred.  In addition many private organizations in Saudi Arabia are family owned 
which might affect the outcome and decisions of their training.     
 
On the other hand, the majority (15) of the interviewed managers from the private 
sector supported the proposed changes to the current role of GOTEVT.  The few 
others agreed with the essentiality of changing the role of GOTEVT to industry-led 
training organization to be more responsive to each industry’s training needs yet they 
were skeptical of its applicability.  Albleihid from the Saudi Research and Marketing 
Group confirmed that  
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We [as the private sector] are crippled not to move because of heavy governmental 
involvement in the economy.  I think GOTEVT should be restructured totally.  GOTEVT 
should not be affiliated to the Ministry of Labour.  I think having it as regulatory, 
supervisory and financial supportive to industry-led training institutions is very 
important.  I do not think they should carry out the training themselves; this is a huge bill 
on the government plus they cannot add value.      
 
Both managers from Alshaya International Trading Corporation, Al Shaya and Al-
Khaldi supported Albleihid’s views.  Al Shaya in particular believed that GOTEVT 
should “get the right people even from outside the country who have more 
international experiences to teach Saudis”.  Both managers illustrated that their 
company considered establishing its own “retail training academy to serve Alshaya as 
well as the industry” as explained by Al-Khaldi.  Al Shaya also added that his 
company was forced to consider such an expensive investment as they were not 
provided with the needed skills, knowledge and attitudes by GOTEVT.  He explained 
that      
 
Unfortunately we are thinking about this kind of investment.  It is unfortunately because 
we are considering the financial burdens of such a project.  In addition there are a lot of 
challenges that we are facing from the government’s ministries.       
 
Similarly, the three managers from dairy and poultry industries, Al-Malki from 
NADC, Al Thumairi from Al-Safi-Danone Company and Al Turaigi from Almarai all 
supported the proposed changes to GOTEVT to be an industry-led training 
organization.  The three managers similar to Al Shaya and Al-Khaldi were 
considering establishing a joint training academy to serve their industry needs for 
qualified Saudis.  Al-Malki explained that  
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GOTEVT with its huge training staff and various training programs must accept the idea 
of participating with the private sector to open private institutes under its supervision to 
conduct industry-led training for each economic sector.  Our strategic committee in 
NADC suggested setting up an academy to attract, train and develop and recruit Saudis to 
serve companies that are working in agricultural and dairy production.         
 
Al Thumairi also confirmed that “changing GOTEVT to industry-led training 
organizations is a brilliant idea.”  He added that  
 
We in Al-Safi-Danone and the dairy companies have a dairy board where all general 
managers in dairy industry thought about something exactly related to this proposal.  
They thought about developing a centralized training institute to generate talents for the 
dairy industry.     
 
Al Turaigi also supported the earlier views of other private sector managers and 
believed that “changing GOTEVT to industry-led training organizations is absolutely 
the right approach”.  He explained that  
 
The graduates of those organizations will be very competent and can seek job 
opportunities anywhere in the world as all companies will be competing to get them from 
day one as the selection and training criteria are right.     
 
Simultaneously, Al Turaigi expressed his concerns that  
 
The government sector [especially GOTEVT] is not thinking in the direction of the 
study’s proposal.  There are some people’s interests that might be in danger.  They have 
about 8,000 government jobs which I am not sure what would they do about them if they 
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decided to privatize GOTEVT.  They need to have different set of skills to run these 
institutes or colleges.  Will those people come and work in the private sector’s 
environment?       
 
AlSai from M Al Hokair and Sons Group similarly confirmed that “there is no 
government training institute in Tourism and Leisure fields”.  Therefore,  
 
Their Group was considering establishing an integrated training institute to benefit the 
whole sector from their 35 years of experience in the both field to graduate qualified and 
specialists Saudis.     
 
From Savola Group, Hussain asserted that “GOTEVT should not be involved in 
conducting training.  They should invest in shaping the training criteria and audit the 
training in the country”.  Furthermore, He suggested that  
 
Through plastic conversion in Saudi Arabia we can capture 25% of the market share 
worldwide as we already trying producing 25% of the petrochemical share in the world.  
Therefore, we need to have a training institution only for plastic production and industry 
as well as retailing.  This proposal of yours applies to every industry in the private sector.      
 
Both managers Al-Koblan from the Arab National Bank and Al-Asmari from the 
Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute supported earlier views by Al Shaya.  Al-
Koblan suggested that “GOTEVT should get international experiences into the 
country to educate and train their students.”  Al-Asmari also supported Albleihid’s 
perspectives of altering and restructuring GOTEVT’s current affiliation to the 
Ministry of Labour.  He explained  
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The only thing that will make GOTEVT successful is autonomy from the restrictions of 
government rules.  They need to be autonomous to work as a private sector to get the 
freedom to recruit trainers from different countries to transfer the skills and knowledge to 
Saudis and not to be the victim of Saudization themselves.       
 
He also added that the private sector if GOTEVT’s role was changed to industry-led 
training organization might not accept GOTEVT’s government manpower as “they 
might not have the skills yet have very high salaries”.  Al-Asmari argued that  
 
This proposal can be accepted to the private companies if GOTEVT evaluated and 
rehabilitated its manpower who even after that might not fit to the private sector training 
requirements.  Private companies would prefer bringing their own instructors from their 
workshops to conduct their training.     
 
Correspondingly, Al Ammash from InterSearch, Al Zaid from Saudi Real Estate and 
Al-Eisa from Al-Yamamah College approved of changing GOTEVT to industry-led 
training organizations.  Al Ammash confirmed that  
 
GOTEVT have to be broken down to smaller units that have their own strategies, goals 
and measures of performance.  The role of GOTEVT is not really to do the education 
itself as this is not its specialization.  Its specialization is to regulate, supervise and 
finance the people who do it the best, the private sector.  GOTEVT will be a very 
influential entity if it became industry-led training organizations.         
 
Al-Zaid, likewise, supported that “GOTEVT should give its budget to private industry 
and let the industry be the trainer to itself”.  He then provided specific evaluation to 
the proposed changes.  He argued that  
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Clusters of the industry that claim a single product or complementary products should 
have their own training.  Those people are the most capable ones to develop their own 
training.  [Nevertheless,] the focus of this process should be on building the business 
work environment in companies and bringing the culture of training to the industry that 
can understand and link such culture to its overall business objectives.    
 
In the same way Al-Eisa stated that  
 
I support changing GOTEVT to industry-led training organizations provided that the 
Ministry of Education rectifies the problem of dropouts from public education for whom 
GOTEVT was established initially to rehabilitate and become useful members in our 
society.  This is not the responsibility of the private sector.  It cannot recruit them directly 
in its labour market as they have behavioral problems and learning difficulties.    
 
On the other hand, a few of the private managers (6) were doubtful of the success and 
acceptance of the proposed changes to the current role of GOTEVT by government 
entities in the country.  AlZahrani from Mobily Telecommunication Company and Al 
Khwaiter from Advanced Electronics Company both agreed that “changing GOTEVT 
to industry-led organization theoretically is very good but practically is impossible” as 
explained by AlZahrani.  Similar to Al Turaigi’s earlier views, Al Khwaiter stated that 
 
GOTEVT as a government agency is paying salaries, paying expenses according to 
government rules and budgeting and spending methodologies.  This proposal might not 
see the light because of the practicality of it as it is attempting to change and may be 
privatize a government body.  My concern also is for small-to-medium sized companies 
which do not consider training as their major concern.  We cannot let training depends on 
their interests which is always based on reducing expenses.          
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Al-Asmari agreed with Al Khwaiter by stating that  
 
Business people want to stay in the business and do not want to spend their money 
outside the business.  Spending it on training institutions can be tolerated by large 
organizations but it is a cost especially for small-to-medium companies.        
 
AlZahrani even suggested alternative proposal for GOTEVT to be more responsive to 
the needs of the labour market.  He recommended that  
 
Instead of establishing something from scratch, I would propose co-partnership between 
private industries and GOTEVT by which it is not put aside.  For example Banks 
approach GOTEVT to support certain number of students in a special training program.  
GOTEVT will train them on the basics and banks will select the elite to deviate from the 
curriculum to sponsor them and teach them banking courses.  Then, the best 75% will be 
signed up to guarantee them jobs in banks.         
 
Finally, Al-Zehairi from Tawteen Training and Recruitment Company also agreed 
with the earlier views of Al Turaigi that  
 
Changing the role of GOTEVT to industry-led training entities will be rejected as its 
implementation requires not only economic or administrative decisions but a political 
one.  All persons in charge of GOTEVT will fight this in all their strength.   
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6.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented the core of this research as it reports the findings of its face-to-
face interviews with selected managers in Saudi Arabia.  The interviews with the 
managers provided the wider viewpoint about Saudization and HRD practices in the 
country.  Their practices and views regarding these two matters, which will be 
discussed in depth in the following chapter, clearly illustrate the correlation between 
the ineffective Saudization resulting from unfocused vocational and technical training 
provided by skill formation systems and GOTEVT, in particular.    
 
The interviews revealed and confirmed the fact that the Saudization dilemma in Saudi 
Arabia is a multidimensional national problem that requires multilevel solutions.  It is 
not and will never be the responsibility of a government body or the accountability of 
the private sector alone.  However, if training and education as well as recruitment 
strategies persist, this dilemma will worsen as the country is witnessing massive and 
rapid economic development that will indeed require enormous supplies of skillful 
human resources.  In worst cases these high demands on human resources will only be 
covered from the ready to work expatriates taking the country back to square one of 
the 1980s when this entire dilemma of high rates of unemployment among Saudis 
emerged.  Yet this time it is going to be even worse as Saudi Arabia already have 
more than 4 million foreign labour that are flooding the country’s labour market.   
 
The findings can be grouped under the following main points:   
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• Government Involvement in Skill formation Systems and the Labour Market 
 
Answers of the interviewees tend to follow similar patterns depending on whether 
they are from the private, the government or the quasi-government organizations.  
There is a general agreement among interviewees of private organizations that 
GOTEVT and the Ministry of Labour are not listening nor fulfilling their needs and 
demands for skilful human resources.  Not only that but also they are imposing 
outdated and restrictive recruitment regulations and procedures on their businesses 
that are affecting their economic activities.  They believe that government 
organizations in general in Saudi Arabia are not capable of coping with the rapid 
changes in the business environment and are pulling them back and discouraging their 
competitive advantage in Saudi Arabia as well as in international markets.          
 
There is unanimous agreement among interviewees from different private 
organizations that the quality of GOTEVT’s graduates is not up to their work 
requirements and recruitment standards.  Their communication, work ethics and even 
technical skills are undoubtedly weak and ‘unemployable’ compared to the time they 
spend in GOTEVT’s institutes and colleges.  Therefore, further investment in 
retraining in the private sectors' training centres, or on the job, are required resulting 
in money, time and effort wastefulness.  In addition to this expensive investment in 
their reorientation, there are no employment laws that guarantee GOTEVT’s 
graduates and Saudi employees in general continuation with their employers as they 
tend to move from one private organization to another following the slightest increase 
in their salaries.       
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On the other hand, foreign employees are skilful, hard working and easy to maintain 
as employers hold their passports and their work sponsorship.  Interviewees in the 
private sector agree that if a Saudi worker performs and competes as a foreign worker 
they will be content to keep him/her.  Not only that but also they are willing to pay 
him/her higher salaries according to their performance and the skills he/she has.  They 
believe, in general, that their labour market employment practices are spoiled by the 
employment and work environment implemented in government organizations as 
Saudi employees are granted lifelong employment regardless of their performance or 
discipline. 
 
Interviewed private sector managers consider the Saudization program as a noble 
national effort that has to be implemented provided that they have the well trained and 
committed Saudis as well as the supportive government employment mechanisms.  To 
achieve the former, a number of private sectors are acting constructively and 
considering establishing their own training institutions to invest in retraining young 
Saudis and bridge the skills’ gap to fulfil their immediate line of businesses’ needs 
and to support their industry as a whole.    
 
The government and quasi-government interviewees, on the other hand, view the 
private sector as not paying enough salaries to Saudis to keep them and increase their 
Saudization percentages.  They believe that private sector organizations are 
attempting any possible tactic to evade employing Saudis as they aim to increase their 
profits.  They consider GOTEVT as not part of the obstacle of Saudization and that 
their graduates are well trained and up to the employment requirements of the labour 
market.  GOTEVT officials support the idea that employment is not their number one 
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responsibility as they are only acting as a government training and education body 
responsible for graduating what the labour market needs.  These needs are well 
advised by different private industries’ representatives and accordingly included in 
their training and education programs.  In addition, they claim that they are attempting 
to establish strategic training program partnerships with different industries to equip 
industries to train for themselves.  However, the large industries that are capable and 
willing to accept this approach appeared to be few in numbers.  Most Saudi industries 
are small-to-medium size organizations that, according to GOTEVT’s top 
management, regard training and skill providing as the responsibility of the 
government.            
 
Quasi-government organizations, in particular, although they retrain GOTEVT’s 
graduates in their own well equipped training centres, believe that they are well 
qualified for their employment requirements.  These organizations were recently 
privatised or partially government owned.  They are well established financially, 
managerially and organizationally and obliged nationally to participate in increasing 
Saudis’ employment.  They have some concerns, however, about GOTEVT’s 
graduates’ English communication competencies as they are trained in GOTEVT only 
in Arabic.  This weakness in fact seems to receive unanimous agreement also by all 
interviewed managers from different private sector organizations which was not seen 
as problematic for GOTEVT’s officials.                        
 
In brief, Saudization strategy is seen as a national vision and priority among all 
interviewed managers.  However, it seems to lack coherent practical mechanisms and 
cooperation between shareholders for its implementation and evaluation especially 
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among responsible human resource government bodies i.e. Ministry of Labour, 
GOTEVT, HRD Fund and other skill formation systems in the Kingdom.  In the 
absence of those mechanisms and cooperation, the private sector cannot interrupt its 
production and competition waiting for the government bodies to sort themselves out 
in such a challenging and seriously competitive markets that Saudi Arabia and the 
region as a whole are witnessing.  So, the easiest choice for private sector 
organizations is to look for foreign labour recruitment to run their production while 
slowly implementing Saudization, a long lasting ineffective national strategy.   
 
• Successful Saudization  
 
All managers interviewed agree that the success of Saudization implementation 
depends mainly on the organization size.  Large organizations are more successful in 
achieving its requirements as it is supported by their top management belief on its 
urgency and priority.  Therefore, they invest in implementing advanced and attractive 
Human Resource Management systems and invest heavily in retraining Saudis to fit 
their employment needs.  They establish their industry-led training institutions that 
allow linking their HRD programs to their industry needs.  A number of the private 
managers as well as government managers believe that government interventions 
through HRDF grants accompanied by rigorous government monitoring are assisting 
Saudization success in the private sector.  
 
• Saudi Negative Attitudes to Jobs in the Private Sector 
 
Private sector managers agree that their human resource practices are spoiled by 
employment practices in the government sector as the latter overlooks linking its pay 
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to employee performance with the majority of its employment for office and 
administrative jobs.  They also confirm that Saudis preferred employment in the 
government and quasigovernment organizations influenced by the long-lasting 
negative social view that private sector employment is for expatriates.  This created 
less attraction to such jobs as they are viewed to represent lower social status for 
Saudis.  Therefore, Saudi employees recruited in the private organizations are hard to 
retain as they move between private sector organizations following the slightest 
increase in their pay.  Government managers agree that Saudis are still not valuing 
jobs in the private sector as they were spoiled by the years of economic booming the 
country has witnessed.  
 
• Investing in Saudi HRD as a Long-term Approach. 
 
Government, quasigovernment and private managers as well agree that decisions to 
invest in a long-term development of Saudis in private organizations are determined 
by the organization size, top management belief and advanced and attractive human 
resource management practices.  They are also supported by available funds from the 
HRDF.  A number of managers believe that Saudization monitoring by the Ministry 
of Labour is a major driving factor for investing in HRD in the private sector.  On the 
other hand, such an investment is inhibited by organization size being small-to-
medium, unavailability of industry-led trained Saudis who has, at the same time, high 
labour turn over, in addition to availability of ready to work, cheap to employ and 
highly retainable expatriates.       
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS  
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses the findings reported in chapter six in the framework of the 
research’s objectives.  The findings are also analyzed in relation to the relevant 
literature in previous chapters with special emphasis on Hendry’s model.         
 
At the beginning of the discussion, though, the focus is on examining the role and 
influence of the state involvement in dominating skill formation systems in the 
country including GOTEVT as the main vocational and technical skill provider for the 
private labour market.  The analysis then focuses on evaluating specific issues related 
to GOTEVT’s strategic and operational outcomes in relation to the manpower needs 
of the private labour market.  Second, the discussion explores the obstacles in 
implementing the Saudization strategy as seen by managers from government, 
quasigovernment and the private sector.  The analysis examines unemployment and 
Saudis attitudes toward employment in private organizations.  Third, the chapter looks 
into the factors that led to high rates of Saudization in some private sectors.  It 
explores the reasons behind some successful Saudization scenarios in private 
organizations that have industry-led training initiatives.  The discussion will facilitate 
proposals to be introduced in the next chapter to the Human Resources Development 
practices to bridge the missing link between skill formation programs provided 
mainly by GOTEVT and the Saudization requirements in the private sector.   
 
At the end of this chapter, the analysis examines Hendry’s interaction factors in a 
different labour market environment such as the Saudi with its employment and 
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training complexities.  It attempts to understand the driving, stabilising and/or 
inhibiting factors that influence Saudi private organizations to invest in training 
Saudis as a long-term investment approach.  Hendry’s model was originally 
developed and implemented in the UK to investigate the HRD practices in relation to 
corporate strategies in small-to-medium sized organizations.  The study developed a 
model (see Figure 4.2) to highlight the interactions of factors that drive, stabilize 
and/or inhibit training as a strategic long-term investment approach in organizations.  
The driving factors according to Hendry (1991) include changes in business strategies 
and competitive pressure in addition to available skills’ supplies by external and 
internal (within the organization) labour markets.  The driving and stabilizing factors 
also include internal actors and systems as well as external support for training such 
as government grants.  The inhibiting factors, on the other hand, hinder the process of 
investing in training from a long-term HRD perspective.  They include simple 
products or tasks, lack of a qualification culture, clerical and technical bias of training 
with low status trainers, and lack of influence of management training.  Hendry 
argued that in order for organizations to pursue training as an investment approach 
and have effective training practices, they must decrease or even eliminate the 
negative effect of the inhibiting factors and reinforce the driving and stabilizing ones.              
 
7.2 Government Bureaucratization and Skill Formation 
 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction and the third chapter, the state is dominating 
HRD activities in Saudi Arabia.  Their efforts include regulating, planning for, 
financing and executing all aspects of its activities.  The outcomes of this heavy 
governmental involvement are affecting the Saudi private labour market and 
Saudization strategy in particular which are examined in this chapter.  The emphasis 
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of this examination, however, is on government bureaucratization that is primarily 
influencing GOTEVT’s role.  Other general education stages and higher education 
institutes such as universities are examined briefly in this analysis as they are not the 
core focus of this study and as they require further and extensive research and 
investigation and may add to the complexity of the current research.  These systems 
including GOTEVT, nevertheless, share many similarities as they are all controlled, 
run and influenced by the government’s systems and operations.          
 
The findings of this research are consistent with the majority of the literature 
discussed in this thesis.  They, especially the ones illustrated by the private sector and 
quasigovernment interviewees, confirm that rigid government bureaucracies are 
delaying the responsiveness of skill formation institutes including GOTEVT to the 
private sector’s rapidly changing needs for skills, knowledge and attitudes.  They are, 
therefore, hindering the efforts of implementing the crucial government Saudization 
strategy to reduce expatriates employment by increasing qualified Saudis’ recruitment 
in the private sector organizations.  This, if achieved, could reduce the annually 
increasing unemployment rates among Saudis.  Moreover, these government 
bureaucratic approaches are delaying the achievement of the country’s overall 
economic vision as they are not synchronizing such vision into the country’s skill 
formation strategies.   
 
Currently, the private sector is emerging to be among the main contributors to the 
Saudi economy beside the country’s natural oil and minerals resources.  The 
government is increasingly encouraging the sector’s participation in establishing and 
running its developmental and industrial projects.  Accordingly, the private sector is 
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becoming the major employer in the country as opposed to the government which has 
reached over the years its ultimate employment capacity of Saudis.  Naturally, the 
private sector’s business and work environment are competition driven and profitable 
oriented.  These eventually are directing its human resource management practices in 
general and employment criteria in particular.  Therefore, the sector is currently 
demanding from the country’s skill formation systems more technical skills, 
knowledge and attitudes as well as scientific specializations that are trained toward its 
specific employment and production needs.   
 
In a more futuristic perspective, AlSwailim from Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry and Al Zaid from the Saudi Real Estate Company anticipate huge demands 
on skills and qualifications in three industrial areas i.e. advanced information 
technologies, energy related industries and transportation.  These three industries and 
services represent the Kingdom’s strategic vision of its leaders for its future economic 
competitive advantage.  They are even included in the country’s Development Plans 
in order to establish the Kingdom’s industrial competitiveness.  Nevertheless, a major 
challenge for such a vision stems from the absence of a clear unified as well as a long-
term economic strategy for the country that can direct its HRD and recruitment 
strategies.  The constraint for such long-term planning is the country’s dependency on 
oil production and prices that can change dramatically depending on fluctuations of 
the market, political and economical circumstances.  Such constraints had forced the 
country’s long-term strategic planning to be overshadowed by shorter-term five years 
Development Plans.  These plans, of course, are successive plans complementing each 
other; nevertheless, they do not fulfill the requirements of the long-term planning for 
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the human resources development and recruitment as they require more stable and 
achievable plans that are longer than five years.  
 
Furthermore, the implementation of such a vision is yet encountering challenges by 
government executors and planners for government skill formation systems.  It is still 
hindered by the government’s rigid bureaucracies to establish skill formation systems 
that are capable of preparing the country’s human resources for the new economic 
development era.  This promising vision requires new and innovative approaches that 
are not yet practiced or planned for by the different ministries responsible for 
planning the country’s overall skill formation strategies.  They require, according to 
Al Zaid from Saudi Real Estate Company and Gaith from FedEx, new government 
practices, a culture and a skill formation system that is knowledge-work base.  They 
involve training for advanced skills, knowledge and attitudes that are still absent from 
curriculums and plans of the country’s skill formation systems.   
 
The skill formation systems are still graduating the majority of their students from 
majors that the labour market is not requiring such as social, arts, and literary studies 
while the real need is for scientific and technical areas.  Al-Qahtani and AlSwailim 
from Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry comment that there is a scarcity of 
technical and scientific majors that can graduate enough quality and quantity 
manpower as the private sector is developing and progressing quicker than the present 
production of the government skill formation bodies.  Private businesses are evolving 
with new technologies and new industries and practices that the government skill 
formation systems are unable to keep pace with due to their bureaucratic nature 
dominating their practices, decision making processes and long-term planning.  Al 
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Turaigi from Almarai also supports the fact that Saudi universities are not graduating 
its students with labour market interests in mind.  According to him 70% of their 
programs’ outcomes are studying majors that the private labour market is not 
demanding anymore while only 30% are focusing on market needs.  This, eventually, 
will delay the implementation of Saudization and burden the government and the 
private sector as well with extra cost to retrain the incompatible skill formation’s 
outcomes with new employable skills and behaviors.  In other words, skill formation 
systems are not linked to the country’s employment needs or to the country’s strategic 
economic vision.   
 
On the same prospect, Al Ammash from InterSearch Recruitment Company confirms 
that university curriculums are focusing on academia and theoretical teaching and 
learning approaches.  They are not producing a well rounded employable graduate 
that is equipped with essential practical knowledge and skills that can guarantee 
his/her school-to-work transition.  In addition, Saudi universities and GOTEVT as 
well do not prepare Saudi graduates for the country’s private labour market by 
building their essential interpersonal and communication skills such as English and 
necessary IT skills prior to providing them with subject matter skills.  In fact, in the 
case of GOTEVT, Gaith asserts that it is not broadening their trainees’ prospects with 
essential learning and development cognitive skills such as general reading, creative 
writing and critical thinking.  These skills, according to many interviewed private 
managers, are the necessary tools that, if provided by GOTEVT and other skill 
formation systems, would enhance their graduates’ employability and increase their 
career promotion opportunities afterwards.  Ideally, private sector industries expect 
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them to have the specializations’ skills, knowledge and attitudes as well as abilities 
and potentials to compete in a businesslike manner in a competitive environment.  
 
Yet, in fact, skill formation systems including GOTEVT consider themselves to be 
only knowledge providers without the need for integration or consultation with 
private managers about their market demands for skills as described by AlZahrani 
from Mobily.  This tactic is appropriate for the bureaucratic planning and developing 
approach of any government system and process.  It ensures lengthy decision-making 
processes and intensive planning and budgeting procedures for developing any new or 
existing HRD initiative.  In other words, it imposes more bureaucratic control over 
expenditures from their limited government budgets which is inconsistent with the 
rapidly changing skill demands of the private sector they are serving.  In addition, it 
reinforces and encourages less involvement, coordination and consultation from the 
private organizations to discuss their employment needs.  The latter cannot jeopardize 
and interrupt the immediate business requirements of its experienced managers to 
participate in such time-consuming processes of the government.  As a result, those 
managers discard involving in the prolonged skill formation development projects 
proposed by GOTEVT and other skill formation systems.  Therefore, private sector’s 
managers, according to Al-Qahtani and AlSwailim, are neither directing nor 
participating in the educational and vocational training curriculum development.  
They are not able to influence such programs to produce what their industry needs.  In 
addition, managers from the private sector are criticizing skill formation systems for 
not utilizing their work experiences and willingness to participate in presenting 
workshops, lectures and studies in their programs.  Therefore, they blame skill 
formation systems of being merely theoretical knowledge providers with less 
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concentration on the most demanded practical learning that increases the graduates’ 
employability in the labour market.   
 
In fact, skill formation systems, as indicated by Gaith from FedEx and Al-Eisa from 
Al Yamamah College, are still operating to enforce receiving and memorizing 
information.  They are not attempting any experiential learning and hands on learning 
approaches that encourage creative, analytical and critical thinking which are essential 
to create the knowledge society.  They are also crucial requirements for current 
employment demands of the country’s evolving private sector.  Such demands are yet 
mostly unaccounted for by the majority of skill formation systems which focus on 
graduating literary majors as opposed to technical and scientific majors as explained 
by AlZahrani.  More alarming, essential coordination and consultation with the 
private organizations on their skill, knowledge and attitudes requirements are hardly 
implemented by such systems.   
 
• GOTEVT’s Role Under the Government Influence  
 
Interviews confirm the literature that GOTEVT’s current role is not fulfilling the 
private sector’s requirements that the country’s overall economic vision demands.  
Such argument, as expected, does not correspond with perspectives of the top 
government managers from both GOTEVT and the Ministry of Labour.  They defend 
its existence and achievements, and deny the private sector argument that government 
bureaucratic and heavy involvement is hindering GOTEVT’s responsiveness to the 
employment needs of their labour market.  In fact, the two GOTEVT’s top managers 
Al-Ghafees and his Vice Governor Alogla, in addition to Al-Humaid from the 
Ministry of Labour, believe that their organization is doing a great job.  It is 
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developing and flourishing and more than that fulfilling the private sector’s needs for 
qualified Saudis.  Their graduates are, according to their perspectives, annually 
increasing and are trained according to the private industry needs.  Al-Ghafees, in 
particular, indicates that their graduates are becoming attractive for employment in 
Aramco and the Saudi Electricity Company among others which only seek the most 
qualified human resources.  This, for Al-Ghafees, is empirical evidence that such 
graduates are well preferred over other skill formation bodies including universities.  
However, Al-Ghafees tends to overlook the fact that the organizations referred to are, 
on one hand, either government organizations like Aramco or quasigovernment ones 
that are obliged to Saudize their manpower as they are partially state-owned 
organizations.  On the other hand, they have their own state-of-the art industry-led 
training institutions that are financially and organizationally well equipped to retrain 
GOTEVT’s graduates to their specific needs.  This advantage, in fact, is not available 
to the majority of private organizations that are currently struggling with GOTEVT’s 
outcomes in their employment and Saudization efforts.   
 
Substantial general pattern evolves from interviews with the managers from 
quasigovernment organizations.  They demonstrate conservativeness in criticizing 
GOTEVT’s programs and the government role in fulfilling their demands for 
qualified national skills.  Those managers including Al-Shagawi from the Saudi 
Electricity Company, Al-Zamel from Saudi Telecommunication Company, and Al-
Bat’hi from SABIC are, on one hand, still inclined to support government entities 
since the government is a significant shareholder of their organizations.  On the other 
hand, they are capable of retraining and rehabilitating GOTEVT’s graduates in their 
advanced industry-focused training facilities.  For example, they consider GOTEVT’s 
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new approaches to involve private managers in their programs development to be a 
positive approach towards the right direction.  Yet they confirm the conclusive fact, 
illustrated by other private managers, that such procedures are lagging behind the 
expected and required time and quality for professionals and specializations to serve 
the private sector of national human capital.  For them, GOTEVT’s vocational 
training programs are still utilizing an incongruous theoretical teaching approach 
instead of a practical training approach that is mostly required by private industries 
including quasigovernment.  To overcome this slow responsiveness and theoretical 
teaching approach of GOTEVT’s, quasigovernment organizations are investing 
substantially in implementing advanced selection and recruitment procedures that are 
followed by considerable retraining of GOTEVT’s graduates to fit their needs.  For 
example, Al-Shagawi asserts that they first implement rigorous selection and 
recruitment practices to ensure the recruitment of the best graduates including 
GOTEVT’s.  Second, they retrain those newly hired employees on the practical work 
environment which is absent from the theoretical curriculums of GOTEVT’s technical 
colleges.  SABIC, on the other hand, as Al-Bat’hi confirms, is utilizing its financial 
capabilities to establish its own training facilities in all of its plants to fulfill its 
industrial demands for skills.  They have even established two industrial colleges in 
Yanbu and Jubail to serve their immediate needs as well as the needs of similar 
private organizations in petrochemical industries.  In all their industry-focused 
training facilities, they retrain GOTEVT’s graduated students to suit SABIC’s 
industrial technologies and production requirements.   
 
For the private sector current employment needs and for the country’s ambitious 
economic vision, unfortunately, GOTEVT’s efforts are currently overshadowed by its 
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government role and inclination to extend its government authority.  At present, 
GOTEVT is implementing an unclear mission that is affecting its strategies, 
operations and outcomes.  On the strategic level, GOTEVT, as described by Al Zaid 
and Gaith, is trying to expand its responsibilities to include any vocational training 
initiatives in the country while overlooking its core mission.  In fact Al-Eisa 
substantiates that GOTEVT is decreasing some of its existing vocational training 
operations in order to seize the new vocational training opportunities.  Such new 
initiatives will increase its allocations of the government budgets as well as its 
domains of authority and control over different industries as well as its private 
training industry and military training.  In addition, these new responsibilities will 
enhance its strategic status in the government and the general public domains as an 
organization of multidimensional roles to assist achieving the state’s overall strategic 
objectives of HRD and recruitment.  Accordingly, GOTEVT has moved from its 
original role of providing the private industries with employable Saudis.  It is now 
interfering in micro activities of the private training industry such as deciding their 
curriculums, the length of their programs and even the selection and recruitment 
procedures for their training faculty.  Not only that but also it is attempting to develop 
vocational curriculums and accreditation standards for other well established and 
developed industries such as the banking and investment sectors.  Gaith believes that 
these sectors’ training programs and accreditation standards can only be determined 
and approved by the industry itself with less interference by GOTEVT.  Such 
interference will only impose its government bureaucratic procedures and business 
approaches on very dynamic sectors that are leading the country for years in business 
achievements as well as in advanced human resource management practices.        
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Moreover, on the operational level, this unclear mission of GOTEVT is hindered by 
heavy government control over its activities resulting in a bureaucratic and slow to 
respond system that has been focusing on quantity of graduates instead of quality.  
Such an argument is supported by Alogla the Vice Governor of GOTEVT himself.  
Alogla asserts that GOTEVT’s focus on quality in graduating skills and qualifications 
has just been introduced.  Unfortunately, GOTEVT’s presence as the country’s main 
vocational training provider for the private sector has evolved for more than a quarter 
of a century.  Since its establishment the focus was on the quantity of Saudi graduates 
rather than their quality of technical and vocational skills, knowledge and attitudes 
that are mostly needed by the private sector.  AlZahrani asserts that the success of 
GOTEVT in fulfilling the market needs of vocational skills should be measured by 
their graduates taking over vocational jobs in their specializations not merely by 
graduating large numbers of graduates every year.  In other words, GOTEVT should 
be focusing on its qualitative measures more than its quantitative ones which basically 
requires establishing their programs according to the labour market needs.  Such 
measured will guarantee GOTEVT’s ability to attract private companies to recruit 
their graduates in their specializations with shorter on-the-job orientation periods.  
However, AlZahrani argues that the present situation of GOTEVT is of the contrary 
where quality of vocational training is being marginalized and overlooked by 
GOTEVT.  As a result, this is costing private organizations important and risky 
investment especially that Saudis are hard to retain and mainly look for office 
employment preferably in the government. 
 
Therefore, GOTEVT, according to AlWagdani from the Institute of Banking, is still 
focusing on the mass production of skill, knowledge and attitudes for different private 
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industries via theoretical teaching and learning methods while overlooking the needs 
of specific industries.  At the same time, as indicated by the majority of interviewed 
private managers, very few and slow efforts are being implemented to involve their 
inputs in the development of GOTEVT’s programs to suit their employment needs.  
Such a slow process is becoming inevitable due to GOTEVT’s slow government 
bureaucracy system and to the fact that it is covering vast geographical areas of the 
Kingdom as Alogla indicates.  Consequently, these industries cannot jeopardize their 
business plans and competitive advantages to wait for GOTEVT’s slow development 
and overdue quality implementation on its programs.  Therefore, the sector, despite 
extensive government efforts, is increasingly recruiting the ready and, in most cases, 
qualified expatriates especially that GOTEVT is continuously claiming its 
unaccountability for employment responsibilities in the country.  In fairness to 
GOTEVT, they have less control over the decisions to reduce or discontinue foreign 
labour force recruitment in the fields that they are training Saudis to take over.  
However, in the absence of industry-focused qualifications and standards as well as 
required work ethics in GOTEVT’s graduates, as expressed by interviewees from the 
private sector, Saudization is even harder to accomplish.  Not only that but also 
achieving the country’s ambitious economic vision of creating knowledge-base 
society and industries are unfeasible. 
 
In contrast, other examples of skill formation systems have succeeded in fulfilling 
their industry’s demands such as SABIC’s Al-Jubail and Yanbu industrial colleges, 
training by the banking sector and training by the Saudi Electricity Company just to 
mention a few examples.  These organizations are admitting and training students 
graduating from the same general education system as GOTEVT.  As evident from 
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the interviews, these sectors have achieved high rates of quality Saudization and 
benefited other industrial sectors with qualified, skillful and business oriented human 
resources better than GOTEVT.  The significant difference is that they are providing 
industry focused vocational training while GOTEVT is not.  For example, Hussain 
compares GOTEVT’s outcomes with SABIC’s Yanbu and Jubail industrial colleges 
that are establishing and developing their curriculums according to the private sector’s 
needs.  Unlike GOTEVT that is conducting mass training programs for different 
industries, SABIC’s colleges focus on petrochemical industries.  Their graduates 
receive industry-led training programs which supply the needs of Savola and other 
similar industries.  According to Hussain, the two SABIC’s industrial colleges 
conduct regular training needs assessment to Savola and other private organizations 
which is then incorporated in their training programs.  Their graduates demonstrate 
industry focused technical competencies and knowledge as well as employable 
English and computer skills that are geared toward labour market needs.  
   
Other empirical evidence emerges from the interviews to confirm GOTEVT’s lack of 
responsiveness to the employment and development needs of the labour market.  Al-
Malki from NADC, Al Turaigi from Almarai and Al Thumairi from Al-Safi-Danone 
represent the dairy and poultry production industry in this study.  They all agree with 
other private managers that GOTEVT’s graduates are not matching their business 
needs.  In fact they criticize GOTEVT for not having a major specialized in the dairy 
and poultry production industry although they have been in the Kingdom’s market 
since its early days.  All three managers believe that GOTEVT’s graduates lack the 
necessary employable skills including English, logical and reasoning thinking.  They 
also lack the general preparation for personal effectiveness including clarity of self 
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and employment vision, motivation for employment in the private sector, ability to 
market one’s self, and essential employment disciplines.  They confirm that GOTEVT 
never approached them to participate and consult in its curriculum development 
processes despite the fact that they are among the largest companies in their industry 
in the local market.  Therefore, similar to other industries, these companies train 
GOTEVT’s graduates for their production needs of skills, attitudes and knowledge in 
either their training centers or through private training providers.  In both cases these 
companies are wasting their time, effort and money on the HRD that has been the core 
mission for GOTEVT in the first place.   
 
Similar criticism comes from Al Shaya and Al Khaldi from Alshaya International 
Trading Company who illustrate that GOTEVT do not have a vocational training 
program specialized in retail.  Alshaya which has been in the Kingdom sine the 80s, 
attracts graduates from unrelated fields of study from universities and GOTEVT and 
retrains them for at least one year to fit their needs.  These graduates have already 
spent at least two years of vocational training in GOTEVT’s technical colleges or 
training institutes in any major just to obtain a vocational diploma which become 
almost obsolete if deciding to be recruited in a retail industry like Alshaya.  The 
industry start from square one in providing essential and lengthy retraining which 
consume Alshaya's valuable time, effort and money to rectify the qualification gaps of 
the country’s educational and vocational training bodies.  This retraining will also 
provide them with basic English communication skills that seem to be an immediate 
need for most organizations included in this study.     
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On the operational level too, GOTEVT’s organizational structure has become so large 
that it is incapable of managing itself to produce the planned and desirable outcomes 
for the Saudi private labour market.  Al Ammash from InterSearch views GOTEVT as 
too large an organization that its management is fully occupied in its day-to-day 
contingency management for its operations and resources rather than planning for its 
strategic organizational issues.  These issues include directing its resources toward 
synchronizing its outcomes with the labour market needs and achieving the country’s 
overall strategy of Saudization and its futuristic economic vision.  However, since 
GOTEVT is a government organization, its organizational system and outcomes are 
influenced by its affiliation and identity as a government system.  In fact, Al 
Khwaiter, from Advanced Electronics Company, acknowledges that this system has 
been always challenged by the private sector’s rapid development, changes and 
demands despite the efforts to cope with such challenges. GOTEVT is actually 
hindered by its own bureaucratic practices of organizational management in addition 
to its limited government financial resources. Its financial incomes and budgets are 
constantly susceptible to the country’s overall revenues that are affected by oil prices 
fluctuations as demonstrated by Table (7.1) and its following illustrative chart.  These 
resources since depending on the country’s oil revenue is consistently unpredictable 
and will always be as such for GOTEVT.  They eventually restrain performing its 
basic role as well as implementing any future development plans in developing the 
country’s human resources according to the labour market employment needs.  They 
will also affect its adaptability to changes to demands in the market it is serving. 
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Table (7.1): GOTEVT’s Annual Budgets (1979-2003) 
Year Annual Budget (Riyals) 
1979/80 1,701,195,000 
1980/81 1,662,970,000 
1981/82 1,253,670,000 
1982/83 1,310,243,000 
1983/84 925,766,000 
1984/85 670,305,000 
1985/86 751,062,000 
1986/87 708,955,000 
1987/88 713,019,000 
1988/89 944,736,000 
1989/90 950,724,000 
1990/91 1,174,799,000 
1991/92 1,299,298,000 
1992/93 1,046,198,000 
1993/94 1,108,625,000 
1994/95 1,128,071,625 
1995/96 1,283,892,000 
1996/97 1,278,091,000 
1997/98 1,437,974,000 
1998/99 1,644,831,000 
1999/2000 1,526,443,000 
2000/01 1,508,900,000 
2001/02 1,542,184,000 
2002/03 2,004,880,000 
0
500,000,000
1,000,000,000
1,500,000,000
2,000,000,000
2,500,000,000
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Acquired from official documentations from the Budgetary Division in GOTEVT’s General 
Department for Planning and Budgeting in 2005     
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The following simple example can illustrate the burden of the government 
bureaucracies and limited financial resources on already congested organizational 
structure   For GOTEVT to incorporate, for example, a new program in one of its 
technical colleges or change an existing one according to a new evolving training 
demand from a private industry, approvals from its top management have to be in 
place prior to any further procedures.  The top management has to consent on such 
program or changes according to available government budgets provided to GOTEVT 
at the beginning of its fiscal year.  Otherwise, GOTEVT has to either reallocate some 
of its finances assigned for other projects to support the new demand which 
sequentially obstructs another already planned for project.   Alternatively, GOTEVT 
requests further financial support from the Ministry of Finance, another government 
organization implementing its own bureaucratic approval procedures.  Both cases can 
delay the introduction and changes of such demanded program to the point it becomes 
obsolete to the private industry.   
 
Therefore, if this industry which demanded the program is financially strong, it will 
eventually establish its own training facility instead of depending on or waiting for 
GOTEVT.  Examples of such institutions are increasingly emerging in the market to 
overcome such bureaucracies to produce Saudis equipped with industry-led skill, 
knowledge and attitudes.  Some of the examples from the interviews include the 
Institution of Zamil Industrial Investment Company, the Prince Ahmed Applied 
Media Institution, SABIC’s two industrial colleges, and the Saudi Japanese 
Automobile High Institute.  
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However, the rest of small-to-medium industries are equipped with neither huge 
financial assets nor the advanced human resource management practices like other 
quasigovernment and large private organizations.  Therefore, they are either 
dependant on recruiting GOTEVT’s graduates with their mass training approaches 
and invest in retraining them on-the-job with the hope that they will retain their 
employment contracts afterwards.  Alternatively, they have to recruit expatriates to 
fill their skill gaps and production requirements which is making Saudis redundant 
and unemployed in their own country.   
 
To add to this dilemma, GOTEVT’s system is overloaded with its supervisory and 
regulatory roles on the huge private training industry of the country which, according 
to AlWagdani, is resulting in an unfocused and ineffective organizational 
management.  For example, GOTEVT has to establish the standards for training, 
examinations for different vocations and accreditations for different private training 
programs available in the country.    This has become too vast a task for such a 
government organization with limited resources which is only exacerbated by its 
bureaucracies to manage and accomplish its main role of HRD.  More alarmingly and 
consistent with the findings of Al-Shammary et al. (2003) and other national scholars, 
Al-Zehairi, from Tawteen Training and Recruitment Company, confirms that 
GOTEVT is unjustly competing with its clients i.e. the private training industry.  
GOTEVT is supplied with large governmental annual budgets and have massive 
human resources as well as considerable training facilities.  It provides free vocational 
training programs that are similar to what the private training industry is conducting.  
Its training certificates are more recognized for employment in both the government 
and the private sector.  Private training institute’s certifications, on the other hand, 
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have to be accredited and approved by GOTEVT in order to be recognized for 
employment for both sectors.  At the same time, GOTEVT is imposing its 
bureaucratic and rigorous regulatory and supervisory procedures on the private 
training industry which is delaying its development and competitiveness.  As a result, 
investing in such industry becomes risky which will in the long run depreciate such 
valuable national economical resource.   
 
On the same operational level, another major obstacle encountering GOTEVT, as a 
government organization, emerges from its training faculty and their employment 
practices as trainers.  Their trainers, according to evidence from Al-Asmari from the 
Saudi Japanese Automobile High Institute (SAJHI) and Al-Ghamdi from Zamil 
Industrial Investment Company, have exceptionally weak training skills which 
eventually produce poor outcomes to the labour market.  Those trainers are mainly the 
product of GOTEVT as it recruits its graduates from its different technical colleges in 
addition to some from the national universities.  They usually join GOTEVT as they 
could not find better recruitment opportunities in other government, quasigovernment 
or lager private organizations.  On the other hand, the other well qualified technical 
Saudis graduating from these universities are few in the labour market and the private 
sector and quasigovernment organizations are inflating their salaries to attract them.  
Limited by the government employment system with its low salaries, GOTEVT 
cannot stand such competition with private and quasigovernment organizations.  
Therefore, it depends on recruiting from its own graduates.  These trainers become 
government employees as GOTEVT also is obliged to Saudize its employment 
regardless of trainers’ competencies or performance.  Once employed in the 
government civil system, GOTEVT will have less authority to terminate their 
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employment if they are incompetent in achieving desirable outcomes.  On the other 
hand, those trainers will be receiving government salaries which are not always 
attractive but will fulfill their eagerness and ambition for a lifetime employment in a 
government agency.  In fact, Alogla from GOTEVT confirms this view as he states 
that GOTEVT’s abilities of recruiting professional trainers for different 
specializations are hindered by their obligations towards Saudizing GOTEVT’s 
positions.  In other words, GOTEVT, itself, becomes restricted by rigid government 
regulations to recruit from different industrialized countries in order to enhance its 
outcomes with advanced technical practices and knowledge.  It is also limited by the 
government employment system that predetermines employment salaries and 
compensation benefits that are not always attractive for employing distinguished 
performers.  Not only that but also GOTEVT’s trainers, according to Al-Asmari and 
Al-Ghamdi during their employment receive less professional development to 
enhance their skills and update their knowledge in their fields to match new 
advancements as GOTEVT is always subject to its government limited expenditures 
and budgets.   
   
• Evaluation of GOTEVT’s Current Outcomes  
 
Numerous examples from the interviews illustrate that, on the outcomes’ level, skills 
provided by GOTEVT are incompatible with and not supporting the private sector’s 
efforts of employing nationals.  Interviewees especially from the private sector 
corroborate that state bureaucratization hinders incorporating and benefiting from 
coordinating and including the private sector’s inputs in GOTEVT’s planning and 
performing HRD strategies.  Factual evidence from the field advocates that the 
dominance of government bureaucracies on its practices and role accompanied by its 
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unclear mission are yet resulting in graduating Saudis unemployable to the private 
sector.  Al Zaid, Gaith and Eisa among other private interviewees support this 
argument and believe that GOTEVT is struggling in achieving its main mission of 
providing the labour market with employable Saudis.  For the majority of the 
interviewees, GOTEVT as a government organization will never be able to fulfill the 
different demands of skills, knowledge and attitudes of different industries in the 
Kingdom.  As indicated earlier, GOTEVT is executing and administering training 
programs in vast geographical areas in the Kingdom in addition to exercising its 
governmental regulatory and supervisory role on the private training industry.  It is 
also being limited by government expenditures and systems.  Therefore many of the 
interviewees believe that vocational training must be the role of the private industries 
themselves as they are more capable of determining their manpower training and 
employment needs.  
 
Unanimously, all private and some of the quasigovernment managers confirm that 
GOTEVT‘s graduates lack English competencies, basic computer skills and, more 
importantly, essential work ethics.  Some private manager interviewees consider them 
even to lack subject area and technical specialization knowledge and skills.  However, 
Al-Ghafees from GOTEVT claims that organizations in the labour market are after 
their graduates’ specializations regardless of their lack of English competencies and 
basic computer skills.  Yet Al-Ghafees insists that their graduates are highly attractive 
for employment despite training them in Arabic.  Companies, according to his 
perspective, are willing to provide English and basic computer training for their 
graduates as long as they can obtain them with their technical skills.  It is evident 
from such argument that GOTEVT’s training priorities are different from those of 
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their clients especially when it comes to English, computer skills and work ethics.  
GOTEVT views such skills, knowledge and attitudes to be the responsibility of the 
general education system (elementary, intermediate and secondary); therefore, they 
are reluctant to incorporate them in their curriculums as they will prolong the study 
period for their trainees.  They also consider their responsibility is to provide work 
related vocational training which, in their view, does not include rectifying failures 
and deficiencies in the previous educational stages.  Rightly argued, these stages of 
general education have not been capable of establishing the solid foundation for 
English and basic computer skills in addition to essential work ethics that establish 
accepting as well as respecting vocational and labour work concept among Saudi 
graduates.     
 
This previous insight by Al-Ghafees, in fact, represents a long-lasting trend of 
GOTEVT’s management approach which justifies disregarding their clients’ essential 
requirements.  This argument is supported by AlZahrani from Mobily who used to be 
a Vice Dean for one of GOTEVT’s technical colleges before being employed by the 
private sector.  From his experience as an ex-GOTEVT official and later as a 
employer of their graduates, he confirms that GOTEVT overlooks the labour market 
needs and do not utilize and incorporate their training needs assessments in its 
curriculums.  The market needs, for example, graduates with English, computer and 
interpersonal skills that are essential for employment and advancements in private 
sector jobs.  They are, according to AlZahrani, absent from GOTEVT’s curriculums 
and are persistently claimed to be unessential by GOTEVT’s officials.  Consequently, 
GOTEVT’s graduates who demonstrate employable potentials due to their individual 
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achievements usually work in different professions than they are trained for in 
GOTEVT.   
 
Therefore a graduate, for example, from the Electrical Technology Department of the 
Technical College will perform better in administrative or retail jobs after being 
retrained in the private sector.  This is the result of poor qualification by GOTEVT 
accompanied by lack of willingness and motivation by its graduates to takeover 
technical careers.  This illustrates that their students initially joined their programs 
just to acquire a diploma knowing beforehand that the private sector will retrain them 
again.  Such belief and practice, in fact, demoralizes their students’ eagerness to learn 
as confirmed by AlZahrani.  They usually prefer employment in the government or at 
least change their profession to work in offices to avoid technical and labour jobs for 
which they have studied for three years.  As a result, these jobs will only be filled by 
expatriates who are either well trained or easily retainable after investing in their 
orientation by the private sector organizations.   
 
Another argument cannot be overlooked in this scenario.  It evolves from the insights 
of two private managers, Al-Rwaily from Riyad Bank and Al-Zehairi from Tawteen, 
in addition to Al-Zamel from STC quasigovernment.  They all tend to agree that 
GOTEVT insufficient outcomes to the private sector are the result of their admission 
criteria in the first place.  They confirm that such poor outcomes of GOTEVT are the 
result of admitting poor performers graduating from the country’s secondary schools.  
In other words, GOTEVT is becoming the last alternative for those who cannot enroll 
in other competitive higher skill formation systems.  In fact throughout its years, 
GOTEVT has been known among Saudis as being the last resort for those graduates 
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who could not get admission elsewhere because of their low grades.  They enter 
GOTEVT looking for diplomas that allow them employment preferably in the 
government sector or quasigovernment organizations not hoping to peruse 
employment in technical vocations in the private sector.  They will, of course, be 
looking for office employment which does not fulfill private sector’s available jobs 
that are mainly technical and in-the-field.  This avoidance of technical jobs is 
reinforced by the poor preparation of GOTEVT’s institutes of its graduates which, 
according to many interviewed managers, focus on theoretical learning approach 
instead of the mostly required practical one by the labour market.   
 
The results of either scenario are graduates who are neither assisting the achievement 
of Saudization nor fulfilling the quality employment requirements of the private 
sector which if both achieved would reduce unemployment among Saudis.  They can 
also facilitate achieving the country’s future economic vision and establish a 
knowledge-base society.  However, in reality, Al-Qahtani and AlSwailim from 
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry confirm that their clients i.e. employers 
from private organizations are complaining of GOTEVT’s inefficiency in providing 
them with knowledgeable, skillful and disciplined national manpower.  GOTEVT’s 
graduates are in fact described to be immense failure by Al-Ghamdi, for example, 
from Zamil Industrial Investment Company.  They do not have the basic employable 
skills such as English, computer and interpersonal communication as they are not part 
of their curriculums.  More alarmingly, those graduates, according to Al-Ghamdi, lack 
the specialization skills which they have studied for at least two and a half years.  Al-
Ghamdi’s insights regarding GOTEVT, in particular, contradict the claims by Al-
Ghafees that considers Zamil Industrial Investment Company to be empirical 
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evidence of GOTEVT’s success in matching the labour market needs of qualified 
Saudis.  Al-Ghamdi confirms the contrary as his company has to retrain what 
GOTEVT has produced which consumes large portion of their effort, time, and 
money.  
 
Similarly, both managers of the private recruiting companies, Al Ammash from 
InterSearch and Al-Zehairi from Tawteen, believe that GOTEVT is not fulfilling the 
needs of their recruitment businesses.  Therefore, they have not recommended or 
recruited GOTEVT’s graduates to their clients in the private sector.  Al-Koblan also 
blames GOTEVT for never involving or inviting available practitioners from private 
organizations to enrich their curriculums and graduates’ prospectives by practical 
experiences from the field.  These curriculums depend on outdated text books in 
comparison to the advanced applied knowledge and technology of the private sector.  
Al-Zehairi, in particular, asserts that GOTEVT’s graduates lack not only basic 
English and computer skills but also technical skills and knowledge in their 
specializations.  Therefore, GOTEVT’s graduates cannot compete for employment 
even in administrative specializations like office management, accounting or 
marketing with other institutes in the Kingdom.  These include, for example, King 
Fahad University for Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), Al-Jubail and Yanbu as well 
as the Institute of Public Administration.  Their graduates, as many interviewees 
confirm, are vocationally trained and prepared for employment in the private sector 
and not just attending skill formation institutes for academic qualifications like 
GOTEVT’s.  The latter’s graduates require further retraining to fit private sector’s 
needs.  This necessitates further unnecessary spending by the private sector.  
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Therefore both the government and the private sector are wasting valuable financial 
and organizational resources to develop the country’s human resources. 
 
Therefore, the Savola Group, according to Hussain, is not finding the ready to employ 
Saudis who only require a brief on-the-job orientation either from local universities or 
from GOTEVT’s technical colleges.  They require a year of retraining investment to 
take over their jobs in Savola which is considered in the private sector standards a 
long time and a massive investment.  Such time and financial investment in HRD is, 
theoretically, the mission of the government through GOTEVT and universities who 
supposedly plan for, finance and train for the private sector’s needs.  Yet in reality 
such presumption is unattained for by the majority of Saudi skill formation institutes.  
Although Saudi private organizations are to invest in developing their human 
resources, such investment should be geared toward specific job requirements’ skills 
not toward basic skills behavioral attitudes that GOTEVT and other skill formation 
institutes are receiving their budgets to produce. The government, according to Al-
Asmari, should not expect the private sector to be held accountable for conducting the 
basic technical and vocational training for the unemployed Saudis as this is merely the 
GOTEVT’s mission. 
 
Al Khwaiter and Al Saad from Advanced Electronics Company (AEC) consider 
GOTEVT’s graduates to lack the depth in electronic knowledge that is essential for 
the company’s production.  They are only trained on simple electronic sets while the 
company deals with advanced and expensive electronic boards.  In other words, 
GOTEVT’s simulation training equipments are outdated in comparison to the labour 
market’s advanced production equipments which also delay these graduates’ 
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transformation period to the working environment.  They require intensive retraining 
which, according to Al Khwaiter, undermines their study period in the GOTEVT’s 
institutes.  Such period, as Al Khwaiter supports a number of interviewees, is even 
worsened by imposing the less beneficiary theoretical training approach instead of the 
needed practical training by the labour market.   
 
Finally, two of the managers from the banking sector interviewed in this study, Al-
Rwaily from Riyad Bank and Al-Koblan from Arab National Bank, assert that they 
prefer employing graduates from other institutes and universities rather than from 
GOTEVT.  Sabban from the National Commercial Bank, on the other hand, never 
employed from GOTEVT or had any business of any sort with them.  So he prefers 
not to comment on them.  The former managers, on the other hand, confirm that their 
banks employ GOTEVT’s graduates after rigorous screenings and selection processes 
and invest in their retraining.  Therefore, the two managers support earlier views by 
other private managers that GOTEVT’s graduates lack English competencies, 
computer skills and work ethics.   
 
In conclusion, this section examines the impact of the extensive involvement of the 
Saudi state in skill formation systems.  In this context, the attempt is to satisfy an 
essential research specific objective that examines the consequences of the 
government involvement in controlling skill formation systems in Saudi Arabia.  The 
emphasis of such examination is mainly on GOTEVT as the main government body 
responsible for providing Saudis with technical and vocational training for 
employment, essentially, in the private labour market.  The discussion highlights the 
present position of skill formation systems in general and GOTEVT in particular 
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considering the state dominance on their strategies and performance.  Their evaluation 
concentrates on their responsiveness to current employment requirements of the 
private sector including Saudization along with their achievement of the country’s 
overall economic vision.   
 
For both requirements, the analysis of empirical data confirms that such systems are 
not fulfilling their role in providing the labour market with concurrent knowledge, 
skills and attitudes.  They are also unable, yet, to synchronize, incorporate and satisfy 
future human capital demands for developing the country’s planned for competitive 
advantage industries i.e. advanced information technologies, energy related industries 
and transportation.  These systems are still saturating the employment market with the 
majority of their graduates from literary and social sciences majors instead of 
scientific and technical majors.  The latters, as the literature and interviews assert, 
represent the core demand for employment in both the employment market and 
economic plans.  Accordingly, skill formation systems are still utilizing the 
unproductive theoretical teaching approaches which stimulate merely memorization 
learning technique and undermine developing and practicing higher learning abilities 
in their graduates.  These unaccounted for abilities as demonstrated by interviewees 
would develop employable individuals who could fulfill current job requirements and 
would be potentially promotable across any private organization structure.  
 
Nevertheless in reality, these systems become the victims of the rigid government 
bureaucracies that are hindering their prompt responsiveness to rapid HRD demands 
of the private sector.  These bureaucracies, as viewed by interviewees, are producing 
the contrary consequences of their intended objectives.  Initially, they are introduced 
 271 
to systematize and regulate skill formation strategic planning, performance and 
expenditures.  Nonetheless, they convert into hindering and obstructing mechanisms 
to the development and responsiveness of such systems toward achieving its core 
clients’ (the private sector) needs for a national manpower trained according to 
industry employment requirements.  Consequentially, graduates from these systems 
become either unemployed or have to accept initial employment with low salaries as 
they require further development providing that they would retain their employment 
as the majority of businesses interviewed struggle with Saudis employees’ high 
turnover.  
 
In the case of GOTEVT, in particular, their plans and performance evolve around 
increasing their government dominance and authority over other industries in the 
market and therefore increase their government financial allocations.  They are, until 
recently, focusing on the quantity of graduates rather than their quality.  They, as 
confirmed by their top management, claim less responsibility for ensuring recruitment 
of their graduates as this is merely the task of other government organizations.  The 
role of their organization is entirely to qualify the national human resources with 
knowledge and skills, which GOTEVT presumes is required by the labour market as it 
implements minimal consultation or participation with different private industries.  
Therefore, GOTEVT produces mass theoretical training for different industries which, 
judging by its results, serves only its bureaucratic government performance and 
interests not necessarily its clients’ or even its country’s.  Likewise, it is overlooking 
the basic development and employment needs of qualifying its graduates with 
English, computer skills and work ethics.  In fact, GOTEVT’s outcomes are 
unsatisfactory for the private managers who demonstrate that providing mass 
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vocational training for all industries will never serve the core purpose of providing 
quality and specialized national manpower to the labour market.  Therefore, 
Saudization program implementation and the future will be jeopardized as the labour 
market is expecting specialized and competent national human resource products from 
any vocational training program and GOTEVT will never be an exception. 
 
In general, the government, if indeed it wants to encourage the private sector to 
involve in developing its economy will have to synchronize all of its requirements, 
procedures and regulations including skill formation systems with the private sector’s 
business nature and environment.  In other words, it has to change its existing 
bureaucratic practices and performances, especially the ones serving the private 
sector, to fit its business nature and needs rather than forcing the latter to adapt to 
government bureaucracies.  This can only be through changing the current role and 
practices of the country’s skill formation systems especially GOTEVT to be 
responsive to existing and future production and development needs of the labour 
market.        
 
7.3 Saudization, Unemployment and Saudis Attitudes to Work  
 
This section focuses on Saudization and unemployment in Saudi Arabia especially in 
the private labour market through examining employment obstacles and Saudi 
attitudes to work in private organizations.  It investigates such obstacles according to 
perspectives of interviewed managers in relation to discussed literature to diagnose 
such a national dilemma that is affecting the country’s economy despite the 
government’s efforts to force Saudization.       
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• Saudization versus Unemployment: reasons and obstacles.   
 
Saudization strategy when created was aiming at a long-term investment in the Saudi 
human resources through a steady and progressive HRD and replacement of 
expatriates by qualified Saudis.  Interviews with top managers from different 
government, quasigovernment and private sectors confirm that the strategy and its 
practices are not yet effective as the country’s unemployment rates are still high and 
increasing to 12% in 2008 from 9% in 2004.  Interviewees unanimously support that 
the Saudi labour market is, indeed, generating massive employment opportunities and 
absorbing the millions of foreign labour that are annually increasing.  In other word, 
the Saudi economy even at its recession times when oil prices were at their lowest or 
during the two Gulf Wars was capable of creating job opportunities at a rapid rate.   
However, such opportunities were constantly occupied by ready to work, cheap and 
easy to retain expatriates leaving Saudis to suffer from unemployment in their own 
country.  At the moment, the country is developing and its massive infrastructure or 
development projects are increasing thanks to the record high oil prices.  Equally, 
employment opportunities are increasingly evolving especially in the country’s 
private sector as the government increases its pressure to reduce unemployment by 
Saudizing the sector’s manpower.     
 
Despite all these facts, the Saudi labour market is increasingly recruiting expatriates 
instead of Saudis who are unable, or according to a number of interviewees, unwilling 
to seek employment in the private sector, the country’s main employer.  This sector, 
according to mostly government managers, is evading Saudis’ employment to achieve 
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higher financial profits as nationals are more expensive for employment than 
expatriates.  On the contrary, potential Saudi employees, according to the majority of 
private managers, are not qualified nor trained by the country’s skill formation 
systems to their employment requirements.  At the same time, they request high 
salaries and require expensive development investment.  Nevertheless, they are 
unstable in their employment and this does not compensate for their high salaries and 
achieve the return on their development investment.  In fact, they are striving for 
employment in government organizations as they offer stable lifelong working 
opportunities that do not demand high performance and provide reasonable salaries in 
comparison to work requirements.  It is vivid that each party -- government, 
quasigovernment and/or private -- recognizes the obstacles encountering Saudization 
according to their interests’ perceptions.  This diagnostic diversion to an important 
national dilemma is resulting in further complications to an already multidimensional 
dilemma i.e. Saudization.  Hence, this section of the discussion focuses on analyzing 
these obstacles as viewed by interviewees in relation to the literature discussed in 
earlier chapters.  
 
The core problem encountering Saudization stems from low salaries offered by 
mainly small-to-medium private sector organizations as illustrated by some of the 
government interviewees as well as by a number of private managers.  Those salaries, 
according to government officials Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour and Al-
Ghafees from GOTEVT are determined according to expatriates’ living standards and 
requirements in the majority of jobs in the labour market.  In fact, the private sector is 
establishing its benchmark level of salaries accordingly while overlooking differences 
between essential living expenses and family responsibilities of Saudis and 
 275 
expatriates.  For example, Al-Asmari illustrates that private organizations are 
recruiting an expatriate car technician for less than SR. 2000 while a Saudi cannot live 
on any pay under SR. 3000 to 4000 depending on the size of the city a person lives in.  
For the private organizations, the difference between the two salaries represents a cost 
that could be spared to even recruit another expatriate to double the profit.  In the 
same prospect, Al-Ghafees, similarly, insists that low pay schemes in the private 
sector are the main contributor to ineffective Saudization implementation in the 
market.  Expatriates are dominating and managing 80% of small-to-medium sized 
organizations which are the major source for job opportunities in the country.  
Evidently, these foreign labour forces are evading and fighting the recruitment of 
Saudis as they will take over their jobs.  
 
Quasigovernment managers, in particular, view Saudization as hindered by ineffective 
selection and recruitment methods.  Lack of utilizations of scientific selection and 
recruitment procedures result in recruiting and investing in developing Saudis who 
may not continue in the private labour market.  They are always looking for 
government or quasigovernment employment.  This is very much related to the 
negative social attitudes adopted by society about vocational and manual profession 
play which is a major obstacle for Saudization in the private sector as explained by 
quasigovernment managers.    
 
However, it could be argued that this low salary dilemma is, in fact, the direct result 
of organization size which empirically can determine the achievement of Saudization.  
The existence of small-to-medium organizations depends on reducing expenses as 
both AlWagdani and Al-Eisa illustrate.  Such expenses result mainly from recruiting 
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Saudis who are hard to attract, demand high wages and search for long-term career 
development plans in comparison to the cheap, ready to work and easy to retain 
expatriates.  These organizations usually are after short-term business operations and 
strategies that generally achieve their objectives for short-term and yet consistent 
profitability.  The private managers, AlZahrani, Al-Ghamdi and Al Ammash are 
conclusive that such strategies do not complement the Saudization’s long-term HRD 
investment approach.  In fact these organizations, as illustrated by a number of private 
managers, lack the competent management and leadership personnel who have the 
aspiration or the time to invest, plan for and manage its human resources development 
practices.  In other words, they lack the capabilities for the long-term planning in 
regard to their Saudization programs. 
 
 This latter fact of long-term Saudization requirement contradicts with the core 
principle of small-to-medium organizations’ existence that is making quick profits 
with less expenditure.  Therefore, their recruitment do not usually start with high 
salaries and office employment as Saudi employees would prefer as indicated by Al-
Zehairi, Al Shaya and many other private managers.  Of course their first preference 
is to recruit cheap expatriates; however, if they recruit a Saudi, these companies prefer 
to start with low salaries then increase their pay gradually as the employee’s 
performance enhances and employment longevity increases.  This practice is widely 
accepted and implemented for employment even for some of the government jobs as 
employees start by provisional employment with low salaries that increase after they 
become permanent employees.  However, in the private sector, Saudi candidates 
especially in the outdoors jobs, which represent the majority of available jobs, expect 
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higher salaries than these jobs actually offer, especially that when they only hold 
lower than secondary school diplomas.     
 
On the other hand, Saudization is successfully accomplished by big organizations in 
the country such as SABIC, ARAMCO, banks, STC and the Saudi Electricity 
Company to mention few examples.  These organizations are accomplishing high 
rates in Saudization as they have well established and clear human resource systems 
as well as advanced management practices and strong financial positions making 
them the second if not the first employment choice for Saudis after the government.  
Most of these organizations pay high salaries, have high retention rates and invest 
considerably in their employees’ development as almost all of them have their own 
training institutions.  These organizations, as evident from empirical data, can cope 
with the slow implementation prerequisites of the Saudization strategy.  They are 
capable, for example, of establishing and practicing efficient human resource 
management systems to attract, develop, and retain Saudis.  These systems attract 
either new graduates or experienced human resources and provide them with career 
development and promotion plans and attractive pay and compensation schemes.   
 
For example, the three interviewees from the banking sector did not view low salaries 
to be among the Saudization obstacles at least for their sector.  Quite the opposite, Al-
Koblan confirms that banks are capable of paying high salaries and attractive 
compensation schemes to skillful Saudis.  Banks strive to retain them especially after 
they are headhunted for their well trained and experienced staff by new operating 
banks or bigger investing organizations.  Banks just need Saudis with the basic skills 
and attitudes who demonstrate high performance and eagerness for development.  
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They usually invest in their development and even retraining through customized 
training in off and on-the-job setting to fit their needs.   
 
Al-Rwaily, echoing Al-Ghamdi perspectives, also considers gaining top and middle 
management belief and support afterwards are the core challenges and the keys for the 
success of implementing Saudization.  The other challenging factor which is 
supported by Al-Koblan also is replacing already recruited highly skilled and 
experienced foreign staff with inexperienced fresh Saudi graduates available in the 
labour market from skill formation systems including GOTEVT.  The size of this 
market suffers from no shortages of Saudi graduates as they are unemployed in high 
rates, yet it suffers from qualities of their skills, knowledge, work attitudes and 
behaviors toward working environment requiring banks to invest heavily in their 
employment and retraining.  For example, these graduates are not capable of speaking 
English, using computers, thinking creatively, and processing mathematical 
operations.  These basic skills actually are included as early as public education in 
students’ curriculum but executed poorly.  They are not geared toward employment 
requirements. 
 
In fact, the majority of interviewees support the view that the skill formation systems 
including GOTEVT outcomes are not related to their employment and production 
needs and therefore affect their efforts of Saudization.  Al Thumairi, for example, 
illustrates that Saudi university and vocational graduates with the exception of King 
Fahad University for Petroleum and Minerals and the Institute of Public 
Administration lack English and basic computer skills.  Al-Khaldi and Al Shaya also 
agree with Albleihid that Saudi graduates from GOTEVT and other skill formation 
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systems lack English skills and work ethics that are both essential for their businesses.  
These behavioral and work ethic problems are not included in educational, vocational 
and training programs run by GOTEVT or any other skill formation institutions.  
They are even neglected in pre-employment public schooling due to the 
misconception that such behavioral implantation is the responsibility of postsecondary 
education and prior employment vocational training.  This disregard of work ethics 
from both parties is affecting the employment future of Saudis in the private sector.  
Al-Asmari supports the general consensus of private sector interviewees that the poor 
outcomes and incompatibility of knowledge, skills and attitudes provided by skill 
formation systems is the major obstacle encountering Saudization.  He believes that 
business owners and private organizations will continue employing expatriates to 
overcome the shortages in knowledge, skills and attitudes of Saudi graduates as they 
are operating in a free market.   
 
On the same prospect, Al-Eisa confirms that Saudization is hindered by the fact that 
skill formation organizations are still graduating uncompetitive and incompetent 
Saudis who are unattractive for employment in the private sector.  The graduates are 
poorly equipped with technical skills and interpersonal communication competencies 
like English and require reorientation on work behaviors and disciplines.  The skill 
formation organizations, as Al Zaid and Gaith confirm, lack the proactive strategic 
planning approach that synchronizes their products with the Kingdom’s future  
aspiration and development plans such as encouraging international investments and 
the establishment of the country’s Economic Cities to mention a few examples.  The 
latter are projected to create massive employment opportunities for Saudis who are 
supposedly are already being prepared in different skill formation organizations to 
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take over such projects when launched.  However, Al-Eisa confirms that such 
preparation is not yet attained or realized by such systems.    
 
As a result of the government poor strategic planning, Saudization is not yet 
supporting the country’s long-term planning and vision.  In an ideal scenario, they 
should be focusing on specifying the Kingdom’s competitive advantage which should 
determine its long-term HRD planning and practices i.e. Saudization.  At the moment, 
such vision and practices are not yet put into full effect to assist the country to focus 
on major economic products that will put the Kingdom among the industrial 
countries.  Therefore, in the absence of this prerequisite synchronization between 
economic planning and HRD and recruitment requirements, skill formation systems, 
undoubtedly, are planning their objectives and programs outside the interests of the 
labour market.  As a result, they are focusing on skills that are not needed in the 
labour market like memorization while overlooking some essential higher cognitive 
skills like analysis, creativity and relating knowledge to real life cases that are mostly 
required for employment in the private sector.  These systems, in the same way, are 
ignoring educating and training their graduates on interpersonal communication skills 
and attitudes as well as work ethics which, according to Gaith, are as important for 
employment retention in the private sector as having other technical skills and 
knowledge.  
 
Similarly, Al-Qahtani and AlSwailim agree with private sector interviewees that 
implementing Saudization is hindered by a lack of skills, knowledge and attitude 
provided by GOTEVT and other government skill formation bodies.  They are not 
fulfilling the sector’s human resources’ needs.  In addition, AlSwailim explains that 
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education and vocational systems lack accredited vocational standards which are 
essential to measuring and training for competencies required for each profession in 
the labour market.  In the absence of such measures, supply and demand mechanisms 
are disrupted and inoperative resulting in an unsynchronized determination between 
available jobs and their required skills, knowledge and attitudes.  The undeniable 
result will be skill formation systems that are training outside the demand boundaries 
of the market.     
 
Al-Humaid and Al-Ghafees argue that the employment of Saudis in general including 
GOTEVT’s graduates is affected by the ineffective skill mechanisms for supply and 
demand dominating the Saudi labour market.  Private companies are more attracted to 
available, cheap and easy to retain expatriates in different technical areas.  
Simultaneously, they evade Saudi graduates who if recruited would decrease their 
profit advantages as they are more expensive and harder to retain.  They assert that 
GOTEVT’s training is in fact qualifying its graduates according to the needs of the 
market.  They would actually fulfill its employment demands if expatriates 
employment discontinued at least for occupations requiring unskilled and semiskilled 
workers.  Such jobs require less vocational training and low educational qualification 
and could be filled with the majority of the unemployed Saudis of schools’ dropouts.  
 
Needless to say, this whole dilemma was the result of the government’s poor vision in 
the first place as discussed in previous chapters.  They took during the late 1970s the 
easiest alternative by opening the doors for foreign labour importation instead of 
investing in training nationals to build up the country’s infrastructure.  More 
alarmingly, such practices are still continuing as foreign labour force import on the 
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Saudi labour market follows similar decisions by the Ministry of Labour which is 
supervising and protecting the efforts of GOTEVT.  For example, Al-Humaid 
confirms that training produced by GOTEVT is satisfactory to labour market demands 
and that the private sector is looking for cheap foreign labour to maximize their profit 
with less consideration to the country’s economic and social interests.  This argument 
of blaming the private sector has been the general theme by government officials 
since the beginning of this dilemma through different means of the media.  On one 
hand, the government is trying to implement the free economy concept to attract and 
maintain a healthy and competitive private sector; while on the other, they are forcing 
old and rigid employment regulations and polices on the private sector to ease the 
pressure on them from the public who are increasingly unable to find good 
employment opportunities despite graduating from local universities or GOTEVT’s 
institutions.  
                  
As a result GOTEVT and government officials strongly believe that GOTEVT’s 
training programs are not part of the obstacles that are encountering Saudization in the 
private sector.  In fact Al-Ghafees argues the contrary:  GOTEVT’s graduates are not 
finding jobs in the service sector because they are equipped with poor vocational 
skills but rather because of expatriates’ control over its occupations.  However, if this 
claim is accurate, the argument here is that GOTEVT is not studying the market needs 
to establish their training strategies accordingly.  In fact GOTEVT officials are 
claiming that employment is not part of their responsibilities.  GOTEVT is an 
organization responsible for HRD not recruitment which is true according to their 
mission.  Recruitment mission is the responsibility of the labour offices of the 
Ministry of Labour, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry as well as the private 
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sector itself.  However, GOTEVT’s courses and programs are not designed according 
to the labour market demand of skills, which was shown conclusively by empirical 
data in this study.  For this reason, GOTEVT is not even achieving its core mission of 
coordinating with the sector it is serving to fulfill the needs and requirements for 
qualified Saudi human resources that could Saudize their labour forces. Instead, they 
are continuing in graduating skills that are already overloaded with cheap foreign 
labour that a Saudi cannot even compete with. 
 
Earlier arguments regarding ineffective skill supply and demand in the labour market 
by government officials, Al-Humaid and Al-Ghafees, is valid as one of the dilemmas 
affecting the employment market and Saudization.  However, Al-Humaid and Al-
Ghafees give less significance to the established empirical evidence by the private 
sector interviewees of GOTEVT’s incompatible vocational training with the private 
sectors’ demands of skills, knowledge and attitudes.  In other words, such 
mechanisms even if rectified would not guarantee quality GOTEVT graduates that are 
trained according to each industry’s needs and employment standards.  GOTEVT with 
its massive resources, according to private managers interviewed, will never be able 
to fulfill different, increasing and changing demands of different industries in the 
private sector.  Their views confirm that GOTEVT’s existing programs are not 
developing intellectual abilities and behaviors that motivate continuous learning and 
development.  GOTEVT, as indicated by Al-Eisa and others, is unable to provide well 
rounded professional individuals who can interact and learn from the surrounding 
business practices.  This could be a direct result of GOTEVT’s admission standards, 
as indicated by a number of managers.  It is accepting lower secondary school 
performers and dropouts who have already learning and interacting problems.  
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GOTEVT was never the Saudis’ first choice for postsecondary degree education 
unless they cannot enroll in universities.     
 
Empirical data provided by the private managers in this study illustrates that 
Saudization is also hindered by bureaucratic practices and lack of coordination 
between different government bodies.  Saudization according to Al Zaid is challenged 
by lack of constructive coordination between different human resources management, 
development and recruitment bodies in the country including the private sector.  Al-
Eisa also illustrates that the government decisions and regulations for this strategy are 
sometimes based on reactions from government officials to related issues or statistics 
raised in the media.  They are also sometimes issued by entities that are not related 
directly to Saudization such as the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Interior, the 
Ministry of Civil Services, the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Trade, GOTEVT, 
and the Chambers of Commerce and Industry just to mention few.  Both approaches 
have failed to achieve Saudization.  Examples of the former are evident in the 
government approach to Saudize complete sectors which is considered a reaction for 
public and government pressure that has failed in the vegetable and gold market as 
well as in the taxicab industry.  These decisions have created a counter reaction of 
illegal practices that created an illegal labour market where people working in 
different professions than what their employment contracts and work permits 
stipulate.  The decisions of those government bodies, undoubtedly stem from the 
country’s core belief that Saudization is an indispensable national strategy that will 
benefit its people although they are not complementing each other as coordination 
among these entities is not yet proven to be accomplished.  As one would expect the 
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results are unsynchronized interpretations, interventions and solutions for an already 
multidimensional complex dilemma like Saudization. 
 
For example, Saudization for Gaith is challenged by the strategy itself overburdening 
managers of private organizations’ abilities to dismiss a Saudi employee with ease.  
The Ministry of Labour through the Saudization implementation mechanisms is 
overprotecting Saudi employees from dismissal if any employee is found unfit for 
private organizations’ needs.  This overprotection is viewed by managers of the 
private organizations as a hurdle affecting their human resource management 
practices and their struggle for productivity and profitability.  On the other hand, it is 
viewed by the government as an indispensable procedure to limit the unjustified 
dismissal of Saudis by private organizations as unemployment rates disrupt the 
country’s economy, social structure, and even security just to mention a few.  This is 
based on the general perception of government officials, interviewed in this study, 
that private organizations seek alternatives approaches or justification to evade 
recruiting Saudis.  Therefore, the government is playing the ‘big brother’ role to retain 
the employment order in the labour market through toughening dismissing Saudi 
employees even if not supporting the organization’s production and performance. 
 
Consequently, the Ministry of Labour, for example, is considered by a number of 
private interviewees to not be sustaining the side it is supposed to serve i.e. the private 
sector.  On the contrary, the general belief is that it is standing against the interests of 
the Saudi private market through its unproductive long-standing bureaucratic 
practices that does not match the modernity of the private sector.  Albleihid also 
confirms that the Ministry is not listening to private sector’s Saudization side of the 
 286 
story.  To be precise, he believes that Saudization is hindered by the Ministry’s old 
registration policy for Saudization quotas imposed over different industries with less 
realization of each industry’s needs of skills.  These quota are disrupting 
organizations’ performance as the Ministry is known for its regular quotas’ changing 
in response to pressure from private organizations’ leaders who complain of shortages 
of skilful Saudis to Saudize their jobs.  Such procedures convey an uncertainty by the 
Ministry of the seriousness in implementing Saudization in different industries.  Clear 
examples of such practices were well documented in the media when the Ministry 
kept changing deadlines and percentages for Saudizing construction companies, 
taxicab industries as well as travel agencies, which until the date of this research, are 
not complying with their Saudization percentages.  
 
Moreover, private manager interviewees blame the Ministry for not imposing clear 
laws and regulation to ensure the retaining of Saudi employees after private 
organizations invest in their development and recruitment.  Such a dilemma is 
becoming the general practice dominating employment in the labour market as 
organizations suffer from headhunting of their experienced and invested in Saudis.  
Such practice is influencing Saudization efforts of private organizations.  For 
example, Al Khwaiter agrees with Albleihid that private companies suffer from head 
hunting practices by other newly formed or even existing organizations that are 
willing to double or even triple their employees’ salaries.  These organizations are 
looking for already trained and experienced employees because of their scarcity in the 
labour market.  This employment mechanism creates, on one hand, an unbalanced 
labour market as organizations compete on a small pool of skilful Saudis who are 
welling to move from one organization to another with less regard to their contracts 
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and with less assurance to some employers who are willing to invest in their career 
development.  On the other hand, it stimulates and reinforces undesirable instable 
employment habits in the Saudi workforce.  It discourages employers from recruiting 
Saudis in the first place and look to employ more stable expatriates.  Along these 
lines, employment contracts do not guarantee continuation of Saudi employees in the 
private sector which signifies shortcomings in the employment laws and regulations 
practiced by the Ministry of Labour.  Al-Malki supports similar conclusion which is 
affecting companies’ return on investment from developing the hard to retain Saudis.  
On the contrary, expatriates are obliged to continue with their present employers as 
they hold their passports and work residence licenses known as Iqama.  If for any 
reason they decide to resign or their contract were terminated, they will have to leave 
the country. 
 
• Saudi Attitudes to Work in the Private Sector  
 
As illustrated by the literature and confirmed by empirical data, Saudization is also 
hindered by Saudis’ attitudes to work in the private sector especially in small-to-
medium size organizations.  Saudis, in general, prefer working in government, 
quasigovernment or large private organizations.  They also expect office employment 
with high salaries rather than manual and service careers which are the majority of 
available jobs in the labour market according to Al-Zehairi.    These jobs score low on 
the preferred employment scale for Saudis unless in the government, 
quasigovernment or big private organizations which all have limitations in their 
employment capacities.  Since the early development days of the private labour 
market in the country, these jobs are looked at as expatriates’ jobs.  This created 
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segregations in the labour market that was reinforced by the rapid wealth and 
economic growth the country witnessed suddenly after the discovery of its oil.   
 
Saudi expectations of high salaries and office employment are encouraged, first, by 
comparing government employment to the private one and, second, by the misleading 
Saudization strategy creating the view that Saudi employment is a national right for 
every citizen.  The latter in particular should be true but is not on the basis of 
equitable competition on skills, knowledge and attitude among employment 
candidates to employ the most competent for jobs’ requirements.  This competency 
and behavioral based employment was rarely the standard for employment in the 
government since the beginning.  For Saudis, government jobs guarantee life-long 
employment with less performance demanding environment.  This employment 
provides progressive annual salary increase and career promotion that are 
hypothetically linked to performance and discipline.  More importantly, it provides 
the individual with the respected social status and self-worthiness even with low 
salaries as concluded by Al-Zehairi.  
 
As a result, throughout these years Saudis were employed by government while 
expatriates mostly from less wealthy and underdeveloped countries were employed in 
private jobs.  This snowball-like dilemma of employment segregation creates 
unbalanced employment and dual labour markets.  It was not an issue and was rarely 
discussed in the literature at times when the country’s economy was booming because 
of high oil prices and when government employment was widely available for Saudis 
in the 1970s and late 1980s.  Accordingly, it also produced a new generation, as 
indicated by Al Ammash, who do not value nor realize the importance of work as the 
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country is served by cheap expatriates from less prosperous countries.  In addition, 
there have not been serious attempts by skill formation curriculums to change this 
paradigm and implant important work values and ethics.  The society was slow to 
realize the importance of work in the private sector especially with oil prices 
fluctuating to affect the country’s economy.  Economic growth became relatively 
unpredictable depending on the oil market supply and demand.  Government 
employment has reached its peak since early 90’s.  Not only that but also population 
growth rates have escalated to be among the highest in the world crating massive 
demands for employment in the country’s unbalanced labour market in which Saudis 
still unrealistically believe that they should be government employees.  Therefore, 
lack of Saudization for Al-Humaid who also supports the conclusions of the 8th 
Development Plan is the result of the imbalance in occupational structure.  Saudis 
insist on employment in already overstaffed government jobs and resist employment 
in the main employer in the market i.e. the private sector.   
 
Al-Zehairi confirms that Saudis prefer employment in the government because they 
cannot fulfill the private sector performance requirements.  They do not have the 
needed skills, knowledge and attitude essentials for competitiveness and job security 
in the sector.  Indisputably, this is associated with poor employment and human 
resource practices by small-to-medium organizations.  This, in fact, is enforcing the 
widely held views in the society that private sector employment provides less job 
security and uncertain career development and promotion plans for Saudis than the 
government.  Employment in the latter might provide a job security for life, as an 
employee cannot be dismissed unless committing a criminal act or being absent for 
more than 15 successive days in one year.  Yet more importantly it is more attractive 
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for employment than a private sector because it is not as performance demanding as 
the private work environment.  The latter requires skills, knowledge and attitudes as 
well as the self-motivation and commitment to work which Saudi graduates of 
different skill formation systems have not yet proven to acquire and seize.   
 
For example, Al Turaigi argues that even though his company’s management and 
shareholders believe in Saudization and recruit Saudis on a large scale, they are 
struggling with their attitude toward work and the workplace.  Saudis especially in the 
entry level have no work disciplines such as punctuality to working hours, 
respectfulness of coworkers and superiors, as well as respectfulness and compliance 
with their employment contracts.  The latter in particular is producing a major 
behavioral employment dilemma of high turn over rates among Saudis which is 
discouraging Saudization as viewed by the majority of interviewed private managers.    
 
Al-Qahtani and AlSwailim confirm that Saudis’ high turnovers and negative attitudes 
to work in private organizations are affecting the recruitment and development of 
Saudis and therefore damaging the Saudization strategy as a whole.  Empirical 
evidence by Al Thumairi illustrates similar conclusion that the private sector are 
evading Saudization because of Saudis attitudes for certain jobs in the private sector 
resulting in their high turnover.   These jobs include labour and field professions 
which require dealing with heavy equipments and demand changing ones’ social 
pattern to work early morning shifts and long hours.  He explains that his company 
cannot provide attractive career development plans for such low level Saudi job 
holders as they do not have the progressive potential for middle or higher positions in 
his organization.  Moreover, employees of such levels will eventually leave the 
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organization for any slight increase in their pay which in the short-term benefits these 
job holders yet in the long-term damages the Saudization strategy.  Therefore, private 
organizations will be hesitant to recruit Saudis as they have developed the reputation 
and attitudes for being unstable in their jobs that are encouraged by the ineffective 
Ministry of Labour employment laws and regulations.  Instead and to maintain their 
competitive advantage and to keep their businesses running, these organizations will 
never depend on such unreliable manpower and will seek expatriates’ employment as 
they are easily controlled, cheaper and skillful. 
 
AlSai also agrees that Saudi employees’ turnover is the biggest challenge they are 
facing in the course of implementing Saudization. Similar to Al-Khaldi view, AlSai 
considers Saudis to be still influenced by the long-lasting wealthy lifestyles.  
Therefore, they are reluctant to accept initial employment salaries of SR. 3000 or SR. 
4000 which is considered reasonable for someone with only secondary diploma 
qualification or a school dropout.  Ironically, such a salary will be accepted if it was 
offered by for any government employment yet it is considered low if offered by a 
private organization.  Understandably, the latter will have longer working hours, 
fewer vacations, and more importantly challenging and performance demanding 
working environment; at the same time, arguably, it will also have more development 
opportunities and pay schemes linked to performance as well as hands-on 
experiences.   
 
In brief, the negative attitudes resulting in high turnover dilemma is negatively 
affecting the employee-employer relationships and overshadowing their employment 
practices.  The employer in this case cannot trust employing a Saudi and investing in 
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his development and promotion as he will not maintain his employment contract.  On 
the other case, the Saudi employee cannot work with the same financial rewards and 
salaries as the expatriates, especially with the living expenses in the country are 
hitting the roof.  Saudis’ false expectations of salary bench marks are based on 
government salaries’ while salary norms in the private sector, especially in small-to-
medium organizations, are set by cheap expatriates.  This creates huge deviation 
between what is expected by Saudi employees and what is actually offered by 
employers.  However, if skill formation systems were to align their outcomes with the 
needs of the labour market, this would cut the cost of retraining graduates from these 
systems.  This in the long run will eventually increase the employment attractiveness 
and vocationalism of the Saudi labour force in the private sector.    
 
To sum up, this section of discussion attempts to fulfill one of the research specific 
objectives regarding the obstacles encountering Saudization as viewed by different 
interviewed managers.  Findings of the empirical data reveal and confirm the fact that 
the Saudization dilemma in Saudi Arabia is a multidimensional national problem that 
requires multilevel solutions.  It is not and will never be the responsibility of a single 
government body or the accountability of the private sector alone.  However, if skill 
formation systems as well as recruitment strategies persist, this dilemma will worsen 
as the country is witnessing massive and rapid economic development that will indeed 
require enormous supplies of skillful human resources.  In the worst case, these high 
demands on human resources will only be covered from the ready to work expatriates 
from different Asian and Arab countries taking the country back to square one of the 
late 1970s when high rates of unemployment among Saudis emerged.  However, this 
time it is going to be even worse as Saudi Arabia already has high rates of 
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unemployment that are increasing every year and millions of expatriates that are 
flooding the country’s labour market annually.   
 
Answers of the interviewees tend to follow similar patterns depending on whether 
they are from the government, the quasigovernment or the private organizations.  The 
government and quasigovernment interviewees see the private sector as not paying 
enough salaries to Saudis to keep them and therefore increase their Saudization 
percentages.  They believe that private sector organizations mainly small-to-medium 
ones are attempting any possible tactic to evade employing Saudis as they aim to 
increase their profits with less regard to the interests of the country.  GOTEVT’s 
officials, in particular, consider GOTEVT as not part of the obstacles for Saudization 
and that their graduates are well trained and up to the employment requirements of the 
labour market.  They claim that the responsibility of employment is not among their 
missions as they are only responsible for the HRD.   
 
Quasigovernment managers, in particular, view that Saudization is hindered by 
ineffective selection for recruitment methods implemented in Saudi Arabia.  In 
addition, they think that the Saudi negative social attitudes associated with vocational 
and manual profession in the private labour market is a hindering Saudization. 
 
On the other hand, there is a general agreement among interviewees from the private 
organizations that skill formation organizations including GOTEVT as well as the 
Ministry of Labour are not listening nor fulfilling their needs and demands for 
qualified human resources.  The former are producing unemployable skills and 
attitudes as they are still focusing on humanitarian majors and overlooking the most 
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needed technical and scientific studies.  Simultaneously, the latter is imposing 
outdated and restrictive recruitment regulations and procedures for Saudization that 
are affecting the private sector economic activities.  Private managers interviewed 
confirm that Saudi government organizations in general are not capable of coping 
with the rapid changes in the private business environment and are pulling them back 
and discouraging their competitive advantage in Saudi as well as in the international 
markets.          
 
There is unanimous agreement among interviewees from different private 
organizations that graduates of Saudi skill formation systems including GOTEVT are 
not up to their work requirements and recruitment standards.  Their interpersonal 
communication, work ethics and even technical skills are undoubtedly weak and 
unemployable compared to the efforts and money spent on them by different skill 
formation institutes.  Therefore, further retraining on and off-the-job is required 
resulting in money, time and effort wastefulness for private organizations.  In addition 
to this expensive reorientation investment, there are no employment laws that 
guarantee Saudi graduates continuation with their employers as they tend to move 
from one private organization to another following the slightest increase in their 
salaries with less considerations of their employment contracts.  On the other hand, 
foreign employees are skilful, hard working and easy to retain as employers hold their 
passports and their work sponsorship.  Unlike the government managers’ claim, 
interviewees from the private sector confirm that they are willing to pay higher 
salaries to Saudis who are able to perform and compete with the expatriates. 
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Private sector interviewees conclude that Saudis prefer employment in the 
government as they have less emphasis on performance and guaranteed employment 
for life even if their salaries are not as high as some of the private organizations.  
Some interviewees relate such a preference to society’s negative view resulting from 
the country’s intensive employment of Saudis in the government while expatriates in 
the private sector creating dual employment markets following the transitory 
economic growth the country witnessed in the 1970s.  They believe, in general, that 
their labour market employment practices are spoiled by the employment practices 
and work environment culture implemented in government organizations as Saudi 
employees are granted lifelong employment regardless of their performance or 
disciplines.  This accordingly created negative perceptions and attitudes to work in the 
private labour market.      
 
Interviewed private sector managers consider the Saudization program as a noble 
national effort that has to be implemented provided that they have the well trained and 
committed Saudis as well as the supportive government employment mechanisms.  To 
achieve the former, a number of private sectors are acting constructively and 
considering establishing their own training institutions to retrain young Saudis and 
bridge the skills’ gap to fulfil their immediate line of businesses’ needs and to support 
their industry as a whole.    
 
Saudization is seen as a national vision and priority among all interviewed managers.  
However, it seems to lack coherent practical mechanisms and cooperation for its 
effective implementation and evaluation especially among responsible human 
resource government bodies i.e. Ministry of Labour, GOTEVT, HRDF and other skill 
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formation systems.  In the absence of those mechanisms and cooperation, the private 
sector cannot interrupt its production and competition for the government bodies to 
sort themselves out in such a challenging and seriously competitive markets that 
Saudi Arabia and the region as a whole are witnessing.  So, the easiest choice for 
private sector organizations is to look for foreign labour recruitment to run their 
production while slowly implementing Saudization, a long-lasting and ineffective 
national strategy.   
 
7.4 Successful Saudization in Some Private Sector Firms 
 
This part of the discussion focuses on successful Saudization implementations in 
some private organizations.  Interviews with managers in relation with relevant 
literature assist in understanding the factors that led to their successes while many 
others have failed.  The importance of studying such factors enhances the 
understanding of their effective visions and managerial practices that are developed in 
the Saudi context to solve a Saudi labour market dilemma.  These visions and 
practices could assist the ineffective Saudization implementations in other private 
organizations by adopting similar approaches.  To put it differently, these successful 
practices can establish long-term remedies for a national problem that is uniquely 
persistent in the Saudi labour market. 
 
Empirical data confirm that successful implementation of Saudization requires top 
management belief and supporting human resource management systems.  
Undoubtedly, both requirements are consistent with organization size.  They are 
available in large organizations while ineffectual in small-to-medium ones which are, 
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as mentioned earlier, looking for short-term profit that can be achieved via recruiting 
expatriates not Saudis.  Nevertheless, regardless of organization size or management 
belief, skill formation systems in the country are not supporting neither especially 
with their incompatible outcomes of skills, knowledge and attitudes.  
 
Managers interviewed confirm the earlier discussion in the literature that 
quasigovernment and large private organizations are more capable of achieving 
Saudization.  In these organizations, top management belief is, usually, the key behind 
the successful implementing of Saudization.  Top management, as confirmed by the 
private manager interviewees, cascades and translates such belief into immense 
investments in Saudis’ HRD and recruitment in their organizations.  They invest in 
attracting and developing Saudis according to their industry needs to overcome the 
poor qualification of skill formation systems including GOTEVT.  They also establish 
attractive retention and compensation systems to retain their high performing Saudis 
who usually get headhunted by other large organizations in the labour market.   
 
These proper human resource management practices for both recruitment companies’ 
managers, Al Ammash and Al-Zehairi, are the key to successful Saudization.  This is 
achieved through establishing attractive recruitment promotions where candidates are 
clear about their compensation benefits, career development plans as well as their 
employment future.  Al-Zehairi in particular illustrates examples from companies he 
provided recruitment services to in which Saudis become ambitious and distinguished 
performers.  They even become managers receiving more than triple their starting 
salaries within five years.  Al Ammash believes such proper practices guarantee 
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employment attractiveness to private companies even if they provide low salaries at 
the start of their employment.   
 
Supporting this argument, Al Zaid also believes that Saudization success in the 
banking sector, and other quasigovernment organizations are the result of their 
advanced work environments, attractive salaries and clear employment futures.  These 
sectors due to their huge revenues are, as he confirms, capable of providing focused 
training and invest in developing their employees.  Therefore, they become the 
primary preference for employment among Saudis over even government 
employment.  Moreover, these industries are also benefiting from their joint ventures 
with international businesses.  These ventures provide them with the latest 
management experiences that may not be available to other non-international joint 
businesses in the Kingdom.  
 
Examples for successful Saudization in some quasigovernment organizations such as 
the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) and SABIC confirm the importance of top 
management belief in Saudization to support investing in its implementation.  Al-
Shagawi from the SEC supports that their Saudization starts from the belief of their 
organizations’ leaders.  Therefore, they established a human resource management 
system that attracts potential Saudis with adequate salaries and compensation schemes 
that are linked to individual’s performance and development plans.  Then they invest 
in retraining the selected Saudi employees in the company’s training center which 
provides focused development programs linked to their production and performance 
needs.  Similarly SABIC, as confirmed by Al-Bat’hi, has accomplished its 
Saudization through considering the Saudization strategy to be their strategic 
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objective.  The company attracts potential Saudi employees from different regions in 
the Kingdom by offering them good future employment opportunities.  These include 
excellent salaries and compensation systems as well as clear career development 
plans.  The latter entails HRD programs customized to SABIC’s industrial and 
production needs in the company’s Jubail and Yanbu Industrial Colleges.  These 
colleges are established to bridge the shortages in quality and quantity of qualified 
Saudis to support employment in SABIC and other similar private industries.  Both 
colleges, as indicated by a number of interviewees, produce distinguished technical 
graduates equipped with good English, interpersonal communication and computer 
skills.  They are highly competed in the labour market as Al-Humaid from the 
Minister of Labour indicates.   
 
Implementing a similar approach, Al Khwaiter from Advanced Electronics Company 
(AEC) asserts that their Saudization started before the government’s initiatives in the 
1990s as it represented their top management belief.  As a result, they are 73% to 80% 
Saudized especially in their technical jobs where the majority of private industries in 
the Kingdom lack Saudization.  According to Al Khwaiter, the company has 
accomplished these high percentages through their intensive job related training to 
preset performance standards.  AEC also provides its employees with an attractive 
working environment via attractive compensation and highly motivating work 
conditions regardless whether they are Saudis or expatriates.  They also have 
succession plans to retain their employees although they suffer from continuous 
headhunting from other industries for their well disciplined and high performing 
employees.   
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Al-Ghafees from GOTEVT also supports the view that private organizations that 
provide clear career development plans are more likely to be successful in their 
Saudization.  These development plans in order to be effective should include on-the-
job training in their area of specializations.   
 
For the three managers interviewed from the banking sector Saudization is becoming 
among the main objectives for their Board of Directors which they believe to be the 
reason for banks’ high rates of Saudization.  Al-Rwaily, for example, asserts that the 
Board of Riyad Bank is impelling the accomplishment of Saudization by 
implementing different supportive mechanisms.  These include attracting university 
graduates and enrolling them into the bank’s intensive training program that integrates 
formal class training with on-the-job training.  The bank also revises its salary scale 
and compensation schemes in accordance with similar organizations in the market and 
makes all necessary adjustments to ensure its competitiveness and attractiveness.  In 
addition, Riyad Bank implements a periodical follow-up on the achievement of 
Saudization plans. 
 
The supportive mechanisms for Al-Koblan from Arab National Bank also include 
establishing achievable Saudization percentages every year.  They also offer 
competitive salaries, career development programs, and attractive compensation and 
benefits allowances including low-interest housing loans and financial participation 
for their employees.  They also run a very challenging work environment that 
contributes to individual’s learning and excelling.  Al-Koblan also asserts that the 
banking sector is benefiting from the government Institute of Banking programs as it 
 301 
is capable of adapting to the rapid changes in the banking business through providing 
cutting-edge courses and tailor-made programs. 
 
Similarly, Saudization in the National Commercial Bank as Sabban asserts has 
became more effective because of their advanced human resource practices.  Their 
human resource department, for example, is acting as a business unit to serve other 
business units in the bank with human resources products.  Therefore, it attracts and 
filters potential candidates according to their English and computer skills then enrolls 
them into a six months focused training programs to promote them to other divisions 
in the bank.  These businesslike practices compel the HR Department to ensure that 
the process of attracting, selecting, training and promoting potential Saudi employees 
has to be precise from the start.   
 
The banking industry in Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been shaped to implement the 
most advanced human resource management practices among all other industries.  
Interviewees in this study as well as the available literature on management practices 
in the country especially on human resource management support this conclusion.  
This can be attributed to the sector’s financial strength that enables them to attract and 
invest in developing their human capital in all banking and business areas including 
human resource management.  Simultaneously, the sector was capable of establishing 
very advanced human resource supporting systems that enabled them to utilize their 
human assets to generate financial and managerial success including leading other 
sectors in implementing Saudization.  Accordingly, Al-Eisa and Al Zaid banks are 
producing attractive organizational environments accompanied with advanced human 
resource management practices that are resulting in high Saudization percentages.  
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Also, they are becoming the source that provides other new competitor in the labour 
market with qualified and well disciplined Saudi employees as they are frequently 
headhunted.   
 
Although one might expect that the strong headhunting practices over the banking 
sector would eventually harm the sector’s business operations the sector, according to 
AlWagdani, is capable of recovering from employee turnover.  Banks are financially 
and managerially capable of retraining and re-qualifying Saudis with needed skills, 
knowledge and attitudes for jobs in private organizations and therefore increasing 
their Saudization.  They are, as Gaith indicates, playing a major role in attracting and 
retraining graduates of skill formation systems to produce quality and employable 
nationals as they invest heavily in developing their employees.  Therefore, banks are 
becoming the primary preference for employment among Saudis who are seeking 
further career development and attractive human resource management practices.  The 
banks’ employment and development approaches, in fact, are becoming employment 
attractive tools that distinguish management philosophy and organization maturity in 
the labour market.  This maturity looks beyond merely satisfying the Saudization 
requirement to investing in developing a quality national manpower that is capable of 
understanding and practicing competitive employment.  
 
Empirical data also introduce other government interventions that assist private 
organizations to achieve Saudization.  Al Thumairi confirms that Saudization in the 
private sector has progressed as a strategy, partially, because of the government’s 
quota for Saudization.  This obliges each industry to achieve gradual and steady 
Saudization percentages among their human resources.  Al-Qahtani also asserts that 
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Saudization has proven to be successful in some private organization due to 
government pressures and rigorous follow-ups by different government agencies 
including the Ministry of Labour and SAMA for the banking sector.  Accordingly, Al 
Zaid supports AlWagdani’s view that the government represented by SAMA is 
contributing to the success of Saudization in the banking sector.   
 
The government also provides training that leads to employment through the HRD 
Fund to encourage private organizations to Saudize their manpower.  This Fund has 
assisted, for example, M. Al Hokair and Son Group's efforts in Saudizing their human 
resources, as AlSai indicates.  It provides them with Saudi trainees/recruits to receive 
on-the-job training for two years that leads to their recruitment in the Group.  The 
Fund during this period pays half of their salaries as well as the cost of their formal 
class training if required. 
 
In conclusion and satisfying one of the study’s specific objectives, interviewees agree 
on some factors that have lead to success in implementing Saudization in some 
private and quasigovernment organizations.  Some even went further to consider 
generalizing such factors on other organizations in the labour market to enhance the 
Saudization implementation which, till the date of collecting this data, has proven to 
be a struggle for the majority of private organizations.  In general, interviewees’ 
responses tend to agree on the priority of top management belief in the importance 
and urgency of Saudization strategy for its success.  This priority as the interviews 
revealed is the core for the success of other factors.  These factors include the 
investment in establishing proper human resource management practices that start 
with the right employment promotions, scientific selection and recruitment 
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approaches, attractive career development plans and appealing compensation and 
benefit schemes.  The emphasis among the interviewees, however, is on providing 
clear career development plans as well as focused and job related HRD programs for 
Saudis.  A number of interviewees believe that the success of a number of 
organizations in achieving Saudization can be attributed to their managerial 
advancements and stability as well as their financial strength.   
 
A number of the interviewed managers in this study emphasize the role of the 
government in encouraging Saudization by its rigorous monitoring and by providing 
financial support for training that leads to employment programs through the HRD 
Fund.  A Few managers, on the other hand, criticize the government's efforts and 
consider their bureaucratic contributions toward the achievement of Saudization to 
negatively affect its successful implementation.  They believe that the success of 
Saudization is in fact the result of individual organization’s efforts of believing in 
Saudization and therefore investing profoundly in developing their human resource 
management systems as well as retraining new Saudi recruits.  They believe that the 
government labour regulations accompanied by mismatched outcomes of skill 
formation systems with the market demands are not assisting their Saudization efforts.  
Therefore, the quality of Saudization is and will continue to be in jeopardy as long as 
the country’s skill formation systems persist in overlooking the labour market’s 
employment needs in their curriculums.    
 
The present picture of skill formation outcomes in the country, according to empirical 
data, is not very promising as the pool for skilful Saudi workers is still small and 
shrinking rapidly.  Companies are competing through headhunting the few skilful 
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workers and therefore escalating their salaries and employment demands.  Such 
headhunting practices are, in fact, stimulating and reinforcing a culture of employees’ 
lack of stability in the labour market which is negatively affecting organizations’ 
long-term business planning and investments as well as Saudization.  The moment a 
skillful Saudi worker becomes well developed and experienced in any industrial 
sector, other companies start their competitive headhunting for his employment 
especially for middle and top management positions.  Employee rotation inside the 
labour market is an established practice in any business environment.  However, such 
a practice in Saudi Arabia is distinctive as the skill formation systems are not yet 
capable of supporting the employment shortages resulting from rapid movement of 
skillful workers to larger private and quasigovernment organizations.  As a result, 
small-to-medium sized organizations are becoming less attractive for the employment 
of skilful Saudis who expect high salaries and attractive employment benefits that are 
not always available to the less profitable segment of Saudi industry in comparison to 
the larger organizations. 
 
7.5 Hendry’s Framework and Skill Formation by Saudi Private 
Organizations  
 
This part of the Chapter focuses on Hendry’s (1991) framework to understand the 
forces that drive, stabilize, and/or inhibit HRD in the Saudi private organizations.  
This discussion incorporates assessing the relevance of such forces to a different 
labour market such as the Saudi with its unique employment practices.  The study 
utilizes the framework to examine the Saudi private organizations’ perceptions and 
practices regarding HRD as a continuous investment in Saudi manpower even after 
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achieving high rates in Saudization.  The desirable conclusion of this discussion is to 
reinforce the driving and stabilizing factors that assist Saudization and long-term 
investment in developing Saudis.  At the same time, the discussion aims at 
understanding the inhibiting factors of viewing training from a HRD investment 
perspective in Saudi employees. 
 
By assessing Hendry’s factors against the empirical findings of this study, some 
practices and approaches in Saudi private organizations tend to be congruent with 
Hendry’s factors while others are unaccounted for by the Model.    Such variation is 
expected and consequential of evaluating such a model in a different labour market 
like the Saudi with its complex structure, internal and external employment factors, 
and its culture.   
 
7.5.1 The Driving and Stabilizing Factors in Saudi Private Organizations 
 
The driving and stabilizing factors in Saudi private organizations as evolved from the 
empirical data include Saudization, organization size, top management commitment 
and belief in addition to government grants for training leading to employment.  
These factors stimulate and support the efforts of Saudi private organizations to invest 
in training as a long-term HRD organizational approach even after achieving 
Saudization.  
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• Saudization  
 
The Saudization strategy is a new element to Hendry’s model to reflect the Saudi 
context.  As illustrated earlier in the literature chapter, Saudization is becoming a 
major underlying driving and stabilizing force for investing in training in Saudi 
private organizations.  In fact in this context, it is as urgent and important as the 
model’s original core driving and stabilizing factors which stimulate investing in 
training as a response to competitive pressure and evolving business needs.  In other 
words, long-term investment in developing and employing Saudis to replace 
expatriates have become a national objective that is dominating private industry 
training and employment strategies and practices in Saudi Arabia.  This government 
strategy enforced by the Ministry of Labour is becoming the country’s most urgent 
strategy as unemployment among Saudi graduates is increasing annually while private 
organizations are employing millions of expatriates.  Therefore, the government is 
imposing annual quotas for Saudization to be achieved by private organizations that 
are reinforced by strict follow-ups and government penalties on private organizations 
evading its implementation.  At the same time, it is providing private industries with 
government funds to encourage their efforts to train for Saudization.   
 
In the banking sector, for example, Saudization strategy as a driving and stabilizing 
factor facilitates viewing and practicing training as a long-term investment in the 
Saudi human resources.  Saudization has been an organizational strategic priority to 
plan for and implement.  Consequently, the sector has achieved high Saudization rates 
reaching 80% to 90% while continuing to invest in the development of the national 
human resources.  The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the supervising 
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and regulatory government body for the banking sector, was determined since the 
1980s to increase Saudization in the banking sector in a progressive approach to 
maintain the country’s financial stability.  AlWagdani from the Institute of Banking 
confirms that SAMA implements rigorous mechanisms to ensure achieving 
Saudization in the banking sector.   
 
AlWagdani’s argument is supported by an official Report obtained from SAMA’s 
Banking Inspection Department on 23rd of May, 2004 describing SAMA’s efforts in 
achieving Saudization in the sector.  The Report illustrates that SAMA conveyed to 
all banks in the country its intention and vision to gradually Saudize their supervisory, 
technical as well as administrative jobs.  To do so, SAMA first established the 
Banking Inspection Department to closely supervise and evaluate Saudization efforts 
in each bank.  The Department examines their employment strategies, HRD programs, 
compensation and benefit programs as well as their job rotations.  For this reason, 
SAMA also established the Institute of Banking to closely assist banks in their HRD 
and Saudization implementation by providing industry-led HRD programs.  The 
Institute, according to AlWagdani, provides customized development and training 
programs that are devoted to the needs of the Saudi banking industry.  Therefore, the 
institute, although it is affiliated to a government body i.e. SAMA, is not hindered by 
the government bureaucracies and is responsive and flexible to the needs of the 
banking industry to invest in the development of Saudis.        
 
According to the same Report, the Banking Inspection Department, on the operational 
level, conducts regular filed inspections including scrutiny of the bank’s human 
resources management documentations.  In addition, on the strategic level, the 
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Department dictates the different banks to regularly include Saudization issues in the 
agendas of their board of directors meetings.  SAMA also imposes terms and 
conditions on agreements with some of the Saudi banks which have partnerships with 
foreign franchises to ensure transferring the knowledge and expertise to Saudis.  
Furthermore, SAMA through the Banking Inspection Department closely inspects 
banks’ outsourcing activities for certain technical or administrative jobs to ensure the 
recruitment of Saudi human resources.  SAMA usually encourages banks wishing to 
outsource some of their services to contract companies providing mainly a Saudi 
workforce.  For example, every six months the Department requests from banks their 
outsourced jobs information including employees’ names, nationalities, and dates of 
recruitment to ensure that banks are not manipulating their Saudization 
implementation.   
 
Therefore, interviewed private managers from the banking sector confirm that training 
cost is not an issue when investing in developing and employing qualified Saudis to 
achieve quality Saudization.  This HRD philosophy is very much expected from this 
financially growing industry.  In fact, Al-Rwaily and Al-Koblan from Riyad and Arab 
National Banks respectively, support some of the factors from Hendry’s model.  They 
confirm that evolving business requirements, changes in technology and job 
regulations including Saudization requirements are the main drivers to invest in 
developing their national human resources.  These investments for the National 
Commercial Bank, as Sabban indicates, are usually stabilized and supported by the 
availability of industry-led training programs nationally or internationally.  In reality, 
such investments, like any other investment, are always conditioned by their return on 
the overall corporate capital.  In the case of Riyadh Bank such investment, besides 
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developing potential human resources, assesses employment suitability of new Saudi 
entrants to the Bank.  Their conservative employment approach recruits Saudis for a 
trial period of three to six months to measure their skills, knowledge and attitudes on-
the-job in accordance to the Bank’s needs and employment standards.  The Bank 
adopted such an approach to overcome the high employee turnover inhibiting factor 
that is evolving as an employment concern in the Saudi private labour market which 
will be discussed below.  Similarly, in the Arab National Bank investing in 
developing Saudi human resource supports the banks’ strategy of developing and 
retaining the Bank's high potential and future business leaders.   
 
Both cases illustrate that banks like all large organizations are utilizing the long-term 
investment in HRD accompanied by clear career development plans and 
compensation benefits to retain the most talented and experienced Saudis.  In doing 
so, they also plan to attract new Saudi talents as these private organizations endure 
aggressive headhunting by other large organizations for their high achieving Saudi 
employees.  This is becoming the general practice as other large organizations realize 
that banks invest in developing their staffs to the highest standards and implement the 
best human resource practices in their working environment compared to other 
industries in the Kingdom. Banks produce high achieving personnel that are attractive 
for other big organizations compelling banks to even triple their employees’ salaries 
and invest heavily in their development to retain them.   
 
In fact, such investments are reflecting a stabilizing factor according to Hendry’s 
long-term investment in HRD approach.  Banks’ efforts are congruent with Hendry’s 
findings which advocate that organizations invest in training as a strategic 
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organizational approach to improve their internal labour market recruitment, retention 
and promotion plans.  Such an approach drives and stabilizes investing in training as 
HRD organizational objective to Saudize and retain its Saudi employees who seek 
clear career development plans more than salaries and bonuses.  The latter rewards 
can always be surpassed by competitors who are eager to have the most qualified and 
industry-trained Saudis especially with the poor outcomes of the governments’ skill 
formation systems.     
 
Similar to the banking experience, large quasigovernment organizations included in 
this study view investing in training their Saudi employees as a long-term HRD 
investment.  On one hand, these organizations are required by the government, since 
they are partially state-owned, to invest in training and developing Saudis as part of 
their Saudization obligations.  Internally, on the other hand, they are financially 
growing, managerially advanced and organizationally well structured.  All this has 
supported their awareness and development of their internal actors and systems -- as 
named by Hendry -- to practice HRD of Saudis from an investment approach.  
Moreover, since they were state-owned, these companies have a wider range of 
internal labour markets that provide them with a wider pool to select the most 
qualified employees from.  They are also, culturally, becoming the most preferred 
employment places for Saudis which increases their external labour market potentials 
and, therefore, provide them with better opportunities to select the best Saudi 
candidates.  All these factors are assisting and stabilizing their training efforts which 
support Hendry’s findings that suggest that top management commitment is essential 
for driving and stabilizing investing in HRD.  In this respect, their commitment stems 
from government obligations and is supported by their belief of the importance and 
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urgency to Saudize their jobs with the most qualified Saudis from their internal or 
external market.  Therefore, these large organizations are proven to be successful 
through their willingness to invest in developing their internal actors and systems as 
well as their training practices while defraying their costs to achieve long-term 
investments in their human resources.  They are increasingly achieving high rates of 
Saudization and are considered, by the all interviewed managers, to provide the best 
HRD programs.  These programs are closely linked to their industrial needs to 
overcome the incompatible outcomes of the country’s skill formation systems.                         
 
Al-Shagawi, for example, asserts that the Saudi Electricity Company (SEC) does not 
consider investing in training Saudis to be an extra financial cost but an essential 
organizational approach to achieve employees’ loyalty.  Investing in HRD at the SEC, 
according to Al-Shagawi, is part of their efforts to attract and retain qualified Saudis 
who are seeking careers with outstanding progression potential.  The company 
provides focused training in its affiliated training institution for both newly recruited 
Saudis as well as existing employees.  Their line managers, or the gatekeepers as 
Hendry describes them, determine their departments’ needs for skills and expertise 
and then incorporate them into the company’s in-house training programs.  This 
industry-led training ensures efficient and effective utilization of the company’s 
financial and human resources.  In addition, line managers facilitate providing their 
employees with any essentials to enhance their work environment, productivity and 
satisfaction through financial and non-financial compensations and benefits.  
Considering Hendry’s framework, SEC, generally, appears to utilize the driving and 
stabilizing factors to invest in training as a long-term approach for HRD.  They are 
committed to Saudize their jobs with the most qualified Saudis through providing 
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them with their industry-focused training.  What is helping such a philosophy to 
succeed is the company’s financial growth that enables the expenditure on training 
and qualifying its employees first to increase its Saudization and second to maintain 
their loyalty and commitment.  The only inhibiting factor for such a philosophy that 
the company has to deal with is the poor outcomes of the country’s skill formation 
systems which seems to be overcome by incorporating a training institution to retrain 
such mismatched qualifications.          
  
For a different quasigovernment organization i.e. the Saudi Telecommunication 
Company (STC) training is determined by business needs and justifiable return on 
investment in human resources.  Al-Zamel from STC explains that the company when 
privatized had to work on changing the government’s long-lasting philosophy for 
training.  Government perceives training to be merely for promotion purposes which 
cannot serve the company’s new business direction and the competition environment 
dominating its future in the private sector.  The company was overloaded with ex-
government Saudi employees who exceeded its employment needs and might conflict 
with its new competition approach.  Therefore, they had to invest in selecting, 
retraining and retaining the most qualified ones at the same time offering attractive 
early retirement benefit programs for the rest.  Since their privatization, STC 
considers training to be a value added process. 
 
STC’s experience in training as long-term HRD investment according to Hendry’s 
framework is driven mainly by its privatization and its targets to compete in the 
private sector market.  Saudization for the company was not an issue as it was 
privatized from a state-owned organization.  However, for STC to invest in quality 
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Saudization through selecting, retraining and retaining the right Saudis was a business 
must and strategy in order to maintain its competitive advantage.  Such competition 
could not be accomplished by maintaining the government approach for employment 
and training.  It is now a company that is market and competition driven based on 
utilizing all its resources including its human capital efficiently and effectively.  This 
was not to be accomplished without focusing on investing in the right training either 
on the individual employee level or as an organizational solution to ensure changing 
the company’s governmental paradigm to operate as a private sector organization.   
 
The last quasigovernment manager, Al-Bat’hi from SABIC asserts that Saudization 
was the key driving and stabilizing factor for investing in training Saudis to take over 
the company’s technical as well as managerial employment positions.  Believing in 
such strategy, top management provided all necessary investments to develop the 
country’s national manpower in the technical areas that SABIC requires.  Therefore, 
SABIC has developed its human resource expertise and systems i.e. Hendry’s internal 
actors and systems to be in synchronization with this strategic belief and commitment.   
 
For this reason, the company established two industrial colleges, Al-Jubail and 
Yanbu, and benefited from internal educational and vocational training bodies 
including GOTEVT and Saudi universities.  They even sent their trainees for 
scholarships internationally.  The two industrial colleges, in particular, are 
organizationally affiliated to SABIC yet not exclusively graduating for their factories 
which is part of their commitment toward serving the wider Saudi community.  In 
fact, they graduate students for the whole Saudi industry as private organizations 
prefer them over GOTEVT’s, as indicated by Hussain from Savola.  Their training 
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standards and qualities are determined by SABIC which exceeds all other skill 
formation bodies in the Kingdome including GOTEVT.   Unsurprisingly, SABIC has 
become among the preferred employment organizations for Saudis who seek 
attractive employment and development opportunities that are driven and stabilized 
by the company’s continuous investment approach in training the national human 
resources. 
 
Another driving and stabilizing factor is government funding and financial support for 
training leading to employment of Saudis by the HRD Fund (HRDF).  This support is 
assisting in achieving Saudization, according to a number of interviewees.  For 
example Hussain from Savola confirms that their business strategies including 
Saudization achievement are the main drivers for their investment in training their 
Saudi employees.  Savola has been utilizing the fund’s grants for six years which, 
according to Hussain, has assisted and stabilized their training and development 
strategies.   
 
Similarly, AlSwailim form the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Al-Humaid 
from the Ministry of Labour confirm a similar conclusion that the availability of 
government funds for training has assisted organizations’ training decisions especially 
in small-to-medium sized organization.  Larger organizations, on the other hand, have 
the financial and organizational resources to invest in Saudis’ training as part of their 
HRD and retention programs as will be discussed subsequently.  They, according to 
AlSwailim, utilize their industry-led training institutions to retrain their existing and 
new employees to fit their organizational needs for skills, knowledge and attitudes.  
Finally, AlSwailim's and Hussain's views support Hendry’s external factors that 
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suggest that financing training costs through training grants is among the driving 
forces for investing in training in organizations.   
 
• Organization Size (large organizations) 
 
As evident from empirical findings, the effectiveness of Saudization implementation 
as a driving and stabilizing factor is interrelated to the organization’s size.  The size, 
as apparent from the interviews and the discussed literature, influences organizational 
views and practices of training as a long-term investment approach in human 
resources leading to Saudization.  In other words, organization’s size in Saudi Arabia 
can drive and stabilize a Saudization or inhibit its implementation.  Large 
organizations are more capable of utilizing Saudization strategy as a driving and 
stabilizing force to invest in developing their national human resource despite its 
financial burdens.  They have large financial capabilities, internal systems, long-term 
strategic planning and commitment to develop Saudi manpower.  For example, Al-
Ghafees from GOTEVT confirms that large organizations which, according to him, 
represent only 20% of the labour market are capable and willing to invest in training 
Saudis and providing them with clear career development plans to retain them 
afterwards.  Al-Ghafees’s views, in addition to other interviewees in this respect, 
confirm that an organization’s size and availability of proper internal actors and 
systems including top management commitment as well as supportive training 
philosophies and mechanisms are among the driving forces to invest in training as a 
long-term HRD philosophy.    
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Similar to quasigovernment organizations and the banking sector, other large private 
industries in the country realize the same urgency and importance of investing in 
retraining Saudis to, first, accomplish Saudization and, second, to ensure having 
qualified national human resources.  This realization is, indeed, costing the industry to 
adopt self-sufficient solutions by establishing their industry-led training institutions.   
 
For a large company like Zamil Industrial Investment the driving and stabilizing 
factors to invest in the development of Saudis are partially derived from the 
company’s social commitment and responsibility toward fellow Saudi countrymen.  
They are also according to Al-Ghamdi stimulated by the company’s efforts to 
implement Saudization by recruiting qualified and dedicated Saudis.  Supporting 
these strategic objectives, the company is also aiming to provide training to enhance 
the Saudis’ employability in the private sector as a whole.  In fact, Zamil is in the 
final stages of establishing their training institution that will serve the entire industry 
with industry-led qualified staff.  They invested profoundly in this institution, 
according to Al-Ghamdi, to overcome the shortages of skillful Saudis who are poorly 
prepared in GOTEVT and other skill formation systems.   
 
Zamil’s perspective of investing in training from a social responsibility and a national 
commitment standpoint is included under the management belief in Hendry’s internal 
actors and systems to drive investment in training.  This investment reflects Hendry’s 
so called top management commitment and organization’s values toward supporting 
training and valuing training as a long-term investment in the Saudi human resources.  
It is, in fact, an ‘enabling’ factor that drives and stabilizes the training philosophy.  
However, such perspectives are not merely derived by the organization’s business 
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strategies as indicated by Hendry’s framework.  In the Saudi context, they stem from 
top management belief as a social contribution by the big organizations in the private 
sector to enhance Saudi employability according to industry needs.    
 
Interestingly, these social responsibilities and commitment to invest in training Saudis 
for employment for the private industries or training for the market is evolving as a 
trend by big organizations that enjoy financial strength and organizational stability.  
This trend in fact is not accounted for by Hendry’s model which relates such 
investments to business strategies and organizational development needs.  Examples 
of such trends include Al-Romaizan Institute for Gold, Prince Ahmed Applied Media 
Institute, and the training programs provided by Al Hokair Group just to mention a 
few.  These efforts, arguably, could be viewed as indications of the private sector’s 
adaptation of proactive strategies to redevelop and re-qualify the poor graduates of the 
country’s skill formation institutions in order to achieve quality Saudization.  They 
are also, undeniably, driven by increasing competition on the rare talents in the labour 
market from national as well as international organizations planning to invest in the 
Saudi market as a result of the country joining the World Trade Organization.   
 
AlZahrani, for example, asserts that Mobily as a large company considers the 
investment in retraining Saudis to be as important as generating profits.  This is to 
increase Saudization and retain its most qualified employees.  Their efforts, in this 
respect, are initiated in essence by the government’s obligations on new companies 
investing in the Kingdom to Saudize their manpower.  At the same time, they are 
supported by Mobily’s top management belief that Saudization and investing in 
training the national manpower is becoming an attractive cost-effective organizational 
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alternative over recruiting experienced expensive expatriates from international 
telecommunication industries.  This strategic business alternative also supports the 
company’s plans of retaining its Saudi employees as new telecommunication 
companies are investing in the market and will be headhunting available trained 
Saudis in the same industry.  The plans also include attracting Saudis with clear career 
development and progression paths that are linked to both employment longevity and 
high quality performance.   
 
Some of Mobily’s practices, similar to many other large organizations in Saudi Arabia 
are accounted for by Hendry’s Model.  They are included under practices related to 
attracting and retaining skilful employees in the organization’s internal labour market 
(see Figure 4.2).  In general, Mobily and other organizations are headhunted for their 
high performing employees unless they develop strategic human resource 
management approaches to retain such employees.  However, in Saudi Arabia 
headhunting is becoming an employment trend that could arguably inhibit 
organizations’ willingness to invest in long-term development of Saudis even in large 
organizations as is evident from empirical findings.       
 
7.5.2 The Inhibiting Factors  
 
On the contrary to the driving and stabilizing forces, empirical data illustrate a 
number of inhibiting factors that hinder viewing and practicing training from an 
investment approach by the Saudi sector private organizations.  Among these are the 
organization size, unavailability of industry-led Saudi graduates together with 
availability of ready to work and cheap to employ expatriates, in addition to Saudis’ 
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high levels of job turnover in private organizations.  These inhibiting factors are new 
elements to Hendry’s model which reflect the uniqueness of the country’s labour 
market.           
 
• Organization Size (small-to-medium sized organizations) 
 
One facet of organizational size and investing in training as a long-term HRD 
philosophy is indicated by Al-Ghafees from GOTEVT.  He confirms that some small 
organizations are controlled and run by a foreign labour force which, in his view, is 
inhibiting the investment in training Saudis.  These organizations resist employing 
Saudis in the first place let alone invest in their training.  This situation, in particular, 
is an uncommon organizational practice dominating some of the small organizations 
in the Saudi labour market which has not been accounted for in Hendry’s Model.  
These organizations are run unlawfully by foreign labour forces that pay Saudi 
business owners a monthly agreed upon salary to take over their businesses 
franchises.  Subsequently, they employ their relatives or fellow citizens to ensure their 
profitability and continuity in the market under the protection of Saudi business 
owners.  This unique organizational behavior dynamic of small organizations in the 
Saudi labour market contradicts the essence of Hendry’s framework that is established 
to study lawful and approved organizations dynamics.  At the same time, it is 
obstructing and working against Saudization and any effort to develop the Saudi 
human resources as indicated by Al-Ghafees.    
 
Another facet stems from small-to-medium organizations lawfully owned and run by 
Saudis who evade investing in training.  Al-Eisa from Al Yamamah College agrees 
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with views of Al-Ghafees, Al-Asmari and Al-Zehairi that small-to-medium 
organizations do not consider training to be an investment but a cost to be evaded.  
These organizations are the major source for employment in the labour market yet 
90% of their employment is of expatriates.  They are after short-term profits with as 
little expenditures as possible from recruiting and training Saudis.  Saudi business 
owners are affected by massive business opportunities available in the country to 
consider training as a long-term investment for their organizations.  Coming from a 
long period of recession since the early 1990s, the country’s economy is witnessing an 
immense economic boom due to record high oil prices.  This has created massive 
demands and business opportunities in all industrial aspects to establish and maintain 
the country’s increasing projects.  It, sequentially, has created short-term business 
attitudes and practices that dominate business strategies of different small-to-medium 
organizations in Saudi Arabia.  This is including their short-term commitment or even 
reluctance to provide training as an investment in developing the country’s human 
resources and as an essential requirement to Saudize the labour market as indicated by 
Al Zaid from the Saudi Real Estate Company.   
 
Simultaneously, these organizations are granted work visas by the Ministry of Labour 
to recruit cheap expatriates who do not require further development and are easy to 
retain.  The Ministry, according to Al-Humaid, cannot risk obstructing the country’s 
rapid development to enforce the long-term strategy of Saudization on a short-term 
business environment evolving in the country as oil prices can fluctuate at any time.  
Therefore, small-to-medium sized organizations rarely seek nationals who are 
considered not yet available, due to incapability of skill formation systems to fulfill 
the private sector’s employment requirements.  Such systems, as confirmed by Al-
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Eisa, will never be able to fulfill all employment requirements for available jobs in the 
market.  For him, this role should be fulfilled by the on-the-job training which small-
to-medium organizations could provide yet try to avoid due to its cost and their focus 
on the urgent profit strategies.  In reality, this dilemma is even made worse as some of 
these organizations attempt to decrease their expenses by providing on-the-job 
training by their existing expatriates who, certainly, attempt any viable effort to evade 
their replacements by Saudis.  As a result, these organizations use any possible 
deception not to Saudize their manpower as this contradicts their core profit strategies 
to reduce costs including training. 
 
So in brief, these short-term business strategies are becoming inhibiting forces for the 
long-term investment approach in national HRD and Saudization.  Business owners 
are devoted to seize any business opportunity yet believe that they are hindered by the 
Saudization process due to the unavailable qualified and ready to work Saudi 
manpower.  They consider Saudis to require further investment in developing due to 
mismatched qualification provided by the country’s skill formation systems.  They 
also require high salaries and career development plans to retain them that are 
unattainable by small-to-medium businesses.  At the same time, available and skillful 
expatriates obstruct business owners’ vision and practice to consider training as an 
investment in Saudis as expatriates require less training investment and provide 
higher profits due to their low salaries.   
 
Hendry, in fact, has reached similar conclusion which stresses the fundamental 
correlation between competitive pressure and the driving force for training activities 
as discussed in the Literature Chapter.  However, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the 
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essential elements for small-to-medium organizations to achieve competitive edge are 
seen by business owners through recruiting expatriates instead of Saudis.  For them, 
expatriates are an easier and cheaper alternative even to train on any new technology 
or new production; they cost much less as they require lower salaries; and at the same 
time, they are easier to manage and retain.  This unique practice has not been included 
in Hendry’s framework as the Model was generated and evaluated in the UK context 
which unlike Saudi Arabia does not suffer from immense competition from foreign 
labour forces with nationals.         
 
• Unavailability of Industry-Led Saudi Graduates 
    
This practice of evading Saudi’s employment, unfortunately, is stimulated by the 
scarcity of skillful and experienced Saudis and the availability of cheap and skillful 
expatriates.  Saudi graduates, although, widely available are considered by the 
majority of interviewed managers to require further development in specialized as 
well as general skills.  According to Al Ammash, Al-Zehairi, Gaith and Al-Asmari, 
just to mention a few examples, these graduates do not understand the value of work, 
are not yet ready to work and require extensive development in English and computer 
skills.      
 
Therefore, small-to-medium sized organizations would never attempt to recruit 
nationals if it was not for government pressure to Saudize their manpower which has 
not yet proven effective despite government financial subsidies for training through 
the HRDF.  These subsidies are still utilizing the country’s poor skill formation 
systems that are overlooking, in their programs, the real business needs of the 
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country’s labour market.  In fact, this pressure to Saudize tends to overlook 
individualized circumstances and business needs of each industrial sector.  One 
example that supports this argument is clear in the construction industry.  This 
industry has engaged with expensive contracts to establish and develop the country’s 
massive new projects and infrastructures like the three Economic Cities in three 
regions over the last two years.  These projects are unable to be launched yet due to 
the unavailability of qualified Saudi manpower.  Therefore, the industry is trapped 
between the business needs to fulfill their contracts and the unavailability of trained 
national manpower. 
 
To make matters worse, interviewed managers confirm that small-to-medium sized 
organizations, due to their limited financial resources, do not have the advanced 
internal management systems that could facilitate the long-term investment approach 
to the country’s human resources.  This reinforces other inhibiting factors to invest in 
training in the majority of Saudi private organizations as they do not have the right 
systems or expertise to execute such expensive commitment.  In fact, AlWagdani 
links viewing training as an investment in private organizations to the awareness of 
managers of the return on the investment from providing Saudi employees with 
training.  Managers responsible for training decisions in small-to-medium sized 
organizations, in his view, are still unaware and untrained on the importance of 
investing in training and measuring its return on the investment by their employees.   
This argument supports Hendry’s findings that require managers’ commitment and 
understanding of the training philosophies accompanied by management systems to 
support viewing and practicing training from an investment approach in 
organizations.  For Al-Zehairi this commitment and understanding is only practiced 
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by 10% of business owners of family organizations which according to him represent 
75% of the volume of the labour market.  Therefore, these small-to-medium 
organizations only practice training to utilize government grants from the HRD Fund 
to train for Saudization. 
 
As a matter of fact this training for Saudization is already becoming an inevitable 
investment to rectify the incompatible outcomes of pre-employment skill formation 
systems with the needs of large or small-to-medium organization alike.  These 
organizations are compelled to retrain Saudi graduates on subject matter skills, 
knowledge and attitudes in addition to providing them with essential linguistics, 
interpersonal and computer skills.  This dilemma is, in fact, influencing the labour 
market entirely and slowing the speed of the development process as skill formation 
bodies controlled by government bureaucracy are incapable of adjusting to the private 
sectors’ businesslike approach.  It is making Saudi graduates expensive, time 
consuming and a risky alternative for small-to-medium organizations.  They require 
longer training investment and are difficult to retain afterwards whereas expatriates 
may only need shorter on-the-job orientation and are retainable.   
 
• Saudi High Labour Turnover in Private Sector Organizations 
 
Private sector managers confirm that Saudis are expensive to invest in as they are 
unstable in their employment in the private sector organizations. This inhibiting factor 
opposes company philosophies regardless of their sizes to invest in training to achieve 
continuous HRD for Saudis.  Typically, it adds to the cost of training and discourages 
training managers to pursue such an expensive and risky training investment decision.  
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For example, Al-Asmari confirms that owners of small-to-medium organizations 
consider training to be an added cost especially with Saudis high turnover that inhibits 
investing in their training and development.  These owners are confounded between 
the government’s pressures to Saudize their staff and their Saudi employees’ 
unwillingness to retain their jobs.  Al Turaigi from Almarai states similar conclusion.  
He believes that Saudi employees’ retention is affecting their company’s business and 
training investment as their turnover reaches 25% in 2006 alone.  This turnover of 
Saudis is costing Almarai according to Al Turaigi great loses.  This raises a very 
critical concern for private organizations that are seeking profit and cannot afford 
expensive and risky investments in unreliable national manpower. 
 
In the same prospect, Al-Malki and Al-Zehairi blame the country’s employment 
regulations and laws enforced by the labour offices of the Ministry of Labour.  These 
regulations and laws do not guarantee the retention of Saudi employees after 
companies’ investment in their employment and training.  Saudi employees terminate 
their employment for any higher salary offer with less consideration to their contracts.  
Al-Malki believes such behavior is supported by the non-existence or ambiguity of 
employment regulations and laws which is resulting in companies’ unwillingness to 
employ Saudis in the first place yet to invest in their training.  On the contrary, 
expatriates require inexpensive short orientation program and they are utterly 
retainable as their employers hold their work permit and passports.  They are also, 
generally, cheaper than Saudis especially in non-management positions and 
administrative jobs which represent the majority of their employment demands.  
Unlike Saudis, they are service oriented and flexible for job rotation and job 
reassignment.    
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Al-Malki’s perspectives on the Saudi labour market when examined in accordance to 
Hendry’s framework confirm that investing in training Saudis is not only becoming 
expensive yet also an uncalculated risk as Saudis are hard to retain due to unpracticed 
or lack of clear regulations in the country’s employment law.  This factor is not 
included in Hendry’s Model due to the uniqueness of such practices for the Saudi 
context.  They could be included as external labour market inhibiting factors to invest 
in training which is considered accordingly an expensive and risky investment by 
private organizations.  Similarly, a new inhibiting factor to Hendry’s framework 
representing the Saudi context is the availability of the reliable and cheap expatriates.  
They are hindering Saudi organizations’ motivation and willingness to invest in 
recruiting and retraining Saudis.   
 
7.5.3 Hendry’s Model According to the Saudi Context 
 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate Hendry’s interaction factors that drive, stabilize and/or 
inhibit businesses in Saudi Arabia to practice training as a long-term investment 
approach to develop the national manpower.  In these Figures, Hendry’s framework 
has been modified to include the (discussed above) additional specific elements that 
are unique to the Saudi context as explained by interviewees in Chapter Six.  
Furthermore, Figure 7.3 has been developed to illustrate the major driving, stabilizing 
and hindering factors to the long-term investment approach of HRD in Saudi Arabia.  
The intention in creating Figure 7.3 is not to overlook, simplify or alter the essence 
and significance of Hendry’ distinguished and widely respected work.  In effect, this 
effort is to summarize and focus on the factors directly in relation to Hendry’s final 
framework outcome i.e. viewing training as a long-term investment in the HRD.  In 
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the same prospect, the aim is to understand general practices and factors affecting 
skill formation and employment in private organizations in the Saudi labour market 
which are better accomplished through such a helicopter perspective to the elements 
of the original model.  
   
As Figure 7.1 illustrates, these additional elements are including two major 
government interventions i.e. Saudization and available government grants from the 
HRDF to encourage private organizations’ efforts to invest in training and recruiting 
Saudis.  The developed model from Hendry’s also includes organization size which 
interacts with a number of factors affecting the organization’s internal labour market 
and its internal actors and systems.  The modified model also added some elements to 
the external labour market and external support for training which are unique to the 
Saudi context. 
 
Saudization has been included in the modified model to equal the importance of the 
original Model’s driving factors i.e. competitive pressure and evolving business 
needs.  This national strategic program is affecting most business strategies in the 
private sector organizations as is apparent from empirical and literature findings.  This 
policy is encouraging organizations to invest in training and employing Saudis on an 
annual basis to avoid government penalties and receive its incentives.  The 
government’s efforts and follow-ups to accomplish this strategy through the private 
sector, although perhaps not be as effective as the successive Development Plans 
aimed for, is forcing private businesses to consider it in their strategic employment 
planning.  Although still concentrating on quantitative measures, Saudization is 
driving the private sector’s human resources investments to develop a national work 
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force that might be able to replace the millions of expatriates in the foreseen future of 
the labour market.       
 
Organization size was also included to illustrate the importance of such a factor in 
either driving or inhibiting investing in training Saudis as a long-term HRD approach.  
The size of the private organization has a direct relationship with investing in 
developing Saudis to achieve Saudization.  Empirical data supports the view that 
Saudization increases with larger organizations which implement advanced and 
attractive human resource management practices, provide attractive working 
environments, and demonstrate organizational maturity that reflect better job security.  
Top management in these large organizations are usually supportive with profound 
investment in developing Saudis and dedicate all organizational internal actors and 
systems to achieve such direction as they are supported by strong financial resources.  
These organizations usually do not depend on government financial support or 
outcomes from its skill formation systems but invest in developing Saudis in their 
industry-led training institutions to serve their immediate shortages of qualified 
Saudis as well as serving their industry as a whole.   
 
On the other hand, small-to-medium organizations are driven by reducing 
expenditures and relying on short-term profit strategies that are accomplished through 
recruiting expatriates.  Since they have limited financial capabilities, they implement 
simpler internal managerial systems that might in some instances require only a 
manager and an accountant.  They do not invest in training from a long-term 
perspective as they are mainly dependant on expatriates who are ready to work.  They 
evade Saudi employment as they are expensive and unqualified to perform without 
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extensive retraining.  Not only that but also, they are unlawfully, in some instances, 
controlled and run by expatriates.  All in all, this goes against Saudization as indicated 
Figure 7.1.         
 
The external labour market is also affected by a number of factors that are included in 
the modified model to represent the Saudi context.  They include scarcity and poorly 
prepared Saudi graduates from skill formation systems that are mainly controlled by 
government bureaucracies.  These graduates require further retraining that can only be 
accomplished in large organizations through the few available industry-led training 
institutions.  However, even after such expensive investment, Saudis are hard to retain 
as labour laws are not guaranteeing employee retention.  Saudis tend to move from 
one job in the private sector to another but generally they prefer employment in the 
government, quasigovernment and/or large organizations for office and non-technical 
jobs.  On the other hand, the external labour market is also suffering from the wide 
influx of million of expatriates who compete with Saudis on available jobs that are 
mainly available in small-to-medium organizations which only invest in developing 
Saudis to acquire the government available funds for training.   
 
The modified model in Figure 7.1 also reflects empirical findings on the importance 
of available external government financial supports through the HRD Fund in 
assisting private organizations to invest in training.  These funds are designed to 
support private organizations to train potential Saudi employees for employment.  
Some Saudi private organizations as, apparent from the interviews, initiate their 
decisions to invest in training their Saudi employees based on the availability of such 
funds. 
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BUSINESS 
STRATEGIC  
Technical or 
product-market 
change signaling 
’skill gap’  
Relative importance 
of spending on 
training to survival    
INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET 
Privatization reduces employees’ 
numbers leading to multi skilling and 
early retirement  
High quality recruitment, retention, and 
promotion. 
Saudis high turnover and lack of 
Stability 
BUSINESS 
STRATEGIC  
Increased 
complexity to 
be managed 
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR TRAINING 
• Establishment of affiliated training institutes to private organizations which provide training to the whole industry.   
• Training and Saudization is compulsory on new investing companies in Saudi Arabia.  
• Customer quality requirements 
• External financial support for training and Saudization through the HRD Fund. 
INTERNAL ACTORS AND 
SYSTEMS  
Top management commitment and 
belief of a training philosophy as a way 
to Saudization  
HRM systems and practices. 
Training and Saudization are social 
responsibilities 
Training Cost vs. the return on 
investment  
Having a positive image of achieving 
Saudization. 
Readiness of Saudi employees to 
perform.  
Majority of small 
organizations are 
controlled and 
run by 
expatriates  
 
Unawareness of 
management of 
the return on 
investment from 
training  
 
Unavailability of 
Industry-led 
training and 
education 
programs. 
Organization 
size 
Small 
Large 
 
 
SAUDIZATION 
INTERNAL ACTORS AND 
SYSTEMS  
Industry-focused recruitment, training 
and placement 
Awareness of multiple measures to 
secure effective work performance  
Mentoring and monitoring of careers 
from an early stage. 
Recognizing development opportunities 
with normal management processes  
Open learning facilities supporting on-
the-job training   
INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET 
Quality training available internally or 
externally  
Generating high career expectations  
Training and development opportunities 
seen as an aid to recruitment  
TRAINING 
EXTERNAL LABOUR MARKET  
• Scarcity of qualified and specialized Saudis readily available in external market leading to headhunting of talents. 
• Availability of foreign and cheap labor force 
• Saudis’ preference of employment in the government and in non-technical jobs. 
• Ambiguity of employment laws and regulations to ensure employee’s stability in employment.    
HUMAN 
RESOURCE 
DEVELOPMENT 
Figure (7.1):  The Interaction of Factors Driving and Stabilizing Training and HRD in the Saudi Context 
Adopted and modified from Hendry, C. (1991) “Corporate Strategy and Training”, in Stevens, J. and Mackay, R. (edit.) Training and Competitiveness: Page 103 
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Competitive 
pressure 
Business 
performance gap 
Product Market 
development  
Technical  
change  
Skill, knowledge 
and attitude  
 performance gap 
Internal Labour Market 
Internal actors, 
training systems, 
philosophy, and management 
organization 
External training stimuli and 
support, including funding  
 
Training 
Government Pressure to saudize 
employment in the private sector 
Unavailability of 
Industry-led 
vocational training 
organizations 
External labour market 
including:  
Availability and 
attractiveness to employ 
cheap expatriates. 
Majority of small 
organizations are 
controlled and run 
by expatriates  
Figure (7.2):  The General Model of Factors Driving and Stabilizing Training in Saudi Arabia  
Adopted and modified from Hendry, C. (1991) “Corporate Strategy and Training”, in Stevens, J. and Mackay, R. (edit.) Training and Competitiveness: 81 
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LONG-TERM 
INVESTMENT IN 
HUMAN 
RESOURCE 
DEVELOPMENT 
DRIVING AND STABILIZING 
FACTORS   
 
INHIBITING FACTORS  
Belief and Commitment of Top management  
Saudization Requirements   
Large Organizations    
Government Funds from HRDF   
Unavailability of Industry-led trained Saudi Graduates 
Availability of cheap and ready to work expatriates  
Saudis high turnover and attitude to private jobs  
Ambiguity of employment laws and regulations 
Competitive pressure and/or business needs 
Small-to-medium Organizations 
Figure (7.3): Summary of the Major Driving, Stabilizing and Hindering factors to HRD in Saudi Arabia  
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In Conclusion this section of the discussion attempts to study the driving, stabilizing 
and hindering factors of Hendry’s work in accordance to practices and philosophies 
dominating Saudi private organizations.  The discussion of the empirical data 
concludes that Saudization, organization size and top management commitment and 
belief toward continuous national HRD are the major driving and stabilizing forces 
in Saudi private organizations.  These driving factors are playing a major role in 
organization’s decisions to invest in an long-term training efforts.  Government 
pressure for Saudization accompanied by financial support of HRDF are two major 
driving factors that have proven effective thus far in achieving Saudization 
especially in small organizations.  Large organizations do not depend on or seek 
such funding as they are financially capable of investing in developing their 
employees.  On the internal labour market level of organizations, most interviewed 
managers assert that their organizations provide training in response to business 
requirements, new technologies or new employment regulations in the market 
including Saudization.  Some of the interviewed organizations tend to provide 
training as a managerial approach to attract new qualified Saudis and at the same 
time to retain their organizations’ most qualified and experienced ones.  Those 
Saudis are usually looking for an organization, preferably large, that can provide 
them with clear career development plans.  Large organizations in Saudi Arabia are 
investing in HRD initiatives to fulfill their social commitment toward developing 
their fellow citizenship and as a constructive approach to bridge the shortcomings of 
the country’s skill formation systems.  In other words, at the moment the industry is 
carrying the load of providing basic training that should have been conducted by the 
established government institutions.  This role, if it continues, will divert private 
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industries from their main business operations and eventually from being a major 
player in the country’s economy.   
 
On the other hand, the inhibiting factors for investing in training as an approach for 
long-term HRD include organization size, poor outcomes of the country’s skill 
formation systems together with availability of ready to work and cheap expatriates, 
in addition to Saudis’ high turnover of jobs in private organizations.  Evidence from 
interviews confirms that small-to-medium sized private organizations are not 
investing in training nationals from an investment perspective.  Small-to-medium 
organizations are either unlawfully controlled by expatriates who will never recruit 
Saudis nor train them or owned by Saudis who view training Saudis as a cost to be 
evaded.  The former case, in fact, is a unique organizational practice to the Saudi 
market and will persist as a major hindering factor for any HRD and recruitment 
effort of Saudis unless the government intensifies its supervisory and inspection 
operations.  In both scenarios, though, small-to-medium organizations seek the 
employment of cheap expatriates who are retainable and evade recruiting Saudis 
who are expensive and risky to train and recruit and who are inadequately prepared 
by the country’s skill formation systems.  Interviewed managers confirm that Saudis 
are hard to retain and expensive to retrain.  They do not continue in their 
employment regardless of their employment contracts and of the companies’ 
investment in their training.  Such irresponsible practices were confirmed by some 
interviewed managers to be the result of ineffective and vague employment 
regulations that could guarantee employers rights.  Managers also confirm that 
Saudi graduates lack the needed competencies and behaviors to work in a private 
business environment.  Both factors are considered as inhibiting external labour 
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market factors affecting decisions to invest in employing and training Saudis by 
both small and large organizations. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter focuses its discussion on linking interviews with research objectives.  
It attempts to discuss the empirical data evolved from the previous chapter to 
understand interviewees’ perspectives within the research framework.  It looks into 
the state role that affects skill formation systems in relation to employment in the 
private labour market.  The government rigid bureaucracy in planning for, 
regulating, financing and implementing skill formation especially in GOTEVT is 
hindering the development of private industry in the country.  This bureaucracy is 
not supporting the labour market with industry-led training programs and results in 
incompatible skills, knowledge and attitudes with present employment needs.  They 
are focusing on theoretical knowledge and literary studies instead of practical 
approaches and technical as well as scientific fields.  These systems including 
GOTEVT are contributing to the unemployment of Saudis instead of the contrary.  
These systems are trying to protect and sustain their financial, organizational and 
even survival interests and resources.  However, such interests should never 
contradict with the nation’s interests or its economy.  Accordingly, if current efforts 
of GOTEVT and other skill formation systems persist the private sector would 
attempt any tactic to evade employing their graduates which would increase 
unemployment rates in the country and put an end to Saudization.  This will even 
diverge from the nations’ interests of establishing a national workforce that will 
ensure a fruitful future for the Kingdom’s generations.   
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Then the chapter investigates unemployment in Saudi Arabia and Saudi attitudes to 
work in private organizations.  The focus is on the Saudization strategy as one 
essential factor affecting employment in the private sector and examines the core 
obstacles encountering this national strategy.  These obstacles include low salaries 
offered by private organizations of Saudis that are usually determined according to 
cheap expatriates’ salary level instead of consideration to Saudis’ financial 
requirements.  The obstacles also include incompatible and unemployable outcomes 
of skill formation systems with the private labour market needs.  Finally, the 
discussion examines Saudi attitudes and employment instability in private 
organizations which managers consider to be hindering any Saudization effort.         
 
Then the chapter examines successful Saudization implementations in a number of 
private industries in order to understand the factors that have led to their success 
while many others have failed.  These factors include top management belief in the 
urgency and long-term benefits of Saudization.  They also include implementing 
advanced human resource management practices that attract and retain Saudis who 
are seeking clear career development plans.  Successful Saudization tends to be 
evident in organizations that provide industry-led HRD programs that link training 
to employment and future development of their employees.   
 
Finally, the chapter also examines Hendry’s framework in a different context 
namely Saudi Arabia.  The discussion revealed many similarities to the framework 
regarding the factors that drive, stabilize and/or hinder investing in training as a 
long-term investment approach by Saudi private organizations.  It also suggested 
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some additional factors that are specific to the Saudi context.  Saudization has 
become a new major driving and stabilizing factor to investing in HRD.  In addition, 
other factors including organization size, top management commitment and belief 
as well as government grants for training are playing an essential driving and 
stabilizing role.  At the same time, the discussion reveals some new inhibiting 
factors to include in Hendry’s model to reflect the uniqueness of the country’s 
private labour market.  These include the organization size (being large or small-to-
medium), the unavailability of industry-led Saudi graduates, and the availability of 
cheap and ready to work expatriates, in addition to the high turnover of Saudis in 
jobs in private organizations.  This has led to a modified model from Hendry's to 
represent these new driving, stabilizing and/or inhibiting factors affecting the Saudi 
context.     
   
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 339 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1 Summary of the Main Issues 
 
Saudi Arabia has been enjoying massive development in all aspects since the 
discovery of its enormous oil reserves in the 1930s.  Such a discovery took the 
country’s strategic planners by surprise as they have to utilize the country’s sudden 
wealth to establish its huge infrastructure projects as well as investing in developing 
human resource related services.  The country was not ready with enough trained 
and qualified technical and educated human resources to take over such projects.  
Therefore, a critical decision was taken to import and recruit expatriates mainly in 
the private sector to build the country while recruiting Saudis in the government 
sector.  Saudis at that time were mainly majoring in the relatively easy to graduate 
from literary and art majors to be employed for life in the government.  The country 
continued in such practices as its population growth continued to increase until it 
became one of the highest in the world with the majority of its citizens under the 
age of 19.  This population growth was associated with huge quantitative outcomes 
from the country’s skill formation systems to satisfy the government’s possible 
employment opportunities.   
 
In the early 1990s, the country began to realize that there was continuing and 
increasing competition by expatriates for the country’s available jobs especially in 
the private sector as unemployment among Saudis began to increase.  So, the 
government introduced the Saudization strategy to reduce expatriates and at the 
same time increase the employment of Saudis in the private sector.  This realization 
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and urgency, however, were not associated by essential changes to the structure and 
programs available by the government controlled skill formation systems including 
GOTEVT, the main technical and vocational manpower provider for the private 
sector.  These systems continued to focus on quantitative measures overlooking 
establishing their academic and technical programs on the real needs of the labour 
market.  In other words, they graduate Saudis who do not have employable skills, 
knowledge and attitudes to work in the private sector organizations which have 
already established the culture of dependency on expatriates to increase their 
competitiveness and revenues.  All this led to unsuccessful implementation of 
Saudization as the country’s recruitment of expatriates is increasing which in turn 
inflates the unemployment rates among Saudis only to be assisted by the 
incompatible outcomes from skill formation systems.  Rates of unemployment 
among Saudis have reached (12%) in a labour market that is creating millions of job 
opportunities mainly to be filled with expatriates (95%) in the private sector.  .                    
     
Therefore, this research investigated the persistent dilemma of unsuccessful 
Saudization in the labour market in relation to the incompatibility between the 
outcomes of the country’s skill formation systems and the demands for labour by 
the private sector organizations.  The research examined the factors contributing to 
such a dilemma as seen by interviewed managers from Saudi government, 
quasigovernment and private organizations.  It also studied the obstacles 
encountering successful implementation of Saudization in the private sector despite 
the rigorous efforts by government.   
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The findings and their implications confirmed the research’s assumption that 
Saudization is mainly hindered by the shortcomings of skill formation systems’ 
outcomes due to heavy government involvement and control over their planning, 
regulating, financing and implementing.  This government bureaucratic control is 
inhibiting and interrupting the responsiveness of these systems to the rapidly 
changing and demanding private sector.  As a result, they graduate Saudis who 
require further and sometime extensive retraining in order to fit the employment and 
performance requirements of the private sector organizations.  They require further 
investments on even developing the specialization skills which are, arguably, an 
indication of improper utilization of public budgets by these systems.        
 
The findings also emphasize another obstacle to Saudization which also involves 
the government’s unfocused planning and implementation as well as legislations for 
the Saudization strategy.  These operational as well as legislative limitations are 
overlooking and undermining the effectiveness of the strategy itself.  The 
government is still allowing the huge influx of cheap and easy to retain expatriates 
to fulfill the labour market jobs.  Whereas, they are not providing nor implementing 
clear employment laws to protect private organizations from the long-lasting and 
heavy turnover practices by Saudis in whom the organizations are investing 
profoundly to develop.   
 
Saudis, in fact, over the years of the country’s labour market development have 
associated their socially negative views to technical blue-collared jobs in the private 
sector.  In fact such negative social views have always been reinforced by the 
country’s segmentation of its labour market where Saudis are employed in the 
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government sector while expatriates are expected in the private sector.  Such 
practices, as confirmed by the findings, are continuously evident as Saudis always 
seek employment in the government, quasigovernment and large organizations 
which provide stable, secure and attractive employment opportunities.  In other 
words, they evade employment in small-to-medium sized private organizations with 
their technically demanding jobs as they do not offer attractive salaries.  These 
organizations employ the majority of expatriates in the country and resist 
Saudization in essence as it reduces their profitability and perhaps even their 
organizational survival.    
 
The study realizes that for Saudization to be successful and establish a long-term 
solution to the Saudi existing dilemma, the focus must be on the first obstacle.  The 
remaining obstacles, although cannot be overlooked as serious challenges for such 
strategy, they will be persistent as long as the government is dominating the 
outcomes of the country’s skill formation systems especially GOTEVT and 
producing manpower incompatible to the labour market demands.           
 
8.2 Reconsideration of the Research Objectives 
 
The research explores, as a general objective, the missing link between skill 
formation outcomes, especially provided by GOTEVT, and the requirements of 
Saudization.  This also included in the three first specific objectives set in Chapter 
One.  The study found that the heavy bureaucratic control of the government is 
producing unemployable outcomes to the labour market.  This is through the 
excessive focus on conducting literary and social sciences’ majors over the labour 
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market’s demand for technical and scientific skills.  These supply systems are 
unable to rapidly respond to the changing demands of the private organizations 
simply because they have been restricted by their government’s bureaucratic 
systems.  Such systems’ performances were never evaluated against their immediate 
client’s demands as their outcomes were always employable in the government 
sector before it become over-employed.  However, the real evaluation is now 
evident as the country is encountering its high employment rates that can only be 
reduced through developing these systems’ graduates to be employable in the 
private sector.  This is through reducing the government influence on them and 
linking planning, performance and outcomes directly to the sector they are serving.                     
 
The study also examines successful Saudization implementation scenarios in some 
private and quasigovernment industries as it fulfills one of its general as well as a 
specific objective.  This objective was achieved through investigating their effective 
visions and practices regarding Saudization and through obtained documentation 
when studying the Saudization success in the banking sector.  These organizations, 
as confirmed by the findings, are driven by their financial strength as well as top 
management belief in the importance and urgency of implementing Saudization.  
These main elements generate profound investments in developing their 
organization’s internal Human Resource Management systems and long-term 
investment in developing and retaining qualified Saudis.  Unlike the government 
skill formation systems, they provide industry-led training in their training 
institutions to retrain the outcomes of the country’s skill formation systems.  Their 
programs are derived from the real industry needs and planned for by the industry 
itself and conducted in the factories like the two industrial colleges of SABIC in 
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Jubail and Yanbu.  This investment, although adding extra cost on their annual 
expenditures, is viewed as inevitable because skill formation systems are not 
providing industry-focused graduates.  Therefore, these organizations even view 
such investments to be part their social contribution to the country through 
providing free training to the public to develop the Saudis and assist Saudization in 
different industries.           
 
The last general objective supported by one specific objective examined GOTEVT 
as a major skill formation provider in relation to the lack of Saudization in the 
labour market.  The research evaluated the current role and outcomes of GOTEVT.  
This role, as evident from the research’s findings and literature, has not yet achieved 
the private sector’s demands of qualified and skilful Saudis that can replace 
expatriates.  This government organization, as an example of other skill formation 
systems in the country, is dominated and influenced by its strategic affiliation and 
supervision by the government i.e. Ministry of Labour.  This, evidently, is 
producing a government bureaucracy approach that is hindering GOTEVT’s 
immediate responsiveness to serve a dynamic and continuously changing private 
sector.       
 
The study has found that GOTEVT as seen by the majority of private managers is 
not assisting their efforts to Saudize their human resources.  In fact it has burdened 
them retraining its outcomes to fit their employment needs.  In other words, they 
recognize that government expenditures and investment on GOTEVT are 
economically and strategically unjustified.  This investment if provided to private 
organizations to train and recruit for themselves it would achieve their interests of 
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qualifying Saudis to their employment standards and needs.  In addition, it would 
also serve the interests of the country as it would reduce the unemployment among 
its citizens and establish a solid national workforce that is dependable and 
industrially and vocationally oriented.  This perspective has been the general theme 
underlying most interviewed managers from the private sector and some of the 
quasigovernment organizations.  Unsurprisingly, government managers do not 
support such an argument.  On the contrary, they blame private organizations of 
evading the employment of Saudis on merely profitability grounds especially in 
small-to-medium organizations.  In their view the sector will always seek 
employment of expatriates regardless of the quality of GOTEVT’s graduates which, 
according to them, is fulfilling the employment needs of the private sector.   
 
The government’s managers reaction to concerns regarding their unsuccessful 
outcomes, especially relating to GOTEVT, is understandable but yet not credible.  
They are, undoubtedly, defending their organizational survival interests which may 
not benefit the interests of the country and its people in the long-term.  Therefore, 
the research attempted to evaluate the possibilities, requirements, and impact of 
changing the current role of GOTEVT, as the grassroots and prerequisite to the 
Saudization of human resources in private sectors.  The reactions to this attempt will 
be discussed in this chapter to provide practical recommendation to conclude this 
study with.  This practical recommendation will encourage and stimulate future 
academic research as well as organizational changes to GOTEVT’s vision and 
practices to bridge the existing gap in their performance.  In addition, it will ensure 
a long-term professionalism or vocationalism of its graduates through which the 
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Saudization of the private sector’s human resources will be an expected outcome of 
developing a competitive and reliable national manpower.    
 
8.3 Study Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This study provides important theoretical and practical information on Saudi Arabia 
that can benefit knowledge in the related studied fields.  First, on the theoretical 
contribution level, the study provided a review for a Western model i.e. Hendry’s 
HRD interaction model for skills development in Saudi Arabia.  This Model 
determines the interactions between the factors that are driving, stabilizing and/or 
inhibiting organizations from investing in training as a long-term HRD approach.  
Its incorporation to study private organizations perspectives and practices in Saudi 
Arabia resulted in its development to account for unique elements from the Saudi 
context.  These new elements reflect the actual practices in the Saudi private sector 
organizations dominating decision-making for their investment in developing Saudi 
employees.  The new driving, stabilizing and inhibiting factors from the Saudi 
context are expected to generate and initiate new theoretical studies about the Saudi 
labour market supply and demand interrelations.                                        
 
Second, on the practical level, it studied a national dilemma, Saudization, a subject 
that is occasionally investigated in the international academia.  This is due to its 
infrequent occurrences in the business world by which a country like Saudi Arabia 
is suffering from high unemployment among its nationals while employing more 
than 4.7 millions of expatriates.  This national subject is mainly discussed in Saudi 
Arabia and/or in other oil producing Gulf States as they suffer from similar 
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employment and social dilemmas.  The study, furthermore, translated many of the 
national and regional studies related to Saudization and skill formation in Saudi 
Arabia from Arabic to English to enrich the knowledge with theories and practices 
from the Arab world.  Some of such studies included government reports and 
unpublished documents that are rarely obtained or included in academia studies.  
 
Third, the study also had the privilege of conducting face-to-face lengthy interviews 
with a large number of government, quasigovernment and private strategic decision-
makers and practitioners.  Such opportunity provided strategic empirical data about 
Saudization and skill formation systems that enables the study to evaluate the 
strategic approaches regarding both issues in the country.  This information could 
assist further academic research on strategic practices in the country in regard to 
employment and skill formation or even the strategic performance of some of the 
country’s government bodies. 
 
Fourth, the study also provided in-depth investigation about the success scenarios of 
Saudization in some of the private sector organizations.  This approach allowed 
examining of their success factors and managerial practices to be studied against the 
failures of others in the market.  These success factors and practices can contribute 
to further analysis and implications in the academia or by organizations that are 
wishing to accomplish long-term and steady investment in their HRD as means to 
employees’ retention and loyalty. 
 
Finally, the study investigated and provided practical recommendation to changing 
the current role of GOTEVT as viewed by some interviewed managers who 
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elaborated on its development and implementation potentials.  The proposed change 
and comments from the managers establish a practical epilogue to this study to 
benefit from perspectives discussed and dilemmas analyzed regarding the Saudi 
labour market in relation to the role of skill formation systems.                
 
During the primary data collection stage for this study, the researcher proposed 
strategic changes to GOTEVT’s current role in order to be more responsive to the 
labour market needs and eventually to the Saudization program.  The initial 
objectives of initiating and introducing such a proposal was to stimulate alternative 
approaches, as seen by the private industries, to the current dominant government 
role governing GOTEVT strategies and performance.  This role, as evident from 
interviews with managers in this study, has not achieved their Saudization efforts 
nor provided them with a skilful, knowledgeable and disciplined national 
workforce.  In other words, it has not accomplished GOTEVT’s core organizational 
objectives of providing Saudi private organizations with a qualified and reliable 
national workforce that can in the long run replace the millions of expatriates who 
are overcrowding the labour market. 
 
However, the current study realises that in order for any Saudization effort to be 
effective, a gradual decrease of expatriates’ importation has to be implemented.  
This gradual effort will ensure a balanced and planned replacement of the 
expatriates in an undisruptive approach to the Saudi economy that has been 
dependent on such foreign workforce since its establishment.  In other words, quick 
and unplanned Saudization could create an employment vacuum in the country that 
could evidently lead to economic recessions.  Therefore, Saudi HRD plans 
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including the proposed changes to GOTEVT must be a long term solution to create 
a vocationalism and professionalism among its national workforce without 
jeopardizing the major and important economic sector such as private industries.   
 
The proposed change involves modifying the present role of GOTEVT from 
planning, regulating, supervising, financing and practicing technical education and 
vocational training in the country.  GOTEVT as a government body, according to 
the new proposed role, will only supervise, regulate and finance technical education 
and vocational training.  The actual planning and training will be carried out by 
industry-led private training organizations who better know their training needs.  
Businesses in the kingdom will be grouped into major sectors with their own 
training institutes or colleges serving their line of businesses’ needs for skills and 
qualifications.  At the same time, these training institutions or colleges will be 
providing each line of business with continuous developmental training to their 
existing human capital.  Another aspect that can be added to these industry-oriented 
training or colleges is assessment centres.  The aim of these assessment centres is to 
save training and selection time, effort and money through scientifically selecting 
potential employees from the labour market according to employers’ specific needs 
of skills and qualifications.  Specific training and development programs will then 
be designed and implemented according to employers needs.   
 
For example, hotels, travel agency services, tourism and leisure businesses will be a 
sector having a training institution or college that is financially supported and 
supervised by GOTEVT with marginal financial participation by private 
organizations of this sector depending on the number of each organizations’ 
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trainees.  This will ensure a positive participation of this sector on all levels 
including their participation in planning, designing, implementing and evaluating 
these training programs.  It will eventually lead to more investment in training on 
their actual skills and knowledge needed for the success of their businesses.  It will 
also encourage private sector organizations to establish more specialized vocational 
industry-led training organizations or programs.  At the same time trainees will be 
motivated by the fact that their training and development will end in their 
employment in the sector.   
 
The same scenario will be implemented in the car industry, construction and 
building industry, plastic and chemical industry, banking and financial industry, 
health industry and farming industry, just to mention few examples.  These 
industry-oriented training institutions or colleges will take over GOTEVT’s already 
established infrastructures, faculties, facilities and logistics that are available in 
every city in the Kingdom.  They will also benefit from the funds already available 
to the HRDF which after implementing this proposal will be a financial support 
body to these industry-led training institutions or colleges. 
 
Government managers are uncertain of the effectiveness of the proposed changes to 
GOTEVT’s role.  For example, Al-Humaid from the Ministry of Labour indicates 
that the Manpower Council which used to be a department of the Ministry has 
studied similar approach as the current study is proposing.  This approach was 
suggested by a team from the Institute of Research in King Fahd University of 
Petroleum and Minerals in 2002 titled Establishing the Comprehensive National 
Training Plan for Saudization.  The study’s final report examines situations and 
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governing factors affecting Saudi labour market for the period from 1994 to 1998.  
Depending on statistical data on the labour market of the private sector, the report 
looks at two interrelated issues namely employment supply and Saudi employment 
demand for the period mentioned.  Employment supply includes the growth of the 
Saudi population, employable human resources and training sources.  On the other 
hand, employment demand focuses on Saudi economy growth rates through 
examining the fiscal years of 1994 through 1998 and their impact on the labour 
market.  The study recommends, according to Al-Humaid and available literature, a 
reorganization of private industries to sectors with similar industrial and economic 
activities.  Each sector will establish an affiliated training organization to serve such 
industry’s needs by providing trained human resources for its specific industry.  
 
That study despite distributing 700 questionnaires on private training institutions in 
the Kingdom and 1500 on private companies, received only 80 responses from the 
former and 31 from the latter representing only 11.43% of total responses.  
Moreover, according to the study, available information and statistics did not 
convey a clear and scientific analysis for the current situation in the labour market 
which includes its development and future expectations in addition to training 
capabilities and its obstacles (2002).  Therefore, the study neglected its 
questionnaires responses as they did not represent scientific significance and instead 
established its conclusions and strategies on comparative analysis of international 
and national experiences available at that time.  As a result, the conclusions and 
recommendations of that study never proposed changing GOTEVT’s role.  In 
contrast, the current study establishes its analysis based on findings obtained from 
strategic private, government and quasigovernment managers who are planning and 
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practicing Saudization and HRD affairs in almost daily basis.  Therefore, such 
findings discusses the most current situations and dilemmas affecting Saudization in 
relation to unsuccessful role of the skill formation system in the country namely 
GOTEVT.  It highlights the evident fact that in order for Saudization to be more 
effective and represent a long term employment strategy for Saudi Arabia an 
essential change for the government dominance on GOTEVT has to be in operation.          
 
However, Al-Humaid believes that such change to GOTEVT will never guarantee 
better qualification nor recruitment for Saudis as the core of the dilemma, according 
to his perspective, is not training related.  The findings of this research demonstrate 
that such claim is not necessarily accurate as private managers experience recruiting 
poor outcomes of GOTEVT that are not industry related or private jobs oriented.  
Al-Humaid prioritizes the reduction of expatriates’ employment through restricting 
importation of foreign manpower and forcing Saudization on private organizations.  
Yet this study and available evidence from the interviews suggest primarily the 
establishment of a responsive HRD system by changing GOTEVT into an industry-
led vocational training organization that is capable of providing what the labour 
market demands of skills, knowledge and attitudes.  This will prepare the country’s 
national workforce to Saudize employment in private organizations with a 
progressive decrease of employment of expatriates implemented by the Ministry of 
Labour.  Nevertheless, Al-Humaid is concerned with the quality of training as he 
confirms that current private training industry is merely profit oriented rather than 
quality driven.  This perspective, in fact, demonstrates that GOTEVT, the 
supervisory and regulatory government body on private training industry, is 
incapable of managing and directing this industry towards the latter.  It also 
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illustrates that such an organization is incapable of executing one of its core roles as 
it is hindered by its government bureaucracies and its interests for extending its 
power as a strategy for its organizational survival. 
 
Another similar perspective of Al-Humaid to justify the essentiality of the existence 
and persistent of GOTEVT’s current role is demonstrated by Al-Ghafees the 
Governor of GOTEVT and his Deputy Alogla.  Al-Ghafees and Alogla both agree 
in principle, with the study’s recommended changes to GOTEVT.  In fact, 
GOTEVT, according to Al-Ghafees, is attempting and has already initiated a 
number of strategic partnerships with large industries to establish industry-led 
training institutions.  However, such new direction of GOTEVT is hindered by a 
lack of flexibility of some related government ministries and unavailability of 
national qualified human resources to run such projects.  However, both GOTEVT 
officials are unconvinced of the private sector’s motivation to take over GOTEVT’s 
role in providing industry-led vocational training that is linked to the employment of 
Saudis.  Their concerns are based on financial aspects as well as willingness of 
government to relinquish one of its main responsibilities of HRD.  They believe that 
only a few private industries are willing and capable of investing in training which 
represents, according to Al-Ghafees, only 20% of the Saudi market. 
 
Supporting government officials’ perspectives, the inputs of the quasigovernment 
managers interviewed in this study regarding changing GOTEVT’s role are less 
enthusiastic.  Currently GOTEVT, according to Al-Shagawi from the Saudi 
Electricity Company, is meeting the needs of the labour market.  It is also, 
according to Al-Bat’hi from SABIC, examining the needs of the labour market.  
 354 
According to both managers, GOTEVT at this stage is only required to cooperate 
and participate with private industries when developing their curriculums.  It also 
needs to reconsider and focus on providing its graduates with English and basic 
computer skills as well as developing their work ethics for employment in the 
private environment.  These three requirements have been unanimously supported 
by interviewed managers from both private and quasigovernment organizations.  
However, private managers assert that even technical skills and specialized 
knowledge of GOTEVT’s graduates are not industry driven due to the mass training 
approach that GOTEVT is implementing.   
 
Quasigovernment managers assert that GOTEVT’s periodical examination and 
development for its products are essential to be responsive to the labour market 
needs yet they consider that vocational training should not be handed over to the 
private industries.  On the one hand, they think that the private sector is incapable of 
performing the role of GOTEVT in providing vocational training to each industry.  
According to Al-Zamel from Saudi Telecommunication Company, one reason for 
this is that many private organizations in the Kingdom are family owned businesses 
which might affect decisions of training investments governing the proposed 
industry-led training organizations.  Decisions might be dominated by certain 
industrial organizations and, therefore, benefiting specific individual owners rather 
than the industry as a whole.  Nevertheless, evidence from empirical data by family 
owned organizations illustrate their efforts in investing to establish training 
institutes to benefit their industry as a whole not merely their organizations.  Other 
examples of nonprofit training institutes such as Al-Romaizan and Al-Othaim, just 
to mention few, illustrate a similar conclusion that private organizations’ leaders in 
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the Kingdom are supporting efforts for HRD and Saudization.  In fact they are 
providing free focus training for Saudis without any employment strings attached to 
their investments unless the trainee wishes to be employed after their training 
period.  Therefore, this argument is empirically unsupported. 
 
Al-Zamel, on the other hand, is doubtful of GOTEVT’s willingness to transfer its 
training authorities, financial resources and infrastructures to the private sector.  
Such a perspective is expected and might be evident as GOTEVT is a government 
organization that is concerned for its survivor and growth.  However, interviews 
with GOTEVT’s officials demonstrate their willingness to accept a new role 
provided that the private sector is willing to take over its main role of planning and 
conducting vocational training under their supervision and regulations.  Their views 
and concerns are credible and valuable since they are an organization mainly 
responsible for planning and conducting vocational training for the private sector 
for a long time.  Therefore, their concerns of handing over their responsibilities 
must not be overlooked as they are based on their practical experiences in the field 
of vocational HRD.  In addition, GOTEVT must be part of the proposed vocational 
training processes as such a task should not be the total responsibility of the private 
sector.  In this respect, the sector will benefit from GOTEVT’s long experiences and 
utilize selected qualified human resources from either its administration or training 
faculty.  GOTEVT’s participation will be to operate as the regulatory, supervisory 
and financing body not planning for nor performing the actual training. 
 
On the other hand, AlWagdani from the government Institute of Banking supports 
changing GOTEVT to industry-led training organizations.  He confirms that such 
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training will be based on focused industrial training and recruitment standards and 
benchmarks that are generated and accomplished by the industry itself.  This will 
ensure an industry qualification system that will establish each industry’s pay 
system for each career which will be recognized and implemented by the industry 
itself.  Such an approach will limit the damaging headhunting that is dominating the 
labour market of the private industry and inflating salaries of the few qualified 
Saudis.  Moreover, the establishment of industry-led vocational training institutions 
will liberate GOTEVT to conduct vocational training for unspecified professions 
that do not fall within any of the existing major industrial sectors.  GOTEVT will 
also be released of performing the ‘massive training’ role to focus on developing 
and executing its supervisory and regulatory role effectively for the whole training 
industry. 
 
The majority of interviewed private managers demonstrate their interests in and 
willingness to support training and qualifying their potential national employees 
provided that they are supported financially and logistically to do so.  Private 
organizations realize that the current role and performance of GOTEVT is not 
accomplishing their employment strategies to Saudize their workforce with industry 
focused skills, knowledge or attitudes.  Nonetheless, they are required to Saudize 
their workforce by the Ministry of Labour which is forcing the strategy on private 
sector with less realization of the poor outcomes of government skill formation 
systems including GOTEVT.  Interestingly, a considerable number of these 
managers confirm that their organizations are considering establishing industry-led 
training organizations to serve their training needs and the needs of their industry.  
Some are performing such investment responsibility individually while others are 
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considering collective investments with organizations from the same industry.  In 
other words, the industry itself is now adopting and executing what the current 
study is proposing as an approach to investing in developing the national human 
resources up to their employment standards.  Such costly investment as performed 
or approached by a number of private organizations to establish industry-led 
training organizations has proven unavoidable especially that GOTEVT is not 
fulfilling their employment requirements.    
 
As mentioned earlier in the study and to overcome the costly investment part of 
GOTEVT’s financial resources and infrastructures can be reallocated for the benefit 
of the industry-led training organizations for each industrial sector.  In this prospect, 
the beneficiary of such industry focused vocational training organizations will 
include large private organizations as well as small-to-medium companies.  These 
companies represent, as indicated by available literature and interviews, the major 
potential employers in the labour market who are currently dominated by 
expatriates.   
 
Albleihid from the Saudi Research and Marketing Group suggests restructuring 
GOTEVT to be an independent vocational training body.  GOTEVT, according to 
his perspective, should be affiliated to the private sector rather than to the Ministry 
of Labour.  In this regard it will perform in a private businesslike approach to 
reduce its government bureaucracies that are hindering its planning and 
performance.  This will also reduce and properly manage the government 
expenditures on GOTEVT that are not currently adding value to their outcomes.  
These expenditures will be geared towards specific vocational industry-led training 
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objectives that will serve each industry with specific skills, knowledge and attitudes.  
It will result in providing different industries with qualified and specialized training 
faculty whose salaries and development will be linked to their performance.  Unlike 
the government employment, promotion and development systems dominating 
GOTEVT now, the new proposed change will motivate trainers to be competitive 
and motivated to upgrade their industrial knowledge and skills as they are working 
under private employment systems.  These systems will be able to employ high 
performing Saudi or international trainer. 
 
Supporting this argument, Al Shaya from Alshaya International Trading 
Corporation illustrates that industry-led training institutes should benefit from 
international experiences.  In other words, although Saudization of vocational 
training faculty is essential, it should not hinder transferring international 
knowledge and experience to Saudis at least until the country is well equipped with 
qualified and specialized Saudi trainers to take over.   
 
Al Shaya and Al Khaldi from Alshaya mention that their organization has already 
started establishing a retail training academy similar to what the study is proposing.  
Yet from a business standpoint they have been concerned of its financial obligations 
as such investment will be difficult on a single organization.  Nevertheless, such 
concerns must be considered and incorporated if GOTEVT’s role changed 
according to the study’s proposal as financial support will be largely provided from 
GOTEVT’s budgets and other government bodies such as the HRD Fund.  The fund 
after this change will perform as part of a larger umbrella responsible for developing 
Saudi human resources and employing them in each industry.  In other words, their 
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role will be incorporated within each industry-led training organization to link the 
gap between training and employment for each industry.  According to this change, 
the fund with industry-led training institutes will have larger budgets to work with 
unlike its current limited financial resources.   
 
Similarly, the three managers from the dairy and poultry organizations, Al-Malki 
from NADC, Al Turaigi from Almarai and Al Thumairi from Al Safi-Danone, are 
supporting changing GOTEVT to an industry-led training organization.  They all 
believe that such change for GOTEVT will benefit and provide their industry with 
qualified national workforce that will assist their Saudization efforts.  In fact, they 
assert that their organizations are campaigning for establishing a similar industry-
led training organization to fulfill their human resources needs.  Such efforts are the 
result of them realizing that GOTEVT and the Ministry of Labour are not 
supporting their Saudization strategies with qualified and reliable Saudis.  They are 
also recognizing that GOTEVT’s efforts for improvement are, if not unattainable, 
slower than the desire of the labour market.  Al Turaigi, in particular, believes that 
organizational interests of GOTEVT are becoming more invaluable than the 
interests of the country and the entire industry.  This organization has been 
protected for a considerable period of time by its top management and by the 
Ministry of Labour with less consideration for its effectiveness and results in 
achieving its core strategic objectives.  Therefore, the dairy and poultry 
organizations are willing to invest profoundly on generating Saudi talents according 
to their specific industry’s employment and performance requirements.   
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Confirming a similar conclusion, AlSai states that “there is no governmental 
training institute for training and education in Tourism and Leisure fields”.  
Therefore, his organization Al Hokair and Sons Group, which has been in this 
industry for 35 years, is considering establishing one to serve the industry with 
qualified and employable Saudis.  This organization represents an example of an 
industry that is thriving and ambitious to develop a competitive momentum yet 
hindered by the poor vocational qualification of GOTEVT’s outcomes.  Such an 
industry will be expected to be one of the major pillars for the Saudi economy due 
to the huge tourism and leisure potentials the country has.  It is, thus far, lagging 
behind as GOTEVT and the Ministry of Labour are not capable of providing them 
with industry driven qualified and specialized Saudis.   
 
Another major contributor to the Saudi economy is petrochemical related 
productions that Savola is specialized at.  Hussain from Savola indicates that for 
such industry to prosper and seize at least 25% of world share, huge investments in 
industry-led vocational training must be arranged.  These investments, according to 
Hussain, require changing GOTEVT to a supervisory, regulatory and financing 
body for vocational training with less involvement in performing the training itself.  
The latter will be the responsibility of the industry itself which will need to 
cooperate to sustain the aggressive competitiveness after the country has recently 
joined the WTO.  Hussain confirms that such competitiveness will affect all 
industries in the Kingdom which if not prepared with qualified and specialized 
human resources, will be eliminated from the competition and the market.   
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Al-Koblan from Arab National Bank and Al-Asmari from Saudi Japanese 
Automobile High Institute illustrate similar perspective regarding GOTEVT.  They 
believe that it should benefit from advanced international experiences and should 
not be a victim of Saudization as the country is still in great need for specialized 
and qualified trainers.  In other words, they believe that GOTEVT should be 
excluded from the Saudization requirements of its manpower especially in its 
training faculty.  Al-Asmari echoes Albleihid conclusion that GOTEVT should 
function like the private sector it is serving and reduce its government bureaucracies 
in order to be more responsive to the labour market needs.  Al-Asmari confirms that 
in order for the proposed change to GOTEVT to be effective and successful, 
industry-led training organizations need to have training faculty and administrators 
from the industry itself.  Private industries prefer not to utilize GOTEVT’s current 
training faculty who might not have the skills and have high salaries.  Moreover, 
they, according to Al-Asmari, may not fit the private sector’s training requirements 
as they have been accustomed to government environment and employment system 
for a long time.   
 
Moreover, Al Ammash from InterSearch Recruitment Company believes that 
GOTEVT in its current structure has become too huge to manage its day-to-day 
operations yet to plan and perform strategically.  It is not yet capable of measuring 
and evaluating its performance to achieve its organizational objectives.  Supporting 
changing GOTEVT to industry-led training organizations, Al Ammash advocates 
its new role to be regulatory, supervisory and financing agency.  He believes that 
developing and performing vocational training should be the responsibility of 
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private industries.  They are more responsive and flexible of changing their 
curriculums according to their industry needs.   
 
In the same way, Al Zaid from Saudi Real Estate Company believes that 
GOTEVT’s budget should be given to the industry to train for itself.  However, he 
recommends that private industries should be educated and prepared prior to 
reassigning the role of GOTEVT.  Their preparation includes developing their 
business work environment and culture to be able to associate training to their 
organizational strategies.  Such a link will be essential as managers in some of the 
private organizations are not educated to realize or measure the return on 
investment procedures required to invest in training their staff.  In fact, AlWagdani 
from the Institute of Banking has raised such an issue earlier as many private sector 
managers are not equipped with the knowledge or the tools to assist them in 
selecting or measuring the return on investment from a training program for their 
staff.  Thus, from a micromanagement prospective, it will be essential to conduct 
initial management training and development programs for all human resource 
managers, training managers and/or owners of organizations in each sector.  Such 
programs will equip the mangers with skills, knowledge and tools to measure the 
return on investment from the industry-led vocational training programs in 
accordance to their specific industrial needs.     
 
Al-Eisa from Al Yamamah College supports the proposed change of GOTEVT to 
industry-led training organizations provided that the government ensures providing 
training and rehabilitation for the dropouts of its general education.  Currently they 
are mainly the responsibility of GOTEVT for which it was initially established.  Al-
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Eisa, rightly, argues that such social responsibility cannot be transferred to the 
private sector with the proposed industry-led training organizations.  Those 
dropouts, according to Al-Eisa, require further psychological rehabilitation as well 
as special vocational training and education to prepare them for the labour market.   
 
Finally, a number of private managers interviewed in this study express their doubts 
of GOTEVT and the Ministry of Labour accepting the proposed change to 
GOTEVT.  They, despite such doubts, generally support and compliment such 
change and think that it will be essential to improve GOTEVT’s outcome to the 
required level of the labour market.  Therefore, they have either recommended 
alterations to the study’s proposal or proposed alternative approaches and changes 
to current practices of GOTEVT according to their experiences in the market.  Their 
recommendations are invaluable for future research as well as for skill formation 
and Saudization policies development.         
       
For example, AlZahrani from Mobily believes that changing GOTEVT is 
theoretical.  This, in his view, is due to GOTEVT’s long-lasting government 
bureaucracies, organizational financial interests and inflexibility of accepting 
change.  He confirms as an ex-GOTEVT employee that top management officials 
are too rigid to realize the importance of the outcomes over the process.  GOTEVT, 
as AlZahrani describes, cannot be put aside from the vocational training process.  
This, in fact, contradicts their interests and efforts to extend their dominance and 
authority over vocational training aspects in the Kingdom.   
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Therefore, AlZahrani suggests an alternative proposal through which different 
industries approach GOTEVT to establish joint vocational training programs or 
training partnerships.  Accordingly, GOTEVT will conduct the basic general 
training.  This is followed by industry focused training provided by each industry to 
the potential elite trainees.  In other words, the program provided by GOTEVT will 
function initially as an assessment tool to assist industries to select the high 
achievers in training programs for further industry driven training.  In this respect, 
all trainees will be highly motivated as they are competing for limited opportunities 
for employment.  In addition, industries will participate in providing focused 
training which will allow them to gradually introduce their potential trainees to their 
work environment and employment requirements to facilitate their school-to-work 
transformation. 
 
On the other hand, although AlZahrani’s proposal sounds practical, it advocates 
maintaining GOTEVT’s influence on planning for and conducting the training.  
This is supporting the current efforts of GOTEVT in establishing strategic 
partnerships with a number of large organizations with less financial commitments 
by GOTEVT.  The key argument here is that the labour market consists of few large 
organizations, 20% according to Al-Ghafees, that are willing to invest in such 
partnerships.  These organizations in essence do not require GOTEVT’s partnership 
and expertise in training for their industries.  In fact they are merely attempting such 
partnerships to overcome its bureaucratic licensing and approval to establish their 
training organizations and to accredit their training outcomes.  In other words, they 
are financially investing in establishing such projects with less financial or logistic 
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responsibilities on GOTEVT.  Substantial evidence to support such a conclusion is 
illustrated in the interviews with private managers in the two previous chapters.   
 
Al Khwaiter from Advanced Electronics Company, Al-Zehairi from Tawteen 
Training and Recruitment Company and Al Turaigi from Almarai express similar 
uncertainty of GOTEVT’s willingness to accept the study’s proposed change.  They 
believe that GOTEVT is too influenced by the government bureaucracies to accept 
such change.  It will require eliminating bureaucracies to facilitate GOTEVT’s jobs 
reassignment as well as careful reallocation of its financial and administrative 
commitments to each group of sectors of industries in the private sector.  More 
importantly, such change, as illustrated by a number of private managers, requires 
political decisions that will certainly contradict with GOTEVT’s top management 
organizational interests.  Therefore, they conclude that such change will be 
theoretical and will never see the light of day despite its desirable approach and 
benefits for the private industry and the Kingdoms economy in general.   
 
Al-Asmari and Al Khwaiter, on the other hand, express their doubts that owners of 
small-to-medium size organizations will accept such proposal as it may require 
financial participation from their side.  These businesses, according to both 
managers, usually do not approach HRD as an investment in their employees but a 
cost to be evaded.  Therefore Al Khwaiter and Al-Asmari are uncertain of their 
constructive involvement in the new proposed industry-led institutes.  This 
assumption is correct as these organizations are currently utilizing the services of 
cheap expatriates that are providing them with more profit and competitiveness.  
However, it is important to realize that in order for this proposal to be effective and 
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for any attempt to increase nationals’ employment, recruitment of expatriates in 
these organizations must be first gradually and decisively reduced by the Ministry 
of Labour.  At the same time, these organizations must also be provided with 
qualified and knowledgeable Saudis to compensate for expatiates’ repatriation. 
   
Therefore, small-to-medium companies will be attracted and encouraged to 
participate in training and recruiting Saudis as they will be supported with huge 
financial resources resulting from changing GOTEVT’s current role.  In other 
words, they will be provided with qualified Saudis who are skillful, knowledgeable 
and disciplined to their industry needs with less expenses from their part.  
Alternatively, these companies will be obliged not to evade recruiting Saudis as 
they will be pressurized into gradual Saudization that is based on providing 
competitive and attractive for qualified Saudis who receive focused industry 
training.  One approach of achieving this gradual replacement of expatriates with 
Saudis is to increase the formers’ recruitment expenses to reduce their competitive 
advantage of being cheap labour.  Such expenses will be incorporated into the 
budgets of the proposed industry-led training institutes.  This will ensure extra 
financial income to these institutes to develop nationals’ employable skills, 
knowledge and attitudes and eventually decrease the private sector’s dependency on 
expatriates.   
 
8.4 Research Limitations  
 
One major limitation was the possibility and difficulty of executing all the 
interviews with all managers included in the study due to limited supporting 
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resources (only the researcher himself was conducting the interviews) and to the 
insufficient time available for such a PhD project.  Another limitation evolved from 
the unavailability and unwillingness of some of those managers to participate in the 
interviews in the first place.  The latter in particular was essential.  According to 
Morse (2000) and Sobal (2001) the nature or sensitivity of the phenomena being 
studied may dictate the sample size.  In our case, this study carried with it inherent 
limitations due to the fact that it examined and explored, in some of its parts, 
sensitive data on the link between Saudi HRD and the implementation of 
Saudization in the private sector.  This issue established a culture of suspicion in 
private sector organizations to reveal any Saudization data to anyone due to the 
strict supervision and rigidly examination of the Saudi Ministry of Labour.  The 
Ministry, usually, imposes penalties on private organizations that do not achieve the 
Saudization quota among their human resource affecting willingness of data 
declaration unless for government officials.  According to Madhi and Barrientos 
(2003), non-complying firms with the Saudization quota can be subject to a freeze 
on applications to recruit new foreign workers or renew residence cards for existing 
ones; exclusion from government tenders and financial support; and exclusion from 
access to government subsidies and facilities.   
 
On the other hand, and fortunately, the researcher himself is a Saudi equipped with 
the ability, experience and knowledge that affected positively the sample size.  
According to Morse (2000); Strauss and Corbin (1998), researchers with more 
experience and strong interviewing skills require fewer participants as they can 
guide and encourage the participant to reveal the data.  Their skill, usually acquired 
through experience, puts the participant at ease and creates a more conversational 
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feeling that establishes an atmosphere of trust (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).  In 
addition, the researcher being a member of such culture and of the Saudi HRD 
environment provided him with essential insight enabling him to bypass 
unnecessary data to formulate questions that guide the interview more efficiently.  
The researcher’s knowledge of the subject in hand and interview experience were 
acquired from both the wide literature review on Saudization and training issues and 
from personal experience in conducting qualitative studies for his two previous 
Masters projects on Saudi Arabia.   
 
The researcher, being  a faculty member of the Institute of Banking of the Saudi 
Central Bank i.e. Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), maintains a well 
established professional network with the banking industry in Saudi Arabia through 
his close training and consultation profession to Saudi banks.  This, in fact, provided 
the trust needed to obtain information and documentations essential to this research 
from such an industry.       
 
8.5 A Proposal for Further Research 
 
The current study has opened other potentials for further academic researches.  One 
of which is regarding the essentiality of the Saudization program itself.  The 
strategy has been in the country since the 1990s and rarely reviewed or questioned.  
However, empirical data obtained confirm that the private sector view such strategy 
to be a burden on their performance and competitiveness especially that they are not 
consulted nor participating in its development even though they are the main party 
affected by its implementation.  The current research raises the question of 
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providing other alternatives for such a strategy that is created by the private sector 
with the consultation and supervision from the government.  Such a proposed 
alternative will ensure the private sector participation, inputs and, properly, belief in 
its implementation instead of the current government developed and forced upon 
Saudization.     
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Appendix 1. 
 
Glossary 
 
• Musharaka (Partnership) is a contract in which partners are all capital owners 
pooling their financial capital in a joint venture and thus sharing the profits and 
losses at the end of the contract period according to their initial shares of capital 
investments (Metwally, 1997; Choudhury, 2001) 
 
• Murabah (Resale contract) is a financing method in which one party requests a 
financing party to buy them a specific commodity on their behalf then resell it at 
a price which covers the purchase price plus the profit margin agreed on by both 
parties, which transforms traditional lending into a sale and purchase agreement 
(Metwally, 1997). 
 
• Mudaraba (Lending with no participation in management) is sharing the 
resources for doing business in an enterprise in which one set of partners 
supplies capital and the other set of partners supplies expertise, management or 
work effort (Metwally, 1997; Choudhury, 2001). 
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Appendix 2. 
 
QUESTION FORM#1 
Quasi-Government and Private Organizations 
 
For the record of this research would you please introduce yourself and your 
position in your organization 
 
1. How do you evaluate the Saudization process in your organization? 
2. What are some of the obstacles your organization has encountered in 
implementing Saudization program? 
3. How did you overcome these obstacles? Would you illustrate with 
examples. 
4. In your opinion what should be done to make the Saudization program more 
effective? Examples from your organization. 
5. What are the challenges in linking training to Saudization requirement in 
your organization? 
6. What are the factors that influence your decisions to invest in training your 
either existing or newly recruited employees?  
7. What are some of the factors that stop or prevent you from investing in 
training your existing or newly hired employees?   
8. In your opinion, how do you evaluate GOTEVT graduates in regard to your 
organization manpower needs? What are some of the examples you have 
experienced? 
9. What are the changes you would recommend to GOTEVT programs to be 
more focused toward providing your organization with employable Saudis? 
10. How do envision the future of the Saudi labour market in regards to skills 
mostly needed by Saudi private organizations? 
11. What are the essential challenges in linking training outcomes to Saudization 
programs in the private sector? 
 
Introduce the proposed changes to GOTEVT to the interviewee then ask the 
following questions    
 
1. How would you evaluate this proposal in light of the challenges imposed on 
your organization by the Saudization program and lack of well trained 
Saudis available for employment in your organization? 
2. What is your input to this proposal? 
3. If you would change anything in this proposal what would it be and why? 
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QUESTION FORM#2 
Government Organizations  
 
For the record of this research would you please introduce yourself and your 
position in your organization 
 
 
1. In your opinion what are the challenges encountering the Saudization 
program in the private sector in the Kingdom? 
2. How does your organization respond to these challenges if accepted as 
genuine challenges? 
3. What are the positive factors that assist the Saudization program in some of 
the private sector organizations? 
4. In private organizations, what are the factors that influence decisions to 
invest in training either existing or newly recruited employees in these 
organizations?  
5. What are some of the factors that stop or prevent them from investing in 
training their existing or newly hired employees?   
6. In the view of the labour market needs, how do you evaluate GOTEVT 
graduates? 
7. What are the changes you would recommend to GOTEVT programs to be 
more focused toward providing Saudi labour market with employable 
Saudis? 
8. How do envision the future of the Saudi labour market in regards to skills 
mostly needed by Saudi private organizations? 
9. In your opinion, what must be done to make the Saudization program more 
effective? 
10. What are the essential challenges in linking training outcomes to Saudization 
programs in the private sector? 
 
 
Introduce the proposed changes to GOTEVT to the interviewee then ask the 
following questions    
 
1. How would you evaluate this proposal in light of the challenges imposed on 
your organization by the Saudization program and lack of well trained 
Saudis available for employment in the private organizations? 
2. What is your input to this proposal? 
3. If you would change anything in this proposal what would it be and why? 
4. To what extent your organization will be willing to leave the planning and 
implementing of training programs to the industry-led training institutions or 
colleges?  (will be asked to GOTEVT and The Ministry of Labour Only)  
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QUESTION FORM#3 
Private Training and Recruitment Organizations 
 
For the record of this research would you please introduce yourself and your 
position in your organization 
 
1. In your opinion what are the challenges encountering the Saudization 
program in the private sector in the Kingdom? 
2. What are the positive factors that assist the Saudization program in some of 
the private sector organizations that have achieved relatively high rates of 
Saudization? 
3. In private organizations, what are the factors that influence decisions to 
invest in training either existing or newly recruited employees in these 
organizations?  
4. What are some of the factors that stop or prevent them from investing in 
training their existing or newly hired employees?   
5. What are the challenges you have encountered as a private training investor 
in Saudi Arabia? 
6. How did you overcome such challenges? 
7. In your opinion, how do you evaluate GOTEVT graduates in regard to 
private sector needs? What are some of the examples you have encountered? 
8. What are the changes you would recommend to GOTEVT programs to be 
more focused toward providing Saudi market with employable Saudis? 
9. How do envision the future of the Saudi labour market in regards to skills 
mostly needed by Saudi private organizations? 
11. In your opinion, what must be done to make the Saudization program more 
effective? 
12. What are the essential challenges in linking training outcomes to Saudization 
programs in the private sector? 
 
Introduce the proposed changes to GOTEVT to the interviewee then ask the 
following questions    
 
1. How would you evaluate this proposal in light of the challenges imposed on 
your organization by the Saudization program and lack of well trained 
Saudis available for employment in your organization? 
2. What is your input to this proposal? 
3. If you would change anything in this proposal what would it be and why? 
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The Study’s Proposed Changes to the Role of the General Organization for 
Technical Education and Vocational Training (GOTEVT) 
 
This study proposes a change in the present role of GOTEVT from planning, 
regulating, supervising, financing and practicing technical education and vocational 
training to be more responsive to labour market needs and eventually to Saudization 
program.  In the new proposed role, GOTEVT as a government body will only 
supervise, regulate and finance technical education and vocational training.  The 
actual planning and training will be carried out by industry-led private training 
organizations who better know their training needs.  Businesses in the kingdom will 
be grouped into major sectors with their own training institutes or colleges serving 
their line of businesses’ needs of skills and qualifications.  At the same time, these 
training institutions or colleges will be providing each line of business with 
continuous developmental training to their existing human capital.  Another aspect 
that can be added to these industry-oriented training or colleges is assessment 
centres.  The aim of these assessment centres is to save training and selection time, 
effort and money through scientifically selecting potential employees from the 
labour market according to employers’ specific needs of skills and qualifications.  
Specific training and development programs will then be designed and implemented 
according to employers needs.   
 
For example, hotels, travel agency services, tourism and leisure businesses will be a 
sector having a training institution or college that is financially supported and 
supervised by GOTEVT with marginal financial participation by private 
organizations of this sector depending on the number of each organizations’ 
trainees.  This will ensure a positive participation of this sector on all levels 
including their participation in planning, designing, implementing and evaluating 
these training programs.  It will eventually lead to more investment in training on 
their actual skills and knowledge needed for the success of their businesses.  It will 
also encourage private sector organizations for latter establishment of more 
specialized vocational industry-led training organizations or programs.  At the same 
time trainees will be motivated by the fact that their training and development will 
end in their employment in the sector.   
 
The same scenario will be implemented to car industry, construction and building 
industry, plastic and chemical industry, banking and financial industry, health 
industry and farming industry, just to mention few examples.  These industry-
oriented training institutions or colleges will take over GOTEVT’s already 
established infrastructures, faculties, facilities and logistics that are available in 
every city in the Kingdom.  They will also benefit from the funds already available 
to the HRD Fund which after implementing this proposal will be a financial support 
body to these industry-led training institutions or colleges. 
  
 
   
 
 
